

The defense transformation debate

Autor(en): **Biddle, Stephen D.**

Objektyp: **Article**

Zeitschrift: **ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische
Militärzeitschrift**

Band (Jahr): **168 (2002)**

Heft 6

PDF erstellt am: **22.07.2024**

Persistenter Link: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-67960>

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Inhalten der Zeitschriften. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern.

Die auf der Plattform e-periodica veröffentlichten Dokumente stehen für nicht-kommerzielle Zwecke in Lehre und Forschung sowie für die private Nutzung frei zur Verfügung. Einzelne Dateien oder Ausdrucke aus diesem Angebot können zusammen mit diesen Nutzungsbedingungen und den korrekten Herkunftsbezeichnungen weitergegeben werden.

Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. Die systematische Speicherung von Teilen des elektronischen Angebots auf anderen Servern bedarf ebenfalls des schriftlichen Einverständnisses der Rechteinhaber.

Haftungsausschluss

Alle Angaben erfolgen ohne Gewähr für Vollständigkeit oder Richtigkeit. Es wird keine Haftung übernommen für Schäden durch die Verwendung von Informationen aus diesem Online-Angebot oder durch das Fehlen von Informationen. Dies gilt auch für Inhalte Dritter, die über dieses Angebot zugänglich sind.

The Defense Transformation Debate

The American Military at the Dawn of the 21st Century

Am 5. Oktober 2001 organisierten das U.S. Army War College und die Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies eine Konferenz in Washington DC zur Transformation (RMA) der U.S.-Streitkräfte. Der vorliegende Artikel zeigt übersichtsartig die Ergebnisse der Paneldiskussionen auf und gibt somit einen Überblick über die aktuellen Forschungsanstrengungen und Meinungen zum Thema RMA.

Stephen D. Biddle*

The U.S. Army War College and the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies cosponsored a conference in Washington, DC, on October 5, 2001, to examine options for transforming the U.S. military. Among the 225 registered attendees were representatives from the military, the executive branch, and the Congress, as well as defense experts from private industry, think tanks, and academia.

The conference centered on three panels. The first considered the strategic context for transformation, the second concerned force structure and technology alternatives, and the third examined organizational implications. This brief summary highlights the salient points raised in these panel discussions.

A central theme throughout the meeting concerned the scale and nature of needed change. All agreed that change was necessary, but change is always necessary, even in much-less-dynamic technological and geopolitical environments than today's. Stasis is thus a straw man. There was substantial disagreement, however, over how much and what kind of change are required.

In particular, advocates of sweeping change focused on three areas where they felt incremental adaptation is insufficient: the need for a new American foreign policy framework; the need for a force structure more oriented on the revolution in military

affairs (RMA); and the need for major reform in the U.S. military command structure. Moderates, by contrast, voiced concern that proposals for sweeping change could abandon traditional concepts and capabilities that remain essential.

Sweeping Change: Imperialism and America First

Some see recent American foreign policy as an unsustainable compromise between mutually exclusive alternatives. We have been engaged abroad, they argue, but only enough to breed enmity without being sufficiently committed to secure our interests. This yields opposite proposals for sweeping change: a case for an "imperialist" foreign policy that embraces a more interventionist role, and a case for an "America first" policy that disengages from overseas commitments and focuses U.S. security policy on homeland defense.

The imperialist brief sees important benefits to American primacy, both for America and for others. Imperialists argue that open markets, for example, are facilitated by a dominant power who has the ability and the will to compel states to reduce their trade barriers. International disputes are more likely to be resolved peacefully when one state enjoys a preponderance of power and is willing to use it on behalf of conflict resolution. The more peaceful, more prosperous world that results is in everyone's interest, reducing the dangers of al Qaeda-style terrorism by creating order in place of the failed societies and local anarchies that create and harbor terrorists.

Of course, not every potential hegemon is benign: a Nazi or Communist empire would have had horrific consequences, and both were appropriately resisted. The British Empire, by contrast, was a broadly beneficial hegemony, many imperialists argue, and a liberal American Empire would be, too. It matters who the hegemon is, and America could enjoy a legitimacy that others have not.

An imperial foreign policy would imply a very different military with four main components. We would require powerful deep strike forces capable of "emphatic dominance" over any combination of competitors, imperialists argue. Second, we would need expeditionary ground forces able to deploy quickly to punish norm-breakers but without a need for sustained, large-scale combat actions; a combination of the Marine Corps and cross-service special forces would be ideal. Third, we would need constabulary forces to keep the peace abroad and maintain order where this exists; this role would be best suited to a radically restructured Army. Finally, domestic law enforcement which reserve component military augmentation would protect the American homeland against terrorism.

By contrast, the case for "America First" holds that the costs and benefits of an assertive U.S. foreign policy have been transformed by the September 11 attacks. Whereas engagement is preferable other things being equal, they argue, the benefits are now outweighed by the costs of becoming a target for groups like al Qaeda. Asserting U.S. power, moreover is unnecessary for prosperity: mutual economic incentives are sufficient to provide for trade and access to oil or other raw materials. Local conflicts may escalate without our involvement, but better to cope with escalation by defending our borders than by intervening in faraway lands: a strong homeland defense backed up by a sole superpower's resources will deter parties with no real need to challenge us, and, by staying out of other's disputes, we reduce their motives for involving us.

An "America First" policy would likewise imply a very different military from today's. Its predominant focus would be homeland security, with a heavy emphasis on frontier defense, missile defense, airspace control, and terminal security for key infrastructure and CONUS economic assets. Nonmilitary security agencies would see a major increase in relative importance and funding, with the FBI, CIA, INS, and Customs Service all rising in priority as key counterterrorist resources, and with major efforts in consequence management by a wide range of civilian and military organizations. The Coast Guard would be radically expanded. American forces would be withdrawn from most overseas bases. Increased emphasis on assets with intercontinental reach (such as B2 bombers and carrier battle groups) would compensate for the rejection of forward basing and provide deterrent power to dissuade foreign actors from drawing America into local disputes. The Army would transition to a role focused on territorial defense on American soil, and restructure accordingly.

*Stephen D. Biddle ist ausserordentlicher Professor für National Security Studies am Strategic Studies Institute des U.S. Army War College in Carlisle. Zuvor lehrte er an der University of North Carolina und Chapel Hill und besetzte Forschungsstellen am Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) in Alexandria (Virginia), am Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs und an der Kennedy School of Government's Office of National Security Programs.

Gelesen

in International Herald Tribune vom 8. Februar 2002, Seite 4: "Extravagant Language in Lieu of Sober War Aims" von Flora Lewis.

The United States is urging the allies ever more insistently to face this gap by spending more on defense. It now spends more than all the others combined. This makes for difficult political problems. Not everybody feels the same threat any longer, although all have responded without question to Mr. Bush's call to oppose terrorism.

It also makes for a very strange new kind of arms race, driven not by the need to keep up with or get ahead of the enemy but by a newly felt need not to be too far behind the major ally. Otherwise the others risk being ignored by the United States, which can do so many things (whether necessary or not doesn't matter) that they can't.

Perhaps the most frightening part of the post-Sept. 11 world is how willingly Americans have swallowed what they are being told. There should be questions, doubts must be expressed, challenges must be offered and rejected, if these essentially new problems are to be examined soberly. ag

The Marine Corps, with no expeditionary mission to perform, could be disbanded or drastically reduced.

Sweeping Change: An RMA Force Structure

Many see U.S. force structure as lagging behind the technological and geopolitical imperatives of the revolution in military affairs. The United States now enjoys a geopolitical "strategic pause" in which we face no peer competitor, they argue; we should exploit this breathing space to discover and implement radically new forces and doctrines for taking advantage of information age technology. The sheer inefficiency of experimentation means that we cannot both transform and remain ready to fight multiple major wars in the meantime, hence today's absence of a peer competitor offers an irreplaceable opportunity to put major resources into transformation before facing a real threat. The danger of complacency is the real threat of today: without a clear and present need, we could fail to take the dramatic steps needed and get caught flat-footed when a new superpower eventually arises.

For RMA advocates, this implies a need for heavier investment in science and technology programs, and rapid development of new weapon systems such as arsenal ships and "Streetfighter" littoral warfare surface combatants; space-based radars; very long range, stealthy unmanned aerial vehicles for both surveillance and strike missions; and stealthy transport aircraft (especially for special forces insertion). New

combat formations and doctrines for using such systems need to be designed and extensively tested in rigorous wargames and field maneuvers, they argue. Sunset systems like carrier battle groups and heavy tanks need to be reduced, and backward-looking weapon programs like the Joint Strike Fighter, the DD-21, or the Crusader need to be cancelled or radically curtailed. U.S. force structure needs to be overhauled, with major reductions in close combat forces and short-range aircraft, a major shift toward increased reliance on very long range deep precision strike systems, a much more bomber-centric attack force, and a major increase in special operations forces for waging the coming war of shadows against terrorism.

Sweeping Change: Command Structure Reform

Closely related to the argument for an RMA force structure is the case for major command structure reform. Some argue that major organizational change is overdue. It has been 54 years since the National Security Act for 1947 established the government's overall organization for defense decisionmaking; the military has been organized around divisions, carrier battle groups, and fighter wings for longer than that. Given the scale of technical and geopolitical change since then, we surely need to revisit these choices.

Among the specific options for such reform might be the development of a National Security Council-like organization for the new Homeland Defense Agency, wherein a powerful Homeland Defense Advisor and staff acted both as policy coordinators but also as the President's advocates in shaping the agendas of the component Cabinet departments. The interagency process could also be overhauled to facilitate jointness and improved coordination across departments. Within the military, a global counterterrorism commander-in-chief (CINC) could be established to counterbalance regional parochialism in the current structure and facilitate cross-regional operations in the war on terrorism. A Space Command or Information Warfare Corps could be established to lend greater coherence to efforts in these critical domains. The current division/wing/battle group structure could be replaced by flatter, less-hierarchical alternatives to speed decisionmaking and information flow. The Army in particular could be reorganized to place less of its essential support activities in unwieldy division or corps size units, perhaps by establishing self-contained brigade size units capable of independent deployment and operation.

Moderate Change: Retaining What Works

Others argue that sweeping change is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. With respect to strategy and foreign policy, for example, some argue that the chief problem before September 11 was that traditional internationalist realpolitik was ignored, not that it somehow failed or represented an unsustainable compromise. We repeatedly failed to retaliate when terrorists killed Americans, as in Somalia and Yemen, and we backed down by withdrawing American military assets when we received subsequent threats of terrorist action against U.S. forces overseas. Defense reformers scorned peacekeeping, nation-building, and development assistance, yet a serious effort at using American economic power or diplomatic clout to promote a less chaotic post-Soviet Afghanistan might have denied Osama bin Laden his base of operations. Chronic underinvestment in defense stretched our forces too thinly to respond as forcefully as traditional realpolitik would have suggested; combined with a lack of will to use our power where necessary, this emboldened opponents to believe we were paper tigers who could be bullied into withdrawal. If so, the solution is not to adopt a radical vision of imperial or isolationist foreign policy, but simply to exercise the normal tools of great power statecraft in a more sustained, forceful way.

Similarly, some argue that calls for radical force restructuring undervalue traditional forces and overlook important shortcomings in new technology. Calls to retire Army close combat force structure in favor of special forces or constabulary units, it is held, err in assuming that we will never again need to fight a major theater war. The war on terrorism may indeed be winnable without large-scale land forces – but it also may not. If early, small-scale uses of force fail, we will face powerful pressures to escalate. Among the most powerful escalatory threats at our disposal is the ability to topple regimes who sponsor terrorism by invading and taking political control of their territory. Against regimes like the Taliban's or Saddam Hussein's, this is the ultimate sanction. And this sanction requires large-scale close combat forces:

Articles in English

In dieser Nummer publizieren wir einige Artikel in englischer Sprache. Es handelt sich um einen Versuch. Wir gehen nämlich davon aus, dass sicherheitspolitisch interessierte Offiziere neben einer zweiten Landessprache auch Englisch verstehen. G.

air power alone cannot topple a regime that takes appropriate countermeasures by hiding its forces and its key leaders.

Calls to restructure away from close combat and toward heavier reliance on long-range precision strike, some argue, fail to recognize the incentive this gives our enemies to adapt. Deep strike systems work best against massed targets in the open. They are much less effective against dispersed opponents in forests, mountains, cities, or towns. Such "complex terrain" offers cover, creates background clutter, and greatly reduces the sensor performance on which all else depends in deep-strike warfare. As our deep-strike capabilities grow, our opponents thus face a growing incentive to avoid massed formations in the open and emphasize dispersed operations in cover, where close combat forces offer the only effective means of reaching them. A restructured U.S. military with more effective deep strike technology, larger deep strike forces, and smaller close combat forces would give our enemies a double incentive to disperse into cover: not only would massed operations in the open be more costly against such a restructured

U.S. force, but dispersed operations in cover would be less so, given the U.S. reductions in close combat capability. If anything, the optimal U.S. response to improving deep strike technology is to shift toward *greater* emphasis on close combat, not less, given our opponents' incentives for responding to this technology. We certainly should not be creating opportunities for them via self-inflicted vulnerabilities in close combat capability.


Others argue that many of technology's benefits can be had with modest deployments rather than wholesale re-equipment. In this view, modest numbers of stealthy aircraft, for example, could be used to destroy air defenses, opening the doors for larger fleets of cheaper, nonstealthy systems to operate with impunity. Moderate nuclear missile defense (NMD) programs could defend against small rogue-state missile inventories without threatening Russian retaliatory capabilities, providing much of the benefit of NMD without the geostrategic costs of a new arms race or Russian diplomatic alienation.

Organizationally, too, some argue that proposals for sweeping change should be

approached with caution. Reorganization has unintended, as well as intended, consequences. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms, for example, created regional CINCs who have subsequently become so powerful as to overshadow the U.S. ambassadors in their regions, becoming almost viceroys and exerting inordinate influence over U.S. foreign policy by virtue of the institutional capacity granted them by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. None of this was anticipated by the Act's authors or supporters. In light of this, some hold, caution is warranted in evaluating major reorganizations whose downstream consequences cannot be completely anticipated.

The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.


More information on the Strategic Studies Institute's programs may be found on the Institute's Homepage at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm> or by calling (717) 245-4212. ■



BRINGT MÄNNER
IN FAHRT.

HÄLT SIE AUF SPUR.
Der ContiSportContact 2.

Bestnote «sehr empfehlenswert»
für ContiSportContact 2.



Touring Nr. 5 vom 15.3.2001,
getestete Reifen der Dimension
205/55 R16 W.

Wer gern schnell zur Sache kommt, braucht die passende Begleitung. Eigens dafür wurde der ContiSportContact 2 entwickelt. Denn er gewährleistet selbst bei hohen Geschwindigkeiten ein äusserst präzises Lenkverhalten und hervorragende Bremseigenschaften. Seine spezielle Advanced-Mold-Concept-Kontur sorgt dabei für eine exzellente Kurvenstabilität.

Und aufgrund der innovativen Silica-Lauflächenmischung verfügt der ContiSportContact 2 auch über eine sehr gute Nasgriff-Haftung. Kurz gesagt: Dieser Hochgeschwindigkeitsreifen geht mit Ihnen gern an die Grenzen der Lust, aber nicht darüber hinaus. Mehr über Continental-Reifen erfahren Sie unter www.conti-online.com

DO IT WITH GERMAN ENGINEERING **Continental**