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DIGNĀGA AND DHARMAKĪRTI ON
*ADARŚANAMĀTRA AND ANUPALABDHI**

Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima

Recently we have been witnessing a growing interest in Buddhist logic among Buddhologists and have accumulated a considerable amount of knowledge concerning its texts and their authors. Yet we are still far away from reconstructing an accurate history of Buddhist logic in India. One of the main obstacles is that we know very little of some of the important Buddhist logicians, e.g. Īśvarasena, who was a successor of Dignāga (ca. 480-530) and presumably the teacher of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660), and whose works have been completely lost except for some fragments preserved in the works of Dharmakīrti and his interpreters. It is Ernst Steinkellner who first tried to reconstruct Īśvarasena's contributions to Buddhist logic by using the materials he collected from the *Pramānavārttika* chapter 1 with its *Svavṛtti*, Arcāṭa's *Hetubinduḥkā* and other texts. Let us first see the result of his investigation.

“According to Īśvarasena the absence of the probans in the heterologue is proved by a third kind of valid cognition (*pramāṇāntaram*), called non-perception (*anupalabdhiḥ*), which is nothing but mere absence of perception (*upalabdhyabhāvamātram*). In consequence of this new concept Īśvarasena seems to have rethought the whole theory of the infallibility (*avyabhicāra*) of the probans and of the conditions the probans has to fulfil to be considered infallible to the probandum. As a result of his concept of non-perception he taught the infallibility of the probans no longer as with Dignāga to be due to the three marks only, but to at least four marks, the fourth being that its object, the probandum, must not have been cancelled by perception (*abādhitaviśayatvam*).”¹

Later, Steinkellner came to attribute to Īśvarasena the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu*-theory which is discussed in detail towards the end of the *Hetubindu*. According to this theory, the valid logical reason must possess, in addition to the standard three forms (*trairūpyam*), three more forms, viz. *abādhitaviśayatvam* (not being cancelled by perception) mentioned above, *vivakṣitaikasamkhyatvam* (being intended to be one), and *jñātatvam* (being

* This paper was originally read at the 33rd International Conference for Asian and North African Studies held at the University of Toronto in August, 1990.

1 “Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund”, WZKSO 10, 1969, p. 84.

known).² In this paper I would like to demonstrate that Īśvarasena's theory of 'non-perception', discovered by Steinkellner, can be traced back to Dignāga at least in part, and that Dharmakīrti's theory of 'non-perception' seems to have had a germ in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*.

As I discussed elsewhere³ Indian logicians had gradually developed the theories of how to justify their logical proof or inference. By the time of Dignāga it seems that two theories had already appeared, somewhat independently. One was the theory of *trairūpya* according to which the valid logical reason (*hetu*) had to possess the three forms, viz. *pakṣadharmatvam* (being a property of the topic of the proof), *sapakṣe sattvam* (presence in the similar instances) and *vipakṣe asattvam* (absence in the dissimilar instances). The other was the theory of *avinābhāva* (*/nāntarīyakatva/avyabhicāra*), according to which the valid inference had to be based on the inevitable/necessary relation between the inferential mark (*liṅga*) and what is to be inferred (*liṅgin*). The former theory was, if not supported, at least known to Asaṅga⁴, and the latter was clearly found in the logical works of Vasubandhu.⁵

It was Dignāga who combined these two theories. Namely, by introducing the restrictive particle *eva* into the second and the third form of *trairūpya*, he could claim that the theory of *trairūpya* implied that of *avinābhāva*. I believe that Dignāga was the first Indian logician who established the theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*) as the foundation of his theories of logical proof and inference.⁶

Now, Dignāga justified proof and inference by the theory of pervasion. But how could he justify the latter? What guaranteed the pervasion of the probans by the probandum in Dignāga's system of logic? In a stock example of Indian proof, the existence of a remote fire is proved by the observation of a column of smoke arising from the area concerned.

2 "Remarks on *niścitagrahana*", *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae Dicata*, Roma 1988, p. 1438, fn. 47. Cf. E. Steinkellner, ed., *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*, Teil I, Wien, 1967, SS. 28*-35*; Teil II, S. 193.

3 "The Origin and Development of the Concept of *vyāpti* in Indian Logic" (in Japanese), *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō*, Vol. 45, Special Supplement 1, 1986, ps. 122; for the English summary, see "On the Origin and Development of the Concept of *vyāpti* in Indian Logic," *Tetsugaku*, Hiroshima Tesugakukai, Vol. 38, 1986, ps. 16.

4 See S. Katsura, "On *Trairūpya* Formulae," *Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions: Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday*, Kyoto 1985, p. 166.

5 See S. Katsura, "On the Origin and Development of the Concept of *vyāpti* in Indian Logic," p. 5.

6 See *Ibid.*, pp. 5-10.

Dignāga justified this procedure by the supposition that the domain of smoke is pervaded by the domain of fire in our universe of discourse, or more precisely, in our 'inductive' domain. But how could he justify such a pervasion?

Since Dignāga criticized the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyaas who claimed that their proof and inference were based on such logical connections (*sambandha*) as causation, inherence, owner-owned relation, etc.,⁷ he could not insist that the domain of smoke was pervaded by the domain of fire because the former was caused by the latter. Dignāga naturally knew what Cardona has called the "inductive reasoning of India", the *anvaya-vyatireka* method, viz. under the condition that x is present when y is present, and x is absent when y is absent, there is some relationship between x and y, such as x is caused by y or x is the meaning of a linguistic item y.⁸ As a matter of fact, the second and the third form of *trairūpya* respectively represent *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Nonetheless, Dignāga does not seem to have made any formal attempt to try to justify his theory of pervasion.

It is now well known that Dharmakīrti introduced the notion of *svabhāvapratibandha* ("essential connection") as a basis for *avinābhāva/vyāpti*, thus providing the ontic foundation for valid reasoning.⁹ When there are two different items x and y, if and only if x is

7 See Ibid., pp. 4-5. Cf. *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* chapter 2, *paramata* section; Muni Jambuvijayaji, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kanāda*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 136, 1961, Baroda, pp. 184-196 and E. Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassischen Sāṃkhyasystems," WZKSO 2, 1958.

8 See G. Cardona, "On Reasoning from Anvaya and Vyatireka in Early Advaita", *Studies in Indian Philosophy*, Ahmedabad, 1981.

9 There has been a considerable amount of literature published concerning how to interpret the term *svabhāvapratibandha*, beginning with E. Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti," WZKS 15, 1971. During the 2nd International Dharmakīrti Conference held in Vienna, June 1989, we had a debate on this topic and came to realize that there were at least two opposing views; namely, one held that *svabhāvapratibandha* represented the state of affairs in reality (: how things are and how they are connected to each other) and the other held that the term meant a logical concept, i.e. the necessary connection between the probans and the probandum (thus, somewhat synonymous with *avinābhāva/avyabhicāra/niyama/vyāpti*). Steinkellner playfully named the former *sambandhavāda* and the latter *vyāptivāda*.

In my paper: "Svabhāvapratibandha revisited," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 35-1, 1986, I once criticized Steinkellner's ontic interpretation of the term and naturally supported the *vyāptivāda* in Vienna last year. Since then, however, I came across *Pramānavārttika* IV.202-207 (the first three verses correspond to *Pramānaviniścaya* III.37-39) which converted me to the *sambandhavāda*. I would like to discuss these verses in a future paper, and just like to mention the following chain of related concepts in the order of

the result (*kārya*) of *y*, the observance of *x* can make us infer the existence of *y*, for the domain of the result is naturally pervaded by that of the cause. And when *x* and *y* represent two conceptually distinguished properties (*svabhāva*) of one and the same item in reality, the observance of *x* makes us infer the existence of *y* in the same item, provided that the domain of *x* is regarded as being pervaded by the domain of *y* in our common sense. The former connection, i.e. causality (*tadutpatti*), is determined by the above-mentioned *anvayavyatireka* method.¹⁰ Dharmakīrti considers that either three or five successive perceptions and non-perceptions can determine the causality between two items. In order to establish the latter connection, i.e. identity (*tādātmya*), on the other hand, Dharmakīrti finally in the *Hetubindu* introduced a kind of hypothetical reasoning named *viparyaye bādhakapramānam* (the negative proof with reference to the contradictory).¹¹

As Steinkellner says, in the *Pramānavārttika* chapter 1 and *Svavṛtti* as well as in the *Pramānaviniścaya* chapter 2,

“Dharmakīrti applies all possible means of his exegetical art to prove that Dignāga’s theory of the logical reason (*hetu*) is impossible without the assumption of an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) as a basis of the logical nexus (*niyama*).”¹²

This is because, as Steinkellner has at various times indicated, Dharmakīrti had to refute Īśvarasena’s theory that the negative concomitance (*vyatireka* or the absence of the reason in the dissimilar instances) could be determined by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātreṇa*). In this connection, Dharmakīrti even quoted a passage from Dignāga’s *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* chapter 2 where Dignāga criticized the Vaiśeṣikas who negated the existence of a special touch-sensation of the wind in visible substances by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātreṇa*).¹³

the preceding being the basis of the following: *tādātmya* & *tadutpatti* → *svabhāvapratibandha* → *avinābhāva/avyabhicāra/niyama/vyāpti* → *gamyagamakabhāva/sādhyasādhanabhāva*.

10 See Y. Kajiyama, “*Trikapañcakacintā*: Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality,” *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotensia*, 4-5, 1963.

11 E. Steinkellner, ed., *Hetubindu*, Teil I, p. 4*; cf. Steinkellner, “The Logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanyāya*,” Proceedings of the 2nd International Dharmakīrti Conference, 1991 Wien, p. 311ff.

12 “Remarks on *niścitagrahana*”, p. 1433.

13 See *Pramānavārttika-Svavṛtti*, ed. Gnoli, Roma 1960, p. 14: *yady adarśanamātreṇa drṣtebhyah pratishedhaḥ kriyate / na ca so 'pi yuktah* = *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* (Peking

Thus, if we follow Dharmakīrti's interpretation, Īśvarasena might seem to have significantly deviated from Dignāga's system of logic. However, I do not think that is the case. If we look at the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* chapter 5, where Dignāga discussed his semantic theory, i.e. the Apoha doctrine, we come across the forerunner of the *adarśanamātra* theory. For example, Dignāga says:

“A linguistic item (*śabda*) expresses its object(*artha*) in two ways, viz. *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. And they are defined as ‘application to the similar’ (*tulye vṛttih*) and ‘non-application to the dissimilar’ (*atulye vṛttih*), respectively. Of them, regarding the similar, it is not necessary to mention the application (or *anvaya*) to all instances, for they are in some cases infinite in number and impossible to mention every object. Regarding the dissimilar, however, although infinite, it is possible to mention the non-application (or *vyatireka*) on the basis of mere non-perception (*adarśanamātreṇa*). Therefore, as [a linguistic item] is not perceived elsewhere from that to which it is related, the inference which excludes the [other] (*tadvyavacchedānumāna*) is called ‘expression of its own object’.”¹⁴

Here Dignāga is claiming that *vyatireka* can be confirmed by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātreṇa*). Although the above passage deals with the problem of the *śabda-artha* relation, I believe the general principle expressed there can be extended to the case of inference and proof, for,

110a5): gal te ma mthong ba tsam gyis ma mthong ba 'gag pa byed na de yang mi rigs te (Cf. Peking 29a1-2: ma mthong ba tsam gyis mthong ba las log par grub pa'i phyir ro // de ltar yang rigs pa ma yin te), English translation by R. Hayes, “Dinnāga's Views on Reasoning (*Svārthānumāna*),” JIPh 8-3, 1980, p. 250: “Q: Suppose one argues that touch is denied in visible substances just on the ground that it is invisible itself. A: That also is incorrect.” For the recent discussion of this passage, see Shōshin Nozawa, “The Theory of Inference in Chapter II-1 of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*” (in Japanese), *Indian Philosophy and Buddhism, Essays in Honour of Prof. K. Fujita on his sixtieth Birthday*, 1989 Kyoto, pp. 172-175.

- 14 *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ad V.34: *śabdasyānvayavyatirekāv arthābhīdhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛtyavṛtī, tatra tulye nāvaśyam sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā, kvacit ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇāvṛtter ākhyānam. ata eva svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānam svārthābhīdhānam ity ucyate.* This is a Sanskrit reconstruction made by E. Frauwallner, “Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,” WZKSO 3, p. 101. For the Tibetan version, see M. Hattori, ed., *The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's Commentary, Chapter Five: Anyāpohaparīkṣā, Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments. Memoirs of The Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University*, No. 21, 1982, pp. 134-135. For other translations, see R. Herzberger, *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*, Studies of Classical India 8, Dordrecht 1986, p. 161 and R. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, Studies of Classical India 9, Dordrecht 1988, pp. 297-298.

as is well known, Dignāga saw no essential difference between inferential and verbal knowledge because he thought they function on the same principle, i.e. 'exclusion of others' (*anyāpoha/anyavyavaccheda*).¹⁵ Therefore, I do not consider that Īśvarasena was guilty of misinterpreting Dignāga in this respect.

In a recent paper of mine¹⁶ I suggested that the above passage might indicate that Dignāga's system of logic was of a purely hypothetical nature. In other words, our inference is valid as long as a counterexample is not discovered. I don't think this is completely off the mark, if we take into account the inductive nature of Dignāga's system of logic. As I mentioned earlier, Dignāga did not resort to any specific relations, such as causation, in order to justify his theory of *vyāpti*, the core of his logic. I believe that his final recourse in determining the pervasion between two items was people's common sense or the way they used their own language (*lokavyavahāra* or *lokaprasiddhi*).

Then what was the original contribution of Īśvarasena on this matter? He must have inherited the idea of mere non-perception from Dignāga. However, he gave it the status of a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*); thus he admitted a third type of *pramāṇa* in addition to Dignāga's perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). By doing so, I think, Īśvarasena believed that he could firmly establish the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) and the pervasion between two items, so that he could remove the hypothetical and inductive nature of Dignāga's logic.

As I mentioned before, Dharmakīrti strongly criticized the above theory of mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) in the *Pramānavārttika-Svavṛtti* as well as in the *Pramānaviniścaya* chapter 2.¹⁷ It is most curious why Dharmakīrti, in this context, did not refer to the above-quoted *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* ad V.34. This becomes even stranger when we consider the fact that Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsaka who was more or less contemporary with Dharmakīrti, explicitly referred to and criticized that passage of Dignāga.¹⁸ Perhaps Dharmakīrti did not want to criticize

15 See *Pramānasamuccaya* V.1: *na pramānāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat(or sah) / kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* // Hattori, ed., p. 107 fn. (1).

16 "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha," Proceedings of the 2nd International Dharmakīrti Conference, Wien 1991, p. 129ff.

17 For detail, see Steinkellner's article mentioned in footnote 1 as well as his German translation of the *Pramānaviniścaya* chapter 2, Wien 1979, p. 112ff.

18 *Ślokavārttika*, Apoha v. 75: *na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyām pratyāyanam bhavet / sarvatraiva hy adṛstatvāt pratyāyyam nāvaśisyate* // M. Hattori, "Mīmāṃsāśīlokavārttika, Apohavāda-shō no kenkyū (II)", *Memoirs of The Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University*, No. 15, 1975, pp. 11-12; cf. *Anumāna* v. 131c-132: *aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy*

his great predecessor Dignāga directly. As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti often tried to prove that he was the correct interpreter as well as the most legitimate successor of Dignāga, although his system of logic shows a clear departure from that of Dignāga. For example, in the *Pramānavārttika* chapter 4, Dharmakīrti indicated that Dignāga's well-known Wheel of Reasons (*hetucakra*) in essence implied the two kinds of his valid reasons, viz. *kārya* and *svabhāva*.¹⁹ In any case, by attacking Īśvarasena's theory of *adarśanamātra*, while ignoring the possible conflict between the implication of the *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* ad V.34 and his own position of *svabhāvavpratibandha*, Dharmakīrti, I believe, implicitly criticized Dignāga's whole system of logic.

Although Dharmakīrti denied Īśvarasena's claim that non-existence could be established by the third *pramāna*, i.e. mere non-perception, he must have realized the necessity of proving non-existence, a problem which does not seem to have been fully discussed by Dignāga. Thus non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) became one of the main logical notions which Dharmakīrti developed throughout his career.

Dharmakīrti recognized two kinds of non-perception, viz. *drśyānupalabdhi* (non-perception of a perceptible object, such as a pot), and *adrśyānupalabdhi* (non-perception of an imperceptible object, such as the remote past or a future event or a ghost). Both have the same function of preventing us from treating such objects as existent (*sadvyavahārapratishedha*). But only *drśyānupalabdhi* can determine the non-existence. In other words, when all conditions for perception, e.g. enough light, attention, etc., are present (*upalabdhilakṣanaprāpta*), then if a pot is not perceived at a certain spot, we can safely determine that the pot is non-existent at that spot. However, we cannot do the same thing with a ghost. A ghost, which is by nature beyond our ordinary perception, cannot be convincingly determined by non-perception as existent or as non-existent. Dharmakīrti regarded *drśyānupalabdhi* as a third type of logical reason, one destined for proving the non-existence of an object; it was a type of reason in addition to *kārya* and *svabhāva*, which were meant for proving the existence of an object.²⁰ In this way Dharmakīrti

adarśanāt // sādhanē yady apīsto 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati / tāvatā na hy anarīgatvam yuktih śābde hi vaksyate // Sh. Yamakami, et al., "Ślokāvārttika, anumāna-shō no kenkyū (III)". *Indo Shisōshi Kenkyū* 4, Kyoto 1985, p. 21. See also *Nyāyaratnākara* ad the latter.

19 See *Pramānavārttika* IV.195-204; cf. M. Ono, "Dharmakīrti no Kukūin kaishaku," *Hikaku Shisō no Michi* 4, Tsukuba, 1985, pp. 81-85.

20 Dharmakīrti's three-fold division of valid reasons is a kind of cross-classification and *anupalabdhi* is in fact included in *svabhāva*. See e.g. *Pramānavārttika* IV.260.

succeeded in incorporating non-perception into his theory of inference and proof without committing himself to the third type of *pramāna*.

The division of objects into *drśya* and *adrśya* seems to have played an important role in determining the scope of Dharmakīrti's epistemology and logic. For him the objective field of the valid means of knowledge may be divided into two classes, viz. one to which we can have an access through our ordinary sense organs (*drśya*) and one which is beyond our ordinary experience (*adrśya = atyantaparokṣa*). Objects belonging to the former class can be known either by perception, if they are in the perceptible environment (*pratyakṣa*), or by a kind of inference which functions by force of reality (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), if they happen to be out of this environment (*parokṣa*). Objects belonging to the latter class may include such controversial doctrinal entities as 'other continua' (*santānāntara*), 'other worlds' (*paraloka*), etc. Their existence, although absolutely obscure, can be proved, according to Dharmakīrti, by another kind of inference which is based on scripture (*āgamāsritānumāna*).²¹ Judging from the proof of other continua presented by Dharmakīrti in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, I consider that the second kind of inference essentially consists in what we call 'Proof by Analogy.'²² Dharmakīrti naturally denies the authority of the scriptures of other schools on the ground that they contain the statements which contradict our ordinary valid experiences. Consequently, he rejects the proofs presented by other schools with reference to their metaphysical entities, such as *ākāśa* and *ātman*. In the *Pramānavārttika* chapter 4 Dharmakīrti discusses this interesting problem of how to assess different sets of scriptures, a problem which I would like to deal with in a future paper.

Concerning non-perception, there is another important distinction between Īśvarasena and Dharmakīrti. As the expression '*adarśanamātra*' suggests, the former takes non-perception as pure negation (*prasajyapratishedha*), while the latter, at least in the *Hetubindu*, regards it as relative negation (*paryudāsa*), for he defines non-perception of x to be perception of something other than x (*anyopalabdhir anupalabdhih*).²³

In this connection it may be interesting to note that the notion of *anupalabdhī* was not completely unknown to Dignāga. In his first

21 Cf. Tom Tillemans, "Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on Scriptural Authority", *Tetsugaku* 38, 1986, pp. 31-47.

22 Cf. S. Katsura, "Dharmakīrti's Santānāntarasiddhi — Japanese translation and Synopsis —", *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu kiyō* 43, 1983.

23 *Hetubindu*, ed. by Steinkellner, p. 21*: *anyopalabdhir anupalabdhih, vivakṣitopalabdher anyatvād abhaksyāsparśanīyavat paryudāsavṛtyā*.

systematic treatise on logic, *Nyāyamukha*, he presented the following arguments:²⁴

“Now, the principle of presenting a property of the subject of a thesis (*paksadharmā* = *hetu*) is that one should prove one property (*[sādhyā]dharma*) by taking another property (*[sādhana]dharma*) as its reason.²⁵

[Opponents:] But suppose that we are to prove [not a property but] a property-possessor (*dharmin*, i.e. the subject of a thesis itself) to be existent or non-existent. For example, some [=the Sāṃkhya] argue:

[Thesis] The Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) exists.

[Reason] Because we see that the various individuals possess a [similar] general characteristic.²⁶

while some [others=the opponents] argue:

[Thesis] [The Primordial Matter] does not exist.

[Reason] Because we do not perceive it.

(*na santi pradhānādayo 'nupalabdheh*)²⁷

How do you explain this?

[Answer:] For them, [as for the first syllogism,] they should formulate the thesis as ‘The various individuals certainly possess one and the same cause [i.e., *pradhāna*],²⁸ in which case they do not prove [directly the existence of] the Primordial Matter [i.e. *dharmin*]; hence, there is no error [of the violation of the above-mentioned principle]. [As for the second syllogism,] when they argue that [The Primordial Matter] does not exist [because of non-perception], ‘non-perception’ is a property of the imagined object [i.e. *pradhāna*] (*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah*)²⁹; hence, there is no error of [admitting] the existence of a property-possessor [= the subject of a thesis, whose existence they do not accept].”

24 See Taishō No. 1628, p. 1b²⁷-c⁴; G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Heidelberg, 1930, pp. 16-17; S. Katsura, “Inmyōshōrimonron Kenkyū (II),” *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 38, 1978, pp. 110-111.

Cf. H. Yaita, “Hosshō no Hininshiki,” *Prof. Ryōkai Makio Festschrift*, 1984, pp. 35-45; “On *anupalabdhi*, annotated translation of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramānavārttikasvavrtti* (I),” *Taishō Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyūronshū* 9, 1985, pp. 1-18; “Do. (II),” *Chizan Gakuhō* 34, 1985, pp. 1-14.

25 Cf. *Nyāyamukha* v.3 = *Pramānasamuccaya* III.13: *na dharmī dharminā na dharmas tena dharmy api / dharmena dharmah sādhyas tu sādhyatvād dharminas tathā // = Dvādaśāram Nayacakram* pt. 2, ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavnagar 1976, p. 693.

26 Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 15-16: *bhedānām ... samanvayāt ... kāraṇam asty avyaktam*.

27 Quoted in the *Pramānavārttika-svavrtti*, p. 105. Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 8: *saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhir nābhāvāt*.

28 Cf. *Sāṃkhyacandrikā* ad *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 15: *... vyāvṛttānām eṣām tatsamānasvabhāvāika-kāraṇakatvam āvaśyakam, tac ca kāraṇam yogyatayā pradhānam eva*.

29 Quoted in the *Pramānavārttika-svavrtti*, p. 107.

In Dignāga's system of logic, the subject of a thesis must be accepted as a real entity by both parties of a debate. Therefore, the second syllogism mentioned above presents a serious problem to Dignāga, for the Primordial Matter of the Sāṃkhya school is, by their definition, beyond our ordinary experience and cannot be accepted as real by their opponents. In the above passage, however, he seems to allow that it can be the subject of a negative proposition, although it is an imagined object. Unfortunately, Dignāga did not elaborate on this important topic. In his main work of logic, the *Pramāna-samuccayavṛtti* chapter 2, on the other hand, Dignāga plainly denies that 'the Primordial Matter' is a subject of inference,³⁰ and in chapter 3, where he presents the parallel discussion to the above quotation, he tacitly drops the second syllogism from his argument.³¹ This may suggest that at the end of his career Dignāga abandoned his position in the *Nyāyamukha*, where he accepted an imagined subject of a negative proposition, in order to adopt the more rigid attitude towards the real accessibility of the subject of a debate. In any case his system of logic does not seem to be much concerned with negative propositions and negative judgements.

In his first work on logic, the *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti*, when Dharmakīrti for the first time tried to establish his new theory of non-perception, he referred to and fully discussed the second syllogism of the *Nyāyamukha* quoted above.³² Dharmakīrti came to the conclusion that the subject of a proposition, either positive or negative, could only be a mere conceptual construction which was an object of our verbal discourse (*śabdārtha*); here Dharmakīrti's new interpretation of *apoha* doctrine played a key role. I suspect that the above passage of the *Nyāyamukha* might have had some impact upon the formation of Dharmakīrti's new system of logic. It is a little ironical that Dharmakīrti seems to have started with what Dignāga had once hinted at and finally dismissed.

30 Peking 111a5: phyogs 'dis ni gtso bo la sogs pa'i rang bzhin rnams la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no; English Translation by Hayes, "Dignāga's view on Reasoning," p. 252: "This view denies inference with respect to such things as (the Sāṃkhya) thesis of Primordial Substance (because it has never been seen before)."

31 Peking 128b6-8: chos can yang des min / chos kyi(s) chos can yang bsgrub pa ma yin te (/) dper na gtso bo gcig yod pa yin te / khyad par rnams la rjes su 'gro ba mthong ba'i phyir ro zhes bya ba lta bu'o // de ni khyad par rnams kho na rgyu gcig pa can nyid du bsgrub par bya ba yin te / der yang gyo mo la sogs pa'i rgyu gcig pa nyid dper byed pa yin no // de'i phyir chos gzhan kho na bsgrub par bya ba yin no //

32 For detail, see H. Yaita's articles mentioned in footnote 24.