To rehabilitate a theological treatsie : Inqdh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar

Autor(en): **Abdulsater, Hussein Ali**

Objekttyp: **Article**

Zeitschrift: **Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie**

Band (Jahr): **68 (2014)**

Heft 1-2

PDF erstellt am: **25.07.2024**

Persistenter Link: https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-681661

Hussein Ali Abdulsater

To rehabilitate a theological treatise. Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar

Abstract: This article deals with a theological treatise that has been wrongly ascribed to the Imāmī scholar al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044). The treatise discusses the question of human agency in relation to divine decree and determining, arguing for positions that, to a large extent, resemble Murtaḍā's known views. Nevertheless, the treatise also betrays features incompatible with Murtaḍā's theology as a whole, in addition to stylistic and bibliographical questions that make a good case against the work's authenticity. This wrong ascription, however, has not been noted despite the repeated editions of the text in the Islamic world. As such, it misrepresented many of Murtaḍā's views, sometimes undermining the main pillars of his theological system. The author of the treatise establishes his ethical concepts on the basis of scriptural dictates before proceeding to rational arguments, relies on non-multi-attested reports, defers to the authority of the Prophet's companions and culls God's names and attributes from the word of revelation. While going against Murtaḍā's positions, these views – put together – are considerably closer to non-Imāmī doctrines, and could have easily been the work of a Muʿtazilī author.

DOI 10.1515/asia-2014-0035

1

The arrival of the Shīʿī Būyids in Baghdad in 334/945 represented a historic turning point for the Imāmī[1] community; for although the new dynasty may have been originally of another Shīʿī affiliation, they clearly favored Imāmīs over others.[2] The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate had long been weakened by mercenaries and lost

1 The term 'Imāmī' will be used for 'Twelver Shīʿī' throughout the article; for the development of the term see Kohlberg 1976a: 534.

2 The particular Shīʿī sect to which the Būyids belonged has still not been fully determined. It may be said, however, that those members of the dynasty who were in Baghdad showed a

Hussein Ali Abdulsater: American University of Beirut. E-mail: ha69@aub.edu.lb

its iron grip under which Imāmīs had lived for almost two centuries, when their participation in authority was limited to a few notable families some of whose members held bureaucratic offices.[3] The death of the eleventh Imam al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī in 260/873 had left Imāmīs for the first time without a present Imam, generating a major crisis that compelled the community to devise new forms of management to sustain itself. Later known as the Minor Occultation, taken to have ended in 329/941, the effects of this crisis were still very much in evidence when the Būyids arrived.[4] Their advent may have alleviated some of the strain that Imāmīs were living under, now that their political position had taken a turn for the better. The Būyids were to maintain control of Baghdad for a long century, only to be replaced by the Saljuqs in 447/1055.

The Būyid age was markedly one of tolerance and constituted a heyday of intellectual activity, termed both 'the Shīʿī century'[5] and 'the renaissance of Islam'[6]. Probably owing to both their status as a minority sect and their not-so-privileged ethnic background, the Būyids showed exceptional acceptance of religious and cultural diversity.[7] It is thus that debates on various matters were often held at the monarch's court and in his presence.[8] Many members of the ruling elite under the Būyids were men of learning, especially the viziers, a few of whom were among the great belle-lettrists of Islam like Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970) and al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād (d. 385/995), to mention but two examples.[9] These influential political figures in turn had their own courts where they hosted the leading intellectuals of the time, in this sometimes competing with their masters. The Būyids also paid considerable attention to the pre-Islamic Iranian heritage, reviving the Persian title 'Shāhānshāh' and some aspects of Sasanid rule while respecting the Islamic nature of government by nominally preserving allegiance to the caliph.[10]

---

stronger inclination towards Imāmism than did their relatives elsewhere, and that the second and third generation Būyids primarily gravitated toward Imāmism while first generation Būyids were Zaydīs. Their profession of the Ismāʿīlī creed, a claim not found in neutral sources, must have been very circumscribed and short-lived. On their religious identity see Busse 1969: 604–605; Cahen 1979; Kraemer 1986: 39–44. Recent studies tend to stress their Imāmī affiliation even more; see Marcinkowski 2001: 201–202.

3 For a succinct survey of the prominent Imāmī families and their respective relations see Newman 2000: 19–26.

4 See Abdulsater 2011: *passim* for a discussion of the development of the Imāmī theological system and its undergirding communal ideology at the time.

5 The Shīʿī color of the era as seen by a Sunnī intellectual is described in al-Qāḍī 2003: *passim*.

6 For a discussion of the appellation see Kraemer 1986: 1–5.

7 Busse 1969: 605–606; Kraemer 1986: 75–80.

8 Kraemer 1986: 275.

9 On them see Kraemer 1986: 241–259 and 259–272 respectively.

10 Busse 1969: 603–604; Madelung 1969: 181–183; Kraemer 1986: 44–46.

In addition to their support for religious scholars of different sects, the Būyids showed great respect for Imāmī scholars who had never before won government favor. The age represented the first period in Islamic history when Imāmīs were not only absolutely free to practice their beliefs and develop their creed publicly, but their religious leaders also enjoyed the patronage of political authority, be it in Rayy or in Baghdad.[11] Extant are famous debates between Imāmī *'ulamā'* and other scholars in the presence of Būyid princes where they openly challenged other schools and creeds;[12] a favorable change whose importance should not be underestimated. The relationship between the Būyids and Imāmīs was a win-win situation: the Būyids needed popular support to balance the Sunnī support for the caliph; the Imāmīs, now without their Imam and therefore politically benign, needed political cover.[13] This situation can best be seen, though in retrospect, in comparison with the subsequent plight of the Imāmīs, particularly their prominent scholars, in the aftermath of the Būyid downfall.[14]

2

ʿAlam al-Hudā ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (d. 436/1044), also known as al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, was one of the leading figures of the Būyid age.[15] An ʿAlid, he was a scion of the seventh Imāmī Shīʿī Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. 183/799). In addition to this noble lineage, his more immediate ancestors and relatives were also of high regard: his maternal great grandfather was the Zaydī Imam al-Ḥasan al-Uṭrūsh (d. 304/917), the third ruler of the Zaydī dynasty of Ṭabaristān and eastern Gīlān (250/864–520/1126) under the title al-Nāṣir al-Kabīr.[16] His father Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā (d. 400/1009), known as al-Ṭāhir al-Awḥad and Dhū al-Manāqib, combined both religious prestige and political stature. He served as the chief

11 For the distinctly favorable treatment of Imāmīs see Busse 1969: 605–606.

12 See for example the debate in the presence of Rukn al-Dawla (r. 324/935–366/976) between Ibn Bābawayh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991–992) and an individual who denied the existence of the Twelfth Imam; Ṣadūq 1991: 87–88.

13 Cahen 1979: *passim*

14 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 391; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 638; Dhahabī 1993: 18: 335.

15 See on him Thaʿālibī 1983: 5: 69–72; Najāshī 1996: 270–271; Ṭūsī 1997a: 164–165; Baghdādī 1997: 11: 401; Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 104–106; Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 318–324; Ḥamawī 1993: 4: 1728–1733; Ibn Khallikān 1993–1994: 3: 313–316; Dhahabī 1993: 17: 588–590; Ṣafadī 2000: 20: 231–234; Iṣfahānī 1982–1995: 4: 14–65; Shīrāzī 1962: 458–466; Khʷānsārī 1991: 4: 284–301; Amīn 1997: 8: 213–219; Madelung 1985: *passim*.

16 On him see Strothmann 1979: *passim*.

syndic of the descendents of Abū Ṭālib (*naqīb al-ṭālibiyyīn*)[17] for five terms,[18] in addition to being the commander of the pilgrims (*amīr al-ḥajj*),[19] taking responsibility for people's complaints to court (*wilāyat al-maẓālim*)[20] and acting twice as a peacemaker between the Būyids of Baghdad and the Ḥamdānīs of Mosul[21]. Murtaḍā's younger brother Muḥammad (d. 406/1015), known as al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, was a renowned poet[22] and a politician who assumed the office of the syndicate after his father;[23] but he mainly owes his fame to his compilation of the sayings, sermons and letters of the first Shīʿī Imam ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) under the title *Nahj al-Balāgha*[24]. The two titles Murtaḍā and Raḍī were both royal gifts: in a decree dated 397/1006, the Būyid king Bahāʾ al-Dawla (r. 379/989–403/1012) bestowed on ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn the title al-Murtaḍā Dhū al-Majdayn, apparently alluding to both his noble ancestry and personal qualities; Muḥammad, on the other hand, was given the title al-Raḍī Dhū al-Ḥasabayn.[25]

In addition to his political influence and social prominence primarily owing to his thirty-year tenure as the syndic of the descendents of Abū Ṭālib following his brother's death and his close association with both the ʿAbbāsid and Būyid dynasties,[26] he was an authority on language and literature. As for his mastery of religious sciences, it was not confined to any particular discipline; he wrote extensively on jurisprudence, law, Qurʾānic exegesis and theology. As such, he was one of the icons of the Būyid ethos, not only in his well-roundedness and diverse knowledge but also in his efforts to systemize the Imāmī system of faith, simultaneous with the efforts of other masters of contending schools of theology.

Murtaḍā markedly represents the atmosphere of relative freedom that the Imāmīs enjoyed; his contributions to the formation of an integral Imāmī discourse are foundational. In theology, his prolific output shows immense erudition, as he presented a system of Imāmī beliefs whose elaborateness is unmatched by any extant

17 Havemann 1993: *passim*.

18 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 8: 329, 395, 421, 483, 9: 23, 85, 112–113; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 8: 565–566, 710, 9: 77–78, 105, 182, 219.

19 See Māwardī 1966: 108–112; Farrāʾ 1966: 108–115.

20 See Nielsen 1991: *passim*; Māwardī 1966: 77–95; Farrāʾ 1966: 74–90.

21 Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 8: 594, 630.

22 For an analysis of some of his poetry see Stetkevych 2007: 293–293 for his career; see also Djeblī 1997: *passim*.

23 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 127; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 263.

24 The authenticity of *Nahj al-Balāgha* has been a controversial issue from early times, at least before its great commentary by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) was written; Djeblī 1997: 33–56.

25 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 96; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 189; see Murtaḍā's poem thanking the king for the title in Murtaḍā 1998a: 1: 403–406.

26 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 8: 483, 9: 23; Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 77–78, 105.

system from before his time. Murtaḍā's theological legacy includes a lengthy *summa*, *al-Dhakhīra fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*,[27] as well as dispersed works, some quite elaborate, addressing particular theological questions. His comprehensive book, *al-Dharīʿā ilā Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa*, is the earliest extant work on Imāmī jurisprudence.[28]

Murtaḍā studied language and rhetoric with the famous poet Ibn Nubāta al-Saʿdī (d. 405/1014),[29] poetry and *adab* with al-Marzubānī (d. 384/994),[30] grammar with the grammarian and Muʿtazilī theologian al-Rummānī (d. 384/994),[31] *ḥadīth* with Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh (fl. late fourth/tenth century)[32] and the head of the Imāmī community of Baghdad al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), with whom he also studied theology and jurisprudence[33]. The list of Murtaḍā's students is indicative of the influence of his thought on Imāmī Shīʿism, even if those students did not fully endorse their teacher's positions. His most prominent student was undisputedly Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), later known in the Imāmī tradition as Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa. Ṭūsī is the author of two of the four books of traditions considered by Imāmīs to be the most authoritative, namely *Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām* and *al-Istibṣār fī mā Ikhtalaf min al-Akhbār*.[34] Also among Murtaḍā's prominent students were Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d. 447/1055),[35] Abū al-Fatḥ al-Karājikī (d. 449/1057),[36] Sallār al-Daylamī (d. 448/1056)[37] and Ibn al-Barrāj (d. 481/1088).[38] In addition to the strong bond between masters and disciples in the traditional Islamic world of learning, Murtaḍā's finances must have guaranteed

27 Initially intended as an independent work, *al-Dhakhīra* ended up being a complement to the unfinished *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* as Murtaḍā himself explains; Murtaḍā 1990a: 607. Therefore, the two works must be seen as one whole.

28 Murtaḍā 2009: 31–32 also refers the reader to his works on theology (i.e. *al-Shāfī* and *al-Dhakhīra*) and his *Rasāʾil* where he elaborated on some questions such as consensus, reports and analogical reasoning, which serves to prove that this work is still earlier than Ṭūsī's *ʿUdda*, despite the latter's earlier public circulation as might be construed from Ṭūsī 1997b: 1: 3–4. The late Calder was apparently unaware of Murtaḍā's *Dharīʿa*, as he describes his jurisprudential work as "short, uncertain and lacking in detail;" Calder 1989: 60.

29 Ibn Khallikān 1993–1994: 3: 190–193.

30 Sellheim 1991: *passim*.

31 Flanagan 1995: *passim*.

32 Ṭūsī 1995: 434; he is the brother of the illustrious Ṣadūq, on him see Najāshī 1996: 68; Khūʾī 1990: 7: 47–48.

33 On Mufīd's life and thought see McDermott 1978: 8–22; see Murtaḍā' eulogy of Mufīd in Murtaḍā 1998a: 2: 438–440.

34 Amir-Moezzi 2000: *passim*; Amīn 1997: 9: 159–167; Khūʾī 1990: 16: 257–262.

35 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 66; Amīn 1997: 3: 634–635; Khūʾī 1990: 4: 283.

36 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 53–54; Amīn 1997: 9: 400–401; Khūʾī 1990: 17: 357–358.

37 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 169–170; Amīn 1997: 7: 70–72; Khūʾī 1990: 9: 177.

38 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 115; Amīn 1997: 8: 18; Khūʾī 1990: 11: 42–43.

him the 'acquired loyalty' of his students thanks to the concept of gratitude due for benefit rendered (*shukr al-niʿma*).[39]

Despite his prominence and massive oeuvre, relatively little has been written on Murtaḍā's thought. In Western languages, two monographs offer a partial treatment of his contributions. First, there is the last chapter of McDermott's *The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd*.[40] The chapter briefly presents the points of disagreement between Mufīd and Murtaḍā. Naturally, it does not exhaust all these points nor does it provide a systematic exposé of Murtaḍā's theological contribution as this is not the focus of the book. The other monograph is Madelung's *A Treatise of the Sharīf al-Murtaḍā on the Legality of Working for the Government* (*Masʾala fī ʾl-ʿamal maʿa ʾl-sulṭān*). It consists of an edition of the Arabic text and an English translation, together with an introduction and concluding remarks on works dealing with related topics in the later tradition. In Arabic, almost all published studies on Murtaḍā are concerned with his literary works, whether in poetry or rhetoric and literary criticism. The only exception is a work studying his view on transmission of traditions, mainly covering his rejection of non-multi-attested reports.[41] His theological works are mentioned tangentially, usually in the introduction. However, there exists an unpublished dissertation on his theology presented to the University of Zliten, Libya, by Raʾūf al-Shammarī in 2004. Despite its usefulness in many respects, it is noteworthy that it suffers from three main flaws: first, only Arabic material is used for both primary and secondary sources; second, the author is not aware of the publication of Murtaḍā's most comprehensive theological work, i.e. *al-Dhakhīra*, among other books of his and third, the dissertation is replete with its author's subjective views on controversial questions as to whether Murtaḍā is right or wrong on each and every point. Although Murtaḍā's theological contributions do not seem to have been studied independently in Iranian scholarship, several works have been produced covering his career in general and the religious aspects of his poetry. Translations of some of his works into Persian and a limited Arabic secondary literature on him are also available.

An even more interesting aspect concerning Murtaḍā's reception in the later Imāmī tradition is the number of works spuriously ascribed to him. Thus far, the author of the current article has been able to identify three works that most likely are erroneously ascribed to Murtaḍā: *Risālat al-Muḥkam wa-l-Mutashābih*,[42]

39 Mottahedeh 1980: 72–78.

40 McDermott 1978: 373–394.

41 Khaṭāwī 1997: *passim*.

42 See my forthcoming article "Resurgence and Spurious Ascription".

al-Ḥudūd wa-l- Ḥaqā'iq[43] and *Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar* – which is the subject of this study. The identification of these problematic works was done by the author in tandem with the larger project of his doctoral dissertation, concerned with studying Murtaḍā's theology and jurisprudence.[44]

3

In what is often termed as the fusion of Mu'tazilī and Imāmī theology,[45] Murtaḍā's role has been noted in both primary and secondary literature; many non-Imāmī heresiographers went even as far as classifying him as a Mu'tazilī[46] or pro-Mu'tazilī.[47] What matters most, for the purposes of this article, is that the concurrence of Imāmī and Mu'tazilī theology is most felt on two major subjects: divine unicity (with the pertinent issues of divine essence and attributes, including speech) and divine justice (with the relevant questions of human agency, divine help, moral theory and otherworldly deserts of acts). This is why the Imāmīs felt, early

43 The author is currently preparing a separate article on the question of the authenticity of *al-Ḥudūd wa-l- Ḥaqā'iq*. It suffices to say here that, unlike the other two works, doubts have been expressed about its ascription to Murtaḍā, though no reason for these doubts is provided; Naẓarī 2008: 32: 26.

44 See Abdulsater 2013: *passim*.

45 The debate on whether the Imāmīs incorporated Mu'tazilī doctrines or developed their own views independently is beyond the scope of the current discussion; each of the two opinions has its supporters. For classical heresiographies, see Khayyāṭ 1925: 6; Ash'arī 1980: 35; Shahrastānī 1992: 1: 145, 166; Ibn Taymiyya 1903–1904: 1: 31, 2: 7, 24. In recent scholarship, see for example Nashshār 1977: 1: 414–415; Jad'ānī 2001: 1: *jīm-dāl*, 371–372; Sourdel 1972: 233–234. See also McDermott 1978: 4–5; McDermott 1977: 223 where he states that Imāmīs, even before Mufīd, had some Mu'tazilī-leaning theologians; Madelung 1970: 15, 17, 25, 28; Jafri 1978: 305–306 (speaking of the early Imāmī theologian Zurāra b. A'yan); Lambton 1989: 93; Kohlberg 2003: XXIV; Bar-Asher 1999: 11; Bayhom-Daou 2005: 23; Clarke 2006: 103; Schmidtke 2008: 154, 156; Gleave 2009: 1600–1602; Amir-Moezzi 2005: *passim* (though only talking about a particular theological trend in Imāmī Shī'ism); Halm 2004: 49–50; Momen 2005: 79–82; Yann 1995: 5–6; Newman 2000: 20, 26. All these studies argue, *mutatis mutandis*, that the Imāmīs fell under Mu'tazilī influence, at least partially on the level of some leading figures. For the other viewpoint inclined more to stress the independence or originality of Imāmī theology, with its different versions and the various extents to which such independence is stressed, see for example Ṭahrānī 1983: 1: 39, 5: 44–45, 8: 56; Amīn 1997: 1: 127; Amīnī 1997: 4: 66–67; Ni'ma 1985: 23–25; Mughniyya 1979: 110–111; Ni'ma 1961: 39–41; Ḥasanī 1964: 14–15, 279–284; Amīnī 1997: 24–25; Ṭabāṭabā'ī 1970–1974: 5: 78–80; Gurjī 1984: 43–47; Akhtar 1986: 102–115; Muhajirani 2008: 179, 181; 'Abd al-Ghaffār 1996: 423; Khāminah'ī 1992: 199–210; Ja'farī 1992: 164–165; Abrahamov 2006: 208; Modarresi 1993: 115–116.

46 Dhahabī 1987: 29: 434; Dhahabī 1995: 17: 589; Ṣafadī 2000: 20: 231; Ibn Ḥajar 1997: 4: 223.

47 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995–1996: 9: 319.

on, that they are no less entitled to the epithet 'Upholders of [Divine] Unicity and Justice' (*ahl al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl*) than the Muʿtazilīs.[48] Where Murtaḍā agrees with Muʿtazilī theology, he champions the positions of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs against that of the Baghdadi Muʿtazilīs which his master, Mufīd, had adopted.[49]

Among the questions of the latter point, Murtaḍā fully endorsed the Baṣran Muʿtazilī view of human agency; human acts, he believes, are purely done by humans, without God intervening in any form.[50] He vehemently argued, not only against pure determinists (*mujbira*) who adopted the blunt position that humans are mere helpless tools of God's power whose acts are as unaffected by their efforts as are their colors or bodily traits, but also against the upholders of acquisition (*kasb*) who attempted to tread a middle-path between what they saw as the two extremes of absolute human independence and helplessness. Murtaḍā's position was to deny the intelligibility of acquisition, while still equating it, if it is to be given any meaningful content, to pure determinism in that they both boil down to infringement on God's justice and disavowal of human power.[51] Likewise, Murtaḍā's moral theory shows his acceptance of the Muʿtazilī view that the moral value of certain acts is known independently from revelation.[52]

He, nonetheless, parted from the Muʿtazilī theory of divine justice on the question of divine help (*luṭf*); while adopting the doctrine of divine help as defined by the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs, he pushed it farther to make it the cornerstone of his theory of the necessity of the Imāma as a means of bringing people closer to salvation due to the moral benefit accruing from the presence of an infallible leader of the community in whom authority and political power reside.[53] In light of that, he might be considered the main influence behind the Imāmī position that the Imāma is necessary not to guarantee the complete transmission of religious law, but to preserve the moral order of society. He also rejected the Muʿtazilī dogma of the Threat (*waʿīd*), i.e. the inevitability of God punishing sinners in the hereafter, arguing that it is not morally problematic to pardon grave sinners – and

---

48 For the Muʿtazilī context of the epithet, see Gimaret 2011: *passim*; see its recurrence in Murtaḍā's works in reference to Imāmīs too, as in Murtaḍā 1986: 4: 40; Murtaḍā 1997: 205–206; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 397–398, 3: 110.

49 See the comparison in McDermott 1978: 373–394.

50 Murtaḍā 2000: 63–64, 449; Murtaḍā 1998b: 93.

51 Murtaḍā 2000: 68–69, 461–462, 468, 476; a briefer version in Murtaḍā 1998b: 44, 96.

52 The most elaborate discussion in Murtaḍā 2000: 303–367; a brief expression in Murtaḍā 2009: 78.

53 Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 47, 99; Murtaḍā 1990a: 410; Murtaḍā 1998b: 191–192; Murtaḍā 1995: 35–36; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 309–310, 2: 294.

thus God might do it,[54] a scenario whose ultimate execution is seen through the effect of the intercession (*shafāʿa*) of the Prophet and the Imams.[55]

In the above points of concurrence and disagreement with Muʿtazilī thought, Murtaḍā's writings betray a strong influence of his elder contemporary, the great Muʿtazilī theologian of the Baṣran school Qāḍī al-Quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Astrabādī (d. 415/1024).[56] The phrasing of the two authors is almost identical in many instances in cases of both agreement[57] and disagreement[58]. Also, Murtaḍā's main work on the Imāma, *al-Shāfī fī al-Imāma*, was written as a rebuttal against the corresponding volume of *al-Mughnī*, with sharp criticisms[59] and copious quotations[60] provided by Murtaḍā before he embarks on his refutations; the same can be said, though to a lesser extent, about his *al-Dharīʿa*[61].

---

54 Murtaḍā 1990a: 509–521; Murtaḍā 1998b: 151–155.

55 Murtaḍā 1990a: 505–509; Murtaḍā 1998b: 158–158; Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 306; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 131, 148–151; Murtaḍā 1998a: 1: 217, 489, 503, 2: 155, 168–169.

56 Ibn al-Murtaḍā 1969: 117 (probably following Jishumī 1973: 383) claims that ʿAbd al-Jabbār was one of Murtaḍā's teachers; Jishumī adds that the studentship was in Baghdad upon ʿAbd al-Jabbār's return from pilgrimage; Madelung 1985 dates it in 389/999. But Murtaḍā never alludes to such a connection even in *al-Shāfī*, despite the lengthy polemic against ʿAbd al-Jabbār. In addition, Murtaḍā's brother Raḍī mentions being a student of ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself; Raḍī 1967: 48, 180, 362. Jishumī might be confusing the two brothers, since he does not mention Raḍī therein. But if Murtaḍā did study under ʿAbd al-Jabbār, then it must have been for a short time, which explains why other biographers of Murtaḍā refrain from listing ʿAbd al-Jabbār among his teachers.

57 Cf. Murtaḍā 2000: 474 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 6{1}: 11.

58 Cf. Murtaḍā 2000: 322–324 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 17: 52–53.

59 According to Murtaḍā, ʿAbd al-Jabbār's methodology suffers from his unfair, inaccurate or even uninformed presentation of Imāmī views (Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 43, 73, 86–87, 96–98, 137, 167–168, 179, 210, 215, 318, 3: 72, 4: 117; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 18, 31–35, 37–38, 56, 69–70, 75, 79, 91–92, 181, 336), in addition to his facile use of slander against his opponents (Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 38, 90; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 13). To show his ability to reciprocate such methodology, Murtaḍā surveys many of the peculiar views ascribed to early Muʿtazilīs, many of which were renounced by later generations; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 90–96. Another problem with ʿAbd al-Jabbār's methodology is in his use of sources, as he seems to either misunderstand the authors' intentions or worse, to deliberately manipulate (*taḥrīf*) the quoted text to serve his position – as Murtaḍā tries to show by quoting those sources; Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 247, 321, 4: 249, 256, 347; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 138–139, 155–156, {2}: 50, 89. Also, ʿAbd al-Jabbār's use of terminology, according to Murtaḍā, is imprecise; Murtaḍā 1986: 4: 216, 236; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{2}: 20–26, 45–47.

60 See for example Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 76–83, 103–107, 143–145, 204–205; 2: 14–21, 26–36, 56–57, 125–126; 3: 5–7, 18–20, 23–25, 63–64; 4: 14–17, 32–36, 90–94, 110–113.

61 In the introduction to *al-Dharīʿa*, Murtaḍā states that the book is unprecedented because his views on jurisprudence are not fully shared by any author. Nonetheless, he mentions that many of these problematic questions were covered in his now lost *Masāʾil al-Khilāf* and in his discussion of ʿAbd al-Jabbār's *al-ʿUmad* (both edited texts of *al-Dharīʿa* mention it under its less commonly

4

Murtaḍā's position on the question of divine decree and determining is, as has been mentioned, identical to that of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs. Murtaḍā considers the question part of the debate on divine justice which he deems complementary to divine unicity as the two essential components of sound doctrine;[62] this position is to be read in his various theological works, be they in the form of books – with extremely elaborate discussions – or shorter treatises where his order of priorities cannot be mistaken[63]. In addition to his discussion of the problem in his various works of undisputed authenticity, the aforesaid treatise entitled *Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar* – solely dedicated to the question of human agency in relation to divine will – is also ascribed to him.

There are three editions of this treatise:

1. *Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar wa-Yalīh Istiqṣā' al-Naẓar fī al-Qaḍā' wa-l-Qadar*. Edited by ʿAlī al-Khāqānī. Najaf: Maṭbaʿat al-Rāʿī, 1935.
2. "Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar." In: *Rasā'il al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Najaf: Maṭbaʿat al-Ādāb, 1966, 51–124. This has been reproduced in *Rasā'il al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Qum: Dār al-Qur'ān al-Karīm, 1985–1990, 2: 175–247.
3. "Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar." In: *Rasā'il al-ʿAdl wa-l-Tawḥīd*. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAmāra. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1988, 1: 283–342.[64] [First edition, Cairo: Dār al-Hilāl, 1971].

---

circulated name, *al-ʿUmda*, although other manuscripts retained the title *al-ʿUmad*; see Gurjī's edition of *al-Dharīʿa*, Murtaḍā 1985: 1: 5n5). Not only does Murtaḍā object to ʿAbd al-Jabbār's jurisprudential views, but he also expresses strong complaints about the latter's methodology in *al-ʿUmad*, though he refrains from mentioning names; Murtaḍā 2009: 29–31, 544.

62 Thus a general account (*ijmāl*) of the precepts of religion would reduce them to only two: unicity and justice; the first includes the discussion on divine essence and attributes while all the remaining precepts can be subsumed under justice; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 165–166.

63 In Murtaḍā's two full theological works, *al-Dhakhīra* (with *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* as its first part) and *Sharḥ Jumal al-ʿIlm wa-l-ʿAmal*, the discussion on divine justice takes up 427 out of about 970 pages in the former and 84 out of about 210 pages in the latter, although topics subsumed under this title vary in the two works.

64 While the first two editions seem to have been motivated by hardly more than mere interest in Imāmī theology, as shown in their respective place of publications and the identity of the editors (both Imāmī clerics), further considerations underlie the production of the last edition. It is published as part of a collection of four texts from leading figures of different Muslim schools of thought (Sunnī – as presented on the cover-page, Muʿtazilī, Zaydī and Imāmī). The editor, Muḥammad ʿAmāra, in his lengthy introduction, makes it clear that the purpose of assembling these texts is to show that Muslims unanimously share the belief in free will; such a universal view, he argues, was dominant even before the translation of Greek philosophy (pp. 8–9). The

Other authors have mentioned the treatise under slightly different titles such as *Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Qaḍā' wa-l-Qadar*,[65] *Īqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar*[66] and *Munqidh al-Bashar min Asrār al-Qaḍā' wa-l-Qadar*[67].

But there is good reason to doubt the authorship of the treatise, as shall be explained presently. Despite the existence of another work written under the title *Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar* by Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992),[68] it must not be confused with the work in question, as its surviving text shows. Therefore, the discussion below excludes the possibility of this text being a misidentified version of ʿĀmirī's work[69].

4.1 Synopsis of the content

Following the classical formulaic expressions thanking God and praising His messenger and his household, the author turns to address an anonymous requester who asked him to dictate a treatise on divine decree and determining. The reason is that the people of al-Nīl[70] – all of its commoners and most of the rest – have been led astray as to believe in determinism, mainly due to their reliance on

endorsement of reason and free will are indispensable tools to help the progress of the Arab-Muslim nation in all respects: political, scientific, intellectual and moral (pp. 38–42). The ideological coloring of such rhetoric cannot be mistaken; one must bear in mind that it was written during the early 1970s when the then dominant discourse of leftist-Arab nationalism was starting to give way to the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. The strength of both discourses is readily felt in the introduction; their later fortunes are also reflected in the career of ʿAmāra himself, a prolific author of more than 200 works who subsequently drifted towards a much more religious worldview; see for example his recent *Izālat al-Shubuhāt* for an accurate assessment of his current positions since the book spans his conceptual world, offering 147 definitions of various terms. Paradoxically, having edited Murtaḍā's work at some point earlier in his career, ʿAmāra resorted to a blatantly anti-Shīʿī – particularly Imāmī – rhetoric in recent years (as in ʿAmāra, 2010: 471–473, 523–529, 549–551), which triggered strong responses by Imāmī scholars; see for example, Diāb 1997: *passim*.

65 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 106; ʿĀmilī 1965: 2: 183; Baḥr al-ʿUlūm 1984: 3: 183; Amīnī 1977: 4: 266.

66 See the introduction to Murtaḍā 1990b: 49.

67 Majlisī 1983: 1: 11; Ṭahrānī 1983: 23: 150, 267. It is worth mentioning that Majlisī 1983: 90: 1–97 has preserved the aforementioned *Risālat al-Muḥkam wa-l-Mutashābih*.

68 Rowson 2011: *passim*.

69 The editor of ʿĀmirī's collected treatises, Saḥbān Khulayfāt, notes that the text reflects his peculiar style, especially regarding the verb-gender agreement; ʿĀmirī 1988: 222–223.

70 The most likely place to be meant by the author is the town of al-Nīl in the countryside of Kūfa, as attested by the phrasing which leaves the impression of a town or city thus named; the other two options are rivers, to which the author is unlikely to refer in the feminine voice or to make a construct such as *ʿawāmm al-nīl* and *khawāṣṣihā*; see Ḥamawī 1997: 5: 334–339.

traditions of unknown provenance or equivocal meaning or because of confused understanding of some Qur'ānic verses. [177–178]

The author, while affirming the complexity of the problem, stresses that the starting point of the whole discussion must be knowing what ought to be said of God and what ought not; only then can one distinguish between the right and the wrong positions. He then provides a succinct exposé of the history of the debate on the identity of the party responsible for human sins and the nature of human agency. According to him, the root of the controversy is the view voiced by some people who first ascribed human sins to God; in early days, the whole debate was restricted to this question. This group was immediately denounced by the scholars of the time. [178–180]

Later, the discussion developed into a more complex debate, pertaining to the createdness of human acts and the nature of agency and power. Erroneous views ascribing acts of God eventually branched into three main ones, all being determinist: (1) absolute determinism, in the sense that God creates everything and humans, being but tools of divine will, are utterly powerless; (2) that God creates human acts, but humans effect them by virtue of a prior power that they have and (3) that God creates human acts, but humans effect them by virtue of a power created in humans simultaneous with the occurrence of the act. The last view, the author claims, is the most common among all determinists. [180–183]

The people of the right faith are aware that all Muslims agree on a number of arguments that set Islam apart from wrong religions. Nevertheless, these people are also mindful of the myriad disagreements among Muslims. Matters of disagreement can be analyzed by reason, then checked with the yardstick of the Qur'ān and the tradition of the Prophet so that the right may be sifted from the wrong. An obligation then falls upon the people of the right faith to spread their call, since the other position leads to all sorts of heinous attitudes, such as believing in the possibility of God committing evil acts, being like his creatures and disbelieving the prophets. Then a brief dogma on the unicity of God is stated; it rejects anthropomorphism, denies God's corporeality and upholds that the Qur'ān is not pre-eternal. [183–189]

The core question of the treatise, i.e. God's justice, is then tackled. The author believes that God never obligates people to the impossible; He only holds them accountable for what they have done. Moreover, it cannot be that He does vile acts committed by them, such as injustice and instances of illicit behavior. The author's opponents, on the other hand, allow that God obligate people to do what they cannot do and punish them afterwards; also, these opponents have no qualms about ascribing to God vile acts that appear in this world at the hands of humans, despite Qur'ānic statements to the contrary. The logical conclusion of this position, he claims, is that God is more considerate towards His enemies than His

friends; the latter cannot trust His goodwill despite their efforts, whereas the former can always hope for it regardless of their sins. [189–193]

The hardships and material happenings of the world are created by God; but they cannot be called evil (*sharr*) as these might be in fact instances of wisdom and justice. Evil, in the form of sins, is effected by humans due to the whispering and temptation of the devil; this, in turn, is supported by ample scriptural evidence from the Qurʾān and the sayings of the Prophet. [193–203]

The author then moves to provide rational, i.e. independent from scripture, arguments for his understanding of God's justice. The first basis of the argument is that whoever does an act merits the corresponding attribute arising from being its agent; whoever lies is a liar, whoever does injustice is unjust and so on. But no one can describe God as such, so He must not be taken as the agent of such acts. In addition, the agent of vile acts is more blameworthy than any other party in relation to these acts, i.e. whoever commands them is less blameworthy than whoever does them. So ascribing them to God would make Him blameworthy and He can no longer blame humans for these acts. Therefore, God is neither the sole agent nor does He have any share of agency in relation to these acts; this goes both against pure determinists and against the upholders of acquisition who still allow that God be responsible, one way or another, for the creation of acts. [203–207]

Following is a list of questions, built around scenarios designed to corner the opponents unless they relinquish their position. In this context, it becomes clearer that the opponents are not pure determinists but the upholders of acquisition, as all the questions aim to force them into adopting the position of pure determinists – which they must be disavowing – or accept the author's proposition on sole human agency not subject to divine intervention. The core of all these scenarios is the problematic position that God is unjust; he can create people's sins and punish them, or lie to people and hold them accountable for believing these lies. To deny one's creation of his own acts is to deny the evidence of senses and thus should not have been elaborately discussed had it not been for the ignorance which clouds the other party's judgment. [207–216]

Having attacked his opponents' position, the author moves on to defend his. For this, he explains away linguistic difficulties accruing from certain Qurʾānic passages pertaining to the notion that God is the creator of everything, divine decree (*qaḍāʾ*), as well as the meaning of guidance (*hudā*) and being astray (*ḍalāl*). In all such cases, God is understood to be responsible for creating the beings of the world and ordaining the good acts of humans in it. As for the twin concepts of guidance and being astray, the true understanding is that God points out the way of guidance and punishes humans for being astray from it if they choose to do so. An elaborate list of relevant Qurʾānic verses is accounted for, with the author's interpretation of each. [216–229]

This leads to a discussion of the apparent conflict between divine will and human agency seen in the Qur'ān; here, the author points out the theological difficulties arising from accepting the proposition that God wills vile acts, especially in relation to consequences affecting moral theory. He then proceeds to reconcile his understanding of divine omnipotence and human will without sacrificing either, which is the classical problem of the author's position. For this, he goes over a copious survey of the occurrences of will and its derivatives in the Qur'ān. [229–239]

Finally, the treatise concludes with a long survey of sayings, anecdotes and short comments on Qur'ānic verses from the Prophet and early Muslim authorities to support the author's viewpoint on divine decree and divine will in relation to human acts. [239–247]

5

5.1 Analysis

The general content of the treatise agrees with Murtaḍā's thesis that it is only humans who effect their acts and that God is in no way intervening in them. In addition, the criticisms of the other viewpoint also concur with many of his attacks on the upholders of the opposite position. However, despite such an agreement, analysis of the content in light of Murtaḍā's corpus reveals discrepancies on many levels – leading to (1) stylistic, (2) terminological, (3) conceptual, (4) sectarian and (5) bibliographic problems. Though not amounting to a radical deviation from Murtaḍā's initial position on this question, these problems contribute not only to question the authenticity of authorship, but even to develop a negative judgment on the matter. Below is a succinct discussion of these various discrepancies.

(1) *Stylistic Points*

The style of the treatise, conspicuously different from Murtaḍā's, casts doubt on its authenticity; already noticeable in the early sections of the text, this dissimilarity increasingly unfolds in various stylistic aspects. (1.1) The author employs rhymed prose (*sajʿ*) frequently,[71] although it rarely appears in Murtaḍā's prolific output, even the literary compilations – not to speak of legal and theological

71 Aside from the opening lines which, although heavily rhymed, may be seen as a natural venue for *sajʿ*, see for example Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 183, 186, 189, 190, 191, 193, 196, 216, 226, 235.

works. (1.2) Also, the phrasing is more relaxed, unlike Murtaḍā's succinct sentences. (1.3) In addition, the passionate polemical spirit, mostly hostile and fervent,[72] is not to be seen in his works, usually characterized by a very cerebral tone even when touching on most sensitive topics and taking uncompromising positions, as noted in his discussion of the Imāma;[73] the same can be said about the tone of admonition dominating certain sections[74]. (1.4) Another stylistic aspect is the author's repetition of refrains at the end of sections,[75] which is not to be seen anywhere in Murtaḍā's writings.

(2) *Terminological Points*

The use of certain terms is also foreign to Murtaḍā's output. (2.1) This is evident in the author's conspicuous preference for the phrase 'our Lord' (*rabbunā*) in reference to God, as is obvious from its frequent occurrence;[76] on the other hand, Murtaḍā very rarely uses it, except when quoting other texts, as observed from surveying his corpus. (2.2) Also, the author uses the terms *ḥamd* and *ajr* for praise and reward respectively,[77] whereas Murtaḍā consistently sticks to *madḥ* and *thawāb*[78]. (2.3) The terms 'People of the Qibla' (*ahl al-qibla*)[79] and 'the Religion of the People of the Qibla' (*dīn ahl al-qibla*)[80] in reference to Muslims and Islam respectively are frequently used; nevertheless, Murtaḍā seems to use the first sparingly and only in legal contexts[81] or quotations,[82] while never the second.

(2.4) In a couple of instances, the author uses *afā'īl* – as the plural form of *fi'l* – for 'acts,'[83] although this form seems to never appear in Murtaḍā's corpus,

72 See for the example the section vilifying determinists; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 189–191, 236.

73 As, for example, in Murtaḍā's style protesting what he considers an unfair and dishonest representation of the Imāmī position. See also how he treats the problem of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, while aware of the potential weakness of the doctrine and how non-Imāmīs mocked it; Murtaḍā 1995: 33–35; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 293–294.

74 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185–186.

75 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 191, 197, 201, 203, 207, 223–224, 226, 239 (where he reiterates that he is concerned with keeping the text within reasonable length); Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 215 (where he asks the reader to reciprocate the arguments of the opponents against them); Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 193 and 228 (where he stresses that no friend of God would trust Him nor would His enemy fear Him).

76 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 177, 187, 189, 195, 205, 217, 218, 227, 231.

77 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 206, 230, 233.

78 See for example the taxonomy in Murtaḍā 1990a: 276–277; Murtaḍā 1998b: 131–132.

79 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 184, 185, 187.

80 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 209, 210, 212, 215.

81 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 506, 512; Murtaḍā 1998c: 302.

82 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 159; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 94, 2: 93, 4: 321; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 178.

83 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 180, 181.

an absence most noted throughout his discussion of the question of human acts. (2.5) The phrase 'Knowledgeable People of Unicity' (*ʿulamāʾ al-tawḥīd*)[84] seems not to have been used in Murtaḍā's corpus, since he prefers 'People of Unicity' (*ahl al-tawḥīd*) in this regard[85]. (2.6) The word *miskīn* is used in reference to an individual's weak mental ability or lack of knowledge;[86] this usage, although metaphorical and rare,[87] is avoided by Murtaḍā who does not even propose it as an option in relation to its possible meanings in certain Qurʾānic contexts.[88]

(2.7) The author refers to the Ashʿarīs as *ashāʿira*;[89] however, Murtaḍā does not use this word, even in his lengthy discussions of theological controversies where this group – or those who would be thus dubbed – is taken as the main rival. In his extant corpus, the only time he comes close to using the term *ashāʿira* is when he speaks of "the attributionists, followers of al-Ashʿarī" (*al-ṣifātiyya aṣḥāb al-ashʿarī*)[90]. (2.8) For the determinists, the author uses terms derived from both roots, J-B-R (*mujbira*,[91] *jabriyya*[92]) and Q-D-R (*qadariyya*)[93] – the latter being more frequent. Nevertheless, Murtaḍā is univocally on the other side of this usage preference; he is consistent in his choice of J-B-R derivations referring to his adversaries.[94]

(2.9) Throughout the text, the only phrase used in reference to Imams is "the Imams of guidance" (*ȧimmat al-hudā*),[95] an expression unusual in Murtaḍā's writings as it does not seem to appear anywhere in his output. (2.10) The author uses *mashīʾa* and *irāda* equally and interchangeably in speaking about God's will.[96] True, Murtaḍā deems the two synonymous;[97] but he almost restricts his

---

84 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 181.

85 Murtaḍā 1986: 178; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 397, 3: 125.

86 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 233.

87 Ibn Manẓūr 1967–1981: S-K-N in the sense of being in a bad condition.

88 See his discussion of Q19:79 in Murtaḍā 1986c: 179–180; this, of course, casting aside the more technical aspect pertaining to the legal discussion on eligibility to benefit from alms, where the term retains the sense of material want and poverty.

89 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 183.

90 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 4: 27.

91 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 190.

92 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 243.

93 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 190, 242, 243.

94 Murtaḍā 2000: 316; Murtaḍā 1998b: 99; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 212, 409; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 48, 499, 2: 211; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 83, 86, 4: 317; Murtaḍā 1998c: 98. The only exception occurs in Murtaḍā 2009: 507 where the discussion is semantic but not polemic, related to how the verb 'to believe in' (*yarā*) is used.

95 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 177.

96 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 192, 236, 239.

97 Murtaḍā 2000: 367–369; Murtaḍā 1990a: 600; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 507–509, 2: 78.

use of the term *mashīʾa* to quoting Qurʾānic verses where the verb (*shāʾa*, *yashāʾ*) appears, or to the formulaic expression "God willing" (*bi-mashīʾat allāh*); using it to refer to the theological concept of God's will is not in harmony with his style as he consistently sticks to *irāda* instead[98].

(2.11) The phrase 'the default state of our reason' (*fiṭrat ʿuqūlinā*),[99] laden with connotations, is not used by Murtaḍā. The term *fiṭra* he takes to mean the way something is created (*khilqa*);[100] thus it would only have a meaning in this context if Murtaḍā believes that reason can be altered. But for him, reason is strictly defined and is not susceptible to changes that would take it far from its default state: it is a subset of knowledge (*ʿilm*), dealing with types of knowledge whose goal is to help a person acquire the knowledge of his religious duties and perform them as ordained;[101] being necessary knowledge, all of these types are effected in us by God and are thus unchangeable[102]. Therefore, the word *fiṭra* in the phrase, based on his jargon, is redundant.

(3) *Conceptual Points*

(3.1) Enumerating the various groups of determinists, the author makes a distinction between the position of Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (fl. ca. 110/728–200/815)[103] and that of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Najjār (d. ca. 230/845).[104] Although both agree eventually that it is God who creates the human act, the disagreement has to do with whether the human power to act (*istiṭāʿa*) is created prior to the act or simultaneously with it; the followers of Ashʿarī belong in the latter category.[105] Nevertheless, Murtaḍā seems to have a different understanding of the question where he lumps these two figures under the same school and ignores the question of human power; Ashʿarī, he states, has a view distinct from both.[106] (3.2) In addition, it is worth noting that the author and Murtaḍā have different names to enumerate the main theologians pertinent to the discussion, which would be a strange occurrence if done by the same author.[107]

98 See for example the discussion in Murtaḍā 2000: 343–395.
99 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185.
100 Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 74–75.
101 Murtaḍā 1990a: 121–122; Murtaḍā 2000: 453.
102 Murtaḍā 2000: 333.
103 van Ess 2011: *passim*.
104 Nyberg/Athāmina 2011: *passim*.
105 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 181–182.
106 Murtaḍā 2000: 449–450.
107 Compare Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 181–182 and Murtaḍā 2000: 449–450; the two texts have in common the name of Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) in addition to the aforesaid Ḍirār b. ʿAmr and

(3.3) The line of reasoning is also different from Murtaḍā's, as in placing rational arguments last in enumeration, preceded by the Qur'ān, Prophetic traditions and consensus,[108] or in making rational speculation subservient to scriptural requirements[109]. This order is not Murtaḍā's standard line of reasoning in theology, given some of his categorical theological positions. For Murtaḍā, the question of human agency belongs to the realm of moral principles deducible by unaided reason; it relates to the axioms that it is vile to obligate to the impossible (*qubḥ al-taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq*) and to do injustice (*ẓulm*) in the form of punishing someone for an act of which he is not the agent. These axioms are accepted by all rational beings, regardless of their religious beliefs and independently from any revelation. Questioning them would jeopardize the whole structure of religion, since it opens the door for the possibility of God's committing all forms of vile acts, eventually leading to deceit which undermines the reliability of revelation, as the classical Mu'tazilī argument – endorsed by Murtaḍā – goes.[110]

(3.4) Then we are faced with the problem of using non-multi-attested reports (*akhbār al-āḥād*). (3.4.1) The author's objection to his opponents' reliance on equivocal reports, without him mentioning that these are non-multi-attested, is conspicuous.[111] Murtaḍā usually points out this problem as his main argumentative tactic as seen from surveying his writings on different theological questions,[112] since he invokes it based on epistemological reasons rooted in his understanding of knowledge and the means to acquire it[113]. (3.4.2) But not only does the author fail to invoke this objection in his opponents' faces; rather, the divergence from Murtaḍā's position is made even starker by the author's extreme reliance on non-multi-attested traditions to buttress his own arguments.[114] Since these reports cannot produce certain knowledge, they are insufficient in matters of secondary importance such as the particulars of religious law, let alone the foundations of doctrines which are the subject of the treatise.[115] But even if the

---

Najjār. But the author mentions Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833), Muḥammad b. Ghawth and Yaḥyā b. Kāmil (d. mid-third/ninth century); as for Murtaḍā, he lists the names of Ḥafṣ al-Fard (fl. late second/eighth century) and Ṣāliḥ Qubba (fl. third/ninth century).

108 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 197.

109 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185.

110 Murtaḍā 2000: 310, 319–322; Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 142.

111 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 178.

112 Murtaḍā 1990a: 358–360; Murtaḍā 1998b: 181–184, 187; Murtaḍā 1995: 48–49; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 116–117.

113 Murtaḍā 2009: 354–358; Murtaḍā 1990a: 351–355; Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 68–69; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 64–66, 2: 336–341.

114 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 201–203, 239–247.

115 Murtaḍā 2009: 380–381; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 33–35, 94–95.

validity of these reports is granted, the controversy in question belongs solely to the realm of speculation about God which, according to Murtaḍā's theology, must not depend on revelation, for the reasons enumerated above, i.e. the logical precedence of establishing the vileness of deceit over the reliability of any report, no matter how well established; so the recurrent use of these traditions stands in contrast to his general approach.[116]

(3.5) Moreover, the author's view on the legitimate source for divine names and attributes seems to have been different from Murtaḍā's; he is more inclined to rule that revelation and not reason is the source of these names and attributes,[117] whereas Murtaḍā confines the role of revelation to prohibiting certain names of God that reason would otherwise have legitimized.[118]

(3.6) In addition, the author argues from a pure linguistic standpoint; that is to say that the agent of an act of injustice is unjust (*fā'il al-ẓulm ẓālim*), which leads to the situation – supposedly unacceptable to the opponent – that ascribing acts of injustice to God would legitimize calling Him unjust. The same line of argument is also used for other derivations of vile acts such as instances of purposelessness and corruption in relation to their agents and other acts that, though not vile, cannot be ascribed to God such as instances of compliance and obedience.[119] This logic runs contrary to Murtaḍā's reasoning as attested in his writings where he stresses the point that concepts enjoy logical precedence over terms and not otherwise.[120]

(3.7) The analogy of obedience to kings with that to God, usually used by determinists to argue that it infringes on God's omnipotence not to be obeyed by his creatures, is rejected by the author. He judges such an analogy fallacious on several grounds, the first being that the king lacks authority, power and knowledge: he is in no position to bring people under moral obligation, nor is he able to unconditionally deliver the consequences of acts nor can he asses the proper magnitude of reward and punishment.[121] Murtaḍā deals with the same scenario in his theological writings; nonetheless, he does not bring up these objections. Rather, his rejection of the analogy is based on the fact that the king, unlike God, is likely to be affected by his subjects' disobedience.[122] That this answer is used by the

116 Murtaḍā 2000: 478–479.
117 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 188.
118 Murtaḍā 2000: 190, 201, 218–222, 392–393; Murtaḍā 1990a: 571–604.
119 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 203–204.
120 Murtaḍā 2000: 327–328.
121 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 232.
122 Murtaḍā 2000: 390–391.

author as his second choice[123] indicates a different order of argumentative priorities and thought processes than Murtaḍā's.

(4) *Sectarian Points*

Certain aspects of the text reflect an attitude that does not easily fit into an Imāmī discourse. (4.1) The author speaks favorably of some groups and individuals who are not so received in the Imāmī tradition, although to various extents. (4.1.1) He uses the term ancestors (*salaf*) in a laudatory tone,[124] which is not usually the case in Murtaḍā's – or Imāmī writings in general. (4.1.2) In addition, there is the positive reference to the Companions, the Followers (*al-tābiʿūn*), and the subsequent guided generations who follow in their steps,[125] all of which being expressions alien to Imāmī literature with its predominantly negative view of these times and individuals[126].

(4.1.3) This divergence from the Imāmī spirit can be read in the many traditions the author relates on the authority of the famous Companion Abū Hurayra (d. 57/676–677) who is considered particularly infamous by Imāmīs, Murtaḍā not being an exception, for more than the theological reasons used to stigmatize other Companions.[127] (4.1.4) The whole work concludes with an episode from none other than the second caliph ʿUmar, whereby the author urges the readers to consider the example of ʿUmar's reaction to heavy obligations.[128] Given Murtaḍā's views on the Companions in general,[129] and ʿUmar in particular,[130] it is extremely unlikely that he defers to his authority. (4.1.5) Moreover, a number of individuals are praised both for being knowledgeable (*ʿulamāʾ*) and among the first to have rejected the claim that God creates people's vile acts; although it is plausible that Murtaḍā did praise some of these individuals, even against the general Imāmī ethos, it is highly unlikely that he lauded all of them.[131]

---

123 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 232.

124 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 185.

125 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 187.

126 See Kohlberg 1976b: particularly 96–98.

127 Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 174–175; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 3: 284. For other early Imāmīs see for example, Ṣadūq 1983: 19; Mufīd 1993b: 78; Mufīd 1993a: 23.

128 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 246–247.

129 Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 126–130, 173; Murtaḍā 1990a: 495, 535–536; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 336–343, 2: 251; Murtaḍā 1998b: 235.

130 Murtaḍā 1986: 3: 272–273; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 290–291, 3: 148–150.

131 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 179; for example Muṭarrif b. ʿAbdullāh, who is reputed to not have been a supporter of ʿAlī, or even to have disliked him. In addition, his extremely hagiographic biographies in Sunnī sources, with the absence of any reference to him having believed that God has nothing to do with human sins, suggests that he probably did not hold such a view in the

(4.2) Another indicator is to be seen in the fact that the author never quotes any of the Imams *qua* Imams; that ʿAlī is mentioned here should be seen in the context of invoking the Companions' authority.[132] (4.3) Certain formulaic expressions are strange to the Imāmī spirit. An example is the phrase "the Qurʾān is our Imam/book" (*al-qurʾān imāmunā*);[133] true that this may still be taken as a legitimate, though infrequent, use of the term '*imām*' to mean 'a book,'[134] but this would not be an Imāmī's first choice, let alone its almost polemical, anti-Shīʿī tone in the context of sloganeering at the beginning of the statement of dogma.

The whole problematic aspect of the potential sectarian affiliation of the content discussed above cannot be easily ascribed to cautionary prudence (*taqiyya*), if one still takes Murtaḍā as the author. Many reasons militate against such an assumption. First and foremost, Murtaḍā's social status made him immune to such a practice, especially given the favorable vicissitudes of time under the Būyids. Second, according to his own legal views, this is not an instance of permissible cautionary prudence, since the author opens by stating that he is replying to the inquiry of a community of people about religious matters.[135] Third, even if cautionary prudence is granted, Murtaḍā's style would still allow him a better and more elusive way of expressing that which he would not accept as an Imāmī, whereas the current text does not show any nuisances – or even an effort in that direction – meant to hide a different attitude of the author than what the *prima-facie* reading of the text suggests.[136]

There remains, of course, the possibility that he was addressing a non-Imāmī audience and writing this way to persuade them, but his biography does not betray any interest in addressing other communities aside from debating their authors. In addition, such an assumption is untenable because Murtaḍā's reputation as a leader – or at least one of the leaders – of the Imāmī community would make any such tactic useless in the eyes of this presumed audience, especially

---

first place, given the hypersensitivity of the subject which does not allow for great toleration. So it is unlikely that Murtaḍā refers to him positively given these two issues, let alone the possible factual mistake regarding his actual position on divine decree and determining; on him, see Ibn Saʿd 1998: 7: 141–146; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd 1959–1964: 4: 94; Dhahabī 1993: 4: 187–195; Dhahabī 1987: 6: 481–483; Ibn Ḥajar 1995: 6: 205–206; Ibn Ḥajar 1984: 10: 157–158.

132 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 241–242.

133 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 187.

134 Ibn Manẓūr 1967–1981: ʾ-M-M.

135 See Murtaḍā 1990a: 562–563 for his views on cautionary prudence, where he restricts its valid application to instances of coercion.

136 In Murtaḍā 1990a: 562–563, Murtaḍā stresses the plausibility of resorting to equivocation to avoid blunt lies. This attitude, one expects, can only translate in a certain phrasing, very different from the straightforward one seen in the current text.

given his declared positions on sensitive points such as the status of the Companions and the question of the Imāma.

(5) *Bibliographic Points*

Examination of the bio-bibliographic sources also leaves one with serious doubts regarding Murtaḍā's alleged connection to the current treatise. (5.1) Thus, another pointer that undermines the ascription of the work to Murtaḍā is that the author mentions a book of his entitled *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* as a reference work dedicated to the interpretation of ambiguous verses on the question, suggesting that it is both elaborate and well-known. This title, however, is neither to be found in the accounts of Murtaḍā's works, nor does he speak of such a work despite his habitual references to his other works by name,[137] nor is the content of any of his works congruous with this allusion. His complementary *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* and *al-Dhakhīra*, which contain a lengthy discussion on human agency, cannot be meant here because of their content which does not correspond to the author's remark, in addition to the fact that Murtaḍā makes frequent references to them, only by this title;[138] so it is unlikely that the title *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* be another title for either *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* or *al-Dhakhīra*. Assuming it is a different work while still wanting to ascribe it to Murtaḍā would pose two questions: (5.1.1) first, why Murtaḍā, contrary to his habit, never alerts readers to such a book in his responses to pertinent questions where he mentions *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* or *al-Dhakhīra* and (5.1.2) second, why the author of *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* and *Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar* mentions neither *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* nor *al-Dhakhīra*.

Admittedly, the last argument suffers three problems; first, it is an *argumentum ex silentio*; second, there is the possibility of *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* and *al-Dhakhīra* not having yet been compiled at the time of writing the treatise in question; third, there is the possibility that the title *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* be initially the title of a work by Murtaḍā that is now known by some other name. Nonetheless, the argument is proposed to deal with these challenges within the limitations of the current information. It is still a reliable way to have a reasonable assessment of authorship, given Murtaḍā's frequent self-referencing in his works and the late date of some of them from which any mention of *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* is still absent. The margin of error is there, but the fact that neither this treatise mentions any known work

137 Murtaḍā 1997: 442; Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 84, 122, 128, 131, 310, 311, 315, 330, 336, 338, 363, 371, 379, 390, 412, 419, 2: 317, 339, 3: 81, 85, 87, 90, 109, 111, 117, 136, 149, 254, 4: 21, 74, 36, 131, 352; Murtaḍā 1995: 31, 36, 61, 71, 73; Murtaḍā 1998c: 277, 307, 349, 351.

138 Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 2: 224; See Murtaḍā 1985–1990: 1: 143, 363, 376, 390, 3: 81, 333; Murtaḍā 2009: 393, 395, 396 where Murtaḍā, having discussed similar questions, refers his reader to *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* as the main relevant work.

by Murtaḍā nor any of his works mention this treatise, coupled with the author's decision to reference himself in a way that does not quite fit into Murtaḍā's bibliographic records, should minimize this margin.

(5.2) Still, one must account for the possibility of the work having been written by Murtaḍā at an early stage in his career. A very early date of compilation may explain why he never refers to any of his works, assuming that all of them were written after this treatise; such a hypothesis would also take care of the difficulty arising from the discrepancy in style and terminology, since one can then propose that the writing style and terminological jargon of a young Murtaḍā were reasonably different from his later ones, even as early as *al-Shāfī*[139] whose style and terminology already betray considerable departure from the work under study. But this possibility can also be safely excluded by looking into Murtaḍā's bibliography. The early list of his works, prepared by his student Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Buṣrawī (d. 443/1051)[140] and ratified by Murtaḍā himself in Shaʿbān 417/September 1026 mentions all his works composed up to that time, enumerating 57 items in total.[141] But neither *Inqādh al-Bashar* nor *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* appear in the list; it is extremely unlikely that Murtaḍā fails to point out the absence of two early works of his, with one of them – i.e. *Ṣafwat al-Naẓar* – being supposedly an elaborate compilation.[142]

(5.3) It should also be noted that the earliest source to list *Inqādh al-Bashar* among Murtaḍā's works is *Maʿālim al-ʿUlamāʾ* by Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192). It is the last item on the list, preceded by *al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq* with which it shares two aspects: first, *al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq* does not appear among Murtaḍā's works in any list before Ibn Shahrāshūb's; second, the content of *al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq* is even more problematic in its relationship to Murtaḍā's authentic writings.[143] Also, Murtaḍā's close associates such as the aforementioned Ṭūsī

139 His *al-Shāfī* is definitely the earliest of Murtaḍā's extant theological books, as he refers to it in almost all of them; Murtaḍā 1998c: 300, 307; Murtaḍā 1990a: 409; Murtaḍā 2009: 431; Murtaḍā 1985–1995: 61, 73. In his legal work Murtaḍā 1997: 442 he refers to *al-Dhakhīra* in which he refers to *al-Shāfī*.

140 On him see Baghdādī 1997: 3: 355–356; Amīn 1997: 9: 404; Khūʾī 1990: 15: 323.

141 The earliest appearance of this list is in Iṣfahānī 1982–1995: 4: 34–39 where the author claims to be copying from a manuscript with both Buṣrawī's and Murtaḍā's handwriting. Another published version is based on Ḥusayn Maḥfūẓ's copy of a manuscript; it appears in Murtaḍā, 1998a: 1: 126–132. The two versions are almost identical, with very minor differences probably due to misreading.

142 No work with such title was found despite my diligent searches in various venues.

143 As a preliminary indicator, the author of the current article was able to find 27 definitions of terms provided in *al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq* that differ from Murtaḍā's explicit definitions of the same terms; this aside from stylistic and less stark contradictions.

and the famous Imāmī bio-bibliographer Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Najāshī (d. 450/1058)[144] fail to mention any of these two texts in their bio-bibliographic entries of Murtaḍā.[145] That both works make their first appearance in this relatively late compilation, their position at the end of the list and their problematic content leave us with either one of two explanations: that the two treatises were added later by manuscript handlers or – in case it is Ibn Shahrāshūb himself who listed them among Murtaḍā's works – that the ascription to Murtaḍā must have taken place within 150 years from his death.

6 Conclusion

The relevance of this article is to show how Murtaḍā's thought might have been misrepresented due to the similarities between his viewpoints and those of Muʿtazilī masters on the particular issue of divine decree and determining, which constitutes the core of the current treatise. Given the other positions taken by its author, the ascription of the text to Murtaḍā would certainly leave an inaccurate impression of his thought. On many matters where Murtaḍā sought to highlight the difference between his position and that of Muʿtazilīs, the author seems to adopt a view that contradicts Murtaḍā's, thus allowing for the misconception that Murtaḍā represented a form of Imāmī theology that was more accommodating of non-Imāmī viewpoints. It is hoped that the evidence presented against such an ascription would help situate Murtaḍā's thought within its context without having to make sense of the apparent divergence from mainstream Imāmī views that the treatise reflects.

Bibliography

ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, ʿAbd al-Rasūl (1996): *al-Kulaynī wa-l-Kāfī*. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.

ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Qāḍī al-Quḍāt (1966): *al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-ʿAdl*. Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd and Sulaymān Dunyā. Cairo: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī.

Abdulsater, Hussein (2011): "Dynamics of Absence: Twelver Shīʿism during the Minor Occultation". *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 161:2: 305–335.

Abdulsater, Hussein (2013): *al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and the Climax of Speculative Theology in Būyid Shīʿism*. Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale University.

144 As an indicator of Najāshī's association with Murtaḍā, when the latter died, his body was washed by Najāshī, the above-mentioned Sallār al-Daylamī and Abū Yaʿlā al-Jaʿfarī (d. 465/1072).

145 Ṭūsī 1997: 164–165; Najāshī 1995: 270–271.

Abdulsater, Hussein (forthcoming): "Resurgence and Spurious Ascription: The Curious Case of *Risālat al-Muḥkam wa-l-Mutashābih*". *Al-Abḥāth*.
Abrahamov, Binyamin (2006): "The attitude of Jaʿfar al-ṣādiq and ʿAlī al-Riḍā toward kalām and rational reasoning". *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 31: 196–208.
Akhtar, Waḥīd (1986): "An introduction to Imāmiyyah scholars: al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā: life and works". *al-Tawḥīd* 4.1: 125–152.
ʿAmāra, Muḥammad (2010): *Izālat al-Shubuhāt ʿan Maʿānī al-Muṣṭalaḥāt*. Cairo: Dār al-Salām.
ʿĀmilī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr (1965): *Amal al-Āmil fī ʿUlamāʾ Jabal ʿĀmil*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Baghdad: Maktabat al-Andalus.
Amīn, Ḥasan (1997): *Mustadrakāt Aʿyān al-Shīʿa*. Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt.
Amīn, Muḥsin (1997): *Aʿyān al-Shīʿa*. Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt.
Amīnī, ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn (1977): *al-Ghadīr fī al-Kitāb wa-l-Sunna wa-l-Adab*. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī.
Amīnī, ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn (1997): *al-Ṣirāʿ bayn al-Islām wa-l-Wathaniyya*. Qum: Markaz al-Ghadīr.
Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad Ali (2005): "Shīʿī Doctrine". *Encyclopaedia Iranica Online*. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/shiite-doctrine (29.04.2014).
Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad Ali (2000): al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan". *Early Islam, Second Series* 10: 744.
ʿĀmirī, Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Yūsuf (1988): *Rasāʾil Abī al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī wa-Shadharātuh al-Falsafiyya*. Edited by Saḥbān Khulayfāt. Amman: al-Jāmiʿa al-Urduniyya.
Ashʿarī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl (1980): *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa-Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn*. Edited by Hellmutt Ritter. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
Baghdādī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. *Tārīkh Baghdād* (1997): Edited by Muṣṭafā ʿAṭā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya.
Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Muḥammad Mahdī (1984): *al-Fawāʾid al-Rijāliyya*. Edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿUlūm and Ḥusayn Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. Tehran: Maktabat al-Ṣādiq.
Bar-Asher, Meir M. (1999): *Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imāmī Shīʿism*. Leiden: Brill.
Bayhom-Daou, Tamima (2005): *Shaykh Mufid*. Oxford: Oneworld.
Busse, H. (1969): *Chalif und Grosskönig; die Buyiden im Iraq (945–1055)*. Beirut; Wiesbaden.
Cahen, Cl. (1979): "Buwayhids". *Early Islam, Second Series* 1: 1350.
Calder, Norman (1989): "Doubt and prerogative: the emergence of an Imāmī Shīʿī theory of ijtihād." *Studia Islamica* 70: 57–78.
Clarke, L. (2006): "Faith and unfaith in pre-occultation Shīʿism: a study in theology and social history". In: *Islam and Other Religions, Pathways to Dialogue: Essays in Honour of Mahmoud Mustafa Ayoub*. Edited by Irfan A. Omar. London/New York: Routledge, 97–112.
Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad (1987): *Tārīkh al-Islām*. Edited by ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī.
Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad (1993): *Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ*. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla.
Diāb, Akram (1997): "D. Muḥammad ʿAmāra min al-Iʿtizāl ilā al-Salafiyya wa-min al-Muʿāraḍa ilā al-Taṭbīʿ". *Turāthunā* 47: 7–68.
Djeblī, M. (1992): "Encore à propos de l'authenticité du 'Nahj al-Balagha'!". In : *Studia Islamica* 75: 33–56.
Djeblī, M. (1997): "al-Sharīf al-Raḍī". *Early Islam, Second Series* 9: 340.
Ed. (2011): "Ḥafṣ al-Fard". *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill. Brill Online.

Farrāʾ, Abū Yaʿlā Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn (1966): *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya*. Edited by Muḥammad al-Fiqqī. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī.
Flanagan, J. (1995): "al-Rummānī". *Early Islam, Second Series* 8: 614.
Gimaret, D. (2011): "Muʿtazila". *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill, Brill Online.
Gleave, Robert (2009): "Recent research into the history of early Shiʿism". *History Compass* 7.6: 1593–1605.
Gurjī, Abulqāsim (1984): "Shīʿism in relation to various Islamic sects". *Al-Tawḥīd* 1.2: 43–50.
Halm, Heinz (2004): *Shi'ism*. Translated by Janet Watson and Marian Hill. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Ḥamawī, Yāqūt (1979): *Muʿjam al-Buldān*. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī.
Ḥamawī, Yāqūt (1993): *Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ*. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī.
Ḥasanī, Hāshim Maʿrūf (1964): *al-Shīʿa bayn al-Ashāʿira wa-l-Muʿtazila*. Beirut: Dār al-Nashr li-l-Jāmiʿīyīn.
Havemann, A. (1993): "Naqīb al-Ashrāf". *Early Islam, Second Series* 7: 926.
Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Hibatullāh (1959–1964): *Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha*. Edited by Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm. Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī.
Ibn al-Athīr, ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (1965): *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir.
Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī (1971): *Lisān al-Mīzān*. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī.
Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī (1984): *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb*. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr.
Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī (1995): *al-Iṣāba fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥāba*. Edited by ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya.
Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1995–1996): *al-Muntaẓam fī Tawārīkh al-Mulūk wa-l-Umam*. Edited by Suhayl Zakkār. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr.
Ibn Khallikān, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad (1973–1974): *Wafayāt al-Aʿyān*. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa.
Ibn Manẓūr, Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad (1967–1981): *Lisān al-ʿArab*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā (1969): *Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*. Edited by Susanna Diwald-Wilzar. Beirut; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Ibn Saʿd, Muḥammad (1998): *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir.
Ibn Shahrāshūb, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī (1961): *Maʿālim al-ʿUlamāʾ*. Edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya.
Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm (1903–1904): *Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī Naqḍ Kalām al-Shīʿa wa-l-Qadariyya*. Būlāq.
Iṣfahānī, ʿAbdullāh Afandī (1982–1985): *Riyāḍ al-ʿUlamāʾ wa-Ḥiyāḍ al-Fuḍalāʾ*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Qum: Maktabat Āyatullāh al-Marʿashī al-Najafī.
Jadʿānī, Muḥammad b. Ḥāmid (2001): *al-Ṣila bayn al-Tashayyuʿ wa-l-Iʿtizāl*. M.A. Thesis, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā.
Jaʿfarī, Muḥammad Riḍā (1992):"al-Kalām ʿind al-imāmiyya: nashʾatuh, taṭawwuruh wa-mawqiʿ al-Shaykh al-Mufīd minh". *Turāthunā* 30–31: 143–299.
Jafri, S Husain M. (1978): *Origins and Early Development of Shiʿa Islam*. London; New York: Longman.
Jishumī, al-Ḥākim al-Muḥassin b. Karāma (1973): *Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-Masāʾil*. In *Faḍl al-Iʿtizāl wa-Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*. Edited by Fuʾād Sayyid. Tunisia: al-Dār al-Tūnusiyya li-al-Nashr.

Khāminahʿī, ʿAlī (1992): "The place of al-Mufīd in the development of Shīʿī kalām and fiqh". *al-Tawḥīd* 10.2–3: 193–225.
Khʷānsārī, Muḥammad Bāqir (1991): *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt fī Aḥwāl al-ʿUlamā wa-l-Sādāt*. Beirut: al-Dār al-Islāmiyya.
Kharsān, Ṭālib (1991): *Nashʾat al-Tashayyuʿ*. Qum: Intishārāt al-Sharīf al-Raḍī.
Khaṭāwī, Wisām (1997): *al-Manāhij al-Riwāʾiyya ʿind al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā*. Qum: Dār al-Ḥadīth.
Khayyāṭ, Abū al-Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Muḥammad (1925): *al-Intiṣār wa-l-Radd ʿalā Ibn al-Rawandī al-Mulḥid*. Edited by H. S. Nyberg. Cairo.
Khūʾī, Abū al-Qāsim (1990): *Muʿjam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth*. Qum: Markaz Nashr ʾĀthār al-Shīʿa.
Kohlberg, Etan (1976a): "From Imāmiyya to Ithnā ʿAshariyya". *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 39.3: 521–534.
Kohlberg, Etan (1976b): "Some Zaydī views on the Companions of the Prophet". *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 39:1: 91–98.
Kohlberg, Etan (2003): "Introduction". In: *Shīʿism*. Edited by Etan Kohlberg. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, i–xlix.
Kraemer, J. L. (1986): *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: the cultural revival during the Buyid age*. Leiden: Brill.
Lambton, Ann K (1989): "Political theory and practice". In: *Expectation of the Millennium: Shīʿism in History*. Edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 92–114.
Madelung, Wilferd (1969): "The Assumption of the Title Shāhānshāh by the Būyids and 'The Reign of the Daylam (Dawlat al-Daylam)'". *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 28:3: 168–183.
Madelung, Wilferd (1970): "Imāmism and Muʿtazilite theology". In: *Le Shîʾisme Imâmite*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 13–130.
Madelung, Wilferd (1985): "ʿAlam al-Hodā". In: Encyclopaedia Iranica Vol. I, Fasc. 8. Edited by Ehsan Yarshater. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 791–795.
Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir (1983): *Biḥār al-Anwār*. Beirut: Dār al-Wafāʾ.
McDermott, M. (1977): "A debate between al-Mufīd and al-Bāquillānī". In: *Recherches d'Islamologie Recueil d'Articles Offert à Georges C.Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et Amis*. Louvain: Peeters, 223–235.
McDermott, M. (1978): *The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd*. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq.
Marcinkowski, M. I. (2001): "Twelver Shīʿite scholarship and Būyid domination: A glance on the life and times of Ibn Bābawayh al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991)". *Islamic Quarterly* 45.3: 199–222.
Māwardī, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (1966): *al-Aḥkām wa-l-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyya*. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī.
Momen, Moojan (1985): *An Introduction to Shiʿi Islam: the History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʿism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mottahedeh, Roy (1980): *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
Mufīd, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad (1993a): *al-Iʿlām bi-mā Ittafaqat ʿalayh al-Imāmiya min al-Aḥkām*. Edited by Muḥammad al-Ḥassūn. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd.
Mufīd, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad (1993b): *Masāʾil al-Ṣāghāniyya*. Edited by Muḥammad al-Qāḍī. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd.
Mughniyya, Muḥammad Jawād (1979): *al-Shīʿa fī al-Mīzān*. Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq.
Muhajirani, Abbas (2008): "Twelve-Imām Shiʿite theological and philosophical thought". In: *Shīʿism*. Vol. 2. Edited by Paul Luft and Colin Turner. London: Routledge, 175–198.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1954): *Amālī al-Murtaḍā: Ghurar al-Fawāʾid wa-Durar al-Qalāʾid*. Edited by Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm. Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1985): *al-Dharīʿa ilā Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa*. Edited by Abū al-Qāsim Gurjī. Tehran: Tehran University Press.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1985–1990): *Rasāʾil al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusayni. Qum: Dār al-Qurʾān al-Karīm.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1986): *al-Shāfī fī al-Imāma*. Edited by ʿAbd al-Zahrāʾ al-Ḥusaynī al-Khaṭīb. Tehran: Muʾassasat al-Ṣādiq.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1990a): *al-Dhakhīra fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1990b): *al-Intiṣār*. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1995): *al-Muqniʿ fī al-Ghayba*. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Ḥakīm. Qum: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1997): *al-Masāʾil al-Nāṣiriyyāt* [*sic*]. Edited by Markaz al-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-ʿIlmiyya. Tehran: Rābiṭat al-Thaqāfa wa-al-ʿAlāqāt al-Islāmiyya.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1998a): *Dīwān al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā*. Edited by Rashīd al-Ṣaffār. Beirut: Dār al-Balāgha.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1998b): *Sharḥ Jumal al-ʿIlm wa-l-ʿAmal*. Edited by Yaʿqūb al-Jaʿfarī al-Marāghī. Tehran: Dār al-Uswa.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (1998c): *Tanzīh al-Anbiyāʾ wa-l-Aʾimma*. Edited by Fāris Ḥassūn Karīm. Qum: N.P.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (2000): *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*. Edited by Muḥammad RiḍāAnṣārī Qummī. Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī.

Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (2009): *al-Dharīʿa ilā Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa*. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Imām al-Ṣādiq.

Najāshī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī (1996): *Rijāl al-Najāshī*. Edited by Mūsā al-Zanjānī. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.

Nashshār, ʿAlī Sāmī (1977): *Nashʾat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām*. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif.

Naẓarī, Maḥmūd (2008): *Fihrist-i Nuskha-hā-yi Khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī*. Volume 19. Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī.

Newman, Andrew J. (2000): *The Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿism: Ḥadīth as discourse between Qum and Baghdad*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.

Nielsen, J.S. (1991): "Maẓālim". *Early Islam, Second Series* 6: 933.

Niʿma, ʿAbdullāh (1961): *Falāsifat al-Shīʿa*. Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāh.

Niʿma, ʿAbdullāh (1985): *Hishām Bin al-Ḥakam*. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī.

Nyberg, H.S. / ʿAthāmina, Khalīl (2011): "al-Nadjdjār". *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill. Brill Online.

al-Qāḍī, Wadād (2003): "Abū Ḥayyan al-Tawḥīdī: A sunni voice in the Shīʿite century". In: *Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam*. Edited by Farhad Daftari. London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 128–161.

Raḍī, al-Sharīf Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn (1967): *al-Majāzāt al-Nabawiyya*. Edited by Ṭāha al-Zaynī. Cairo: Muʿassasat al-Ḥalabī.

Richard, Yann (1995): *Shiʿite Islam: Polity, Ideology, and Creed*. Translated by Antonia Nevill. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Rowson, E. K. (2011): "al-ʿĀmirī". *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by P. Bearmanet al. Brill. Brill Online.
Ṣadūq, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh (1983): *al-Khiṣāl*. Edited by ʿAlī Akbar al-Ghaffārī. Qum: Markaz al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyya.
Ṣadūq, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh (1991): *Kamāl al-Dīn wa-Tamām al-Niʿma*. Edited by Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt.
Ṣafadī, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (2000): *al-Wāfī bi-l-Wafayāt*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Arnāʾūṭ and Turkī Muṣṭafā. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth.
Schmidtke, Sabine (1991): *The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī*. Berlin: K. Schwarz.
Schmidtke, Sabine (2008): "al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī and Shiʿite Muʿtazilite theology". In: *Shīʿism*. Vol. 2. Edited by Paul Luft and Colin Turner. London: Routledge:151–1174.
Sellheim, R. (1991): "al-Marzubānī." *Early Islam, Second Series* 6: 634.
Shahrastānī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm (1992): *al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal*. Edited by Aḥmad Fahmī Muḥammad. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya.
Shammarī, Rȧūf (2004): *al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā Mutakalliman*. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Zliten, Libya.
Shīrāzī, Ṣadr al-Dīn ʿAlī Ibn Maʿṣūm (1962): *al-Darajāt al-Rafīʿa fī Ṭabaqāt al-Shīʿa*. Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya.
Sourdel, D. (1972): "L'Imamisme vu par le Cheikh al-Mufīd". *Revue des Études Islamiques* 40: 217–296.
Stetkevych, S.P. (2007): "al-Sharīf al-Raḍī and the Poetics of ʿAlid legitimacy: Elegy for al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī on ʿĀshūrāʾ, 391 A.H". *Journal of Arabic Literature* 38: 293–323.
Strothmann, R. (1979): "Ḥasan al-Uṭrūsh." *Early Islam, Second Series* 3:254.
Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn (1970–1974): *al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān*. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt.
Ṭahrānī, Āghā Buzurg Muḥammad Muḥsin (1983): *al-Dharīʿa ilā Taṣānīf al-Shīʿa*. Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwāʾ.
Thaʿālibī, Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Malik (1983): *Yatīmat al-Dahr fī Maḥāsin Ahl al-ʿAṣr*. Edited by Mufīd Qumayḥa. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya.
Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan (1995): *Rijāl al-Ṭūsī*. Edited by Jawād Qayyūmī Iṣfahānī. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.
Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan (1997a): *al-Fihrist*. Edited by Jawād Qayyūmī Iṣfahānī. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī.
Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan (1997b): *al-ʿUdda fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. Edited by Muḥammad Riḍā al-Anṣārī al-Qummī. Qum.
van Ess, J. (2011): "Ḍirār b. ʿAmr". *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill. Brill Online.