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Objekttyp: **Article**

Zeitschrift: **Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie = Revue philosophique et théologique de Fribourg = Rivista filosofica e teologica di Friburgo = Review of philosophy and theology of Fribourg**

Band (Jahr): **64 (2017)**

Heft 1

PDF erstellt am: **23.05.2024**

Persistenter Link: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-825796>

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GIANCARLO COLACICCO

Truth of faith in transcendental perspective: Francisco Suárez and the *Apostolici regiminis* (1513)

[...] veluti digito indicem lectori,
quam ratione principia metaphysicae sint
ad Theologicas veritates
confirmandas referenda et accommodanda
(Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae, Ad lectorem*)

1. IN HOC OPERE PHILOSOPHUM AGO: FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND THE BAROQUE TRAIT OF HIS THOUGHT

The Granadian thinker Francisco Suárez spent nearly forty years teaching, first, as a professor of philosophy to his brethren in Salamanca and Segovia (1570–1574), and later, as a teacher of theology. It seems that over the course of his teaching vocation, Suárez nurtured the pedagogical concerns already contained in the disciplinary section of the papal bull *Apostolici regiminis*, issued in 1513. Among other things, the bull required the teaching of Christian doctrine and its careful defence through the subsequent rejection of the errors perpetrated by those who claimed to be able to prove through philosophy alone (*secundum saltem philosophiam*) contrary theses, e.g. maintaining the mortality of the soul.¹ Truth, as the bull states, cannot contradict truth and therefore every statement contrary to the enlightened truth of the faith is totally false.²

Moreover, the Granadian theologian's biography reveals a personal commitment to the attitude expressed in the passage above and it is for two reasons. Firstly, we find a man genuinely concerned with defending

¹ MANSI, J.D.: *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*. Parisiis: Expensis Huberti Welter, Bibliopolae, 1902, vol. XXXII, col. 842. For a complete picture of the critical studies on the topic see the introduction to this volume.

² "Cumque verum vero minime contradicat, omnem assertionem veritati illuminatae fidei contrariam omnino falsam esse definimus [...] Insuper omnibus et singulis philosophis in universitatibus studiorum generalium, et alibi publice legentibus, districte praecipiendo mandamus, ut cum philosophorum principia aut conclusiones, in quibus a recta fide deviare noscuntur, auditoribus suis legerint, seu explanaverint, quale hoc est de animae mortalitate aut unitate, et mundi aeternitate, ac alia huiusmodi, teneantur eisdem veritatem religionis Christianae omni conatu manifestam facere, et persuadendo pro posse docere, ac omni studio huiusmodi philosophorum argumenta, cum omnia solubilia existant, pro viribus excludere atque resolvere". See MANSI: *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, 842–843.

and seeking the truth contained, preserved and transmitted in *depositum fidei* of the Church of Rome. Secondly, we see Suárez as a ‘political’ conciliator and peacemaker by means of the methods he deployed in his theological works and philosophical commentaries.³ Hence, to some extent at least, the most heated disputes that Suárez was involved in and that made famous not only his life, but also his works, seem intertwined with the crucial concerns of the bull *Apostolici regiminis*; in particular, this regards the question of whether truths of faith and truths of reason are reconcilable.⁴ This is to say we find Suárez trying to meet and to harmonize the theological and philosophical issues by using nothing else than natural reason alone. Suárez’s attitude is neatly expressed in a letter he wrote to Everando Mercuriano, General of the Society of Jesus, on July 2, 1579:

el modo de leer que yo tengo, que es diferente de lo que los más usan por acá, porque hay costumbre de leer por carpatacios, leyendo las cosas más por tradición de unos a otros que por mirallas hondamente y sacallas de sus fuentes, que son la autoridad sacra y la humana y la razón, cada cosa en su grado. Yo he procurado salir deste camino y mirar las cosas más de raíz, de lo cual nace que ordinariamente parece llevan más cosas algo de novedad, quier en la traza, quier en el modo de declarallas, quier en las razones, quier en las soluciones a las dificultades, quier en levantar algunas dudas que otros no tratan de propósito, quier en otras cosas que siempre se ofrecen; y de aquí pienso que resulta que, aunque las verdades que se leen no sean nuevas, se hagan nuevas por el modo, o porque salen algo de la vereda de los carpatacios.⁵

Consequently, the direct analysis of sources and the use of human reason testify to the new baroque sensibility, different from that of his own time and in particular reflective of the Jesuits’ charism. It was a baroque sensibility capable of drawing on sources ranging from religious arguments

³ See for example: LOHR, Charles H.: *Metaphysics*, in: SCHMITT, Charles B./SKINNER Quentin (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1988, 611–617.

⁴ For example, the dispute over whether the life of Jesus was not so poor and austere at least from an external point of view, as some members of other, non-Jesuit, catholic religious orders held, but on the contrary was a relatively normal standard of living. Most famous was the controversy regarding the notion of *De auxiliis*, which had been reopened in Suarez’s time by the 1599 publication of a volume known as *Varia opuscula theologica*. While Dominicans such as Domenico Bañez defended the centrality of God’s foreknowledge in the economy of salvation, Jesuits such as Luis de Molina and Suárez emphasized human merit and actions. Another case regarding the question of remote absolution, initially defended by Suárez but later retracted after the Pope’s intervention. Suárez also made a significant diplomatic and academic commitment in drawing up his final document, the *Defensio fidei adversus catholicæ anglicanæ sectæ errores*, which he produced in accordance with a direct instruction King Philip II as well as pressure from the Apostolic Nuncio in Spain. The *Defensio* took a stance against King James I’s imposition to pay absolute loyalty to the king instead of the pope.

⁵ SCORRAILLE: *El P. Francisco Suárez de la Compañía de Jesús según sus cartas, sus demás escritos inéditos y crecido número de documentos nuevos*, 156–157.

to human and secular ones, through a method that, as we read in the letter above, “es diferente” from that customarily used during the years of Suárez’s life. The customary method was characterized by using arguments taken from tradition without an adequate critical reflection. The context of this baroque sensibility provides our starting point to study Suárez’s writings,⁶ since it seems highly relevant to know what Suárez thought about the relationship between grace and nature, faith and reason. The texts that will be analysed in what follows have been chosen because of their relevance to the themes discussed in the bull. This article shall focus on his works, in particular, the *Metaphysical Disputations* (1597) and the *Commentary on De anima* (1621). In the *Commentary on De anima* the bull is explicitly referred to, as we will see below. It is mentioned by Suárez among the sources used to prove the immortality of the soul. In the *Metaphysical Disputations* however the bull is referred to only in an indirect way with regard to the epistemological status of the truth. The three leading questions of the following analysis are: which of the *Apostolici regiminis*’ propositions are directly or indirectly present in Suárez’s theological and metaphysical reflections? What kind of arguments does he use, especially in the relationship between theology and metaphysics? Finally, it shall be asked whether these arguments were able to give an epistemological principle in order to conceive mysteries of the Christian faith as the immortality of the soul.

2. THE PROOF OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL: A DOGMA OF FAITH OR EVIDENCE FROM REASON? FROM “LUMEN NATURAE” TO “LUMEN FIDEI” IN SUÁREZ’S COMMENTARY ON *DE ANIMA* (1621)

In his investigation of the soul and its predicates, Suárez chooses to adopt, in line with his predecessors, the form of a commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima* following a scholastic method, dividing his work into *disputationes* and *quaestiones*. Our present examination will focus specifically on those passages in which Suárez makes explicit reference to the *Apostolici regiminis*. First, we know thanks to the current edition published by Castellote of Suárez’s commentary that it was published posthumously in 1621 in Lyon by Father Alvares. Father Alvares used an autographed manuscript by Suárez after he had died in 1617. Moreover, we also know Suárez was working on a reorganization of his writings in order to complete his philosophical plan of a comprehensive publication of his lessons.⁷ This reorganization took place before giving the commentary to the press.

⁶ See ESPOSITO, Costantino: *Suárez and Baroque Matrix of Modern Thought*, in: SALAS, Victor/FASTIGGI, Robert (eds.): *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden: Brill 2015, 124–147.

⁷ It is still Castellote who mentions a part of Suárez’s letter contained in Scorraille’s biography of Suárez. Suárez writes to P. Vitelleschi: “Me veo ya muy avanzado en años para

We can look to the very first line of Suárez's commentary for evidence of the impact that the bull and in particular the afore-mentioned principle of *omne verum vero consonant* had on his thought. He expresses the central aim of his project with the following statement:

Cognitio animae intellectivae tanto nobis difficilior est, quanto ipsa est perfectior et a materia magis elevata.⁸

With this statement we can immediately understand the difficulty of the object of the commentary from both the cognitive and ontological points of view. How can our concepts express an objective content that claims to belong to the thing as it is in itself and not only as it is for us? And also, how can arguments and premises make this correlation possible? Are the immortality, the univocity of form and immateriality attributes that belong to the human soul? And then, are the attributes given by God's grace (*ex gratia Dei*) or by an internal characteristic of human soul (*ex natura sua*)? It should be remembered that regarding this question, the bull leaves no room for ambiguities: its firm declaration is that "omnis assertio contraria veritati christianae fidei illuminatae."⁹ According to the bull, Christian faith is able to resolve, enlighten and support the understanding's grasp of the nature of entities. This includes the soul along with some of its predicates, such as immortality. How does Suárez prove the soul's immortality by theological and philosophical arguments?

In his commentary, Suárez first proposes arguments for the immortality of the soul from the perspective of faith. The most significant step in this regard addresses a more general question entitled "Utrum principium intelligendi hominum sit aliquid incorporeum, subsistens et immortale."¹⁰ Suárez's treatment of this question is divided into several parts questioning (respectively), whether the soul is immortal (1) according to the faith (*an anima sit immortalis secundum fidem*), (2) by an internal characteristic of its nature (*ex natura sua immortalis*), or (3) by the grace of God (*an vero ex gratia Dei*). In response to the first question Suárez expresses the seemingly self-evident view that

Certissimum est secundum fidem catholicam animam nostram numquam perituram, atque adeo esse immortalem. Probatur: Sap 2, 3 et 4 cap: "Iustorum animae in manu Dei sunt, et non, etc." Et Ex 3 dicitur: "Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob." Et additur Mt 22: "Non est autem Deus mortuo-

poder terminar los trabajos que tengo comenzados, y para poder dejar acabada una filosofía que corresponda a mi teología". See SCORRAILLE: *El P. Francisco Suárez de la Compañía de Jesús según sus cartas, sus demás escritos inéditos y crecido número de documentos nuevos*, 226.

⁸ SUÁREZ, Francisco: *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*. ed. Salvador Castellote. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1978–1992, vol. I, Prooemium. (Hereafter: CQDA).

⁹ See above note 12.

¹⁰ SUÁREZ: CQDA, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.

rum, sed vivorum.” Quo testimonio utitur Chrysostomus, Homil 71 in D. Matthaeum, Theophylactus, et Caietanus super illum locum Matthaei. Item Mt 10: “Nolite timere.” [...] Praeterea haec veritas de immortalitate animae est fundamentum fere omnium mysteriorum nostrae fidei, et praecipue eorum quae ad salutem humani generis pertinent [...].¹¹

The human soul is certainly immortal according to the Catholic faith, and this truth – as defined by Suárez – must even be placed at the foundation of all other mysteries of faith transmitted by the faith “et praecipue eorum quae ad salutem humani generis pertinent.”¹² The consequences are clear, because Suárez adds

si anima esset peritura, superflua esset Christi redemptio et passio. Quid enim haec prossent homini, si post hanc vitam nihil manet? Certe, si anima moritur, vana est fides nostra, et vana praedicatio nostra, et gratis Christus mortuus, et falso regnum eius praedicatur aeternum.¹³

Also in accordance with the *Apostolici regiminis*, Suárez warns in these passages of the consequences¹⁴ resulting from the acceptance of the mortality of the soul, a thesis supported for example by Pomponazzi. Namely, without presupposing the immortality of the soul, other central doctrines such as the redemption and the passion of Christ, His death, the preaching of His kingdom, and more generally the salvation of mankind would be rendered meaningless. From this first point in favour of immortality Suárez moves to another question, namely “An anima sit ex natura sua immortalis, an vero ex gratia Dei.”¹⁵

Here, the reference to nature is interesting for at least two reasons: first, it gives proof of the importance that Suárez gives to *via naturae*, as a way to the definition of entities; second, it shows concretely the problem of correlation between two causes, namely God’s grace and nature. The two causes appear to be opposed even in terms of the immortality of the soul, involving, in that case, the nature and the grace of God. But here, too, Suárez has a ready answer to the apparent problem. Consequently he says that

Elementa enim corruptibilia sunt, et tamen in aeternum durabunt. Sic igitur posset quis dicere nostram animam perpetuo mansuram, quia Deus conserba-

¹¹ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.49.

¹² See below note 20.

¹³ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.49.

¹⁴ For that conclusion see the critical analysis contained in: CAPPIELLO Annalisa/LAMANA Marco: *Il principio dell’unicità del vero dalla bolla Apostolici regiminis (1513) alla Rivoluzione scientifica*, in: *Quaestio 14* (2014), 229–256.

¹⁵ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.50. In this view Suárez is also inserted into the same horizon of the *Apostolici regiminis* in terms of consequences by the one and the other of the arguments about the immortality of the soul.

bit illam, non quia ab intrinseco sit immortalis. Quod quidem non videtur contra fidem.¹⁶

As we can infer from this passage, God has been placed as guarantor of eternity and the immortality of the soul, which cannot aspire to immortality by virtue of its own nature. In this case, Suárez seems to admit at least two premises: first, that God preserves and creates the world in a predetermined order, and second, that the entities are not the first causes of their being and existence, because they require an ontological reference that is different from themselves.¹⁷ Premises that do not seem – as Suárez informs us – contrary to the faith (*quod quidem non videtur contra fidem*), and therefore derived from another faculty which is not the faith in the first instance, but is more probably natural reason itself! This is precisely where faith and reason may possibly be linked. In this last argument, Suárez adds a final consideration to those seen above, summarizing the context of the “secundum fidei” and the “ex natura sua/ex gratia Dei” in a unique solution perfectly in line with the *Apostolici regiminis*. In answer to the claim that “omnis assertio contraria veritati christianae fidei illuminatae,” Suárez responds by saying that “De fide est animam nostram esse ex natura sua immortalem,” and then he adds that “in hac perpetuitate animae nullum miraculum Deus facit, nec Sacra Scriptura id narrat ut miraculum, sed ut quid naturale.”¹⁸ Consequently, it is clear that this statement will be Christian and true because it is illuminated by faith, which allows us to know the immortality of the soul as a natural fact exactly in accordance with the 8th session of the Fifth Lateran Council. Suárez points out

Praeterea, Concilium Lateranense V, sub Leone X, sessione 8, definit hanc rem: Anima, inquit, rationalis “per se et essentialiter non solum est forma corporis humani [...], verum et immortalis.” Et infra damnat ut haereticos eos qui dixerint esse mortalem secundum naturam, aut secundum philosophiam.¹⁹

With these three reasons Suárez would have completed the demonstrations in favour of the immortality of the soul primarily from the standpoint of faith. However, how would the demonstrations have been preserved even from the point of view of natural reason? If so, would the correlation between truths of faith and truths of reason demanded by the principle of the unity of truth have been realized? Once we arrive at this point Suárez’s answers start to become increasingly interesting because,

¹⁶ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.50.

¹⁷ The opinion of Suárez does not seem different from what Bianchi notes in his own text on the double truth and in particular when he says citing O’Malley that: “Pietro Marsi est le seul à affirmer que l’immortalité n’appartient pas à l’âme ‘par quelque chose d’intrinsèque [*per aliquod intrinsecum*]’ mais ‘par l’ordonnance de Dieu [*ex ordinatione divina*]’”. See BIANCHI, Luca: *Pour une histoire de la ‘Double vérité’*. Paris: Vrin 2008, 120.

¹⁸ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.51.

¹⁹ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.51.

generally, he does not exclude a critical and open confrontation between the theses and arguments given by natural reason. Through deference to the authority of Aristotle and other philosophers, Suárez aims to demonstrate the correlation between soul and his immortality in accordance with what is taught by the faith and 'prescribed' by the Fifth Lateran Council.

The arguments presented by Suárez in favour of the concordance are essentially two: the first is to reiterate that it is clear for the natural reason that "*animam humanam esse immaterialem et subsistentem*,"²⁰ while the second is that "*principium intellectivum nostrum est immortale*."²¹ Regarding the first we simply recall the method adopted by Suárez in order to explain the predicate of the immateriality of the human soul. Starting therefore "*ex proprietatibus et actibus intellectus et voluntatis*"²² it can be concluded according to Suárez that "*si est in nobis aliqua operatio spiritalis et non elicita organo corporis, potentia ad talem operationem debet etiam esse spiritalis et non organica, id est, non utens corpore tamquam instrumento suae operationis*."²³ From the operations of the intellect and will, therefore, it is possible to go back to the immateriality of the cognitive faculty, which with respect to the body is not, however, material.²⁴ Suárez dwells longer on the second argument, and then on the second predicate (i.e. the incorruptibility of the soul), and he uses different ways to demonstrate its correlation with the doctrine of the immortality taught by the faith. To this second thesis, beyond being dedicated to numerous arguments, we find a summary that is noteworthy for understanding the value that Suárez places on natural reason and faith, and consequently on their concordance. With regard to the claim that our intellectual principle is immortal (*principium intellectivum nostrum est immortale*), Suárez proposes many ways to demonstrate this correlation between rational soul and his immortality. He offers one demonstration by natural reason (*ratio naturalis evidenter demonstrat*), one physical (*via magis physica*), one speculative (*via speculativa ad demonstrandam animae nostrae incorruptibilitatem*) and various moral reasons (*rationes morales solent adduci multae*). To these reasons Suárez added many conclusions drawn from statements by pagan philosophers and poets, Church Fathers, and members of the Peripatetic school, including Averroes, who, according to Suárez, support the thesis of the immortality of the soul!²⁵ Now, on the basis of all

²⁰ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.6.

²¹ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.21.

²² SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.20.

²³ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.7.

²⁴ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.7. The sources Suárez uses in this case are Aristotle, Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and Thomas.

²⁵ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.33: "Eadem veritatem tenuit schola Peripateticorum, nempe Theophrastus, Themistius, Philoponus, Simplicius, Averroes et alii, quamvis multi

these references and arguments, it would appear that the concordance between soul and his immortality was fully supported, but – and here one needs to look more closely – it could have been grounded on natural reason alone, and not so much on faith. Suárez concludes consequently that

[...] cum cognitio immortalitatis animae sit adeo necessaria ad recte instituentos mores hominum, pertinebat ad providentiam Dei, ut esset cognita in omnibus nationibus et in omni tempore, et praecipue ab excellentioribus viris [...] Et qui hanc veritatem cognoverunt neque tanta claritate, neque tanta firmitate attigerunt illam, quanta nos lumine fidei adiuti cognoscimus. Et multi eorum hanc veritatem cognoscentes in multis aliis errarunt circa ipsam animam, nempe aut circa originem illius, aut circa modum existendi illius in corpore, aut circa multitudinem animarum, aut circa statum futurae vitae, ut quaestione sequenti videbimus. A quibus erroribus fides nos liberat, rationem naturalem dirigens.²⁶

Faith, therefore, free from the mistakes of human reason, is on the right path toward knowing, in this case: the soul itself (*circa ipsam animam*), its origin (*originem illius*), its mode of existence in the body (*circa modum existendi illius in corpore*), the multitude of those souls (*circa multitudinem animarum*) and, finally, their status in the next life (*circa statum futurae vitae*). What Suárez seems to say here includes two important aspects. The first is about the possibility of a correlation between the immortality of the soul known through and thanks to faith and the doctrines of natural reason. The second regards the difference between the latter, as finite and limited, and faith since “we do not comprehend our soul as it is in itself.”²⁷ The position that emerges from Suárez’s *Commentary on De anima* is that faith is the only means able to guide and to free natural reason from its possible mistakes.

3. THE TRANSCENDENTAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE CONCEIVABILITY OF THE MYSTERIES OF FAITH: FROM “LUMEN FIDEI” TO “LUMEN NATURAE” IN THE *METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS* (1597)

Going back to 1597, the date of publication of *Metaphysical Disputations*,²⁸ we note that Suárez’s conception of the relationship between the supernatural and natural seems significantly different from the one we have just described from the *De anima*. This difference not only plays out on meta-

errent putantes intellectivum principium non informare corpus, de quo quaestione sequenti est dicendum, tamen omnes in hoc conveniunt illud esse immortale.”

²⁶ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.35.

²⁷ SUÁREZ: *CQDA*, vol. I, d. 2, q. 3.6: “[...] no comprehendimus animam nostram prout in se est.”

²⁸ SUÁREZ, Francisco: *Disputationes metaphysicae*, [Salamanticae 1597] ed. C. Berton. Paris: Vivès 1856–1861, vol. 25 and 26. (Hereafter: *DM*).

physical grounds, but also, and above all, on theological grounds.²⁹ At the beginning of his work, Suárez starts by defining the relationship between theology and metaphysics, specifically the relation between the truths contained and demonstrated in each area of knowledge. At the same time, Suárez underlines the need to connect these disciplines on the basis of speculative and educational interest.³⁰ If metaphysical truths are regarded as contributing to the illustration of divinely revealed truths, and this is Suárez's intention,³¹ they become essential and fundamental to their development and acquisition.³² As a result of this approach, divine and supernatural theology, which doctrinally speaking enjoys greater importance in the group of sciences, becomes, cognitively speaking,³³ secondary to the metaphysics. Why does Suárez require metaphysics at all? The First Philosophy is the only science that ranks first of all sciences and it is especially useful to sacred and supernatural theology. This is so because the knowledge of First Philosophy allows for close consideration of divine matters, and the natural principles of First Philosophy comprehend all things in general and support every doctrine such as theology.³⁴ At this point one might ask: what kind of knowledge can metaphysics allow for? Moreover, is metaphysical knowledge in accordance or at odds with the mysteries of

²⁹ About the general profile of the theologian from Granada, Daniel Schwartz writes: "Was Suárez primarily a philosopher or a theologian? What motivates this question seems to be not so much a matter of zeal for disciplinary boundaries, but the suspicion that Suárez's fundamental views may not be based on reason but ultimately on faith and revelation". See SCHWARTZ, Daniel: *Interpreting Suárez. Critical essays*. New York: Cambridge University Press 2012, 7.

³⁰ SUÁREZ: *DM, Ratio et discursus totius operis, Ad lectorem*: "In dies tamen luce clarius intuebar, quam illa divina ac superanturalis Theologia hanc humanam et naturalem desiderare tac requireret, adeo tu non dubitaverim illud inchoatum opus paulisper intermittere, quo huic doctrinae metaphysicae suum quasi locum ac sedem darem, vel potius restituerem".

³¹ SUÁREZ: *DM, Ratio et discursus totius operis, Ad lectorem*: "Quem mihi scopum prae-fixi, non solum in quaestionibus pertractandis, sed multo magis in sententiis, seu opinionibus seligendis, in eas propendens, quae pietati ac doctrinae revelatae subservire magis viderentur".

³² See COURTINE, J.F.: *Il sistema della metafisica. Tradizione aristotelica e svolta di Suárez*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1999, 164.

³³ See HONNEFELDER, Ludwig: *Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiend-heit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus-Suárez-Wolff-Kant-Peirce)*. Hamburg: Meiner 1990.

³⁴ "[...] prima omnium est et nomen primae philosophiae obtinuit, sacrae ac superna-turali theologiae praecipue ministrat. Tum quia ad divinarum rerum cognitionem inter omnes proxime accedit, tum etiam quia ea naturalia principia explicat atque confirmat, quae res universas comprehendunt omnemque doctrinam quodammodo fulciunt atque susten-tant". See SUÁREZ: *DM, Proemium*. For the rule attributed to natural principles and conse-quently also to causes for the definition of both the theological and metaphysical states of his own fields of knowledge see: COLACICCO, Giancarlo: «*Omnis causa est principium*». *Un breve confronto tra la dottrina delle cause e la dottrina dei principi nelle Disputationes Metaphysicae di Francisco Suárez*, in: *Revista filosófica de Coimbra* 46 (2014), 263-292.

faith which, beyond the immortality of the soul, also concern the incarnation of Christ, transubstantiation and also the relationship between the Divine Persons in the Trinity?³⁵ How are the change of the substance and the permanence of the accidents to be explained from a purely metaphysical point of view? And finally, is it possible to search for one or more ways of transforming an object of thought into a tenet believed by faith? All these questions, as well as showing the complexity of the issues raised by *Apostolici regiminis*, allow us to highlight how broad the Suarezian perspective is. Suárez devotes just one of his fifty-four disputations, in its entirety, to the question of the epistemological status of truth.³⁶

Suárez decided to address the epistemological status of truth for two reasons: the first concerns the priority of the true compared to the good, since “nulla enim res esse potest in sua specie bona, nisi prius in eadem vera intelligatur.”³⁷ The second is that the discussion about truth belongs to the metaphysics at the highest level since the science of metaphysics investigates truth according to the highest possible level of abstraction and universality.³⁸ Yet, what kind of truth is it? Is it unique in its kind or varied with different natures? Suárez in this case divides truth into three distinct categories (*solere distingui*): “veritas in significando, veritas in cognoscendo et veritas in essendo.”³⁹ Each of these three aspects of truth has a corresponding object and belongs to a specific discipline. The words and the concepts are expressed by the first aspect of truth, proper to dialectics as a discipline. The human being and its knowledge belong to the second meaning of truth and are related to physics as their discipline. Finally, beings and their passions are expressed by the third being a subject of the discipline of metaphysics.⁴⁰

Suárez adds another distinction to this subdivision, distinguishing “real truth” from reason. What characterizes the former and what the latter?

³⁵ About the relationship between the Divine Persons of the Trinity, Suarez states, and offers clear support for, the principle of concordance between mysteries of faith and natural reason. He affirms that: “[...] Dico quarto, nihilominus asserendum non esse mysterium Trinitatis esse contra rationem naturalem. Ita sentiunt omnes. Et probatur, quia veritas non potest esse veritati contraria [...] Item Deus est auctor naturalis luminis, ergo non potest per se inclinare ad falsum [...]”. See SUÁREZ, Francisco: *De Deo Uno et Trino*, ed. M. André. Parigi: Vivès 1856, vol. 1, p. 569.

³⁶ The section dealing with this issue bears the title “De veritate seu vero, quod est passio entis”: SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII.

³⁷ SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII, Ordo disputationis.

³⁸ In that second point Suárez quotes a passage taken by Aristotel’s *Metaphysics* and in particular when he say that “hanc scientiam maxime esse veritatis contemplatricem”: SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII, Ordo disputationis.

³⁹ SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII, Ordo disputationis.

⁴⁰ SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII, Ordo disputationis: “Prima igitur veritatis consideratio ad dialecticum pertinet; secunda ad physicum, quatenus de anima ejusque functionibus considerat; tertia vero est propria hujus scientiae, quae tractat de ente in quantum ens, et de passionibus entium”.

And also, how do they relate to the mysteries of the faith, if they also claim to be defined on the basis of truth? In order to answer these questions Suárez uses a further division, adding the category of transcendental truth (*veritas transcendentalis*) which includes the real truth (*veritas realis*) which must also be linked “per analogiam et proportionem” with the truth of reason (*veritas rationis*). The two, although distinct, are interconnected: the truth of reason depends to some extent on the real truth, which, in turn, takes its character of reality through its transcendental reference.⁴¹ With regard to the meaning of the term “transcendental,” Suárez writes:

[...] dico primo, veritatem transcendentalem intrinsece dicere entitatem realem ipsius rei [...] Dico secundo, veritatem transcendentalem significare entitatem rei connotando cognitionem seu conceptum intellectus, cui talis entitas conformatur, vel in quo talis res repraesentatur, vel repraesentari potest prout est.⁴²

Transcendental truth, thus defined, contains not only the real and intellectual truths, but in addition shows both the entity of the thing itself (*dicere entitatem realem ipsius rei*) and the entity as it is known by the intellect “in quo talis res repraesentatur, vel repraesentari potest prout est.”⁴³ Recalling what emerged from the *Commentary on De anima*, it seems clear that if, on one hand, the immortality of the soul was taught and defended by faith, on the other, it could be demonstrated through numerous ways of natural reason, although in conclusion Suárez had admitted only the “lumen” that came from faith for a full knowledge of the soul and in particular of immortality. On the contrary, the situation in his *Metaphysical Disputations* seems radically changed, because the synthesis between the mysteries of faith and the philosophical arguments is no longer made certain and universal by “lumen fidei”. It is by the “lumen naturae” that we attain, through transcendental truth, a representation (perhaps even without faith) of faith’s own dogmas. In this regard, the examples that Suárez proposes are significant, because when “dicere solemus hostiam consecratam esse verum corpus Christi Domini [...] nihil aliud significamus quam illud idem corpus, quod per proprium ac verum conceptum corporis Christi repraesentatur.”⁴⁴ And similarly, when we say that “Deum esse verum hominem” we say only that “habere illam naturam quam in essentiali spe-

⁴¹ For the different usage of Suárez with respect to term ‘transcendental’ see: DARGE, Rolf: *Suárez’ transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition*. Leiden: Brill 2004.

⁴² SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII.7.24.

⁴³ See note above n. 47.

⁴⁴ SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII.7.25: “Existimo enim hunc veri entis conceptum esse virtualiter comparativum unius rei vel naturae ad proprium conceptum eius rei, quae vera esse dicitur; ut, verbi gratia, ad profitendunt Eucharistiae mysterium dicere solemus hostiam consecratam esse verum corpus Christi Domini, ubi per verum corpus nihil aliud significamus quam illud idem corpus quod per proprium ac verum conceptum corporis Christi repraesentatur”.

cie hominis vere concipimus.”⁴⁵ Consequently, both the concepts of body and human being primarily represent Christ’s body and God. This is because the human intellect is able to understand dogmas by means of its own concepts such as those of body or human being without faith.

4. CONCLUSION

To conclude, we can thus highlight some points of interest that emerge in the context of Francisco Suárez’s psychological, theological and metaphysical discussion. First, Suárez quotes the *Apostolici regiminis* in his *Commentary on De anima*, signalling the importance and value of the bull also at the end of the sixteenth century. Second, we may observe a complex and progressive development of the principle of *omne verum vero consonat* from the ‘strictly’ theological reflections contained and analysed in *De anima* to the purely metaphysical analysis systematized in the *Metaphysical Disputations*. Third, we may highlight, on one hand, the Suarezian strategy of limiting natural reason in the context of faith, as in the *Commentary on De anima*, and, on the other, to bring the knowledge of faith into the context of metaphysics or natural theology, as in the *Metaphysical Disputations*.

In the *Commentary* Suárez proves the immortality of the soul from both the theological and the philosophical point of view. The theological arguments are taken from Holy Scripture and decrees of Councils such as the *Apostolici regiminis*. The philosophical strategies are instead two: the first is to prove the immortality of the intellect by appealing to its immaterial properties and acts; the second is to derive the immortality of the soul from the immateriality of the intellect. Nevertheless, the concept of soul cannot be grasped by means of reason only, as faith is required too. On the contrary, in the *Metaphysical Disputations* Suárez intends to preserve the truth, from the “lumen naturae” to the “lumen fidei” and from the latter going back to the “lumen naturae” using a transcendental perspective, the strength, certainty and superiority of theological truth. He showed how that truth can be achieved paradoxically only through natural intellect, even before there is any form of dialectic between reason and faith. With this last reference to strictly natural reality, where do not appear to be any conflicts of faith and reason, we can find an original Suarezian solution to the issues raised by *Apostolici regiminis*. For example, as we have mentioned above, natural reason is capable of really and actually accounting for the body of Christ as well as other similar mysteries of faith. From this follows that the treatment of the soul is ambiguous, but the truth is one.

⁴⁵ SUÁREZ: *DM*, VIII.7.25: “Et similiter, ad confitendum mysterium Incarnationis, dicimus Deum esse verum hominem, id est, habere illam naturam quam in essentiali specie hominis vere concipimus”.

Nevertheless, it could be asked: how can entities beyond nature be preserved if the principle of the unity of truth must be safeguarded with its arguments in defence of the soul? How and what in the transcendental levels of truths “in essendo, in cognoscendo et in significando” can be thought, once the pacification of conflicts between the different fields of sciences and the knowledge of reality is achieved?

Abstract

In 1513, the 8th session of the Fifth Lateran Council culminated in the writing of the papal bull Apostolici regiminis. In establishing the epistemic principle of omne verum vero consonat, also known as the principle of the unity of truth, the Apostolici regiminis reopened the problem of the relationship between the truth or truths believed by faith and those demonstrated by reason. This article focuses on the important and original contribution of the Granadian theologian Francisco Suárez to the debates raised by Apostolici regiminis. This article has two aims: the first is to present two different ways of Suárez's thought in his Metaphysical Disputations and Commentary on Aristotle's De anima; the second is to remark the use of the transcendental point of view as the key to explaining and connecting the natural and the supernatural levels of reality, e.g. in defending the immortality of the soul.

