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Autor(en): **Tillemans, Tom J.F.**

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MORE ON *PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNA*, THESESES AND SYLLOGISMS

Tom J.F. Tillemans, University of Lausanne

1. Introduction

In 1984 I published an article in this journal entitled “Sur le *parāarthānumāna* en logique bouddhique”¹, where I argued, amongst other things, that it is an important logico-philosophical point that an inference-for-others (*parāarthānumāna*), taken along Dharmakīrtian lines, cannot state a conclusion or thesis (*pakṣa*; *pratijñā*).² I argued that this point – and others – fundamentally differentiate this version of *parāarthānumāna* from Aristotelian syllogisms. Specifically, if we take a typical *parāarthānumāna* such as, “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a vase. Now, sound is produced”, the point of this logical form is not to show an actual deduction of the conclusion, “Sound is impermanent”, but rather to show only those elements which would prove such a deduction. In short a *parāarthānumāna* only presents the “provers” (*sādhana*) of a conclusion or thesis, viz. the triply characterized reason (*trirūpahetu*; *trirūpaliṅga*), as it is only this which has the “power” to prove.³ It presents these

1 *Asiatische Studien / Etudes Asiatiques* XXXVIII, 2, 1984, pp. 73-99.

2 Although the Naiyāyika's five-membered reasoning states the thesis (*pratijñā*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) as two separate members, for our purposes in talking about the Buddhist's two and three-membered *parāarthānumānas* we shall use the English words “thesis” and “conclusion” interchangeably as referring to what is being proven – this allows for an easier comparison with conclusions in Aristotelian syllogisms. So, it should be stressed that we are not using “conclusion” in the Naiyāyika's particular technical sense of *nigamana*, where it would be something different from *pratijñā*. That said, note, however, that Dharmakīrti's arguments against *pakṣa* / *pratijñā* do apply to the Naiyāyika's *nigamana* too.

3 Cf. Dignaga's definition in PS III, 1: *parāarthānumānam tu svadrṣṭārthaprakāśanam* “Inference-for-others is what elucidates the object understood by oneself”. The commentators are unanimous in taking *svadrṣṭārtha* as meaning the triply characterized reason. See p. 83ff. in Tillemans 1984. On *artha* in *svadrṣṭārtha* see PV IV k. 13-14 translated on pp. 159-160 in Tillemans, “*Pramāṇavārttika* IV (1), WZKS 30, 1986. Cf. NB III.1: *trirūpaliṅgākhyānam parāarthānumānam* // “An inference-for-others is a statement of the triply characterized reason.” On the triply characterized reason alone being *sādhana* and having the power to prove the thesis, cf. PV IV k. 16, 17ab and k. 20 translated and edited in Tillemans, “*Pramāṇavārttika* IV (2), WZKS 31, 1987.

K. 16: *tat pakṣavacanam vaktur abhiprāyanivedane / pramāṇam samsayotpattes tataḥ sāksān na sādhanam*. “So the thesis-statement is a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for revealing the speaker's intention. [But] as doubt arises from it [as to whether the thesis is true or not], it is not directly (*sāksāt*) a *sādhana*.”

K. 17ab: *sādhyasyaivābhidhānena pāramparyeṇa nāpy alam*. “In stating merely the *sādhyā*, [the thesis-statement] cannot, even indirectly, [establish it].

sādhana, however, in a very specific way: to take the above-mentioned case, the *parārthānumāna* shows that the reason “producthood” (*kṛtakatva*) is a valid prover in that the universal implication (*vyāpti*) holds as does the specific case at hand, the so-called *pakṣadharmatva*, or “fact that the reason is a quality of the subject”.

In any case – so I argued in 1984 on the basis of Dharmakīrti and his commentators – a thesis will never prove itself or even contribute in the slightest to its own proof, and thus cannot be considered a *sādhana*: it is therefore important that the thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*) be absent from a well-formed *parārthānumāna*.

By contrast, in whichever way we analyse Aristotle's idea of a syllogism in the first book of the *Prior Analytics*; whether we see it as a *rule* along the lines of “*P*; *Q*; therefore *R*” or as a *proposition* like “If *P* and *Q*, then *R*”, in any case, the syllogism must have a conclusion (*R*).

Such was my argument in 1984 against treating a *parārthānumāna* as a syllogism and so it remains in philosophical and logical discussions on the theme of *parārthānumāna* versus syllogisms. In such discussions, as we shall see below, we make a justifiable gain in simplicity by dealing with the final developed form of the *parārthānumāna*, i.e. the form to which Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's earlier thought was tending.

The *historical* question as to when exactly the thesis-statement was definitively banned from *parārthānumānas*, however, is more complicated than I had thought in 1984. The present article will provide some evidence to show that the case for Dignāga in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) and Dharmakīrti in his early works is probably somewhat different from what I, or the Dharmakīrtian commentators, made it out to be. Dharmakīrti himself seems to have changed his position from that of his earlier works, such as *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Nyāyabindu*, to that of his later *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*. In fact, it is really in the *Vādanyāya* that the prohibition on thesis-statements is at its most clear and absolute – there he stresses that since the statement of a thesis (*pratijñāvacana*) is useless (*vyartha*), then presenting such a thesis or conclusion in the statement of a *sādhana* (*sādhanavākya*) is a “point of defeat”, or *nigrahasthāna*, for the proponent.⁴

K. 20: *antaraṅgam tu sāmartyaṃ triṣu rūpeṣu saṃsthitaṃ / tatra smṛtisamādhānaṃ tadvacasy eva saṃsthitaṃ //*. “The intrinsic capability [to prove the thesis], however, is in the three characteristics (*rūpa*). Only the statement of the [*trirūpalīnga*] can kindle the memory of that [viz. of the *trirūpalīnga*'s capacity to prove the *sādhya*].”

4 See 64,3-4 in *Vādanyāya*, ed. D. Shāstrī, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1972. *tasmād vyartham eva sādhanavākyaḥ pratijñāvacanopādānaṃ vādino nigrahasthānam*. There are two sorts of *nigrahasthāna* spoken about in *Vādanyāya*: *asādhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana* (“not indicating the fault”). As M.T. Much points out on p. 134 of his article on

While I'm not a partisan of the current tendency to exaggerate the differences between Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's philosophies – e.g. I don't believe that Dharmakīrti “washed away Dignāga's philosophical accomplishments”⁵ – I do think that here on the question of the members of a *parārthānumāna*, Dharmakīrti inherited an inelegant and overly complicated position from his master, one which did nonetheless contain a number of core ideas that Dharmakīrti, over time, struggled with and tried to unravel and simplify. Unfortunately, some of Dharmakīrti's own commentators, such as Prajñākaragupta and Śāntarakṣita, in true scholastic fashion, attempted to show that Dharmakīrti's (later) view was completely consonant with the textual evidence in Dignāga. In other words, Prajñākaragupta *et al.* wished to show that Dharmakīrti's view was unoriginal and already wholly present in PS. This, I think, was a mistake and blurred a rather complex historical development for Indo-Tibetan writers, and indeed also for the present author when he wrote his article on this subject in 1984.

2. *Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the absence of a thesis-statement in a parārthānumāna*

Now, Dharmakīrti himself finds only one source in Dignāga concerning the role of the thesis-statement. This is PS III k. 1cd:

tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ “In this regard, the presentation of the inferendum is held to concern the goal of the reason”.

He invokes this passage in PV IV k. 18ab⁶, and interprets it quite correctly as showing that thesis-statement has no power to prove anything, i.e. that it is not

nigrahasthāna in Dharmakīrti, *asāadhanāṅgavacana* is given a double interpretation depending upon where one places the negation, viz. “the non-statement of a member which is a means of proof” or “the statement of a member which is not a means of proof”. The statement of a *pratijñā* falls into this latter category. See p. 135 in M.T. Much, “Dharmakīrti's Definition of 'Points of Defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*)”, in B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986, pp. 133-142. See also n. 11 below.

5 See p. 310 in R. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*. Studies of Classical India 9, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988. One finds a similar position throughout the book of R. Herzberger, *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists: an essay in the development of fifth and sixth century Indian thought*. Studies of Classical India 8. Dordrecht: D. Reidel (= Kluwer), 1986. I argue against both in Chapter I and Appendix I of my *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Vienna, 1990.

6 *hetvarthaviṣayatvena tadaśaktoktir īritā*

a *sādhana*, an interpretation which, no doubt, fits well with what Dignāga himself says in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV(a)) ad PS III k. 1cd:

yan lag rnams nas gañ rjes su dpag par bya ba bstan pa de ni kho bo cag gi sgrub byed ñid du mi 'dod de / de ñid the tshom skyed par byed pa'i phyir ro // (Kitagawa p. 471.5-7). “Amongst the members, the presentation of the inferendum is not held to be a *sādhana* for us, for it engenders doubt.”

Nonetheless, PV IV k. 18's interpretation of PS III k. 1cd is a far cry from justifying the later Dharmakīrtian view in *Vādanyāya* that the thesis-statement *should not* be in a *parārthānumāna*. In other words, it is clear that in PS Dignāga did not consider the thesis-statement as being a *sādhana*, but nevertheless he most likely allowed its presence in a *parārthānumāna* – we shall see more on this below. Dharmakīrti in the *Vādanyāya*, seems to have gone one step further on his own in saying that if the thesis-statement is not a *sādhana*, it *should not* be in a *parārthānumāna*. How much Dharmakīrti was conscious that this additional step was his own is difficult to say. At any rate, his discussion in PV of Dignāga's actual words can, with little difficulty, be taken as showing that he realized that Dignāga in PS only went so far as to deny that the thesis-statement is a *sādhana*.⁷ Indeed, I now think that there are good reasons for thinking that Dharmakīrti in PV held this same position.

“The statement of that [viz. the *sādhya*] which is powerless is explained as having the goal of the reason as its object.”

- 7 Dharmakīrti argues at length against the view that the thesis-statement provides some sort of indispensable orientation for a *parārthānumāna* (see e.g. PV IV k. 21-22) and is thus indirectly a *sādhana*. See PV IV k. 21ab: *akhyāpīte hi viṣaye hetuvṛtter asaṃbhavāt / viṣayakhyāpanād eva siddhau cet tasya śaktatā //*. “[Objection:] If the aim (*viṣaya*) [of the reason] were not stated, then indeed the reason could not occur. Thus, as it does in fact make the aim known, the [thesis-statement] is [indirectly] capable of establishing [the *sādhya*].” Now, one can read PV IV k. 21 and the reply *uktam atra* (“This has already been answered”) as no more than a restatement of Dignāga's denial of *sādhana*-status to the thesis. The rest of k. 22 would then be Dharmakīrti's additional position that the thesis is understood by *arthāpatti*. Indeed, it is probable that PV IV k. 21 is an opponent's interpretation of PS III 1cd's phrase *hetvarthaviṣaya*: PVBh 490.17-18, at least, takes it in this way and subsequently shows that what the opponent is saying is that because a statement of a thesis is a necessary condition for stating the reason, this thesis-statement also has probative power and is hence a *sādhana*. The indirect “power” to establish the *sādhya* by showing the aim (*viṣaya*) is rejected as leading to various already explained (see k. 19) absurd consequences, notably, that one would be forced to accept a bloated *parārthānumāna* of ten members, including the proposition which is doubted (*saṃśaya*), what we wished to know (*jijñāsā*), etc. etc. If the thesis-statement shows the aim (*viṣaya*) and is thus a *sādhana* for the *parārthānumāna*, the other indispensable conditions should also have membership and be *sādhana*.

In a recent study on the notion of *pakṣābhāsa* (“fallacies of the thesis”) in pre-Dignāga logicians, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Masahiro Inami has shown that the use of the *pakṣavacana* can be profitably compared with the development of the closely related concept of *pakṣābhāsa*.⁸ Inami is of the opinion that the use of the *pakṣavacana* (“thesis-statement”) can be profitably compared with the development of the closely related concept of *pakṣābhāsa*.⁸ Inami is of the opinion that Dharmakīrti in PV, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Nyāyabindu* adhered to the same position as Dignāga in PS III, i.e. he permitted the presence of a thesis, all the while denying that it had any status as a *sādhāna*. In this phase Dharmakīrti, like Dignāga before him, also still accepted *pakṣābhāsa*, as we see by the discussions in PV IV, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III and *Nyāyabindu* III. The ban on thesis-statements comes later in the *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya* and coincides with his rejection of the theory of *pakṣābhāsa*. *bhāsa* and that of the thesis-statement. After all, it is incongruous to give an account of *pakṣābhāsa* in a chapter on *parāarthānumāna* and yet maintain that the thesis-statement can under no circumstances be given in such a logical form! I might remark, though, that in practice, when Dharmakīrti gives actual *parāarthānumāna* in texts such as PV IV k. 22, *Nyāyabindu* III, 8, 21, 23, etc., and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, he does not give theses, but only presents a two-membered form. The “permissibility” of thesis-statements, then, is at most a theoretical possibility for Dharmakīrti at this stage, but one which he himself did not, to my knowledge, avail himself of in his own argumentation.

Now, Inami's account – to which I am heavily indebted – could be supplemented with one of the motivations behind Dharmakīrti's evolution. There seem to be two basic motivations. One is Dharmakīrti's view (from his early works on) that the thesis is known by *arthāpatti* (“presumption”) and is hence unnecessary in the *parāarthānumāna*. Whereas Dignāga in PS stresses that the thesis is not a *sādhāna*, but that it may be stated to show the “goal of the reason”, i.e. the proposition which the argument is about, Dharmakīrti goes one step further in suggesting that this proposition is at any rate indirectly known by means of the statement of the *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatva* in a *parāarthānumāna*. Progressively he realizes that Dignāga's function for the thesis-statement in terms of *hetvarthaviṣayatva* is usurped by the indirect knowledge stemming from hearing the two other members. In fact, he gives various formulations explaining just how the conclusion can be known from the *parāarthānumāna*: in PV IV k. 22 he uses the term *arthāt* (“by implication”); in the *Nyāyabindu* (NB) he speaks of *sāmarthyāt* and in *Pramāṇavini-*

8 See his article, “On *pakṣābhāsa*”, forthcoming in the *Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference*, Vienna.

ścaya (Pvin) III⁹ we find him using *arthāpattyā* (Tib. *don gyis go bas*). Indeed, what seems to be at stake is “presumption” (*arthāpatti*) – the conclusion is “presumed” from the two statements in the *parārthānumāna* in that these two statements could not both be true unless the conclusion were also.¹⁰ But what is of interest for us here is that it seems that it was the fact that the thesis was known indirectly from the other two statements in a *parārthānumāna* which was one of the driving forces behind Dharmakīrti's own changes of position. In PV IV, Pvin and NB Dharmakīrti probably takes the view that the thesis-statement is dispensable because known by implication, but that it can be used and can have *pakṣābhāsa*. Later, from the *Hetubindu* on, it is the same fact of *sāmarthyā* which leads him to view thesis-statements as completely redundant and to abandon talk of them (and *pakṣābhāsa*) altogether. *Hetubindu* 5.23-24:

atra sāmarthyād eva pratijñārthasya pratīter na pratijñāyāḥ prayogah / “Here, because the thesis-proposition is known just simply by implication there is no need for the thesis.”

The other driving force for abandoning the thesis-statement completely was the fact, already recognized by Dignāga, that the thesis-statement was not a *sādhana*. This is evident in the progression from the argumentation in PV IV to *Vādanyāya* 59, 8-9, where it is argued that the thesis-statement is not a *sādhana* and that its presence is a point of defeat in that it states something useless.¹¹

By way of a contrast with this evolutionary view of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's development let us briefly look at some of Dharmakīrti's commentators. Their view on Dharmakīrti, which would become the received interpretation in later Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, was that Dharmakīrti's position did *not* evolve from PV to *Vadanyaya*: the thesis-statement was completely inadmiss-

9 Peking 288a.

10 For a definition of *arthāpatti* see p. 42 in K. Mimaki, *La Réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthiraśiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)*, Paris, 1976: “[L]a présomption est la façon dont le fait 'B' est déduit à partir de l'expérience réelle du fait 'A' et du jugement que le fait 'A' n'est pas possible autrement (*anyathānupapatti*) qu'en présumant un fait tel que 'B'.” Compare Dharmottara's gloss on NB's *sāmarthyāt* (NBT 175, 2-3): *yadi ca sādhyadharmas tatra sādhyadharmiṇi na bhavet sādhanadharmo na bhavet / sādhyaniyatavāt tasya sādhanadharmasyeti sāmarthyam* // “If the property to be proved did not exist there in the subject of what is to be proved, then the property which is the prover [i.e. the reason] would not exist [either], since this property which is the prover is connected to that which is to be proved. We thus speak of 'implication'.” The existence of the state of affairs corresponding to the conclusion can be presumed from the fact that the reason exists, i.e. possesses the three characters.

For a translation of PV IV k. 22, see Tillemans, “*Pramānavārttika* IV (2)” WZKS 31, 1987.

11 *atha vā tasyaiva sādhanasya yan nāṅgaṃ pratijñopanayanigamanādi tasyāsādhanāṅgasya sādhanavākye upādānaṃ vādino nīgrahasthānaṃ vyarthābhīdhānāt* /

able. Not only that, but they maintained that Dignāga in PS had no role at all for the thesis-statement either. Let us for convenience term Prajñākaragupta's and Śāntarākṣita's interpretation of Dignāga, the "Dharmakīrtian commentators' interpretation." This interpretation where one seeks to impose the *Vādanyāya-Hetubindu* position on Dignāga is, I now think, untenable. As it is worth our while to try to see some of its shortcomings in some detail, we shall take up the problems which the Dharmakīrtian commentators had with PS IV k. 6.

3. Dharmakīrtian commentators' interpretations

Prajñākaragupta, in his *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (PVBh 487.30 - 488.1), presents the commentators' problem in his introduction to PV IV k. 18:

*nanv ācāryasya pakṣavacanam abhimatam eva / yad āha / svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ
niścayotpādanecchayā / pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam //*
"[Objection: But did not the Master [Dignāga] in fact admit the thesis-statement when he said [in PS IV k. 6] 'As one wishes to generate certainty for others just like one's own certainty, then anything other than the statements of the *pakṣadharmatva*, necessary connection (*sambandha*) and *sādhya* is excluded."

He then argues that in fact when Dignāga spoke of the *sādhya* in this verse, he meant only the *sādhyadharmā*, i.e. the property to be proved which occurs in the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of a two-membered *parāarthānumāna* – in short, there are not three members, but only the usual two. PVBh 488.8-11:

*yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti vyāptyantargatā sādhyoktir na pratijñārūpeṇa / avasyam
hi sādhanē vyāpakatvam sādhyasyopadarśanīyam / ato 'vayavadvayam eva
darśanīyam / sambandhena rūpadvayākṣepād eva trirūpatā hetoḥ / tasmād anityaḥ
śabda iti nādāv ante vā darśanīyam / rūpadvayamātrakād eva sādhyasya siddheḥ /*
"The statement of the *sādhya* is included in the *vyāpti*, 'Whatever is produced is impermanent', but is not in the form of a thesis. For indeed, one does definitely have to show that the *sādhya* is a pervader (*vyāpaka*) of the *sādhanā*. Hence, one should present only two members [in a *parāarthānumāna*]. By means of the necessary connection two characters [of the reason] are in fact implied, and thus the reason has the three characters. Therefore, neither at the beginning nor at the end should one present [the thesis] 'Sound is impermanent', for the *sādhya* is established simply by the two characters [i.e. *pakṣadharmatva* and *vyāpti*] alone."

Note that Prajñākaragupta's explanation is also what one frequently finds adopted by Tibetan commentators – it figures plainly in rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*.¹²

12 See p. 247 in Vol. II, Sarnath ed. 1975: *slob dpon phyogs tshig sgrub byed du bzed pa ma yin na / phyogs chos 'brel ba bsgrub bya dag / brjod pa las gzan span bar bya / zes pa ji*

Sāntarakṣita, in his *Vādanyāyavṛtti Vipañcitārthā*, also cites PS IV k. 6 as a potential inconsistency, but seems to “resolve” the problem by saying that the statement of the *sādhyā* (i.e. the proposition to be proved) is implied (*ākṣepa*) by the *pakṣadharmatva* and *saṃbandha*, and that therefore the thesis (*pakṣa*), application (*upanaya*) and such members of a traditional five-membered reasoning are banished from use.¹³

Now, to get an idea of the fragility of the Dharmakīrtian commentators' interpretation that Dignāga did not allow that the thesis-statement at all, consider the following points:

- (a) Nowhere does Dignāga say clearly and unambiguously in PS that he rejects the thesis-statement as being a member of a *parārthānumāna*.
- (b) In the *Nyāyamukha* (NM) Dignāga definitely did accept the thesis-statement as a member of a *parārthānumāna*.
- (c) PS IV k. 6 and PSV ad k. 6 provide good evidence that Dignāga did allow the thesis-statement.
- (d) PS IV k. 6 = NM k. 13 (ed. Katsura 1981, 5.5; Tucci p. 44) and Dignāga's PSV on PS IV k. 6 is identical with NM's own explanation of NM k. 13.

While the Dharmakīrtian commentators' view that the thesis-statement must be excluded finds no hard evidence in Dignāga, there is, by contrast, considerable hard textual evidence to show that Dignāga in the *Nyāyamukha* and *Pramāṇasamuccaya* did allow a place for the thesis-statement in a *parārthānumāna*. The degree of obligatoriness is, however, different. Concern-

ltar ze na / slob dpon phyogs glaṅ phyogs tshig sgrub ñag gi yan lag tu bzed pa ma yin par thal / rjes dpag bya der bstan pa ni / gtan tshigs don gyi yul du 'dod / ces pa'i tshig de ñid hyis / phyogs tshig des phyogs sgrub pa'i nus pa med pa'i phyogs de ni brjod par bśad pa'i phyr / 'o na tshig sna ma'i don ji lta bu ze na / de ni bsgrub bya'i chos la / bsgrub bya'i min gis btags pa yin gyi bsgrub bya mtshan ñid pa min no // “[Objection:] If the Master [Dignaga] did not accept that the thesis-statement is a *sādhana*, then how could he say [in PS IV k. 6], 'Anything other than the statements of the *pakṣadharmatva*, necessary connection and *sādhyā* is excluded.' [Reply:] It follows that the Master, Dignaga, did not hold that the thesis-statement is a member of a proof [i.e. *parārthānumāna*] because by means of the phrase, *tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ*, he asserted that the thesis-statement states a thesis which [itself] has no power to prove a thesis. [Objection:] Well then, how [are we to understand] the meaning of the previous phrase [in PS IV k. 6]? [Reply:] It [i.e. the *sādhyā* spoken about in k. 6] is the *sādhyadharmā*. It has been metaphorically termed *sādhyā*, but it is not the real *sādhyā*.”

13 Ed. D. Shāstrī p. 64,22-24: *kathaṃ tarhy uktaṃ pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam iti / nāsti virodhaḥ (I) pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhābhyam sādhyasyokti-prakāśanam ākṣepaḥ / tasmād anyeṣāṃ pakṣopanayavacanādīnām upādeyatvena sādhanavākyavarjanam iti vyākhyānāt.*

ing the *Nyāyamukha*, there is no question that at this stage Dignāga held that the thesis *should* be a member of a *parārthānumāna*, for it was a *sādhana* which, if left out, would bring about the fallacy of the *sādhana* known as “incompleteness” (*nyūnatā*).¹⁴ In PS and PSV it is clear, as we saw above, that Dignāga no longer considers the thesis-statement a *sādhana* and that he has redefined *nyūnatā* to concern only the statement of the characteristics of the reason.¹⁵ The result is that to avoid *nyūnatā*, there is now no obligation to present a thesis. However, while this much is different from NM, there are important passages, such as PS IV k. 6 and PSV ad k. 6, which do give evidence that the thesis, while not a *sādhana*, *could* be present. PS IV k. 6 has already been given above, but now consider Dignāga's own commentary to this verse in PSV(a):

'di ltar phyogs kyi chos ñid bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs kyi tshig yin no // de rjes su dpag par bya ba dañ med na mi 'byuñ ba ñid du bstan pa'i don du dpe'i tshig yin no // rjes su dpag par bya ba bstan pa'i don du phyogs kyi tshig brjod do //. “Thus, the statement of the reason is for the purpose of showing the *pakṣadharmatva*. The statement of the example is to show the necessary connection with the inferendum (*anumeṃya*). One states the thesis-statement in order to show the inferendum [itself].”¹⁶

Dharmakīrti's commentators on his PV IV k. 18 were obviously troubled by the fact that k. 18 seemed in contradiction with Dignāga's PS IV k. 6, and they devised various tortuous explanations to resolve the apparent contradiction so that they could continue to maintain that Dignāga completely rejected the thesis-statement. These types of explanations might have been possible for PS IV k. 6 taken in isolation, but they become extremely problematic in the light of PSV. The *coup de grâce*, however, comes from the fact that PS IV k. 6 along with the quoted passage (and more) from the PSV also figure in Dignāga's earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha*¹⁷, and that in NM's system the thesis-statement *does* indeed figure in a *parārthānumāna*. Now, we cannot reasonably interpret NM k. 13ff. along the lines of Dharmakīrti's commentators, but have to take it as showing that the thesis is stated. Hence, either the same pas-

14 See NM 1 and 1.1. in Katsura 1977: *zōng dēng duō yán shuō néng lì* “The thesis (*pakṣa*) and other terms are called *sādhana*”; *yóu cǐ yīng zhī suí yǒu suǒ quē míng néng lì quò* “Thus it should be understood that lack [of any of these terms] is called a fault of the *sādhana*” (*Taishō XXXI*, 1628 i 1a 7 & 10). Cf. *Nyāyapraveśa* 2 (in Tachikawa ed.): *tatra pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam*.

15 See PSV(a) Kitagawa p. 470.7-8: *'dir yañ tshul gañ yañ ruñ ba ciq ma smras na yañ ma tshañ ba brjod par 'gyur ro //*. “Here, we will term [the *parārthānumāna*] ‘incomplete’ if any of the characters (*tshul = rupa*) are not stated.” Cf. PV IV k. 23 in Tillemans, *Pramānavārttika* IV (2), p. 151.

16 PSV(a) Kitagawa ed. p. 521.18-522.4.

17 This equivalence was already noted by Tucci in his n. 79, 80, 81 on pp. 44-45.

sages would have to mean two radically different things in two different texts of Dignāga – an unlikely prospect – or Prajñakaragupta's and Santaraksita's approaches are impossible.

In short, as not in frequently happens in Indian philosophy, commentators are reluctant to admit that there was an evolution and an historical development of certain notions. If, however, we take a more evolutionary view, we should get the following result: True, Dignaga did make a change in his positions in NM and PS on the questions of the thesis-statement being a *sādhana* and the fallacy of *nyūnatā* being incurred if it is absent, but in PS he still kept some holdovers from his earlier views. Specifically, the lack of a thesis-statement ceases to be a criticizable fallacy in PS, but nonetheless, there is still a theoretical justification for stating a thesis in a *parārthānumāna*. Dharmakīrti initially inherited this view (although in his actual practice of *parārthānumāna* he never actually stated theses), but then moved gradually to simplify Dignāga's inelegant theoretical stance.

4. Syllogisms

Now, what implications does this revised version of the history of *pakṣavācāna* have for our philosophical comparison between *parārthānumāna* and syllogisms? A catalyst for the present reflections is a recent book by V.A. van Bijlert, who makes three basic criticisms of my 1984 article: (a) Dignāga did accord some place for the thesis-statement in a *parārthānumāna*; (b) hence, my anti-syllogism polemic is unfounded or too strong; (c) there are significant similarities between the Buddhist *parārthānumāna* and Aristotelian syllogisms.¹⁸

Van Bijlert's book is a very valuable contribution and raises some interesting questions concerning the specific problem of *parārthānumāna*. In effect, I think that the above discussion and Inami's paper shows that van Bijlert is basically right on the first point¹⁹. The errors in his second and third points should become clearer below.

18 See p. 70ff. and n. 15 on pp. 88-90 in Vittorio A. van Bijlert. *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority: The development of epistemology and logic in the old Nyāya and the Buddhist school of epistemology with an annotated translation of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika II (Pramāṇasiddhi) vv. 1-7*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 20. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1989.

19 Oddly enough, the actual reasons he gives are perhaps somewhat inaccurate. He says on p. 90:

“... I think he [i.e. Tillemans] is not quite right in saying that the absence of a thesis (on which his interpretation of the *parārthānumāna* as not being a syllogism seems to rest)

To take up (b), the revised historical account of *pakṣavacana* in *parārthānumāna* does not change my earlier point that the thesis-expression, contrary to the conclusion in a syllogism, is fundamentally irrelevant in an inference-for-others. In fact, the basic metalogical views in PS and PV concerning what is and is not a *sādhana* already implied that the thesis-statement was a more or less useless appendage, although it took Dharmakīrti some reflection to actually arrive at the explicit position that it was *thoroughly* useless and should be banned. In making a logical comparison between *parārthānu-*

is a fundamental logical and philosophical characteristic of the *parārthānumāna*. As we will see in my description of the *parārthānumāna* [on van Bijlert's p. 72], Dignāga discusses some sort of enunciation of what is to be proved (*sādhyanirdeśa*) in PS III.1cd-2, although he makes it clear that this is not a separate step in syllogistic reasoning as his predecessors thought."

Now, the unique use, in Kanakavarman's translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (See Kitagawa p. 472.7), of the definition of the thesis (*pratijñā*), viz. *sādhyanirdeśa*, found in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.33 is in itself nothing extraordinary and proves little about Dignāga's view on the thesis. After all, later in PS III k. 3 Dignāga goes on to discuss this Naiyāyika definition's shortcomings and to reject it in favour of his own definition of the thesis given just previously in PS III k. 2, viz. *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyak-ṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmīni //*. For k. 3, see Kitagawa's ed. of Kanakavarman's translation of PS III k. 3, p. 473: *bsgrub bya bstan pa 'des bya 'dir // grub pa med la don byas 'ñid // de lta na yañ dpe dan rtags // ma grub brjod pa thal bar 'gyur //* "In this [Naiyāyika definition], *sādhyanirdeśa*, the meaning [of *sādhya*] is taken to be 'what is not established' (*asiddha*). In that case, it would follow absurdly that statements of unestablished examples and reasons [must be theses]."

The fact that Dignāga may have preferred *sādhyanirdeśa* once according to one version of PSV is thus not of much consequence for our purposes. The scholastic problem of the differences between the Naiyāyika definition and Dignāga's own definition of the thesis were also taken up by Dharmakīrti in PV IV k. 24-26, as well as in k. 164-168 and 171-172, but while the argumentation is complex and not without interest, it is not relevant for our purposes of deciding what role a thesis plays in a *parārthānumāna* for Dignāga. The real question is "Why does he speak of theses at all immediately after giving a definition of *parārthānumāna* which supposedly excludes them from being *sādhana*?" Presumably, PS III k. 2's definition of the thesis meant that Dignāga saw *some* role for a thesis in a *parārthānumāna*.

Concerning Dharmakīrti's account of the reasons for PS III k. 2, PV IV k. 28ab states: *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asamhāya lakṣaṇam /* "Although the *sādhya*-statement is to be understood [by implication from a *parārthānumāna*], the definition [of the thesis in PS III k. 2] is [given] in order to avoid confusion." In brief, following Dharmakīrti and his commentators, the point of the thesis-definition (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*) in PS III is to refute various wrong views on what theses are, some being the views which the Sāṃkhyas and Cārvākas exploited to prove various sophistical conclusions turning on ambiguity, and others being the views on *pratijñā* which Naiyāyikas would use to say that properties of the subject (*dharmin*) which are merely specified in the proponent's treatises also count as part of the thesis. The more than one hundred verses which follow in PV IV treating of PS III k. 2's *pakṣalakṣaṇa* have to be seen in this light.

māna and syllogisms, then, I would maintain that we can profitably disregard the tortuous historical process that it took for the Buddhist writers to work out the implications of their own key ideas. If we wish to speak of a *parārthānumāna* as a logical form and make philosophical analyses about what is and is not crucial to it, we do better to speak about the fully developed form where the extraneous elements, such as the useless *pakṣavacana*, have been consciously eliminated. In discussions on comparative logic there is a certain justifiable simplicity in relegating the Buddhists' actual discovery of their own implicit notions to the domain of an extremely long footnote.

Let us now look at van Bijlert's remarks on (c), the so-called similarities which make it appropriate for us to use the term "syllogism" for *parārthānumāna*. He first gives a paraphrase of Aristotle's definition of the syllogism – "a discourse in which from certain propositions that are laid down something other than what is stated follows of necessity".²⁰ For the rest of the argument let me cite the relevant passage from van Bijlert's pp. 89-90:

"What is important here [in Aristotle's definition of the syllogism in the *Prior Analytics*] is that from general true propositions another proposition generally follows. If this general notion is kept in mind, we are able to see the correspondence of this with the *parārthānumāna*, for in the latter the *drṣṭānta* functions as a proposition enunciating a general *fact* while the *hetu* enunciates a particular *fact*. The thing that was announced for proof follows from both propositions."

Van Bijlert, in brief, is emphasizing that in a *parārthānumāna* too, "the thing that was announced for proof follows from both propositions". Indeed it does. But that is comparatively trivial and was certainly not the point I was driving at. What's important for us – as I insisted in 1984 – is the way in which syllogisms and *parārthānumāna* are evaluated. Let us take this up again from a slightly different angle.

First of all, most of Aristotle's key discussion of syllogisms in the *Prior Analytics* and in particular that concerning the syllogistic figures is comprehensible only if we include the conclusion and premises in a syllogism. We get sentences like "If *A* [is predicated] of no *B*, and *B* of all *C*, it is necessary that *A* will belong to no *C*" where syllogism is said to occur, and other cases where syllogism is said to fail to occur. We cannot understand these occurrences of syllogisms or non-occurrences, or "syllogistic necessity" (to use Lukasiewicz's gloss on the word *ἀνάγκη* figuring in syllogisms), without taking into account the conclusion. Take the syllogism's three figures, which William and Martha Kneale simplify as:

20 Aristotle himself defines it as "discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so" (24b18).

(I)	(II)	(III)
A-B	M-N	T-S
<u>B-C</u>	<u>M-O</u>	<u>P-S</u>
A-C	N-O	T-P

(Here letters show the skeleton of general statements which can be affirmative or negative, universal or particular in accordance with the Square of Opposition. The variables are term variables.²¹) Again it makes no sense to evaluate figures in terms of syllogistic necessity unless we specify which conclusion we are speaking about. Now, I realize that some writers like Lukasiewicz and Bochenski have preferred to take syllogisms as material implications along the lines of “if *P* and *Q* then *R*.” In other words, we are not speaking about validity, as in inferences, but rather of the truth or falsity of a sentence. Dr. T.J. Smiley once proposed the interesting solution that the syllogism be seen as a type of formal deduction, viz. a finite series of well-formed formulae satisfying certain specific conditions. Thus the syllogism would have to be the ordered triple $\langle P, Q, R \rangle$.²² At any rate, whatever be the analysis which we adopt, the conclusion is obviously an integral part of the syllogism. This, then was my point in saying on p. 87: “un syllogisme, quelle que soit notre manière de l’analyser, doit avoir une conclusion.”

Now, I can imagine that at this point someone schooled in traditional logic might argue that all this only serves to show that actually it is the enthymeme (viz. a syllogism-like form where one member is missing) which is a better candidate for a parallel with *parāarthānumāna*. Specifically, it might be argued that a *parāarthānumāna* is like what older logic textbooks²³ would call “an enthymeme of the third order” – those in which the conclusion is the omitted member. This is typically used in cases of innuendo. E.g.

“Cowardice is always contemptible, and this was clearly a case of cowardice.”²⁴

- 21 See p. 68 in William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford, revised edition, 1975.
- 22 For J. Lukasiewicz see Chapter I of his *Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, second edition, Oxford, 1957. See also his “Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik”, *Erkenntnis* 5 (1935), pp. 111-131 for a comparison of the Stoic and Aristotelian syllogisms, the former being inference-schemata involving propositional variables, while the latter are logical theses of the form “if... then ...” containing term variables. On the notions of “necessity” in Aristotle, see also Chapter II in Günther Patzig, *Die Aristotelische Syllogistik*, third and revised edition, Göttingen, 1969. My information on Dr. Smiley’s views is based on notes of his lectures of Lent term 1970.
- 23 See e.g. pp. 154-155 in R.J. McCall, *Basic Logic*. New York: Barnes and Noble. Reprinted in 1961.
- 24 McCall op. cit. p. 155.

Actually shifting to enthymemes changes virtually nothing, for they are simply truncated syllogisms whose necessity is to be judged by that of a corresponding elaborated form. The usual textbook explanation is that we must first determine which member has been omitted, restore it, and then evaluate things in the usual syllogistic fashion: “if the syllogism thereby constructed is formally valid, the original enthymeme is valid, if the syllogism is formally invalid, the original enthymeme is invalid.”²⁵ So, to be blunt, enthymemes are a red herring for this discussion and can best be disregarded.

Now, contrast all this with the Buddhist *parārthānumāna* as we find it already in Dignāga's PS, all of Dharmakīrti and certainly in post-Dharmakīrti logicians, where the validity of the reason and of the *parārthānumāna* which exhibits that reason is not a matter of whether or not the conclusion follows, but whether the *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatva* hold. If we want to judge a *parārthānumāna*'s merits, the main question is whether the reason possesses the triple characterization (*trairūpya*): we can and do judge a *parārthānumāna* without even examining the “necessity” of its “conclusion” at all. Granted in PS and the earlier works of Dharmakīrti the thesis may be present, with the result that a *parārthānumāna* can be judged faulty if there are *pakṣābhāsa*. But this was little more than an inelegance in the system. The gradual elimination of the notion of *pakṣābhāsa* and the growing realization of the redundancy of thesis-statements indicate just how little logical role they played. The streamlined version of the *parārthānumāna* captures all the essential features which Buddhist logic demanded of it. Nor does the *arthāpatti*-version of the way in which a conclusion “follows” from the *parārthānumāna* in any way contradict my fundamental point: we can come to know the truth of the conclusion by *arthāpatti*, but in order to evaluate a *parārthānumāna*, the conclusion plays no indispensable logical role.

So, looking deeper at the respective ways to evaluate syllogisms and Dharmakīrtian *parārthānumānas* we see that the conclusion has a completely different importance in the two sorts of logical forms. This is, in turn, connected with the fact that syllogisms and *parārthānumāna* serve very different roles in widely differing accounts of argumentation, the former providing a type of derivation (à la T.J. Smiley), the latter merely giving a perspicuous presentation of the triply characterized reason, nothing more than a preliminary step to the opponent inferring a conclusion in his own *svārthānumāna* (“inference-for-oneself”).

In short, the whole PS, Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian account of *parārthānumāna* is principally governed by their peculiar account of *sādhana* – something totally foreign to Aristotle – and it is in that sense that we could

25 Ibid. p. 151.

say that the fundamental incommensurability between syllogisms and *parārthānumāna* stems from two different philosophies of logic, or metalogics. The supposed similarity between Aristotelian syllogisms and the Dharmakīrtian *parārthānumāna* is only correct, then, in a trivial sense. No doubt, conclusions do follow from *parārthānumānas*: they are forbidden in the statement of the *parārthānumāna* itself not because they are *non-sequiturs*, but for metalogical considerations about *sādhana*, i.e. about how logic works.

In my 1984 article I insisted upon this incommensurability between syllogisms and *parārthānumāna* not out of nitpicking compulsion for detail, but rather because if we satisfy ourselves with superficial similarities we blur the philosophically interesting point that Buddhist logic is *sui generis*. Thus we preclude meaningful, informed attempts at comparative philosophy. Naturally, if someone wishes to use the word “syllogism” in a new sense and is conscious that the *parārthānumāna* is very different from an Aristotelian syllogism, I'll give him the word. There's clearly no harm here in adhering to Humpty Dumpty's philosophy of language and letting a word mean “just what we choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”²⁶ Far be it from me to prevent writers on Buddhist logic from using “syllogism” in their own way, just as they use “epistemology” to categorize what Dharmakīrti and co. did, even though that use of the term bears little resemblance to Western notions of “epistemology” or “Erkenntnistheorie”, terms which were developed by neo-Kantians in the 19th Century.²⁷ But unfortunately, our secondary literature from Vidyabhusana to Stcherbatsky and onward to van Bijlert is full of evidence that people *did* indeed see *parārthānumāna* as being a kind of quasi-Aristotelian syllogism. And that, I maintain, is a bad misunderstanding.

26 See p. 274 et seq. in Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, Penguin, 1974:

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.'

'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you *can* make words mean so many different things.'

'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master – that's all.'

27 On the development of the Western notion of epistemology, see e.g. Chapter III in R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton, 1980.

Abbreviations

k	<i>kārikā(s)</i> .
Kitagawa	H. Kitagawa, <i>Indokoten ronrigaku no kenkyū</i> : Jinna no taikai, revised edition, Tokyo, 1973. Including a partial edition and translation of PS and PSV.
NB	<i>Nyāyabindu</i> of Dharmakīrti. Ed. by D. Malvania, along with Dharmottara's <i>Nyāyabinduṭīkā</i> and Durveka Miśra's <i>Dharmottarapradīpa</i> . Patna, 1955, reprint. 1971.
NBT	<i>Nyāyabinduṭīkā</i> of Dharmottara.
NM	<i>Nyāyamukha</i> of Dignāga. Ed. and Japanese transl. by S. Katsura, <i>Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū</i> . <i>Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters of Hiroshima University</i> , 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1987. English transl. G. Tucci, <i>The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga</i> , Heidelberg, 1930, reprint. Chinese Materials Center, Taiwan, 1976.
P	Peking edition of the Tibetan canon.
PS	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> of Dignāga. P. 5700.
PSV	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> of Dignāga. PSV(a) transl. by Vasudhararakṣita and Señ rgyal, P. 5701; PSV(b) transl. by Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab, P. 5702. See Kitagawa for partial edition and Japanese translation.
PV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> of Dharmakīrti (PV I = <i>Svārthānumāna</i> ; PV II = <i>Pramāṇasiddhi</i> ; PV III = <i>Pratyakṣa</i> ; PV IV = <i>Parārthānumāna</i>), ed. Y. Miyasaka, <i>Acta Indologica</i> , Narita, 1972.
PVBh	<i>Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya</i> or <i>Vārttikālamkāra</i> of Prajñākaragupta, ed. R. Sāṅkrtyāyana, Patna 1953.
PVin	<i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> of Dharmakīrti. P. 5710.
Tucci	See NM.
WZKS	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens</i> .