

# On the Vaiesikastra 1.2.3

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Objektyp: **Article**

Zeitschrift: **Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen  
Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société  
Suisse-Asie**

Band (Jahr): **48 (1994)**

Heft 2: **Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaiesika , Hong Kong, August  
1993**

PDF erstellt am: **10.08.2024**

Persistenter Link: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-147111>

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## ON THE VAIŚEŚIKASŪTRA 1.2.3

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The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (henceforth VS) 1.2.3 reads *sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*. There is no difference of text among versions, but on interpretation there is a great discrepancy among modern scholars.<sup>1</sup> Most of the problem lies in the understanding of the compound word *buddhyapekṣam*, especially the latter part *apekṣā*. I will first examine the meaning of this term in reference to the theory of causation of the Vaiśeṣika, and then proceed to discuss the relation of this sūtra with sūtras 1.2.1,2, and 8.5,12 in an attempt to determine the purport of this sūtra.

The compound *x-apekṣa* is often translated as 'dependent on x,' and so such relevant expressions as *sāpekṣa* and *anapekṣa* are understood in line with this and translated as 'dependent' and 'independent' respectively. Although this means that the core concept of *apekṣā* denotes 'dependence,' it cannot be directly derived from its root *apa-√īkṣ* (to look around, expect). This understanding is, not to say a total misconception, sometimes rather misleading in that it obscures the status of *apekṣā* in the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation which is not always explicit on the surface of exposition and often lies in the deep context.

On the Buddhist theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), it is admitted that an effect requires or waits for (*apekṣate*) causes and causal conditions, but not that causes require or wait for the cooperatives, since it entails the recognition of the duration of an entity. Against this, the Vaiśeṣikas recognize *apekṣā* in both ways. An entity has as its own innate nature the opera-

1 Uī, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, London 1917, pp. 173, 174, Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam 1918, p. 289, Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, Oxford 1921, p. 192, Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, Cambridge 1922, p. 286, Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, London 1923, p. 209, Randle, *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, London 1930, p. 133, 134, Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Poona 1947, p. 19, Frauwallner, *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, II. Band, Salzburg 1956, p. 147, Narain, *Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology*, Varanasi 1976, pp. 207f, Nakamura, 'Vaiśeṣika Tetsugaku niokeru Huhē to Tokushu,' (in Japanese) *Felicitation Volume for Dr. Katsumata*, 1981, p. 510, Matilal, *Perception*, Oxford 1986, p. 380, Takenaka, 'Go no Hyōji Taishō,' (in Japanese) *Indo Sisō* 3, Tokyo 1989, p. 92, Murakami, 'Gainen to sono Taishō,' (in Japanese) *Essays in Honor of Prof. Fujita*, Kyoto 1989, p. 86, Halbfass, *On Being and What There Is*, New York 1992, p. 116.

tive efficiency (*atiśaya*) or causal efficiency (*śakti*) which makes it operative to produce an effect. It is, however, not actualized without being in association with the cooperative causes, so that in fact it belongs also to a full set of causal factors, i.e. the operative cause and the cooperatives (*sāmagrī*). Therefore the operative cause requires or waits for the cooperative causes arising at subsequent moments and the cooperatives also require the operative cause so as to be efficient. Because of this relation of requiring one another (*parasparāpekṣa*)<sup>2</sup> among the operative cause and the cooperatives, they conceive an entity not to be momentary (*kṣanika*) but durable (*sthira*) at least for several moments until the cooperative causes appear.

It should be noted that there is a crucial difference between Vyomaśiva's and Śrīdhara's views on causation. On the former's theory the operative efficiency is actualized at the moment a full set of causal factors (*sāmagrī*) is completed, so the product arises at the next moment of the occurrence of the final cooperative cause, while on the latter theory the operative efficiency appears while the cause is in association with the cooperatives, so the product arises by degrees in the process of assembling the cooperative causes. This difference is clearly reflected in their interpretation of VS 10.7. Vyomaśiva reads the sūtra as follows:

Before the final conjunction of threads arises threads require [conjunction] and are not formative of cloth. But since these kinds of threads [requiring conjunction] are determinately possessed of the potentiality of producing another cloth [than what has already been formed], they are needed for bringing about the final conjunction of threads. When it [i.e. the final conjunction of threads] arises, [the threads] are without any requirement [to be fulfilled]. And right after this they form cloth, therefore when producing a substance, conjunction is without any requirement. And hence [in this case] there is no other causal efficiency (*śakti*) than the final conjunction, because it has been explained in the section of earth that the causal efficiency takes the form of a cooperative cause arising subsequently.<sup>3</sup>

- 2 There appears an expression *parasparāpekṣā* in NVT 841.22 and NK 74.10, which must be the same as *itaretarābhisambandha* of Vyo I,60.24. When the operative cause and cooperative causes are related to one another or stand in the relation of requiring one another, they form a full collection of causal factors which is efficient to produce an effect. Although this relation of *parasparāpekṣā* among them sounds like a logical fallacy of *anyonyāśraya*, this is totally a different case from that. The fallacy of *anyonyāśraya* or *itaretarāpekṣa* consists in forming a relation in which two relative terms require each other either for themselves to be known or to be produced or to be continued. Here the relation of requiring one another among the operative cause and cooperative causes is called for to actualize the causal efficiency in cooperation with one another, and so it is not a case of the fallacy of mutual dependence.

- 3 Vyo II,64.26.

Here production is regarded as occurring at the moment following completion of a full set of causal factors, while in the explanation by Śrīdhara it is conceived to occur in the process of assembling cooperative causes:

This sūtra (VS 10.7) means that, just as the notion that cloth will be produced arises from [perceiving] threads prepared for cloth (VS 10.6), the notion that cloth is being produced arises from [perceiving] those [threads not yet woven and so] requiring [conjunction] and those [threads already woven and so] not requiring any more [conjunction]. Otherwise the notion of the present arising from [perceiving] those threads with requirement [to be fulfilled] and those without any requirement would never be possible. That is to say, when some of the threads are in conjunction and others are not, then the notion that cloth is being produced arises from [perceiving] those threads. In this sūtra the word *anapekṣa* is used for such threads that are in mutual conjunction, therefore conjunction is known to be without any requirement [to be fulfilled] when forming a substance. This is the purport of the sūtra.<sup>4</sup>

The origin of this difference must have lain in an earlier stage of the history of this school, since this diversity of opinions on production can be traced back to much older texts such as Vasu's commentary on the \**Śatasāstra*:

(Opponent) There is no flaw in our theory, because the first, second and last parts [of a pot] are produced in due course.

[A pot is] made of clay in due course. First the bottom, then the belly, the neck, and lastly the mouth is produced. The first, second and last parts arise in due course. It is not that a pot is produced [all at once] at the next moment of clay. Therefore a pot does not arise at the moment of clay, nor does it arise at the moment of a pot. And again it is not that a pot does not arise at all.

(Proponent) The first, second and last parts are not produced in due course.

The first is named the moment which has no previous moment and has a subsequent moment. The second is named the moment which has a previous moment and a subsequent moment. And the last is named the moment which has a previous moment and has no subsequent moment. According to what you say the

4 NK 142.15. Also see NK 76.22: *sahakārisāhitye sati kāryakaraṇasvabhāvo hi bhāvo nānapekṣakāraṇasvarūpaḥ. tasya yathānvayavyatirekāvagatasāmarthyāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ sannipatanti tathā kāryotpattir ity upapadyate sthirasyāpi krameṇa karaṇam.* Candrānanda gives a similar explanation to Śrīdhara's on VS 10.7:

Likewise the notion 'exist', arises from [perceiving] those [threads] requiring [conjunction] and those [threads] not requiring [any more conjunction]. (VS 10.7)

When one perceives threads prepared for cloth and requiring conjunction to the previous ones and then sees them connected one after another and being not in need of any more conjunction, then the cognition that a product exists, or that a product is produced arises to him by looking at an intermediate product, i.e. part of cloth and by considering that some conjunction has been completed and some conjunction has not yet completed in the product substance being produced. (C 73.14-17)

first, second and last moments must require each other. But when each of these three stands independently, how is it possible to require each other? Therefore the first, second and last parts are not produced in due course.

If you say that a pot arises at the same time as its completion, it is not correct either.

If it arose at the same time as its completion, you could not say, 'This is the first part of a pot,' 'This is the second part,' and 'This is the last part.' And these three parts cannot require each other. Therefore it is not correct.<sup>5</sup>

There seems to be no direct definition of *apekṣā* in the Vaiśeṣika literature, but there are some significant explanations on *anapekṣa*. This term plays a very important role in the definitions of quality and action, since the difference of these two categories lies mainly in the point that quality is defined as *saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣaḥ* (1.1.15), while action is *saṃyogavibhāgeṣv anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam* (1.1.16).<sup>6</sup>

Here again discrepancy is found in the historical understanding of the term *anapekṣa*. Uddyotakara explains *anapekṣa* as 'being not in need of any requirement appearing subsequently,'<sup>7</sup> and Vyomaśiva and Udayana apply this interpretation of *anapekṣa* to the reading of a phrase *dravyārambhe nirapekṣaḥ* in the *saṃyoga* section of PDh,<sup>8</sup> while Śrīdhara states that this *nirapekṣa* means 'being not in need of any other requirement than its own substratum and the requirement for producing itself.'<sup>9</sup> But this difference is not so much important as far as the concept of *apekṣā* is concerned, because the basic function of *apekṣā* in the theory of causation includes no significant difference.

These instances clearly reveal the status of *apekṣā* in the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. When something *x* requires no cooperative cause so as to produce something *z*, *x* is called *anapekṣa* or *nirapekṣa*. When *x* requires some cooperative cause *y* so as to produce *z*, *x* is called *sāpekṣa* or *y-apekṣā* and *y* is termed *apekṣā* and *z* is *y-apekṣa*. And if *y* stands last in a chain of cooperative causes, or if *y* is not in need of any other cooperative cause, it is

5 Taisho 1569, p. 178b13. Tucci, *Śataśāstra*, GOS 49, Baroda 1929, p. 67. See also Halbfass, p. 179.

6 Note that this *anapekṣa* is not the adjective of *kāraṇa*, therefore the import is not that there are two kinds of cause, i.e. *sāpekṣakāraṇa* and *anapekṣakāraṇa* which are of later origin, but that only some qualities with requirements are the cause of conjunction and disjunction, while action is the cause of conjunction and disjunction without any requirement.

7 NV 482.4.

8 Vyo II,64.22, Kir 144.10.

9 NK 142.8.

called *anapekṣa* or *nirapekṣa* in terms of *z*, although *y* itself calls for its own requirement to be produced and may be called something-*apekṣa* in terms of its own causes. As a compound *nimittāpekṣatva* is translated as ‘das Erfordern einer Ursache’ in PW, *apekṣā* means ‘requiring’ or more often than not ‘what is required’ or ‘requirement.’ This goes well throughout all the cases where *apekṣā* is used in reference to the causal relations in the Vaiśeṣika literature. Even the famous elusive term *apekṣābuddhi* is understood in this way: i.e. two ones (*x*) require the cognition of ‘two ones’ (*y*) as cooperative cause for producing the number two (*z*), so *y* is called *apekṣābuddhi* (cognition as requirement) and *z* is *buddhyapekṣa* (having cognition as requirement). This understanding is consistent with the usual translation of *apekṣā* in Chinese 觀待 which means ‘looking around and waiting.’

The compound word *buddhyapekṣa* appears once in PDh on p. 99.11, which apparently seems to give a strong basis for the nominalistic/conceptualistic interpretation of 1.2.3.

Farness, nearness, the number two, two-individuality and so forth are *buddhyapekṣa* (those having cognition as requirement for coming into existence).

Insofar as these qualities stand before a cognizer as perceptible objects to form the connection with the sense, the mind and the self (or cognizer), they must be taken as objectively real just like universals. It is, however, reported by Śrīdhara that these qualities produced by cognition exist only for those who cognize them,<sup>10</sup> which may suggest that the reality of these products of cognition is, not to say purely subjective, fairly tintured with subjectivity. It would seem natural that when one reads VS 1.2.3 based on this part of PDh, he is led to the nominalistic/conceptualistic interpretation.

When VS is read with the help of the established system of PDh, this much can be said with certainty: it is inappropriate to apply this understanding of *buddhyapekṣa* in PDh to VS 1.2.3, because there is a marked difference between the eternity of universals and the non-eternity of these products of cognition, and that universals, which are eternal and are never produced by anything, when arising, are said to be only manifested by a manifesting agent, i.e. their substratum. Nevertheless there is no reference to the eternity of universals in VS, which seems to encourage the nominalistic/conceptualistic interpretation. But before jumping to the conclusion a close examination should be required as to the situations in which *apekṣā* is utilized.

10 NK 116.13.

There is an interesting reference to the concept *apekṣā* used in terms of causal relation in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.

*Apekṣā* is of two kinds: 1) *apekṣā* concerning production (*utpattyapekṣā*) and 2) *apekṣā* concerning designation (*prajñāptyapekṣā*). Between these two, the *apekṣā* concerning production is such that when there is production of the [five] constituent groups of being (*skandhāḥ*) due to causes and causal conditions, the causes and the causal conditions are required for the production of the [five] constituent groups of being. [And the *apekṣā* concerning designation is such that] when there is designation of the [five] constituent groups of being due to the collection of names, the collection of phrases and the collection of letters, the three collections of names, phrases and letters are required for the designation of the [five] constituent groups of being.<sup>11</sup>

And the *Nyāyakośa* reports evidently a recent but similar theory that *apekṣā*, as a causing factor (*prayojaka*), is used in the three kinds of causation, i.e. that of knowledge (*jñāna*), of continuance (*sthiti*) and of production (*utpatti*).<sup>12</sup>

Moreover this division of *apekṣā* into the productive and the designative bears a conspicuous resemblance to the twofold division of cause into the productive ( 作因 ) and the cognitive ( 了因 ) which first appears in the \**Upāyahrdaya*.<sup>13</sup> It appears several times in the *Mādhyamika* literature also, and some of them are found in the argument where the opponent is considered to be most probably the Vaiśeṣika: e.g. Piṅgala's commentary on the *Madhyamakaśāstra*.

(Objection) Buddhist teachings, heretical teachings and mundane teachings alike include entities without causes. Buddhist teachings have three unsynthesized entities and they are without causes because they are eternal. Heretical teachings have space/ether (*ākāśa*), time, direction, God, atoms and the state of emancipation termed 'extinction.' Mundane teachings have the sky, time, directions, etc. These three entities have no particular place to exist, so they are called eternal. And because they are eternal, they are without causes. Why do you say that there is no entity without causes in the world?

(Answer) These entities without causes are nothing but verbal expressions. Anything merely conceived or conceptualized is non-being. If an entity comes into existence due to causes and causal conditions, it cannot be said to be without causes. If there are no causes and no causal conditions, [there appears no entity] as we have stated above.

11 *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series, Patna 1973, p. 141.11.

12 *Nyāyakośa*, p. 61.

13 Taisho 1632, p. 23c10. Tucci, *Upāyahrdaya*, GOS 49, Baroda 1929, p. 5.

(Objection) There are two kinds of cause. The one is the productive cause and the other is the cognitive cause. These entities without causes have no productive cause because they have only cognitive causes which make one cognize their existence.<sup>14</sup>

There is no explicit explanation of the two types of cause in the Vaiśeṣika literature, so nothing definite can be stated about whether the Vaiśeṣikas held the theory of twofold division of cause or *apekṣā*, but its trace can be found in the expressions *ārambhaka* or *utpādaka* and *pratyayakāraṇa* or *vyavahāarakāraṇa* of PDh.<sup>15</sup> And it would suffice here to point out the following fact that the usages of *apekṣā* in VS are also divided into these two groups, i.e. those in 1.1.15,16 and 10.7 which are productive and those in 8.6-8,12 and 9.21 which are cognitive. And 1.2.3 has the same construction as 8.12 and 9.21. Furthermore, the twofold division of *apekṣā* provides a good reason why *apekṣā* appearing in the Vaiśeṣika literature is sometimes explained as *utpādikā* (a productive agent) or *kāraṇa* (a cause) and sometimes as *pramāṇa* (the means of cognition) or *liṅga* (an inferential mark) by commentators.<sup>16</sup>

Before entering into the argument on the import of the sūtra 1.2.3, it is imperative to define *buddhi*, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, the key terms of the sūtra. *Buddhi* is not so much of a problem. Praśastapāda, in the wake of the *Nyāyasūtra* construes *buddhi* as a synonym of *upalabdhi* (acquisition of knowledge or perception), *jñāna* (knowledge) and *pratyaya* (notion) and divides it into *vidyā* (correct knowledge) and *avidyā* (incorrect knowledge), so that it is safely taken as 'cognition.'<sup>17</sup>

The problem is what the *buddhi* of 1.2.3 refers to. Commentaries explain that this cognition refers to *anuvṛttibuddhi* and *vyāvṛttibuddhi*. But the concepts *anuvṛtti* and *vyāvṛtti* are not found anywhere in VS.<sup>18</sup> They might not have been the original intention of VS. When another solution should be asked for within the sūtra, it would be a clue that 1.2.3 has the same construction as 8.12: i.e. *x iti buddhyapekṣam*. The resemblance of con-

14 Taisho 1564, p. 6b-c.

15 Halbfass, p. 210.

16 Kir 129.10: *apekṣābuddhis tu dvitvasyotpādikā*. Vyo II,97.1: *apekṣāśabdaś cātra kāraṇe varttate*. V 14.5: *buddhiṃ pramāṇatayāpekṣata iti buddhyapekṣam*. U 34.6: *buddhir apekṣā liṅgam lakṣaṇam vā yasya tad buddhyapekṣam*.

17 PDh 171,172.

18 U 1.2.4 reads *bhāvo 'nuvṛtter eva hetuvāt sāmānyam eva*, but the phrase *anuvṛtter eva hetuvāt* does not appear in C and V. It must have been adopted from PDh 11.13.



struction seems to show the closeness of origin. The interpretation of 8.12 itself is rather problematic, but the reason why *buddhyapekṣa* is given in the neuter form is obvious in the case of 8.12, since it appears in a section beginning with 8.4 where perceptual knowledge (*jñāna*), a neuter noun, is the main theme. By the addition of *jñāna* to *iti*, 8.12 reads *ayam eṣa kṛtaṃ tvayā bhojayainam iti [jñānam] buddhyapekṣam*: i.e. “The [knowledge] of ‘this’, ‘It has been done by you’, and ‘Feed him’ has cognition as requirement.’ Further in the same section as 8.12 there appears a reference to *buddhi* in 8.9: “The cognition of the quality white arises from the universal of whiteness inherent in the quality white and the cognition of the universal whiteness, and these two kinds of cognition [the cognition of the universal whiteness and the cognition of the quality white] are in a causal relation.” And the universal is called *apekṣā* in 8.6: “[The knowledge] of substance, quality and action has a universal-differentia as requirement.” In this case the causal relation is supposed as follows: the connection among an object, the sense, the mind, and the self (or cognizer) is the cause (*x*) and *sāmānyaviśeṣa* is the *apekṣā* (*y*) and the cognition of substance, etc. is the effect (*z*). There appears also in 1.2.7 the same conception that *sattā*, the highest universal, is the cause and the cognition of *sat* is the effect. The sūtra 1.2.7 reads “[Beingness is that] from which [the cognition of] ‘existent’ [arises] concerning substance, quality and action.” The sūtra 1.2.3 might refer to these kinds of *buddhi*.

Both in 1.2.7 and 8.6 *sāmānya* is supposed to be the cause of verbal judgment. It reminds us of Plato’s famous declaration of the *idea* theory in the *Politeia* 596a: “We always assume that there is a single *eidos* corresponding to each set of particular things to which we apply the same name.” Therefore there seems no problem to translate *sāmānya* as ‘universal.’ And this characteristic of *sāmānya* is clearly described by the following sentences in the *Abhidharmakośa*.

The Vaiśeṣikas hold the following established theory that there is a category of *sāmānya* from which the general notion arises as regards those with different modes of existence. But there is a difference between this *sāmānya* and *sabhāgatā* [of the Vaibhāṣika] in that *sāmānya* is one and subsists in many things, [while *sabhāgatā* is not so].<sup>19</sup>

In the present order of the sūtras, the argument of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* comes first in the 2nd Āhnikā of the 1st Adhyāya and then the explanation of perceptual judgment comes later in the 8th Adhyāya. It cannot, however,

19 *Abhidharmakośa*, Patna 1967, p.68.4.

be taken as representing the historical order in which these sections were formed. It is highly probable that the theory of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* was formed in the course of development of the theory of perception in which *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* played an essential role.

As has been mentioned above, perceptual judgment requires *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. This requirement of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* for perceptual judgment has some similarity to Aristotle's definition of 'definition' that definition consists of genus and differentiae (Topics 103b), although there is a conspicuous difference in that *sāmānya* itself serves as a differentia as well. Insofar as a universal works only as a universal, it does not produce any definite cognition but doubt. It must work at the same time as a differentia, a factor differentiating the substratum of itself from the others having the same universal: e.g. when *pṛthivīva*, the universal of *pṛthivī*, produces the cognition of *pṛthivī*, it differentiates its substratum, *pṛthivī*, from the other entities having the same universal, *dravyatva*. Thus, although *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* have a hierarchical order as in the case of Aristotle's categories, the Vaiśeṣikas use it in a considerably different way. At present I prefer 'differentia' as the translation of *viśeṣa*.

The *apekṣā* of *buddhyapekṣa* in PDh is used obviously in the sense of 'productive.' This understanding cannot be applied to the sūtra 1.2.3, even when it is read in accordance with Candrānanda's commentary which does not make it clear whether the *apekṣā* is productive or cognitive, because it leads to a fatal inconsistency. That is, Candrānanda explains that *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* has *anuvṛttibuddhi* and *vyāvṛttibuddhi* as their *apekṣā*, respectively. If this *apekṣā* were in the sense of 'productive', *anuvṛttibuddhi* and *vyāvṛttibuddhi* would be the productive cause of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. But it is informed by Praśastapāda that *sāmānya* is the cause of *anuvṛttipratyaya* and *viśeṣa* is the cause of *vyāvṛtti*. In the supposed interpretation this relation is inverted, which could not possibly be tenable. Therefore Candrānanda must have taken the *apekṣā* to be a cognitive kind.<sup>20</sup>

The other commentaries than Candrānanda's indubitably indicate that it is a cognitive kind: i.e. in the *Vyākhyā* the *buddhyapekṣam* is explained as what requires cognition as a means of knowledge and in the *Upaskāra* as that for which cognition is the requirement [so as to be known], i.e. an inferential mark or an indicating characteristic.<sup>21</sup>

20 The last part of Candrānanda's commentary on 1.2.3, i.e. *tadanuvṛttibuddhyapekṣam sāmānyam vyāvṛttibuddhyapekṣo viśeṣa iti*, must be read as this: 'A universal requires inclusive cognition and a differentia requires exclusive cognition [so as to be known to exist].' (C 8.11)

21 See note 16 and Halbfass, p. 118.

Further if the *apekṣā* of *buddhyapekṣa* is taken to be productive, it will not fail to lead the inconsistency with the intention of the sūtra 8.5 in which a universal-differentia is defined as having no *apekṣā* when perceived. If it were the product of *buddhi*, it would require some *buddhi* so as to arise as an object of the sense organ when perceived.

It is, therefore, reasonably concluded that the *apekṣā* in 1.2.3 is a cognitive kind, and hence the sūtra means that the knowledge of a universal and a differentia has cognition as requirement; in other words, that a universal and a differentia require cognition so as to be known to exist. This understanding is thoroughly compatible with the realistic explanation on *buddhilakṣaṇatva* of PDh by the commentaries.<sup>22</sup>

Now there is another problem to be solved that *sāmānyaviśeṣa* is explained as directly perceptible without any requirement in 8.5, which appears to be contradicted by the explanation in 1.2.3. What is the relation of the two sūtras? The following verses of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* will answer the question.

Now the genera such as beingness, cowhood and so on are cognized by perception, because when the eyes are functioning, the notion 'existent,' etc. arises. (713)

The existence of them is also known from inference, because a particular notion arises from some other cause than itself. (714)<sup>23</sup>

It is clear from this that 1.2.3 explains that, when recognized to be real, a universal and a differentia are *sāpekṣa*, while 8.5 explains that, when perceived, a universal, which works as a differentia as well so as to be a qualifier of a perceptual judgment, is *anapekṣa*.

In 1.2.3 the causal relation is used in a reversed way of 8.6, i.e. from the effect or the cognition of substance, etc. to the cause or *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, which indicates that the intention of 1.2.3 lies in the proof of existence of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Namely, the sūtra 1.2.3 is a proof of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* based on the causal relation with cognition produced by them. And this interpretation will give a sufficient answer to the question why it is preceded by the two sūtras 1.2.1,2 referring to the causal relation.

22 NK 19.15: *buddhir eva lakṣaṇam pramāṇam yeṣam te buddhilakṣaṇāḥ*. Kir 21.11: *buddhimātram amiṣām lakṣaṇam pramāṇam*. Takenaka, p. 92, Halbfass, p. 117. Vyomaśiva also gives the term a realistic explanation. Vyo 1,40.21: *tathā buddhir lakṣaṇam yeṣām buddhyā lakṣyanta* (i.e. *pratīyante* NK 19.18) *iti vā buddhilakṣaṇās teṣām bhāvo buddhilakṣaṇatvam*. *ibid.* 1,41.4: *buddhivedyatvam*.

23 *pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhās tu sattvagotvādijātayaḥ/ akṣavyāpārasadbhāve sadādipratīyayodayāt /713/ anumānabalenāpi sattvam āsām pratīyate/ viśeṣapratīyayo yena nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ/714/ (TS 1,294.2)*

The supposition that 1.2.1-3 is a proof of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* could be sustained by the resemblance to the argument in the 1st Āhnika of the 4th Adhyāya in which the causal relation is again used as the basis for proving the existence of eternal substances. This Āhnika is meant first in 4.1.1-5 for confirming the existence of eternal and imperceptible substances treated in the preceding two Adhyāyas.<sup>24</sup> At the same time it shows the validity of inference of them from their products based on the causal relation. Furthermore, it explains the conditions of perception of these products in the remaining sūtras from 4.1.6 on, since the perception of a product, which serves as an inferential mark, forms the prerequisite for the inference.

Sometimes 1.2.3 is interpreted as a sūtra explaining the relativity of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in deference to a part of the *Mahābhāṣya*.<sup>25</sup> Although the possibility is not deniable that the grammatical speculation bore the germ of the Vaiśeṣika conception of universals,<sup>26</sup> this interpretation of 1.2.3 is wide of the mark, because the relativity or reciprocal hierarchy of them is explained in the following three sūtras 1.2.4-6. As has been explained above, 1.2.3 offers the proof of existence of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* by using the causal relation. This theory of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is greatly different from that of the *Mahābhāṣya* in which these are treated only as two relative terms in the sense that the same object can be called sometimes as *sāmānya* and sometimes as *viśeṣa* in accordance with a viewer's intention,<sup>27</sup> while in VS they are construed as the causing factor of cognition objectively real. This difference is significant in our understanding of the sūtra 1.2.3.

24 The 2nd and 3rd Adhyāyas in the present form appear to give an explanation of the qualities of nine substances because of the beginning sūtras 2.1.1-5, which are very similar to the so-called accumulation theory held by the Sāṃkhya, the Naiyāyika, etc. and cannot possibly be the original thought of the Vaiśeṣika. In fact excepting one (2.1.12) all the sūtras mentioning *guṇa* in these Adhyāyas are later additions (2.1.24,25, 2.2.25,29). The main theme treated in these two Adhyāyas is the proof of substances, especially of imperceptible substances. The following three topics are consistently found in these two Adhyāyas: i.e. *a*) what is the *liṅga* of each substance (2.1.9,10,20, 2.2.6,12, 3.2.1,4), *b*) the reason of its being substance and eternal (2.1.11-13,27, 2.2.7,13, 3.2.2,5) and *c*) whether it is one or many (2.1.14,28, 2.2.8,9,14-18, 3.2.3,15-17). These might have been the core of the original thought of the Vaiśeṣika, around which they gradually developed the theories of inference, perception, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* and so on.

25 *Mahābhāṣya*, Poona 1880, I,171.26f, Ui, p. 174, *do*, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu* 3, (in Japanese) Tokyo 1921, pp. 453,478, Narain, p.209.

26 Narain, pp. 188f.

27 Scharfe, *Die Logik im Mahābhāṣya*, Berlin 1961, p. 66.

*Abbreviations*

- C *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, GOS 136, Baroda 1961. (Numbering of the sūtras in this paper follows this edition.)
- Kir *Kiraṇāvalī*, GOS 154, Baroda 1971.
- NK *Nyāyakandalī*. See PDh.
- NV *Nyāyavārttika, Nyāyadarśanam*, CalSS 18, Calcutta 1936 (rpt. Kyoto 1982).
- PDh *Padārthadharmasamgraha with Nyāyakandalī*, VizSS 4, Banaras 1895 (rpt. Delhi 1984).
- TS *Tattvasamgraha, Bauddha Bhāratī G.M. 2*, 2 vols, Varanasi 1968.
- U *Upaskāra*, KSS 3, Varanasi 1923.
- V *Vyākhyā, Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an anonymous commentary*, Darbhanga 1957.
- Vyo *Vyomavatī, Śivakumārasāstri G.M. 6*, 2 vols, Varanasi 1983,84.