

From commentary to paribhss : Ktyyana and Patañjali vis-à-vis Vydi

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Objektyp: **Article**

Zeitschrift: **Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie**

Band (Jahr): **72 (2018)**

Heft 2

PDF erstellt am: **05.07.2024**

Persistenter Link: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-813508>

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From Commentary to *paribhāṣās*: Kātyāyana and Patañjali vis-à-vis Vyāḍi

<https://doi.org/10.1515/asia-2018-0013>

Abstract: The present paper is targeted on three landmarks in the long story of the *paribhāṣās*' development. Two of these landmarks descended from the earliest testimony of Vyākaraṇa meta-rules, i. e. those included in Pāṇini's grammar (fifth–fourth century BCE), and one which has been handed down as the first independent collection of *paribhāṣās* and attributed to Vyāḍi. In particular a shift is highlighted between Kātyāyana's (third century BCE) integrative approach (*vacana*) and Patañjali's (second century BCE) recourse to implicit *paribhāṣās* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as a powerful hermeneutical tool. A shift that helps in interpreting the need for a validation and collection of implicit pāṇinian *paribhāṣās* as carried out by authors such as Vyāḍi.

Keywords: *paribhāṣā*, meta-rules, sanskrit grammatical tradition, *vacana*, Vyāḍi, *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*, hermeneutics

1 The classic theory of *paribhāṣās* in grammar

Paribhāṣās, namely general statements aimed at helping interpret a (technical) text correctly,¹ have a very long history within the grammatical tradition. They begin with Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* meta-rules (c.a. 5th–4th BCE) embedded in the text itself, up to the emergence, with Vyāḍi, of an autonomous exegetical genre – a collection of *paribhāṣās* – culminating in the *summa* we

This paper is the result of a joint work discussed and shared by both authors. However, Maria Piera Candotti is responsible for §§ 1–2.1; 3–3.2; 4–4.1; 5–5.1 and 5.3 and Tiziana Pontillo for §§ 2.2; 3.3–3.3.2; 4.2; 5.2 and 6. All translations are the authors' unless explicitly signalled.

1 For a standard contemporary definition, see Roodbergen 2008, s.v.: “general convention for the interpretation of rules”.

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owe to Nāgeśa. The term itself is not used by Pāṇini, but the first occurrences are already found in Kātyāyana² – together with the more generic term *vacana* – and it has a stable and codified usage in Patañjali. Such a long intellectual history requires an interpretation to single out the different roles this instrument has played in such diverse cultural (and textual) environments. In our contribution we shall focus on the three most ancient authors of grammatical tradition, namely, Pāṇini and his first two commentators, Kātyāyana and Patañjali (c.a 250 BCE and 150 BCE), and compare them with the first collectors and editors of *paribhāṣās* (from Vyāḍi³ onwards) who gave rise to an altogether independent textual genre.

Before investigating the origins and first steps of this metalinguistic instrument, we should make a point about the classical theory of *paribhāṣās* in grammar, a theory already seen at work in the first *paribhāṣā*-collections, such as Vyāḍi's.

- a. All the metalinguistic conventions stipulated in the *Aṣṭhādhyāyī* are assigned for the purpose of limiting the scope of a wider (and commonly accepted) metalinguistic principle that would otherwise be assumed in interpreting the text.
- b. It is therefore legitimate to postulate that Pāṇini does not enunciate *all* the metalinguistic principles he assumes to be valid, but only the ones he deems strictly necessary, leaving the others implicit.⁴

² The term is used precisely twice, i. e. vt 4 ad A 1.1.69 and vt 4 ad A 1.3.11, in both cases with reference to Pāṇini's explicit *paribhāṣās*. Patañjali's usage, on the other hand, already covers both explicit and implicit metarules.

³ It is not so easy to define the chronology of Vyāḍi's work, since the proper name Vyāḍi seems to be overused in grammatical and lexicographical contexts, such as the *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya* or the *Ganapāṭha*, as clearly explained by Wujastyk 1993: XIV–XXIV. This *Paribhāṣā*-collection might even date back to the 3rd c. BCE and pre-date Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*, if its author were the sponsor of the thesis according to which *dravya* "individual substance" is the default-meaning of words, mentioned in vt 45 on A 1.2.64 and opposed to Vājapyāyana (quoted in vt 35 on the same A rule), who is for the *ākṛti* "generic form".

⁴ Particularly interesting in this respect is Nāgeśa's *incipit* of his *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* which states that Pāṇini left implicit some rules that earlier grammarians had stated explicitly, and that the task of the authors of *paribhāṣā*-texts is to recover and explain them: *prācinavaiyākaraṇatantra vācanikāny atra pāṇinīyatantre jñāpakanyāyasiddhāni bhāṣyavārttikayor nibaddhāni yāni paribhāṣārūpāṇi tāni vyākhyāyante* "The *paribhāṣās* – which in the works of earlier grammarians were explicitly stated, and which here in that of Pāṇini are established by means of suggestions and reasonings, and which are contained in the *Bhāṣya* and in the *Vārttika* – will be explained [in this text]."

- c. This does not however lead to an unbridled rise in implicit Pāṇinian hermeneutical principles. Commentators have established ways of checking the legitimacy of a given *paribhāṣā*, which are listed here in order of frequency.
- Some *paribhāṣās* are established by an indication (*jñāpakasiddha*) found in Pāṇini's text itself. This indication is, in most cases, a supposed redundancy in Pāṇini's text that can be justified – or rather, is no longer a redundancy – if the principle at stake is assumed to be accepted by Pāṇini. Vyāḍi's commentator already provides finalized examples of this kind of reasoning, such as his treatment of VPBh 9 *nānubandhakṛtam anekaltvam* “The condition of being polyphonic is never created by a marker”. To give an example, the affix of the first verbal class *ŚaP*, where both *Ś* and *P* are markers, is a single sound affix. The indication that Pāṇini accepts this meta-principle even though he does not state it explicitly is to be found in a rule which is also a meta-rule, i. e. A 1.1.55 *anekal śit sarvasya* which states that polyphonic substitutes and single sound substitutes with marker *Ś* replace the whole form mentioned as the substituendum.⁵ If Pāṇini did not follow the principle of not counting markers to determine the number of sounds of a given linguistic string, the mention of single-sound substitutes with marker *Ś* (e. g. *Śi*) would be redundant, since *Śi* will obviously be polyphonic. This supposed redundancy is the hint given by Pāṇini of his implicit acceptance of the principle.⁶
 - Several other *paribhāṣās* are established by way of a commonly accepted everyday norm or practice (*lokanyāyasiddha*). To stay with examples from Vyāḍi, VPBh 19 *saty api sambhavē bādhanam bhavati* states that even when two rules could apply contemporaneously, only one is used.⁷ This is stated to deal with some difficulties such as the undesired alternant application of both the specific pronominal infix *akac* (taught by A 5.3.71) and the general

5 e. g. A 2.4.53 *bruvo vaciḥ* teaches that *vac-* should be used instead of the whole verbal base *brū* (and not just for its final sound). Similarly, in the case of single sound substitutes with the marker *Ś*: 7.1.20 *jaśśasoḥ śiḥ* teaches that *Śi* should replace the whole of the forms *Jas* and *Śas*.

6 Comm. ad VPBh 9: *yad ayaṃ anekāl śit sarvasyeti śidgrahaṇam karoti | tatra hi sānubandha ādeśo 'nubandhena sārddham anekāl eva bhavati | tatrānekāl ity eva sa sarvādeśaḥ siddhaḥ | nārthaḥ śitkaraṇena | paśyati tv ācāryaḥ yo 'nubandhena sākam anekālādeśaḥ sa ekāl eva | sa ca na sarvādeśaḥ | tasmāc chidgrahaṇam |*

7 This contradicts the preceding pbh which states that the blocking of one rule only arises when two rules cannot apply together. The pbh should probably be considered *anitya*, i. e. not compulsory, since its application would lead to serious problems.

affix *ka* (A 5.3.70).⁸ The principle is assessed through a maxim widely accepted in daily activities, as when a person tells another “Give curds to the Brahmins, buttermilk to (the Brahmin) Kauṇḍinya”, this second person will only give buttermilk to the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya even though, as a Brahmin, he would also be entitled to curds.⁹ That these maxims are assumed to be widely accepted justifies the fact that Pāṇini did not feel any need to state them explicitly in the text.

- Others are stated by logical reasoning (*nyāyasiddha*). For example, VPBh 35 *nimittābhāve naimittikasyāpy abhāvo bhavati*, stating that in the absence of a cause there is no effect, is argued on the basis that it is logical, just as the shadow created by an umbrella disappears once the umbrella is taken away.¹⁰
 - A fourth category is sometimes evoked, namely that of the *paribhāṣās vācanikī*, whose authority derives from their being uttered by reliable persons.
- d. A *paribhāṣā*, legitimated by one of the arguments above, must also prove useful in rules other than the one used as an intimation in order to be fully accepted as authoritative.

To sum up, the theory of implicit *paribhāṣas* emerges from an analysis of the practice of explicit *paribhāṣas* observed in Pāṇini, and particularly from the fact that he does not aim at any explicit regulation of all the metalinguistic conventions at work in his grammar, but only those whose usage needs somehow to be restricted/specified. This has opened the door to a good deal of speculation on implicit *paribhāṣās*. These, nevertheless, show different degrees of proximity to the source texts, from the principles hinted at by

⁸ Comm. ad VPBh 19: *kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | sarvanāmno 'kajvidhīyamāno 'dhikṛtaṃ kaṃ bādhatē | asti ca saṃbhavo yad ubhayaṃ paryāyeṇa syāt* “What is the purpose of indicating this [*paribhāṣā*]? [The purpose is that] *akaC*, which is prescribed for a pronoun (by A 5.3.71), blocks *ka* which is taught by the *adhikāra* (= A 5.3.70). And there is the possibility that they might be applied alternately”. This would lead to the undesired forms *idakaṃka/adakaska*.

⁹ Comm. ad VPBh 19: *kutaḥ | loke dṛṣṭvāt | evaṃ hi dṛśyate loke brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatāṃ takraṃ kauṇḍinyāyeti saty api saṃbhavē dadhidānasya takradānaṃ nivartakaṃ bhavati | asti ca saṃbhavaḥ yad dahi kauṇḍinyāya dīyate takraṃ ca*.

¹⁰ Comm. ad VPBh 35: *tad yathā chattranimitā chāyā chattrāpāye na bhavati*. In Vyāḍi the argument is nevertheless followed by a *jñāpaka*; this is quite common in his text both for *nyāya* and *lokanyāya* arguments and, as we will see, is the clue to a deep change in the function of these statements within the whole exegetic and interpretative mechanism.

Pāṇini himself, to those so general as to be recognised as simple common-sense aphorisms. The work of the collectors of *paribhāṣas* has been to gather, evaluate and discuss these principles, which were actually already extensively used by the first commentators on Pāṇini as sharp and useful hermeneutic tools. In the discussion that follows, we shall focus on these first testimonies to investigate points of agreement with and differences from what we have called the classical theory of *paribhāṣas*, to see whether this helps us in tracing the first steps in the history of this tool.

2 The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* ancillary rules as an intrinsic part of the text

2.1 Typology of Pāṇini's ancillary rules

As we well know, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* contains both operational rules (*vidhi-sūtras*), which mainly enjoin affixes (*pratyayas*), increments (*āgamas*) and substitutes (*ādeśas*), and ancillary rules. These are traditionally divided into three distinct classes namely *adhikāra-*, *saṃjñā-* and *paribhāṣā-sūtras*, i. e. rules governing whole sections of grammar, names and exegetical conventions/guidelines. Only the class of *adhikāras* is signalled as such by Pāṇini,¹¹ the other two are to some extent later categorizations, albeit with a sound basis in the A.

Many of these ancillary rules are gathered in a single place, at the beginning of the work, just as they are in some *Śrautasūtra*-texts (see Chierichetti's contribution) and show a close relation to the bulk of the text. To the best of our knowledge, no doubt has been cast upon the attribution of this group of rules, nor has anybody advanced the hypothesis that the whole *corpus* of these initial rules was a late interpolation, even though it is self-evident that the nature of this part of the A is inherently open to changes and insertions. We cannot therefore exclude that e. g. A 1.2.46 has actually been interpolated, since the principles of the correct use of *ca* and of the *anuvṛtti* seem to have been violated (as underlined by Joshi/Bhate 1983¹²), or that even the whole section A 1.2.53–57 is the fruit of a progressive insertion of 'semantic' provisions, as suggested from the time of Böhlingk's translation onward, mainly on the basis of Pāṇini's *usus scribendi*.¹³

¹¹ The headings are marked with a *svārīta* accent according to A 1.3.11 *svāritenādhikāraḥ*.

¹² Joshi/Bhate 1983: 197; 217.

¹³ see e. g. Palsule 1949; Wezler 1976: 366 ff.

On the other hand, most of this large introductory collection of rules included in the first *adhyāya* of the A are known by Kātyāyana, who overtly comments them.

We shall present here a short survey of some very well-known ancillary rules in the A in order to single out the characteristic features of each, attempting to account, as far as possible, for the concept behind the mechanism set to work by Pāṇini.

The third chapter of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, for instance, starts with the following plain set of three governing-elements (*adhikāras*), which extend up to the end of the fifth chapter:

A 3.1.1: *pratyayaḥ* |

It is an affix.

A 3.1.2: *paraś ca* |

And it is following.

A 3.1.3: *ādyudāttaś ca* |

And with high pitch on its first vowel.

Thus, these three governing-elements continue to apply to all the units taught in the rules included throughout chapters 3, 4 and 5, by merely relying on the technical anaphora-device called *anuvṛtti*, which permit the extension of these words as part of all the following *sūtras* included in this section, i. e. their simultaneous inclusion in all these rules. Consistently, all these rules enjoin some units termed ‘*pratyayas*’, which are high-pitched on their first vowel, and juxtaposed after some others. As a consequence, e. g. A 3.1.5 *gup-tij-kid-bhyaḥ san* actually enjoins the application of the high-pitched (*ādyudāttaḥ*) affix (*pratyayaḥ*) *sāN* after (*paraḥ*) the units *gup-* “to hide”, *tij-* “to sharpen” and *kit-* “to take care”.

A smaller section included in this broad group of affixation-rules begins with the *adhikāra* A 3.1.91 *dhātoḥ* “after a verbal base” and closes with the end of chapter 3, so that each rule in section A 3.1.91–3.4.117 has to be additionally considered as taught “after a verbal base”. For instance, A 3.1.93 *kṛd atiṅ* gives the name *kṛt* for a high-pitched (*adhikāra* A 3.1.3) affix (*adhikāra* 3.1.1) which follows (*adhikāra* 3.1.2) a verbal base (*adhikāra* 3.1.91), provided it is not a verbal *parasmaipada* or an *ātmanepada* ending (*tiṅ*): i. e. a deverbal or primary nominal affix.

On the other hand, rule A 3.1.93, supplemented with all the previous governing-elements, is a naming rule (*saṃjñā-sūtra*), i. e. a rule which establishes a terminological convention whose domain generally extends to the whole

grammar.¹⁴ As we have seen in examples A 3.1.1–3, *adhikāras* strictly rely on the precise place they occupy in the grammar. All the rules subsequent to a governing-element, i. e. which are included under their relevant *adhikāra*, involve it as a part of their wording. As a consequence, the precise boundaries of the domain of each governing-element are clearly fixed with a considerable saving of details to be explicitly included by every rule pertaining to this domain.

By comparison, the specific features of naming rules plainly emerge: their domain is independent of the place they occupy, as clearly shown by the following example. The double naming rules A 1.2.45–6 – devoted to the term *prātipadika* – employ our term *ḥrt*, even though they occur far before the naming rule that teaches it (A 3.1.93).

A 1.2.45: *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam |*

A 1.2.46: *ḥrttaddhitasamāsās ca |*

A unit other than a verbal base or an affix, which is endowed with a meaning, has to be called *prātipadika* (1.2.45) and a unit ending with a *ḥrt*- or a *taddhita*-affix or a compound unit [has also to be called *prātipadika*] (1.2.46).¹⁵

Once the name-teaching-rule has established a conventional meaning, it will be applied every time the name is used and, in the case of words with a non-technical meaning (such as *vṛddhi*, lit. “growth”), it will be limited to what is explicitly taught. In whatever operational rule it occurs, a name works as if it were a sort of whistle which ‘musters’ the relevant rule (or rules) for its interpretation, so that they contribute to constitute the complete wording of this rule.

This is actually one of two traditional interpretations of the naming mechanism, namely, the so-called *kāryakāla*-interpretation formulated by Vyāḍi (VPBh 45 = NPBh 3), as *kāryakālaṃ saṃjñāparibhāṣam* “(technical) names and meta-rules [are understood] at the [appointed time, i. e. at the] operation time”. The other interpretation, i. e. the so-called *yathoddeśam*, conversely aims at summoning in the naming rule itself all the operational rules which use the relevant name. Thus, the “definition” (or more precisely the “name-giving rule”) is widened because of the operational rules involving it. This latter is also proposed as a *paribhāṣā* from the twelfth century CE onward (see Puruṣottama PBh

¹⁴ However, there are some rules, such as A 1.2.43 limiting to compounds the definition of *upasarjana* as what is expressed with the first ending, or A 3.1.92 giving the name *upapada* to what is expressed in the seventh ending in the section of primary derivatives.

¹⁵ The names *ḥrt* and *taddhita* are actually used here to designate nominal stems ending with a *ḥrt*-affix or a *taddhita*-affix respectively, in accordance with A 1.1.72.

105 and Śiradeva PBh 116) and it constitutes the NPBh 2: *yathoddeśam saṃjñāparibhāṣam* “(technical) names and interpretation-rules [are understood] in accordance with [the place where] they are stated”. In both interpretations, the automatic involvement of a meta-rule by another rule or rules is due to the presence of a specific sign linking the two rules together. This sign is the name itself in the case of a naming rule; in interpretation rules (*paribhāṣā*), on the other hand, it is another feature (*liṅga*) quoted as distinctive in the meta-rule. As we have just seen, the two traditional ways of interpreting *saṃjñāsūtras* are shared by the *paribhāṣā*- themselves. Self-evidently, commentators wondered about the location of this kind of ancillary rules, possibly because their strategic “competitors”, i. e. *adhikārasūtras* were, conversely, so neatly grounded in the place they occupied.

In fact, rules teaching names have more than one point in common with rules teaching conventions. Let us start by having a look at two well-known ones, crucial for a correct interpretation of Pāṇini’s syntax.

A 1.1.66: *tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya* |

“A unit which is expressly indicated by means of the seventh nominal ending refers to an operation on something which precedes it,” i. e. the referent of a locative form in grammar is the right-hand context of an operation which applies to what precedes this mentioned unit.

A 1.1.67: *tasmād iti uttarasya* |

“A unit which is expressly indicated by means of the fifth nominal ending refers to an operation on something which follows,” i. e. the referent of an ablative form in grammar is the left-hand context of an operation which applies to what follows this mentioned unit.¹⁶

Both these meta-rules teach nothing that is not included in the common usage of these two nominal endings, and they merely specify the only permissible interpretation to be adopted among the different ones otherwise available to a Sanskrit speaker. We have relied on the first meta-rule e. g. by translating A 3.1.5 *gup-tij-kid-bhyaḥ* “after the units *gup-*, *tij-* and *kit*” here-above. As far as the seventh ending is concerned, the general operational rule of semivowel replacement is a good example: A 6.1.77 *iko yaṅ aci*¹⁷ “A sound denoted by *iK* (= *i*, *u*, *r*, *l*) is replaced by the corresponding sounds denoted by *yaṅ* (*y*, *v*, *r*, *l*) when a

¹⁶ Recently an interesting proposal has been made by Scharf to interpret both these meta-rules as limited to the context of substitution. Cf. Scharf 2003 (2012) and Candotti 2012: 33–34.

¹⁷ The whole wording of rule A 6.1.77 should be < *dīrghāt padāntāt vā hrasvyasya* > *iko yaṅ aci* according to Patañjali (M 1.52 l. 2–53 l. 13 *ad* A 6.1.77). See Candotti/Pontillo forthcoming § 5.1.

sound denoted by *aC* (*a, i, u, ṛ, ḷ, e, o, ai, au*, i. e. a vowel) follows [in *sandhi*].” E. g. **madhu atra* > *madhv atra*. A number of interpretation-rules are in fact concentrated, like name-teaching rules, in the first part of the grammar, but they actually apply to the whole *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (see below § 2.2). Commentators interpret them through the same two devices we have seen for name-teaching rules, that is, either by recalling the interpretation-rule in the contexts to which they are relevant, i. e. contexts that show the distinctive feature or *liṅga* mentioned in the interpretation rule itself,¹⁸ or by mustering all the relevant operative rules together with the interpretative one.

Nonetheless, some interpretation-rules are limited to a specific domain and to a specific place in grammar, such as A 1.4.1 *ā kaḍārād ekā samjñā* “Only one name [among those introduced by the rules of the following section] [may apply at once] up to *kaḍāra* (2.2.38).” Whenever two technical terms taught in the domain of this section of grammar become applicable to a single object, only one is actually applied. At the same time, such meta-rules are often classified as *adhikāra*-rules by modern scholars like Cardona¹⁹ and Sharma²⁰.

2.2 Commentarial comparison between heading- and interpretation rules

What is therefore the crucial difference between the so-called headings (*adhikāra*) on the one hand, and interpretation-rules and naming rules on the other? It is difficult to find explicit answers in Pāṇini himself, as some rules may be characterized – as we have seen – by an ambiguous or joint *status*: since the *svarita*-pitch that should mark the heading²¹ was lost in the early stages of the tradition of the text, indeed, from the beginning, commentators had to integrate it by independent reasoning. While the prototypic tokens of both kinds of rules are quite clearly established, the boundary between the two seems to be fuzzy. *Paribhāṣās* are prototypically context-free full sentences meant for interpreting any relevant rule in the text, and headings are fragments subsidiary to the rules immediately following, but there are numerous in-between cases: e. g. the *status* of A 2.1.1 *samārthaḥ padavidīḥ* was already discussed by Patañjali (see below).

¹⁸ In our examples, the usage of an ablative ending for A 1.1.66 and of a locative ending for A 1.1.67.

¹⁹ e. g. Cardona 1997: 66ff.

²⁰ Sharma 1987–2003, e. g. vol. 2: 203.

²¹ As taught by A 1.3.11.

In Pāṇini, what seems to keep together naming-rules and interpretation rules on the one hand, and headings on the other is the fact that neither is independently valid. Indeed both exist as a function of other rules (*parārtha*) and extend, so to say, their function over these rules. The capacity to extend a function over other rules – a capacity intimately linked with the condition of being subservient to them – is by no means unique to meta-rules; on the contrary, it characterizes operational rules as well,²² and was used in early times under parallel technical traditions, particularly in ritual exegesis. When discussing such a case of extension, Jaimini uses the standard comparison of a lamp, often found in grammatical tradition.

MS 11.1.61: *vibhavād vā pradīpavat |*

Or like a lamp, on account of the capacity [of its light] to expand.

Here, the reference is to a kind of subsidiary rite (*aṅga*), which provides benefits for more than one primary rite, even though it is performed only once. The simile is included in Jaimini's discussion on the possibility for a single subsidiary ritual action to be simultaneously (*yaugapad*) helpful for more than one primary rite, provided that they share the same purpose (MS 11.1.57: *ekārthyād [...]*). Nevertheless, the statement that *the simultaneous effectiveness of a single rite for many primary rites is granted by its acting 'like a lamp'* might be superseded, according to the opponent, if there were a specific injunction for the focused subsidiary, as advanced in the following *sūtra*:

MS 11.1.62: *arthāt tu loke vidhitaḥ pratipradhānaṃ syāt |*

But since in ordinary life (the position of a lamp) is prescribed by the aim (i. e. by the needs of each case), it might have to be [repeated] along with [each] principal rite because of the injunction.

The final position, on the other hand, confirms that this kind of extension takes place spontaneously:

MS 11.1.71: *vidhir iti cen na vartamānāpadeśāt |*

[If one says] “It is an injunction”, [the answer] is “No, because that is [merely] the statement of how things go”.

In the fairly long previous discussion, the joint/simultaneous performance (*yaugapadyam*) of several subsidiaries is said to be the rule, provided that it complies with some simple principles:

²² Incidentally, in grammar, headings are often [parts of] operational rules.

MS 11.1.68: *vyākhyātaṃ tulyānām yaugapadyam agrhyamāṇaviśeṣāṇām |*
It has [already] been explained that there should be a joint/simultaneous performance of [several] comparable [subsidiaries] among which no distinction is perceived.

MS 11.1.69: *bhedas tu kālabhedāc codanāvyavāyāt syād viśiṣṭānām vidhiḥ pradhānakālatvāt |*

But they should be separate when their time is separate or their injunctions are not joined, and there should be an injunction of the distinct [subsidiaries] because time is the prevalent concern.

Some points of this discussion may throw light on Pāṇini's ancillary devices; in particular, what both texts seem to share is the perception of the natural capacity of some rules/actions to be assigned to other rules/actions, thereby expanding their scope from the single expressly denoted element to a whole context through a sort of radial process. They also commonly share the need to take the natural boundaries of such an expansion into account – boundaries created by sameness of context – and, to consider the provisions to overcome them. Typically, this is done in the case of headings that extend the natural mechanism of *anuvṛtti* outside the proper context. What, on the other hand, is not found either in Pāṇini or in ritualistic literature, is the need to distinguish sharply between a mechanism of extension *in praesentia* and one *in absentia*. This need will develop later on with the distinction between *tantra* and *prasaṅga* extension devices,²³ and between *adhikāras* proper on the one hand and naming/interpretation rules on the other.

In fact, a first sharp division between these two devices is proposed for the first time in grammatical tradition by Patañjali while discussing the *status* of the meta-rule A 2.1.1 *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*:²⁴

²³ These two technical devices with the history of the relevant terminology are focused on in Freschi/Pontillo 2013 and 2013a.

²⁴ This rule is commonly interpreted as “A provision concerning inflected words [is said] of words having semantic and syntactic connection (*samartha*)”. Cf. Cardona (1997: 66): “An operation pertaining to *padas* applies to *padas* that are syntactically and semantically related.” Its range of application traditionally includes all compounds or even all five types of *vṛtti* (i. e. primary and secondary derivative nominal stems, compounds, derivative verbal base formations, and the so-called *ekaśeṣas*). Recently (Pontillo 2013: 113–120) the following fresh interpretation has been submitted: “A provision which mentions (involves/depends on) inflected words denotes the same object [of the output of rule],” partly based on a previous analysis of all the A occurrences of the noun *vidhi* used as a second constituent of a compound, presented in Candotti/Pontillo forthcoming: § 5. Accordingly, moving from the everyday linguistic setting to the metalinguistic one, the target of this rule becomes the equivalence of the denotation taught by the formation-rule and the output of the formation itself, i. e. between the *vigraha* enunciated

M 1.358 ll. 3–7: *kiṃ punar ayam adhikāra āhosvit paribhāṣā | kaḥ punar adhikāraparibhāṣāyor viśeṣaḥ | adhikāraḥ pratiyogaṃ tasyānirdeśārtha iti yoge yoga upatiṣṭhate | paribhāṣā punar ekadeśasthā satī sarvaṃ śāstram abhijvalayati pradīpavat | tad yathā | pradīpaḥ suprajvalita ekadeśasthaḥ sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati |*

What [kind of rule] is this? A heading or an interpretation-rule (*paribhāṣā*)? – But what difference is there between a heading and an interpretation-rule? – A heading stands by the side of every rule, so that it may not be specifically mentioned at each rule. On the other hand, an interpretation-rule illuminates the whole corpus of rules [although] located in only one place like a kindled lamp which illuminates the whole house.

Once again we find the simile of the lamp, but this time it is directly connected with one of the two devices. The lamp becomes a metaphor for a mechanism working *in absentia*, as opposed to a heading that stands by the side of each and every rule, which is physically present, so to say.²⁵ And this presence of the physical/concrete dimension of language in the case of extension by heading, i. e. the extension of a linguistic form as opposed to a more general ‘convention’ on meaning-interpretation (*paribhāṣā*) becomes crucial for commentators in solving difficulties raised by the interpretation of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* rules, see e. g. the following well-known passage from Patañjali:

M 1.119 ll. 9–15 *ad vt 4 ad A 1.1.49: adhikāro nāma triprakāraḥ | kaścid ekadeśasthaḥ sarvaṃ śāstram abhijvalayati yathā pradīpaḥ suprajvalitaḥ sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati | aparō ’dhikāraḥ yathā rājjvāyasā vā baddham kāṣṭham anukṣyate tadvad anukṣyate cakāreṇa | aparō ’dhikāraḥ pratiyogaṃ tasyānirdeśārtha iti yoge yoga upatiṣṭhate |*

What is called a “governing [element]” (*adhikāra*) is of three kinds. One of these illuminates the whole corpus of rules [although] it is located in only one place like a kindled lamp, which illuminates the whole house. Another kind of *adhikāra* is dragged in by means of the syllable *ca*, like a piece of wood, which is dragged along since it is bound by means of a rope or a chain. Another kind of *adhikāra* remains present in every rule, so that it may not be specifically mentioned in each rule.

or suggested by *vṛtti*-rules and the newly formed (and then inflected) *pada*. Thus, in whatever operational rule, the *liṅga* bidding the application of this rule of equivalence might actually consist of the presence of *padas* (used to condition the denotation of the relevant formations).

²⁵ Cf. *Nyāsa*’s etymological explanation of the term *paribhāṣā* (*ad A 2.1.1*): *parito vyāpṛtā bhāṣā* [...] “*paribhāṣā* is a speech which is engaged all around”.

The aim of the passage is in itself quite straightforward: a proposal is made (M 1.119 l. 4 vt 4 ad A 1.1.49: *viśiṣṭā vā ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā*) to identify substitution genitives with a specific marker in order to differentiate between them and other kinds of genitives. At this point an objection is raised that it would be necessary to repeat an item in the genitive if, while recurring from one rule to another, the meaning of the genitive changed. The objection is answered by the passage quoted above which highlights the fact that there are three kinds of governing elements,²⁶ the last of which corresponds to the definition of the *adhikāra* proper, or heading, which stands by the side of every rule (*yoge yoga upatiṣṭhate*). This ensures the sole presence of the linguistic form, irrespective of the meaning it conveys.²⁷ Thus a genitive form can recur from one rule to another while conveying the meaning of a partitive in the first rule and that of a substitution in the second. The second case is that of an *anuvṛtti* managed by the physical presence of the word *ca*. And the first type of rule affected is certainly the *paribhāṣā* as shown by the definition and by the standard of the lamp, and as explained by commentators.²⁸ Thus, just as a lamp illuminates a house by illuminating itself, in the same way a meta-rule leads to the understanding of further rules by conveying the notion and not just the form of itself.²⁹

26 It is evident that this three-fold *adhikāra* is an overarching name encompassing *adhikāra* proper, ellipsis with *ca* and also, as we shall see, *paribhāṣās*. A hint that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the difference between the three is often blurred.

27 This third type of *adhikāra* seems to encompass both cases of technical headings, i. e. originally marked with the *svārita*-accent and cases of *anuvṛtti*, i. e. of common cases of ellipsis. By the way, there are many hints of the strictly non-technical usage and interpretation of *anuvṛtti* both in Pāṇini and his commentators.

28 See Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa ad M ad A 1.1.49 vt 4: adhikāro nāmeti | pārārthyasāmyāt paribhāṣāpy adhikāra ity ucyate | kaścid iti | paribhāṣārūpa ityarthah* "As far as 'What is called *adhikāra* [by Patañjali]' is concerned, the meta-rules are also indicated by means of '*adhikāra*', since they also aim at something else (i. e. at further *A sūtras*). With regard to '*kaścid*', it means 'that which is represented by a *paribhāṣā*'. Nāgeśa, in turn, attributes the following interpretation to Kaiyaṭa: *adhikārasābdena pārārthyāt paribhāṣāpy ucyate | kaścit paribhāṣārūpa iti kaiyaṭah | dīpo yathā prabhādvārā sarvagṛhaprakāśaka evam etatsvabuddhijanādvārā sarvasāstropakārakam iti tattātparyam* (NPBh 3.1–3) "Kaiyaṭa maintains that *paribhāṣās* are also denoted by means of the word *adhikāra*, because they aim at some other [rule]. One (of the three types of *adhikāra*, namely the first one mentioned above) is the *paribhāṣā*. The intentional meaning of this is that [a *paribhāṣā*] is a subsidiary for the whole (grammatical) teaching through the production of its own notion, just as a lamp illuminates the whole house by [its] light".

29 We also find this underlying 'autonymic' significance in the simile of the lamp, as shown by other contexts where it is used. See e. g. D 1.3 ll. 19–20: *[...] anye manyante | dviśaktiḥ śabda ātmaprakāśane 'rthaparakāśane ca samarthah | yathā pradīpaḥ ātmānaḥ prakāśayan nidhyarthān prakāśayatīti* "Others think: the word has two powers: it is capable of manifesting itself and its meaning. Like a lamp which while manifesting itself also manifests the riches in the treasury". Cf.

But how much of this distinction reconstructed by the commentators can be safely attributed to Pāṇini? As we have said, the situation seems blurred and the lengthy commentarial discussions on the *status* of some rules (A 2.1.1 as already seen, but also A 1.1.3) clearly show that commentators felt the need to create some order and give a clearer categorization to those devices whose different features and functions are mostly left implicit by Pāṇini. In fact, Pāṇini seems, at the very least, uninterested in such a distinction, an attitude that he appears to share with other technical traditions. At least from the terminological point of view, there is no occurrence of the term *paribhāṣā* in Śrauta-sūtras (see Chierichetti, this volume). Moreover, the only occurrence of the term *adhikāra* we have singled out in the same literature is included at the beginning of the KŚrS. Here ability/legitimacy to perform the Vedic rites is discussed and finally restricted on the basis of *varṇa* and other specific conditions: 1.1.1–4 *athāto ‘dhikāraḥ | phalayuktāni karmāṇi | sarveṣām aviśeṣāt | manuṣyāṇām vārambhasāmarthyāt* “From here onward [we shall explain] the entitlement [of performers]. Ritual actions are [all] essentially connected with the [achievement of] a result. The entitlement [to perform these ritual actions] belongs to all because there is no difference [as far as the results of ritual actions are concerned]. Or rather, [the entitlement only belongs] to human beings because of their ability to undertake [the performance of rites]”.³⁰ It is self-evident that this kind of usage of the term *adhikāra* does not concern a category of rules, but rather a classification of eligible performers of sacrifices. What can be considered as shared by grammatical and ritual *adhikāras* is their being fit to undertake specific opera-

Mīmāṃsā-commentary by Śabara (*ad* MS 1.1.5), where the argument is put into the opponent’s mouth – merely in the sense that even the *siddhāntin* cannot deny the fact that a cognition while making the other objects known must itself be known: *utpadyamānaivāsau jñāyate jñāpayati cārthāntaram pradīpava* “(Is it not a fact that) it (= the cognition) becomes known, while it comes into existence and at the same time it makes the other objects known, as a lamp does (which is itself seen and renders other things visible?”. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 5.1.10: *pradīpopādānaprasaṅganivṛttivat tadvinivṛttiḥ* “As it is not necessary to bring a (second) lamp to see the (first) lamp (which people who desire to see things bring to see them), in the same way, it is not necessary for the instance (which is stated in order to make known a thing that is not known)”.

³⁰ This meaning is close to that in MS 6.1.4: *phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstraṃ sarvādhikāraṃ syāt* “The entitlement [to perform] that (= the ritual action) which is taught should belong to all beings, because the ritual action is targeted on its results”, and in MS 6.2.1: *puruṣārthakāsiddhitvāt tasya tasyādhikāraḥ syāt* “The entitlement to the fruits of ritual actions should belong to each [human being], because a single end is established for human beings”. Cf. also MS 6.6.36; 11.1.21.

tions, i. e. their capacity to govern operative rules/ritual performances in order to put them into effect.³¹

Furthermore, the fact that Pāṇini puts the majority of interpretation-rules at the beginning of the grammatical text, thus granting them the possibility of covering almost the whole text by *anuvṛtti*, is more consistent with a functioning of interpretation-rules akin to that of natural ellipsis mechanisms and consequently, closer to the functioning of headings. The times for a long discussion on *kāryakāla* and *yathoddeśa* interpretation of the functioning of meta-rules were yet to come. If the above is true, both interpretation rules and headings are, from all points of view, part of the grammatical text in Pāṇini, characterised by being subservient to other rules and by being interpreted not only on the basis of their wording but also of the place (let us recall *ekadeśastha*- said by Patañjali of interpretation rules) they occupy in the actual text.

3 Kātyāyana's interpretative and philological tools to establish a conclusive text

3.1 Meta-rules and operational rules

From the first commentaries onwards, we concentrate mainly on interpretation rules (*paribhāṣās*) since both the term and a distinctive concept seem to emerge. Let us begin with a few lexical facts. The term *paribhāṣā* is far from common in the early period of grammatical tradition. Even though it seems well-established by the time of Patañjali, Kātyāyana uses it only twice.³² It is used once with reference to meta-rule A 1.1.69 *aṇudīṭ savarṇasya cāpratyayaḥ*, which teaches that an *aṇ* sound and a sound marked with *U* denote not only themselves but also all homogeneous sounds. The problem that arises is what to do with

³¹ Cf. M 1.2 ll. 2–3: *atha śabdānuśāsanam | atha iti ayam śabdaḥ adhikārthaḥ prayujyate | śabdānuśāsanam śāstram adhikṛtam veditavyam* “Here is the teaching of linguistic forms. This word *atha* is used in the sense of ‘appointing’. The treatise which teaches the linguistic forms has to be recognized as appointed”.

³² In addition to these two occurrences, we find a gerundive form from the verbal stem *paribhāṣ-* used by Kātyāyana in the same context (A 1.1.69): vt 7 *savarṇe ṅgrahaṇam aparibhāṣyam ākṛtigrahanāt* “In the notation of homogeneous sounds there is no need to specify the comprehension of the *aṇ* sounds because of the comprehension of the generic form”. On the other hand, Abhyankar (1967: 6) recenses more than 40 *vārttikas* he considers as *paribhāṣās*.

sounds, in particular, vocalic sounds, which are not directly mentioned³³ but indicated through the sounds in the list of sounds (*akṣarasamāmnāya*), in their turn, denoted by their condensed forms (*pratyāhāra*).³⁴ In fact, no long vowels are mentioned in the list, nor can we say (vt 3) that the sounds in the list can denote something in their turn: they are objects denoted and not words denoting, and nothing can change this intrinsic nature of theirs.³⁵ Nor it is possible to state (vt 4) that the teaching is imparted in the initial sound-list itself, because the meta-rule is both actually and logically subsequent³⁶ to the list:

vt 4: *varṇapāṭha upadeśe iti ced avarakālatvāt paribhāṣāyā anupadeśaḥ |*
If one says that the reading of sounds is made in the first teaching, then there can be no first teaching of a specification/commentary (*paribhāṣā*), because it is subsequent.

In this passage, the function of regulating, i. e. commenting on another rule, proper to the *pari-bhāṣā*, is crucial for logical reasoning: the meta-rule presupposes another rule, it cannot be a ‘first teaching’.

The second occurrence is found in the comment on A 1.3.11 *svaritenādhikāraḥ*, the meta-rule teaching that *adhikāras* ‘headings’ are marked in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* with a *svarita* accent. Now, as vt 2 points out, what is explicitly stated (*nirdiśyamāna*) is assigned to the entire communicative event in everyday practice (*loke*) too.³⁷ Moreover, another explicit statement would block a previously affected statement in ordinary language and this is not desired for headings in grammar:

33 e. g. A 7.4.32 *asya cvau* “[Long vowel *i*] replaces *a* when it is [the final sound of a pre-affixal base] before the affix *Cvi*”, is applied both to *a* and *ā*.

34 Condensed forms are taught by A 1.1.72 to denote the sounds in the list. Sounds of the object language are only secondarily hinted at by condensed forms.

35 vt 3 *hrasvasampratyayāt iti cet uccāryamāṇasampratyāyakatvāt śabdasya avacanam*.

36 Cf. Patañjali’s commentary thereon (M 1.178 ll. 23–26 ad A 1.1.69 vt 4: *kiṃ parā sūtrāt kriyata iti ato ’varakālā | neti āha | sarvathāvarakālaiva | varṇānām upadeśas tāvat | upadeśottarakāletsamjñā | itsamjñottarakāla ādir antyena saha itā iti pratyāhāraḥ* “– Does it come later than this, since it is considered as subsequent with respect to the [relevant *sūtra*] (i. e. with respect to the *akṣarasamāmnāya-sūtras*)? – No, the Teacher says. It comes later in any case. First of all, there is the first teaching of sounds. After this first teaching [of sounds] there is the *samjñā* *it*. Then there is the *pratyāhāra* consisting of the initial sound with the final marker according to rule A 1.1.71”.

37 vt 2 *na vā nirdiśyamānādhikṛtatvād yathā loke*. Patañjali gives the following example: one can say “let a cow be given to Devadatta, one to Yajñadatta and one to Viṣṇumitra” and a cow is also attributed to Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra.

vt 3: *anyanirdeśaḥ tu nivartakaḥ tasmāt paribhāṣā |*

But a different explicit statement will block it, for which reason there is the meta-rule/specification.³⁸

Another vt will be mentioned here. Even though Kātyāyana does not clearly identify a class of meta-rules (still less a class of interpretation rules) as opposed to operational rules, he does not hint at the existence of a function that differs from the one – commonly attributed to operational rules – of bringing about (*nir-vṛt-*) linguistic elements. The vt in question tackles the problem of the meta-rule A 1.1.50 *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* “In the place of [something] there is the nearest one”, which specifies the mechanism of substitution by clarifying that, when more than one substitute is applicable to a substituend, one must choose the one most similar to it. Now, one needs to understand what exactly A 1.1.50 does:

vt 2: *sthāne 'ntaratamanirvartake sthāninvṛttiḥ |*

If [it is a rule that] brings about the most similar [substitute] in that place, then the place-holder would be excluded.³⁹

That is to say, if A 1.1.50 is interpreted as an operational rule teaching that any linguistic form be substituted by its most similar substitute, there would be no place for any substituend whatsoever. Yet, the converse option also sparks some difficulties:

vt 3: *nirvṛttapratipattau nirvṛttiḥ |*

If there is perception of [substitutes] which have already taken place, then they have [already] taken place,⁴⁰

38 Let us imagine a sentence such as “let a cow be given to Devadatta, a blanket to Yajñadatta and one to Viṣṇumitra”.

39 Cf. Filliozat’s (1976: 389) translation: “Si ‘*sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*’ est producteur, il y a éviction des originaux”. That seems to be fairly close to Patañjali’s commentary (M 1.122 ll. 4–6 *ad* A 1.1.50 vt 2: *sthāne 'ntaratamanirvartake sarvasthāninām prāpnoti | asyāpi prāpnoti | dadhi madhu | astu | na kaścid anya ādeśaḥ pratinirdiśyate tatrāntaryato dadhiśabdasya dadhiśabda eva madhuśabdasya madhuśabda evādeśo bhaviṣyati* “If [it is a rule that] brings about [the substitutes] most similar in the place, then there the withdrawal of all the place-holders will be obtained. [The withdrawal] of this will also be obtained. Take for example *dadhi madhu*. Let it be so! No other substitute is referred back. In this case, on the basis of the similarity, the linguistic form *dadhi* will replace the linguistic form *dadhi*, the linguistic form *madhu* will replace the linguistic form *madhu*”.

40 Cf. Filliozat’s (1976: 389) translation: “S’il y a par la présente formule compréhension d’éléments produits par une autre, la production ne se réalise pas.”

and (vt 4), if the production of the substitutes has already been accomplished, the rule is purposeless. Finally, with vt 5, Kātyāyana returns to a previous solution, namely that of putting the rule under the governing element ‘*śaṣṭhī*’ in A 1.1.49, thus meaning that the most similar substitute takes the place of something expressed with a genitive ending. What is relevant here is how Kātyāyana continuously evokes the distinction between an injunctive rule and a meta-rule *paribhāṣā* without however ever focusing on it clearly, through the opposition of “a rule bringing about the substitute” (i. e. an operational rule) and a rule leading to “a [specific] comprehension concerning substitutes already realized”. In this sense, such an understanding can be safely declared useless for obtaining the right substitute forms (vt 4). Likewise, the final solution of linking 1.1.50 with ‘*śaṣṭhī*’ quoted in the immediately preceding *paribhāṣā* helps in reading the whole set of rules 1.1.49–50 as a *paribhāṣā*-provision. This, however, is not the specific point of the vt which aims, rather, at limiting the rule’s scope to rules involving a substitution genitive.⁴¹

3.2 *Jñāpaka*

To close our survey on Kātyāyana’s usage of later well-established technical terms in the field of discussion on meta-rules, we must also quickly tackle his usage of the well-known term *jñāpaka*, the ‘indication’ that in latter texts proves both the existence of the interpretative principle and the superfluity of enunciating it explicitly. Occurrences of the derivatives of the causative base *jñāp-* in Kātyāyana are scanty, ten times in all in the *vārttikas*, among which we must consider 2 occurrences in *ślokavārttikas*⁴² and 2 occurrences of non-technical verbal forms of *jñāp-*.⁴³ This leaves us with a core set of six occurrences.⁴⁴

What is particularly interesting is that in these passages, all dealing with proposed integrations or particular interpretations of the text, Kātyāyana never says that the *jñāpaka* allows the desired integration/interpretation not to be

⁴¹ Again, what is only confusedly hinted at by Kātyāyana is, on the contrary, explicated and systematized by Patañjali who glosses *nirvartaka* with ‘*antarataṃ anena nirvartyante*’ (M 1.122 l. 1 *ad* A 1.1.50 vt 1) and *nirvṛttapratipatti* with *pratipādaka-* further explaining it as *anyena nirvṛttānāṃ anena pratipattiḥ* (M 1.122 ll. 9–10 *ad* A 1.1.50 vt 2).

⁴² M 1.73 ll. 15–18 *ad* A 1.1.19 vt 2; 1.200 ll. 21–24 *ad* A 1.2.18 vt 2.

⁴³ M 1.259 l. 8 vt 13 *ad* A 1.3.1; M 1.261 l.16 vt 3 *ad* A 1.3.1.

⁴⁴ M 1.67 l. 18 vt 5 *ad* A 1.1.11; M 1.111 l. 14 vt 3 *ad* A 1.1.45; M 1.155 l. 14 vt 3 *ad* A 1.1.59; M 1.156 l. 23 vt 8 *ad* A 1.1.59; M 1.209 l. 22 vt 5 *ad* A 1.2.32; M 1.349 l. 17 vt 3 *ad* A 1.4.99.

stated aloud. It is difficult to consider this as incidental because, as we shall see later, Kātyāyaṇa does, whenever needed, explicitly state on what grounds he considers that a given principle may remain implicit; see for example, the fixed statement *avacanāt lokavijñānāt siddham* “This is established because what is not stated explicitly is known from mundane usage”.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the thinking behind a *jñāpaka* is much more oriented towards the need to prove Pāṇinian authority for a proposed integration or interpretation:

1. A 1.1.11 *īdūded dvivacanam pragṛhyam* provides the name *pragṛhya* for words ending with *ī*, *ū* and *e* when they are dual endings. vt 4 calls attention to the fact that, if we interpret the rule as targeting words ending with *ī*, *ū* and *e* and with dual endings, it is necessary to make an explicit prohibition for cases with a zeroing of dual endings. This avoids using the name *pragṛhya* for forms such as *kumārī agāram* with zero substitution of the dual ending (<*kumāryor agāram*) taught by A 7.1.39.⁴⁶ vt 5 then states: *saptamyām arthagrahaṇam jñāpakam pratyayalakṣaṇapratiṣedhasya* “The mention of meaning in the seventh ending is a clue of the prohibition of rule A 1.1.62 [in the case of the name *pragṛhya*]”. The reference here is to rule A 1.1.19 *īdūtau ca saptamyarthe* which teaches that words ending in *ī* and *ū* with the meaning of a seventh ending [are called *pragṛhya*]. The mention *arthe* instead of the simple seventh ending is stated as necessary in order to take care of cases with a zeroing of the ending,⁴⁷ thus showing that A 1.1.62, which grants the transference of affix-rules to the zeroed realisations of these same affixes, does not work when dealing with the name *pragṛhya*. The *jñāpaka* is used here to prevent a possible objection to the proposed integration.⁴⁸
2. A 1.1.45 *ig yaṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇam* provides the name *saṃprasāraṇa* for *i*, *u* and *ṛ* substitutes of the respective semivowels. The problem is understanding whether this (vt 1) is a name for the sounds (which are substitutes of the semivowels) or (vt 2) for the operation of replacing the semivowels with the vowels.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Cf. e. g. vt 5 *ad* A 1.1.21; vt 2 *ad* A 1.1.65.

⁴⁶ A 7.1.39: *supām sulukpūrvasavarṇāccheyādādyāyājālaḥ* “Affixes named *suP*, when occurring after an *aṅga* in the *chandas* are replaced with *sU*, *LUK*, a long vowel corresponding to the preceding one, *ā*, *āt*, *Śe*, *Ḍā*, *Ḍyā*, *yāC* and *āl*”.

⁴⁷ Where the name *pragṛhya* is desired, unlike in A 1.1.11.

⁴⁸ Using a loose paraphrase we could say that the reasoning behind the *jñāpaka* is the following: “and we cannot use the argument of transference of zeroed endings by A 1.1.62 because rule A 1.1.19 shows us that such a transference does not work in the case of the name *pragṛhya*.” An explicit mention (as proposed) is thus necessary.

⁴⁹ M 1.111 l. 5 vt 1 *ad* A 1.1.45: *saṃprasāraṇasaṃjñāyām vākyasaṃjñā ced varṇavidhiḥ*; 1.111 l. 9 vt 2 *ad* A 1.1.45: *varṇasaṃjñā cen nirvṛttiḥ*.

To this, vt 3 *vibhaktiviśeṣanirdeśaḥ tu jñāpakaḥ ubhayasaṃjñātvasya* retorts that the explicit mention of the name *saṃprasāraṇa* in different endings is a clue to the fact that it is a name for both. The *jñāpaka* is used here to prove a given interpretation of the rule.

3. Two occurrences are found in one of the meta-rules managing the process of substitution: A 1.1.59 *dvirvacane 'ci* teaching that “[the substitute of a vowel] occurring immediately before (a suffix) which begins with a vowel is as if it were the place-holder in case of reduplication.” The problem raised here is that since the prescription of transference follows the establishment of the reduplicated substitute, the reduplication will have the form of the substitute itself which, in many cases, is not desired.⁵⁰ vt 3 *ajgrahaṇaṃ tu jñāpakaṃ rūpasthānivadbhāvasya* answers that “the mention of vowels is a clue to the fact that there is ‘treatment as if it were the place-holder’ of the form itself”. In fact, the restriction *aci* “before a suffix beginning with a vowel” is said to be meant to block the otherwise assumed *rūpasthānivadbhāva* in cases such as *jeghrīyate* and *dedhmīyate*⁵¹ (with suffix *yaṅ*) where a transference of the form of the place-holder would lead to the incorrect forms **jāgrhyāte* and **dādhmīyate*. In this case, the clue is found in the rule itself and is, strictly speaking, not a redundancy (*aci* is not used only to debar unwanted cases of *rūpasthānivadbhāva*) and it is by no means a way of avoiding the explicit mention either of an addition or of a hermeneutical principle.
4. Nevertheless, the commentary continues, if we assume *rūpasthānivadbhāva* for doubling, a problem arises for forms such as *adhijage* where it is necessary to double the form of the substitute *gāṅ* and not of its place-holder *iṅ*, and a number of other cases. As we are not interested in the technicalities of the discussion here, it suffices to say that vt 7 proposes both a different interpretation and an integration (*vacana*) of the text: *dvirvacananimitte 'ci sthānivad iti ceḍ ṇau sthānivadvacanam* “If [we interpret] ‘before a [suffix] beginning with a vowel that causes reduplication, [the substitute] is treated like the place-holder’, then there should be explicit mention of treatment like the place-holder before the affix *ṆiC*”. In forms such as *jijāvayīṣati* (from *ju* + *ṆiC* + *saN* + *ŚaP* + *tīP*), *saN* (and not *ṆiC*) triggers the doubling yet the *rūpasthānivadbhāva* must be granted. vt 8 *oḥ puyaṅjiṣu vacanam jñāpakam ṇau sthānivadbhāvasya* closes the discussion certifying that “the mention *oḥ puyaṅjiṣu* is a clue that before a *Ṇi* there is

⁵⁰ M 1.155 l. 9 vt 1 *ad* A 1.1.59: *ādeśe sthānivadanudeśāt tadvataḥ dvirvacanam*; l. 12 vt 2: *tatrābhyāsarūpam*.

⁵¹ Taught by A 3.1.22 with substitution of *ī* for *ā* by A 7.4.31.

sthānivadbhāva.”⁵² Here the *jñāpaka* plays a role more akin to the one we are used to considering in later literature: i. e. it grants the pointlessness of the previously proposed modification of the text.

5. Rules from A 1.2.32 to 40 teach the name *ekaśruti* “monotone utterance”⁵³ and specific accent rules thereon. Now, as pointed out by vt 1 *ad* A 1.2.32, some of these rules teach effects that take place after a circumflex accent (*svaritāt*) and thus presuppose rule A 8.4.66 teaching the substitution of an *udātta* accent (when followed by an *anudātta*) with a *svarita*. The problem is that A 8.4.66 is supposed to be as if it were non-realised for all the rules preceding it, and thus the rules should be enunciated later than A 8.4.66 itself.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, what is proposed here is not (or at least not explicitly) a textual shift, but rather a logical succession in rule application. vt 5 *ad* A 1.2.32 *devabrahmaṇor anudāttavacanam jñāpakam svaritād iti siddhatvasya* states “[The rule A 1.2.38] teaching the *anudātta* accent [in place of the circumflex one] for the [plural vocative forms of *deva*- and *brahman*-, i. e.] *devāḥ* and *brahmāṇaḥ* [instead of *dēvāḥ* and *brāhmāṇaḥ*]⁵⁵ [in the *subrahmaṇyā* hymns] is a clue to the fact that [A 8.4.66] is accomplished with reference to rule [A 1.2.39]⁵⁶, i. e. ‘after a circumflex’.” Without the previous application of A 8.4.66, there would be no scope whatsoever for A 1.2.38. It is difficult here to determine whether the *jñāpaka* proves the correctness of the proposed interpretation or grants the non-necessity of its explicit mention. Nonetheless, the former interpretation seems to be more probable, since elsewhere Kātyāyaṇa explicitly states the second interpretation (cf. vt 9 *ad* A 1.1.65, below).
6. The rule 1.4.99 *laḥ parasmaipadam* gives the name *parasmaipada* to the abstract verbal ending *la*. Yet, as the first vt points out, it is necessary to ensure that the name for any single concrete verbal ending acting as a substitute for abstract ones is understood (*grahaṇa*). In fact, where it is

52 Rule A 7.4.80 *oḥ puyaṇjy apare* teaches the vowel *i* as the substitute of the vowel *u* (of any length) of the reduplicative syllable before [a base] beginning with any labial consonant, any semivowel or the consonant *j*- followed by *a* before the desiderative affix *saN*. Now the only possibility for a base with a vowel *a* to have a reduplication syllable in *u* is on the basis of the *rūpasthānivadbhāva* of a place-holder in *u*.

53 *ekaśruti* is a monotone utterance for calling someone from a distance according to A 1.2.33 *ekaśruti dūrāt sambuddhau*.

54 M 1.209 ll. 5–6 vt 1 *ad* A 1.2.32: *svaritasyardhahasvodāttāt ā udāttasvaritaparasya sannatarāt ūrdhvam udāttād anudāttasya svaritāt kāryam svaritāt iti siddhyartham*.

55 The initial *udātta*-pitch is taught by A 6.1.195: *āmantritasya ca* “The initial of the address form (i. e. the vocative expression) is also *udātta*-pitched”.

56 A 1.2.39: *svaritāt saṃhitāyām anudāttānām*.

actually taught (*vacana*), the name is superseded by the names of the triplets of endings taught by a subsequent rule (A 1.4.101), as established for the *ekasaṃjñā* section.⁵⁷ Then vt 3 closes the discussion:

vt 3: *sici vṛddhau tu parasmaipadagrahaṇaṃ jñāpakaṃ puruṣābādhakatvasya |*

But the understanding of the term *parasmaipada* in the rule teaching *vṛddhi* before the aorist affix *siC*⁵⁸ is a clue to the fact that the name of the person does not block [the name *parasmaipada*].

In this case, the clue actually seems to be an alternative to something else being introduced by the oppositive particle *tu*. On the other hand, it is not opposed to a concrete proposal of textual addition, as any text-addition in the *ekasaṃjñā* section would be blocked by the name of the person.

To sum up, we can say there are only scanty traces in Kātyāyana of what will later become a strict terminological system. In particular, there seems to be no evidence of the specific role played by the *jñāpaka* in later times, namely that of a substitution for the full textual addition;⁵⁹ on the contrary, in most cases *jñāpaka* could also be proof of the soundness of the proposed integration or interpretation.

3.3 *Vacana*

Most often, when reference is made to what we would call a *paribhāṣā*, Kātyāyana uses the term *vacana* ‘[explicit] statement’ (e. g. M 1.161 l. 16 vt 1 *ad* A 1.1.62 *pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇavacanāṃ sad anvākyānāt śāstrasya*; M 2.386 l. 3 vt 3 *ad* A 5.2.59 *svam rūpam śabdasya aśabdasaṃjñā iti vacanāt*). Now, *vacana* is a generic term used by Kātyāyana in a wide range of situations that go far beyond the limited domain of meta-rules. The term is also used to make reference to:

- (a) injunctive rules (e. g. vt 3 *ad* A 2.1.24 whereby *ahine dvitīyāsvaravacanānarthakyaṃ ca* reference is made to accent-teaching rule A 6.2.47 *ahine dvitīyā*).

⁵⁷ M 1.349 l. 11 vt 1 *ad* A 1.4.99: *lādeṣe parasmaipadagrahaṇaṃ puruṣābādhitatvāt*; M 1.349 l. 13 vt 2 *ad* A 1.4.99: *iha vacane hi saṃjñābādhanaṃ*.

⁵⁸ A 7.2.1 *sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeṣu* “*vṛddhi*, [in place of the vowels *i*, *u*, *r*, *l* final of a verbal pre-suffixal base] before the aorist suffix *siC* co-occurring with *parasmaipada* endings”.

⁵⁹ See for example, the translation ‘intimation’ consistently used by Wujastyk.

- (b) sub-segments of injunctive rules (e. g. M 3.170 l. 14 vt 1 *ad* A 6.3.79, where the part of the text ‘*granthānta-*’ is said to be purposeless: *granthānte vacanānarthakyam avyayībhāvena kṛtatvāt | granthānte vacanam anarthakam*).
- (c) proposed rules/proposed adjunctions or complements to rules (e. g. M 1.207 l. 12 vt 2 *ad* A 1.2.29–30 *siddham tu samānaprakramavacanāt* where it is taught that the definition rules *uccair udāttaḥ | nīcāir anudāttaḥ* are to be completed by *samānaprakrame* “in the same place of articulation”, in order to account for the fact that different vowels with different points of articulation also have a different elevation).⁶⁰

There are some common points in many of these passages showing the term *vacana*. In many of them Kātyāyana is generally considering the necessity/appropriateness of some explicit teaching as opposed to an implicit one, or as compared to something to be discarded from or emended in the text. In fact, we can reconstruct the different steps of Kātyāyana’s reasoning to prove the necessity of enunciating a given norm explicitly, and such steps are common to both rules and meta-rules.

3.3.1 *Avacana*

A rule must be spelt out if, and only if, it is absolutely necessary. This is the axiom on which the interpretation of any rule whatsoever in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is founded. Many passages with *vacana* are concerned with what would happen if the rule were not stated aloud.

For example, let us analyse, Kātyāyana’s vts. on the rule A 2.4.79 *tanādibhyas tathāsoḥ* “Optionally [zero by *LUK* in place of *sIC*] after verbal bases of the group beginning with *tanU* when the affixes *-ta* (3rd sing. *Ā*) and *-thās* (2nd sing. *Ā*) follow.”⁶¹ Kātyāyana is not satisfied with the formulation of this rule, particularly with the ambiguous mention *ta*, which is both a 3rd sing. *Ā* and a 2nd plural *P* with regard to the secondary endings. In the first two vts., he proposes the integration of either a mention of *ātmanepada*⁶² or of *ekavacana* (singular):⁶³ each one of these two mentions would suffice for ruling the 2nd

⁶⁰ Patañjali glosses all these proposals of integrations by *iti vaktavyam*.

⁶¹ The rule must account for the following forms *atata/ataniṣṭa* “he extended”; *atathās/ataniṣṭhās* “you extended”.

⁶² M 1.495 l. 17 vt 1 *ad* A 2.4.79: *tathāsor ātmanepadavacanam* “As far as the [endings] *-ta* and *-thās* are concerned, the [restrictive] mention of the *ātmanepada* [has to be added]”.

⁶³ M 1.495 l. 19 vt 2 *ad* A 2.4.79: *ekavacanagrahaṇam vā* “Otherwise the [restriction to the] singular has to be understood”.

plural P out of the picture. Kātyāyana then closes the argument with a third and last vt stating that if the explicit integration is not carried out (*avacane*), undesired results could be obtained:

M 1.496 l. 1 vt 3 *ad* A 2.4.79: *avacane hi aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ* |

If it is not stated, there is an automatic involvement of something not desired.

Thus, Kātyāyana accepts the explicit integration of either *ātmanepada* or *ekavacana* to the wording of A 2.4.79. On the contrary, Patañjali, as he often does, goes one step further and tries to demonstrate that such an explicit mention is unnecessary, because the same result might be obtained by correct interpretation of the existing rule through an everyday heuristic convention, i. e. by restricting *-ta* to the ending most similar to the unambiguous second-mentioned ending *-thās* (2nd sing. *Ā*).⁶⁴

Now, existing *paribhāṣās* or proposals of new ones are evaluated in the same way, that is to say, by looking for the need to state them explicitly. A classical example is that of Kātyāyana's comment on A 1.1.50 *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* "In the place of [something] there is the nearest one", teaching that if more than one substitute is available for a substituendum, one must choose the substitute that is nearest to the substituendum:⁶⁵

vt 1: *sthānina ekatvanirdeṣād anekādeśanirdeṣāc ca sarvaprasaṅgas tasmāt sthāne 'ntaratamavacanam* |

There is over-application because of the mention of the place-holder as being one, and the mention of substitutes as being more than one; that is why there is the teaching "*sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*".

3.3.2 *Prasaṅga*

The similarities between operational rules and meta-rules do not stop here. None of them, for example, is aimed at establishing some wholly new linguistic convention. On the contrary, their explicit mention (*vacana*) is justified by the

⁶⁴ For a discussion of Patañjali's position, see below, section 4.

⁶⁵ e. g. in A 6.1.87 *ād guṇaḥ < Saṃhitāyām acy ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ >*, which teaches a *guṇa* vowel (i. e. either *e* or *o*) as single substitute for both a preceding long *ā* and a following vowel (e. g. **tava udakam > tavodakam* 'your water'), the pbh is necessary to substitute *o* for (*a + u*) and *e* for (*a + i*).

necessity to prevent and modify a default rule that would otherwise automatically apply or stigmatize an attested incorrect linguistic usage. This position is already clearly stated in Kātyāyana's very first vt, where he says that since the relationship between word-form and word-meaning is already established by everyday usage, grammar is meant to teach restrictions in usage for the sake of correct behaviour (*prayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ*). Thus, regarding A 1.4.21 *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* “plural [endings] in the meaning of many”, which is, by the way, of questionable status, but traditionally considered a *vidhisūtra*, Kātyāyana says that its mention is necessary because the rule teaching the affixation of nominal and verbal endings is made in a general way (i. e. without specifying which endings are used in the singular, etc.) while there are attestations of incorrect usages, such as the usage of plural for dual.⁶⁶

In general, any automatic implication of a rule (or of part of a rule) in a context different from its own is called *prasaṅga*, a term whose history and implications we have analysed elsewhere.⁶⁷ Good management of the principle of automatic implication is a crucial tool for a rational and economic management of information. It ensures the effortless application of that rule unless a special effort is made to prevent it; to quote a well-known example, a general rule applies automatically in its dominion except for the specific sub-domains identified by specific rules. In the above-mentioned example, rule A 2.4.79 would automatically apply to all the available *-ta* endings unless a way of limiting its scope is adopted. Now, this same term *prasaṅga* also comes up in the explanation of the role played by a given *paribhāṣā*, as we have seen in vt 1 *ad* A 1.1.50 above. In Kātyāyana's mind, the limitative action of rules – which, as we have seen, will become a distinctive feature of *paribhāṣās* – is at the root of the whole grammatical system.

This is felt to such an extent that, again as regards both rules and meta-rules, the conditions for a rule to be legitimately spelt out are not only that it must lead to a correct result, but also that the same result cannot in any way be obtained without the explicit teaching of the rule: consequently, it must be necessary in the strictest meaning of the word. Even sensible rules leading to correct results might be denied the right to be spelt out, if the result they target may be obtained through mundane knowledge or practice.

Particularly significant in this respect is Kātyāyana's rejection of the purpose attributed to rule A 2.2.30 *upasarjanaṃ pūrvam* “[In a compound] the *upasarjana* comes first”. vt 1 *upasarjanasya pūrvavacanam paraprayoganivṛtyartham*

⁶⁶ M 1.322 l. 2 vt 1: *suptinām aviśeṣavidhānād dṛṣṭaviprayogtvāc ca niyamārthaṃ vacanam*.

⁶⁷ Candotti/Pontillo 2013: 141–147; Freschi/Pontillo 2013; Freschi/Pontillo 2013a.

proposes that the explicit teaching of the *upasarjana* coming first aims at avoiding usages where this same *upasarjana* is put in second position, i. e. the aim would be to avoid forms like *puruṣarājan* with the meaning of *rājapuruṣa*. Yet this justification for its explicit teaching is not reckoned valid:

vt 2: *na vāniṣṭādarśanāt* |

Or this is not [the aim] because no undesired forms are recensed.

Kātyāyana closes the discussion with a third vt that negates the necessity of the rule to account for cases where it is not possible to recognise the *upasarjana* via A 1.4.23,⁶⁸ thus *de facto* rejecting the rule itself as purposeless.⁶⁹

The same pattern of reasoning is sometimes used to reject previously suggested integrations into the text. If it can be proved that the integration does not add any new benefit that cannot be obtained through correct interpretation of the original text, then the integration is discarded. An interesting example can be found in Kātyāyana's discussion on rule A 1.1.65 *alo 'ntyāt pūrva upadhā* which defines the technical term *upadhā* (roughly speaking the penultimate sound of a given linguistic unit) either as the sound before the final part or as the part before a final sound.⁷⁰ After a failed attempt to make the second option work through A 1.1.72 *yena vidhis tadantasya*, Kātyāyana proposes modifying the wording of the rule so as to make it clear that both the penultimate and the final unit must consist of one single sound.

68 M 1.435 l. 14 vt 3 *ad* A 2.2.30: *ṣaṣṭhyantayoḥ samāse 'rthabhedāt pradhānasya apūrvanipātaḥ* “Even in a compound of two [*padas*] ending in the sixth *vibhakti*, the main [*pada*] cannot be the first constituent, since it determines no difference in the meaning [of the *upasarjana*] (viceversa the *upasarjana* differentiates the *pradhāna-pada* from all others)”.

69 By contrast, Patañjali does not reject this rule, which he justifies in the following way: *ṣaṣṭhyantayoḥ samāse 'rthabhedāt pradhānasya apūrvanipāto na bhaviṣyati | evaṃ na cedam kṛtaṃ bhavaty upasarjanaṃ pūrvam ity arthaś cābhinna iti kṛtvā pradhānasya pūrvanipāto na bhaviṣyati* “Even in a compound of two [*padas*] ending in the sixth *vibhakti*, the main [*pada*] cannot be the first constituent, since it determines no difference in the meaning: this shall not be [accepted]. This should not be done: rule A 2.2.30 *upasarjanaṃ pūrvam* has to be uttered. Nonetheless, if it is not considered able to determine a difference in the meaning, the main [*pada*] shall not be the first constituent”.

70 As proposed respectively by vt 1 and vt 2. In the first interpretation it is not possible to rule out the undesired possibility that one single sound precedes a unit made up of more than one sound. In the second, the unit preceding the last sound might be formed by more than one single sound.

vt 8: *alaḥ antyāt pūrvaḥ al upadhā iti vā* |

Or [one should say...] the sound before a final sound is called *upadhā*.

Is it necessary to integrate the text in such a way? Kātyāyana's answer is that the integration is unnecessary because the correct meaning of the sentence is obtained simply by interpreting it in the way one would interpret a common language sentence:

vt 9: *avacanād lokavijñānād siddham* |

This is obtained even if it is not stated explicitly because of knowledge from mundane usage.

e. g. as in the example given by Patañjali thereon, *amīṣāṃ brāhmaṇānām antyāt pūrvaḥ ānīyatām* “among these Brahmins, bring here the one before the last”.

The same line of reasoning is also applied to check the legitimacy of explicit Pāṇinian *paribhāṣās*. We can briefly recall here the long discussion on the aim of A 1.1.68 *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā* where any attempt at interpretation is discarded on the basis of the fact that every time there is proof that the result can be obtained without having recourse to the *paribhāṣā* (vt 1–4). The pbh's right to exist is finally recognised but only to deal with a limited range of examples, the others being accounted for without any need for its use.⁷¹

We have already seen one major reason leading to the non-necessity of teaching a given *paribhāṣā*, and this lies in the fact that the interpretation-rule is naturally accepted by common practice, and thus no further limitation to this mundane way of acting is needed. Let us follow Kātyāyana's line of reasoning in evaluating A 1.1.21 *ādyantavad ekasmin* “In the case of one, it is as if it were the beginning and the end”, a meta-rule teaching that expressions like ‘beginning with’ and ‘ending with’ can also apply to units consisting of a single element.⁷² vt 1 states that the meta-rule is necessary because common expressions like *ādi* and *anta* are used *saty anyasmin* “when there is something else”. vt from 2 to 4 discuss the appropriateness of substituting the original meta-rule with a more general principle, that of extending a specific designation (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*). vt 5 then states that such an explicit teaching is not necessary:

⁷¹ See Candotti 2006: 108–121.

⁷² e. g. the monosyllabic verbal base *i* qualifies both for the description of “verbal bases beginning with *i*” and of the description of “verbal bases ending with *i*”.

M 1.77 l. 10 vt 5 *ad* A 1.1.21: *avacanād lokavijñānād siddham |*

This is obtained even if it is not explicitly stated because of knowledge from mundane usage.⁷³

The same formulaic statement used to check the legitimacy of a proposed addition to the text is used here to check the validity of a rule.

vt 6 then closes the discussion pointing out how a single sound can still be said to be the beginning or the end of a given unit simply because there is nothing before it or nothing after, even though nothing but the element itself constitutes the unit:

M 1.78 l. 25 vt 6 *ad* A 1.1.21: *apūrvānuttaralakṣaṇatvād ādyantayoḥ siddham ekasmin |*

Owing to its feature of not having anything before or after, the attribution of “initial” and “final” is realised in the case of one.

From vt 7 onwards, Kātyāyana changes subject and looks for the *prayojana* of the meta-rule. One must thus conclude that, as regards the need of explicitly mentioning the meta-rule, Kātyāyana considers that it is possible to do without A 1.1.21 and also without the implicit principle of extension of a specific designation (*vyāpadeśivadbhāva*).

What catches one’s attention in the preceding examples is that Kātyāyana processes rules and meta-rules in the same way: in both cases he questions the necessity of the principle and also the compelling need to state it aloud. Some rules and/or some integrations or emendations are necessary and, at the same time, must be stated aloud (such as *ātmanepada* in 2.4.79 or the meta-rule 1.1.50 discussed above). Others, though necessary, may remain implicit (such as the emendation of *al* in A 1.1.65 or the principle of extension of a specific designation in A 1.1.21). In these cases the necessity of being ‘explicit statements’ (*vacana*) of those preliminarily accepted rules or parts of rules is then discarded.⁷⁴ Kātyāyana’s crucial concern is rarely that of distinguishing between

⁷³ The statement is further elucidated by Patañjali (M 1.77 ll. 11–12 *ad* A 1.1.21 vt 5): *antareṇaiva vacanaṃ lokavijñānāt siddham etat | tad yathā | loke śālāsamudāyo grāma iti ucyate | bhavati caitad ekasmin api ekaśālo grāma iti |* “Even without any explicit statement, this is obtained because of knowledge from mundane usage. For example, in everyday life a collection of houses is called a village. And this is also so in the case of one [house] only: a ‘single-house’ village.”

⁷⁴ In such cases of implicit *paribhāṣās*, the term most commonly used by Kātyāyana is *grahaṇa* making reference to a kind of understanding of meaning granted by a given principle. See, e. g.

operational rules and meta-rules, but rather, between what must be explicitly stated and what – at both levels – can remain implicit. Kātyāyana’s attitude is much more akin to that of a philologist trying to establish the best possible version of the text, than that of a commentator striving to make the most out of the existing text. Kātyāyana does not consider the exact preservation of the original Sanskrit text as being crucial, unlike later commentators.

4 Patañjali’s search for hints of implicit principles in Pāṇini

4.1 Exegetic stratagems

A turning-point in this attitude to the text is already found in Patañjali, who often tries to demonstrate that Kātyāyana’s proposed integrations are not necessary or, rather, that it is not necessary to state them aloud. To prove this, he resorts to many exegetic stratagems, some of them already used by Kātyāyana, others that are completely new: he can derive a proposed addition element through *anuvṛtti*; he can obtain the desired meaning through rule splitting (*yogavibhāga*); he makes an item polysemous through *praśliṣṭanirdeśa*, or he can recur to ready-made (*nipātana*) forms, and so on. Here we propose four significant examples in order to show the radically different frame of reasoning between the two commentators.

1. A 2.3.4 *antarāntareṇa yukte* teaches that the second ending is used to express the object combined with the words *antarā* and *antareṇa*: the usages targeted by this rule are forms such as *antarā tvāṃ māṃ ca* ‘between you and me’. Kātyāyana’s comment on this rule consists of one single vt:

vt 1: *antarāntareṇayuktānām apradhānavacanam* |

With reference to the words connected with *antarā* and *antareṇa*, there should be mention of *apradhāna* “not principal”.

This is necessary, Patañjali (M 1.445 l. 7 *ad* A 2.3.4 vt 1) says, in order to avoid the second ending for principal elements in sentences like *antarā tvāṃ māṃ ca*

vt 2 *ad* A 3.4.77 (M 2.181 l. 13: *arthavadgrahaṇāt siddham iti cen na varṇagrahaṇeṣu*), vt 2 *ad* A 6.2.2 (M 3.123 l. 8: *siddham tu lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ pratipadoktasya eva grahaṇāt*), vt 4 *ad* A 4.1.1 (M 2.192 l. 3: *nyābgrahaṇam anarthakam prātipadikagrahaṇe liṅgaviśiṣṭasya api grahaṇāt*) and so on.

kamaṇḍaluḥ “between you and me, a pitcher”, as the pitcher is also between the two persons. There seems to be no doubt that Kātyāyana considers the addition necessary, since his comment on the rule stops here. Patañjali, on the other hand, goes on and resorts to the implicit maxim *upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktir baliyasī* “a case ending determined by a *kāraka* is stronger than a case ending determined by a concomitant word” (quoted by Kātyāyana himself on A 2.3.19 but not used here) in order to show that the addition is not necessary.⁷⁵

2. We have already seen (§ 3.3.1) Kātyāyana’s discussion on A 2.4.79 *tanādibhyas tathāsoḥ* that ends with his statement on the necessity of adding the information that either the ending *-ta* targeted by the rules is *ātmanepada* or it is singular, otherwise:

vt 3: *avacane hi aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ |*

If it is not spelt out, there is an automatic involvement of something which is not desired,

namely the *-ta* 2nd plural P ending in the rule. Kātyāyana stops here with this strong assertion of the necessity of the addition. Once again, Patañjali goes one step further and shows that it is not necessary to spell out the addition (*tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam*) because a reasoning characterised by the usage of an accompanying element (*sahāya*) suffices: since *-ta* and *-thās* are mentioned together and *-thās* is unambiguously a singular *Ā* ending of the secondary group, *-ta* is also supposed to be both singular and *ātmanepada*. Patañjali recalls how this also happens in everyday communication: if someone is told

⁷⁵ M 1.445 ll. 9–10 *ad* A 2.3.4 vt 1: *tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam | kamaṇḍalor dvitīyā kasmān na bhavati | upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktir baliyasīti prathamā bhaviṣyati |* “Then this shall be said. It does not. How then is there no second case ending for *kamaṇḍalu-*? A case-ending for a *kāraka* is stronger than a case ending for a concomitant word: thus the first case ending is obtained for it (*kamaṇḍalu-*).” The maxim is known to Kātyāyana who quotes it in A 2.3.19 *sahāyukte ’pradhāne* teaching third case endings for a word in connection with *saha*, meaning the agent or the most effective means, when it is not principal. He questions *apradhāne* itself and proves (aided by the above-mentioned maxim) that it is not necessary to state it explicitly (M 1.453 ll. 3–4 vt 1 *ad* A 2.3.19): *sahayukte ’pradhānavacanam anarthakam upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktibāliyastvād anyatrāpi*. This is meant to account for the fact that in syntagms such as *putreṇa saha devadattaḥ (gataḥ)* “Devadatta went with his son”, Devadatta, agent of the action of going, does not take the third-ending required by *saha*. The maxim in question should suffice, since the ending required by the *kāraka* would prevail over the ending required by the concomitant word. Why does Kātyāyana not resort to the same principle in A 2.3.4, and furthermore, why does he explicitly ask for the addition of *apradhāne*? It seems that A 2.3.4 still teaches a *kāraka*-ending, and thus the maxim cannot be applied here.

by someone else ‘of this cow, ask for the companion’, he will bring another cow and not a horse or a donkey.⁷⁶ Commentators often use this common-language principle in order to solve difficulties, and it will later become the basis for a *paribhāṣā*.⁷⁷

3. A 3.1.27 *kaṇḍvādibhyo yak* teaches the affix *yaK* in the meaning of ‘being’ (*bhāva*)⁷⁸ after bases (whether verbal or nominal) of the group beginning with *kaṇḍū*-. Kātyāyana begins by stating the necessity of teaching the optionality for these bases through explicit mention of *vā*:

vt 1: *kaṇḍvādibhyo vāvacanam* |

After the bases *kaṇḍū*, etc., there must be explicit mention of *vā*,

otherwise, verbal bases like *kaṇḍū* could not be used alone with that same meaning.⁷⁹

vt 2: *avacane hi nityapratyayatvam* |

If it is not spelt out, the suffix will be compulsory.

⁷⁶ M 1.496 ll. 2–7 ad A 2.4.79 vt 3: *anucyamāne hy etasmin aniṣṭaṃ prasajyeta | ataniṣṭa yūyam | asaniṣṭa yūyam iti | tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam | yady api tāvad ayaṃ taśabdo dṛṣṭāpacāro ’sty ātmanepadam asty eva parasmaipadam asti ekavacanam asti bahuvacanam ayaṃ khalu thāsśabdo ’dṛṣṭāpacāra ātmanepadam ekavacanam eva | tasyāsyā ko ’nyaḥ sahāyo bhavitum arhaty anyat ata ātmanepadād ekavacanāc ca | tad yathā | asya gor dvitīyena artha iti gaur eva ānīyate nācevo na gardabhaḥ* | “If this mention [of *ātmanepada* or *ekavacana*] is not made, there should be some undesired automatic involvement, e. g. *ataniṣṭa yūyam* ‘you (pl.) extended ; *asaniṣṭa yūyam* ‘you (pl.) acquired’. Thus it has to be mentioned. – It has not to be mentioned. Even if an improper use (*apacāra*) of this word-form *-ta* is perceived, which is really both *ātmanepada* and *parasmaipada* and both singular and plural, the improper use of this word-form *-thās* is actually not perceived: it is exclusively *ātmanepada* and singular. [If one wonders] what is entitled to be a companion (*sahāya*) [object of the same rule], [he has to admit that there is no] other one than an *ātmanepada* and singular [ending]. See, e. g. if it is said ‘this cow needs a second one, only a cow is brought, not a horse or a donkey.’”

⁷⁷ See NPBh 103.

⁷⁸ In accordance with A 3.1.67: *sārvadhātuke yak* “The affix *yaK* is introduced after a verbal base before the *sārvadhātuka* verbal affixes [when a *bhāva* or a *karman* is denoted]” – see e. g. *ās-ya-te devadattena* “Sitting is done by Devadatta = Devadatta is sitting” (*bhāva*); *kriyate kaṭaḥ* “a mat is being made” (*karman*).

⁷⁹ If the optionality is introduced, when the affix *yaK* is not introduced, the verbal bases such as *kaṇḍū* can work e. g. as nominal bases (also when meaning ‘condition’) by means of the affix *KviP* (A 3.2.76: < *dhātoḥ kvip ca bhāve* 3.3.18 *kārake* 3.3.19 >) or by means of the affix *KtiN* (A 3.3.94: *striyām ktin* < *bhāve kārake* 3.3.19 >), in order to form the feminine noun *kaṇḍū* and *kaṇḍūti* respectively which could denote both “the itching” and “that which itches”.

Nevertheless, Patañjali questions the necessity of this addition (M 2.38 ll. 6–8):

*tat tarhi vāvacanaṃ kartavyam | na kartavyam | ubhayaṃ kaṇḍvādīni
dhātavaś caiva prātipadikāni ca | ātaś cobhayaṃ kaṇḍūyatīti kriyāṃ
kurvāṇe prayujyate 'sti me kaṇḍūr iti vedanāmātrasya sāṃnidhye |*

Then this explicit mention of *vā* must be made. – No, it must not. Those elements beginning with *kaṇḍū-* are both verbal and nominal bases. And thus both are used, *kaṇḍūyati* “it itches”, meaning the making of an action and *asti me kaṇḍūḥ* “I have an itch” meaning the presence of the simple sensation.

4.2 *Jñāpakas*

Last but not least, arguments by *jñāpaka* are also commonly and widely used to avoid the need for an explicit mention. It is not possible to carry out a survey of the occurrences here, but we can at least briefly say that the device is used by Patañjali following strict argumentative rules and even fixed formulaic expressions. In Patañjali’s view, a *jñāpaka* is a detail (better, a clue) consciously⁸⁰ uttered by the Teacher in order to avoid explicit mention of a detail of a rule or of an interpretive convention (*tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam*), or to solve some difficulty in the interpretation of the text (*naiṣa doṣaḥ*). This detail is significant only if it can be assigned no other function than the suggestion of the implicit element; in the contrary case (*etad anyad prayojanam*), the *jñāpaka* as such is rejected. Moreover, to be accepted, an interpretive rule must not be made *ad hoc*, i. e. it must prove useful for the interpretation of another rule as well.

Just for the sake of the example we can follow one of these discussions in detail here. Rule A 1.1.72 *yena vidhis tadantasya* teaches that the word-form through which an injunction is made is used in place of an element ending with that form. vt 15 of Kātyāyana proposes the addition ‘*tasya ca*’ which means that it is used both in place of a form ending with that form and in place of itself:

“And one must say *and of it* to account for cases such as *rauṇaḥ*.⁸¹ [vt 15]
– Why should it not be effected? It will be effected after what ends in the element according to the present rule A 1.1.72 *yena vidhis tadantasya*, and

⁸⁰ In the relevant passages, alongside the more impersonal *ācāryaprayatīti jñāpayati*, we also find *tad jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ*.

⁸¹ A 4.2.78: *roṇī* “[The *taddhita*-affix *aṅ* occurs] after the nominal base *roṇī*, [ending in the relevant *sUP* to denote the meanings listed in 4.2.67–70]” – e. g. *rauṇaḥ kūpaḥ* “a well built by *Roṇī*”.

after the element alone through extension of the specific designation (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*). – But the extension [only] concerns what is not a nominal base.⁸² – Why does the extension of designation [only] concern what is not a nominal base? – In order that here ‘after a word ending in *-sūtra* there is the suffix *ṭhak*’,⁸³ or ‘after a word ending in *-daśa* there is the suffix *-ḍa*’,⁸⁴ there should be no appearance [of the suffix] after the simple base. – This is not the aim [of the axiom]. Thus [the involved rules] will be effected through rule A 1.1.72 after what ends with the quoted form, and by extension of the designation after the form alone. This being effected, the Teacher, who makes mention of *anta* ‘end’, makes it plain that it is only after a word ending in *sūtra* or *dāśa*. – [No], in this case it does not receive application after that which ends in it. In fact, it has already been said that [A 1.1.72] is prohibited in the case of [rules] concerning compounds or affixes. Then this maxim must be stated. It must not: one of the Teacher’s practices makes it plain that the extension of the designation concerns elements other than nominal bases, and it is the fact that he says ‘[the suffix] *ini* after the nominal base *pūrva* and a base with *pūrva*’ (A 5.2.86–7). – This is not a clue (*jñāpaka*). There is another purpose for this mention. – Which? – ‘I shall teach the [suffix] *ini* after [a word] (*pūrvāt*) having the word *pūrva* (*sapūrvāt*)’ – Then [the clue is the fact] that he splits the rule. Otherwise he could simply have said *pūrvāt sapūrvāt*. – But must this ‘*tasya ca*’ only be provided for this [case of *rauṇaḥ*]? – No, the Teacher answers. This ‘*tasya ca*’ is provided for what has already been enumerated and for what will be, for everything.”⁸⁵

82 Cf. NPBh 32: *vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipādikena*.

83 A 4.2.60: *kratūkthādisūtrāntāṭ ṭhak* “The *taddhita* affix *ṭhak* occurs after a nominal base expressing the names of sacrifices, and after the list beginning with *uktha* or after a nominal base ending in *-sūtra*- [provided that the derived nominal base denotes one who studies or knows the object denoted by the nominal base]”.

84 A 5.2.45: *tad asminn adhikam iti daśāntāṭ ḍaḥ* “The *taddhita* affix *ḍa* occurs after a nominal base ending in *-daśa*, provided that the derived nominal base denotes ‘what is in excess in it’”.

85 M 1.185 l. 21 – 186 l. 9 ad A 1.1.72 vt 15: *tasya ceti vaktavyam | rauṇaḥ | kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam na sidhyati | tadantāc ca tadantavidhinā siddham kevalāc ca vyapadeśivadbhāvena | vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipādikena | kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipādikena | iha sūtrāntāṭ ṭhak bhavati daśāntāṭ ḍaḥ bhavati kevalād utpattir mā bhūd iti | naitad asti prayojanam | siddham atra tadantāc ca tadantavidhinā kevalāc ca vyapadeśivadbhāvena | so ’yam evaṃ siddhe sati yad antagrahaṇam karoti tat jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ sūtrāntād eva daśāntād eveti | nātra tadantād utpattiḥ prāpnoti | idānim eva hy uktam | samāsapratyayavidhau pratiśedha iti | sā tarhy eṣā paribhāṣā kartavyā | na kartavyā | ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipādikeneṭi yad ayaṃ pūrvād iniḥ sapūrvāc ca ity āha | naitad asti jñāpakam | asti hy anyad etasya vacane prayojanam | kim | sapūrvāt pūrvād iniḥ vaksyāmīti |*

Thus, at the end of this long discussion, we are back at the beginning, i. e. with the fact that the integration is necessary. In the meanwhile, we have had a preview of all the tools at the disposal of the commentator in his endeavour to avoid explicit mention of the rule: first of all, recourse to a mundane practice (the extension of specific designation), nevertheless superseded by a technical *paribhāṣā* stating that this extension of designation is limited to what is not a nominal base (and consequently not applicable in the case under discussion which is a nominal base). The legitimacy of the technical *paribhāṣā* is then checked: its utility is found in the interpretation of rules such as 4.2.60 and 5.2.45,⁸⁶ and the clue (or, perhaps, already the ‘intimation’ in the strict technical meaning) of its existence lies in the otherwise futile mention of *sapūrva* in A 5.2.86–7. Under such circumstances, the integration remains necessary. Thus by the time of Patañjali, the proliferation of interpretative devices had already reached considerable dimensions.⁸⁷ And far from being a confused set of *ad hoc* devices to be used at will, they represent a system that had to be coherent. A *paribhāṣā* may be a problem (as we have seen in the example above) as well as a solution, and each single *paribhāṣā*, to be fully valid, must find its place in an integrated Pāṇinian system of conventions.

5 Collecting, checking and classifying implicit meta-rules

Now we shall try to see how the earlier collectors/writers of *paribhāṣās* and above all the commentators of the relevant collections seem to work, by paying attention to the specific relationship that links them to the contents of the earlier *Aṣṭādhyāyī*-commentaries. To do this we focus on what seems to be the earlier extant collection of meta-rules, i. e. the one traditionally attributed to Vyāḍi, taking advantage of its late commentary, known as *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*.

We shall deliberately ignore the complex problem of the relative chronology between Vyāḍi and Kātyāyana/Patañjali, – regarding which the introduction to

yat tarhi yogavibhāgaṃ karoti | itarathā hi pūrvāt sapūrvād inir ity eva brūyāt | kiṃ punar ayam asyaiva śeṣas tasya ceti | nety āha | yac cānukrāntaṃ yac cānukraṃsyate sarvasyaiva śeṣas tasya ceti |.

⁸⁶ This thanks to a sub-argument showing that A 1.1.72 itself is declared (by a proposal advanced in vt 3) not to apply to rules teaching compounds or affixation.

⁸⁷ Some very interesting notes on the further history of grammatical practices of textual criticism can be found in Radicchi 1985: esp. 87–96.

the edition and translation of Vyāḍi's and his commentator's work by Wujastyk are broadly illustrative.⁸⁸ There is certainly a strong bond between the two traditions: 27 out of the total number of 87 *paribhāṣās* attributed to Vyāḍi have a parallel in several of Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*. Additionally, 31 out of the 60 of Vyāḍi's *paribhāṣās*, which do not match any of Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*, do at least seem to have one, or more than one *Mahābhāṣya* passage in common. Yet it is difficult to determine whether we are here facing a case of direct borrowing (and in which direction) or borrowing from a common source or practice. We shall, instead, concentrate our efforts on understanding the tendencies of the author of the *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*⁸⁹ as compared to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, with the aim of testing the relationship with both these supposed source-texts, and thereby conjecturing at which fresh target he might actually have been firing.

5.1 An example of Vyāḍi's distance from Patañjali

For instance, Vyāḍi's pbh 67 *sarvo dvandvo vibhāṣāyaikavad bhavati* "Every *dvandva* optionally becomes as if it were one (= a singular noun)", which is a pbh discussed by all pbh commentators⁹⁰ also occurs thrice in the *Mahābhāṣya* (but is never mentioned by Kātyāyana).

In his commentary on VPBh 62,⁹¹ the Vyāḍi-commentator already shows how a result similar to the one sought by this pbh could be obtained by applying a *yogavibhāga* or rule-splitting to rule A 2.4.12. This ensures to the optionality-expression *vibhāṣā* (embedded in rule A 2.4.12) to extend the singular form to every *dvandva*-compound (A 2.4.2).⁹²

The existence of rule-splitting can then be inferred thanks to the mention of *bahuvacanasya* in A 1.2.63 (*tiṣya-punarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya*

⁸⁸ Wujastyk 1993: XIII–XXVII.

⁸⁹ Although the date of the commentator is only slightly less aleatory than that of the author, it can safely be assumed that he knew both Kātyāyana and Patañjali. On the other hand, he seems to pre-date the *Nyāsa* and even the *Kāśikā*. See Wujastyk 1993: xxviii.

⁹⁰ As underlined by Wujastyk (1993: 230 n. 347) – by Puruṣottamadeva, 50; Śiradeva, 16; Nīlakaṇṭha, 22; Haribhāskara, 16; Nāgeśa, 34; Śeṣādrisudhi, 34.

⁹¹ VPBh 62 *yogavibhāgād iṣṭasiddhiḥ* teaches that a desired result may be obtained through the splitting of a rule.

⁹² The existence of the *yogavibhāga* is then inferred thanks to the mention of *bahuvacanasya* in A 1.2.63 (*tiṣya-punarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya dvivacanam nityam*) which specifies that the compulsory substitution of a dual ending is to be understood as replacing a plural form (and not the optionally singular *dvandva*-compound *tiṣyapunarvasu*). This rule is traditionally used as a *jñāpaka* for VPBh 67.

dvivacanam nityam) which specifies that the compulsory substitution of a dual ending is to be intended as replacing a plural form (and not the optionally singular *dvandva*-compound *tiṣyapunarvasu*). The very same argument is traditionally used as a clue for VPBh 67. Nevertheless, VPBh 62 has a wider scope than 67, particularly in the interpretation suggested by the Vyāḍi-commentator.

The commentary on VPBh 67 is restricted to the mere proposition of the clue (*jñāpaka*) – drawn from rule A 3.1.100 – and of the purpose (*prayojana*), which extends the singular form taught by A 2.4.12 to whatever *dvandva* compound is considered as expressing a unity:

katham jñāyate | yad ayaṃ sūtre kvacid bahūnām ekavacanam nipātayati gadamadacarayama iti (A 3.1.100) | kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | yo dvandvaikavadbhāve aparigaṇitānām dvandva ekavad dṛśyate tatraiva paribhāṣā vartate |

How is this known? Because somewhere in the corpus of rules he incidentally mentions (the masculine singular *dvandva*) *gadamadacarayamaḥ*.⁹³ What is the purpose of hinting at this [*paribhāṣā*]? As far as ‘the condition of being as if it were one’ is concerned, this pbh applies exactly when a *dvandva* formed by unreckoned constituents is seen to be as if it were one.

We are thus confronted with two axioms: VPBh 62 on the usage of splitting rules and 67 on the optionality of the singular for any *dvandva*-compound; both revolve around a common set of rules.

If we now turn to the possible commentarial sources of these arguments we notice that, while VPBh 62 is never stated as such in the *Mahābhāṣya*, the clue singled out in the commentary on Vyāḍi’s pbh 62 is properly explained in the first M occurrence of VPBh 67:

M 1.232 ll. 2–6 ad A 1.2.63: *bahuvacanasyeti kim artham | uditam tiṣyapunarvasu | katham cātraikavacanam | jātidvandva ekavad bhavatīti | aprāṇinām iti pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti | evaṃ tarhi siddhe sati yad bahuvacanagrahaṇam karoti tajjñāpayaty ācāryaḥ sarvo dvandvo vibhāṣāikavad bhavatīti | kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | bābhravaśālaṅkāyanam bābhravaśālaṅkāyanā ity etat siddham bhavati |*

What is the purpose of mentioning “*bahuvacanasya*”? – See e. g. *uditam tiṣyapunarvasu* “the *Tiṣya* and *Punarvasu* asterisms are rising” (singular). –

⁹³ In A 3.1.100, i. e. Pāṇini employs a singular *dvandva* consisting of four constituents, which are the verbal bases *gad-*, *mad-*, *car-* and *yam-*, instead of a plural compound (i. e. instead of an *itaretarayoga-dvandva*), but not a standard neuter *samāhāra-dvandva*.

How can this expression be singular? – [It is taught that] a *dvandva* formed by *jāti*-names becomes as if it were one. – The prohibition [taught] for living beings should apply.⁹⁴ – If it is thus well established, the fact that the Master understands “*bahuvacana*”, reveals that every *dvandva* optionally becomes as if it were one. – What is the purpose of the indication of this [*paribhāṣā*]? – The [singular *dvandva*] *bābhraśālaṅkāyanam* in the sense of “the descendants of Babhru and the descendants of Śalaṅka” becomes well-established.⁹⁵

The question is thus evoked in Patañjali, because of the presence of the (assumed) redundancy, i. e. the mention of *bahuvacana* in A 1.2.63. It answers the question *kim artham* ‘what for’, a question often asked by Patañjali concerning the specific purpose of single words mentioned in the rules and which is not at all limited to the mentions used as *jñāpakas*. In the commentary on A 1.2.63 itself, the same question is also asked for the words *tiṣyapunarvasvor*, *nakṣatre* and *dvandve* mentioned in the rule. Furthermore, its acting as a clue or indication is resorted to only because no other more direct function can be attributed to it. The same *paribhāṣā* is merely recalled in M 1.475, ll. 1–2 in order to solve the problem of the grammatical number of compounds involving numerals.

Lastly, M 1.476 l. 25 – 477 l. 5 *ad vt 5 ad A 2.4.12* once again involves our pbh to comment on vt 5 (*ekavacanam anarthakaṃ samāhāraikatvāt*), which maintains that the mention of *ekavacana*⁹⁶ is useless since a group is by itself singular (and thus, when expressing a group, the *dvandva* would take a singular ending). Patañjali rejects this vt by advancing four different purposes for the mention of *ekavacana* and accepting the last one (M 1.477 ll. 4–5 *ad vt 5 ad A 2.4.12*). On the other hand, the first of these purposes – i. e. the fact that its explicit mention results in the possibility of establishing that the singular is compulsory for some elements (A 2.4.1–11), while for others (A 2.4.12–13) it is only marginal – is rejected specifically on the grounds of VPBh 67, proven on the grounds of A 1.2.63 commented above. All the *dvandvas* are hinted at by the Teacher as being marginally used in the singular.⁹⁷ Thus here, more than being

94 A 2.4.6 *jātir aprāṇinām* teaches that a *dvandva* compound denoting classes is treated as if it were one, provided that the constituents do not denote living beings.

95 Even though it deals with the names of living beings.

96 In fact from A 2.4.1 onward, derived by *anuvṛtti*.

97 M 1.476 l. 25–477 l. 2 *ad A 2.4.12*: *idaṃ tarhi prayojanam | etaj jñāsyāmīha nityo vidhir iha vibhāseti | naitad asti prayojanam | ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati sarvo dvandvo vibhāṣaikavad bhavatīti yad ayam tiṣyapunarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya dvivacanam, nityam ity āha |*

a problem-solving device, the pbh is actually a problem in itself, as it denies (at least in a first step) the usefulness of a well-established set of Pāṇini rules.⁹⁸

On the other hand, as we have seen, Vyāḍi's commentator on VPBh 67 (and 62) merely elaborates some Patañjali arguments, but in order to focus on a specific clue for VPBh 67, he seems to have originally singled out a noteworthy detail of the A, i. e. the singular *dvandva*-compound used in A 3.1.100.

5.2 Vyāḍi's attitude to make choices

Now we shall analyse a pbh not included in any other Collection, i. e. Vyāḍi's pbh 79: *samudāyeṣu śabdāḥ pravṛttā avayaveṣv api vartante* "Word forms employed for whole groups are also involved in their parts". This maxim occurs three times in three different sections of the *Mahābhāṣya*. One specific couple of examples employed by Patañjali in each of these three passages also occurs in the *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*. We shall start by analysing the M source.

The first relevant M passage is included in the context of the several answers to the general question about the meaning of the word-form *vyākaraṇa*, pointed out by Patañjali in a specific section of the *Paspaśā* (M 1.11 l. 14 – 12 l. 27). The proposal of vt 14 *lakṣyalakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam* (M 1.12 l. 15) is that "Vyākaraṇa means both the object of a rule and the rule itself," i. e. according to the commentary M 1.12 l. 17 *ad* vt 14, the word-form *vyākaraṇa* might denote the whole, consisting of both the language ruled by grammar (*śabdāḥ*) and the rule/corpus of rules (*sūtram*) themselves.

As a possible shortcoming of this double denotation, Patañjali mentions the difficulty of limiting the derivation of the noun *vaiyākaraṇa* 'grammarians' which has to be connected with the single meaning of *vyākaraṇa* as 'rule/corpus of rules' (rather than with both meanings):

M 1.12 ll. 17–18 *ad* vt 14: *evam apy ayaṃ doṣaḥ samudāye vyākaraṇaśabdāḥ pravṛtto 'vayave nopapadyate | sūtrāṇi cāpyadhīyāna iṣyate vaiyākaraṇa iti |* Even in this way there is this shortcoming: when the word-form *vyākaraṇa* is employed to mean a whole group (i. e. both as *lakṣya* and as *lakṣaṇa*, according to vt 14), it cannot be applied to a part (i. e. to the single meaning of *lakṣaṇa*, which is the proper etymon for the noun *vaiyākaraṇa*). [The noun] "grammarians" is also desired for one who [merely] studies the rules.

⁹⁸ Let us recall that this fifth vt closes the discussion as far as Kātyāyana is concerned. Thus it might well be that this vt is the actual origin of the pbh.

Our targeted axiom thus represents the proposal for solving the mentioned shortcoming and some intriguing examples of its application are immediately listed

M 1.12 ll. 18–21: *naiṣa doṣaḥ | samudāyeṣu hi śabdāḥ pravṛttā avayaveṣv api vartante | tad yathā | pūrve pañcālāḥ | uttare pañcālāḥ | tailaṃ bhuktam | ghṛtaṃ bhuktam | śuklaḥ nīlaḥ kṛṣṇa iti | evam ayaṃ samudāye vyākaraṇaśabdaḥ pravṛtto 'vayave 'pi vartate |*

This shortcoming does not occur. Word-forms employed for whole groups are also involved in their parts. [Let us consider] e. g. “East Pañcāla”, “North Pañcāla”, “oil has been consumed”, “ghee has been consumed”, “white”, “blue”, “black”.⁹⁹ In this way the [questioned] word-form “*vyākaraṇa*” employed to mean the whole group (i. e. both the word-forms that are the object of the rules and the rules themselves) are also involved to mean a part (i. e. only the rules).

However, this does not represent a definitive solution to the puzzling derivation of *vyākaraṇa*, since the last alternative proposed by Patañjali aims at interpreting this noun as merely designating the corpus of *sūtras*. Nevertheless, such a choice raises difficulties in interpretation, accounted for through another exegetic maxim that sanctions the possibility for an item to be treated as if it had a specific designation (*vyapadeśivadbhāva*).

The second occurrence of the mentioned pbh (with a really slight difference, as we shall see below) is included in M 1.411 ll. 19–21 *ad* A 2.2.6, in the context of the meaning of the compound *a-brāhmaṇa*. To understand fully the relationship between the *denotatum* of the negation and that of the common noun *brahmin*; Patañjali says that this last word could also denote a bunch of distinctive features. For example, in the case of Brahmins, Patañjali proposes that asceticism, learning, and birth¹⁰⁰ be considered as distinctive features, along with some additional ones, such as the fair complexion or clean living generally

⁹⁹ All these examples are based on the opposition between the totality of an entity and some partial component of it. A whole region is opposed to one of its geographically selected parts (or its inhabitants taken as a whole, to a single portion of them), the whole quantity of some viscous substance is the general reference for its mentioned portion, the general quality of a colour is visualized as if it were a sort of deposit of all the available items marked by this colour.

¹⁰⁰ Patañjali quotes a *Smṛti*-strophe about the definition of the *brāhmaṇa*, where precisely these three properties, i. e. asceticism, learning and birth are required, even though a *jāti-brāhmaṇa*- “a Brahmin merely by birth” (i. e. lacking in asceticism and learning) is also admitted (M 1.411 ll. 16–17 *ad* A 2.2.6): *tapāḥ śrutaṃ ca yoniś cety etad brāhmaṇakāraṇam | tapāḥśrutābhyāṃ yo hīno jātibrahmaṇa eva saḥ.*

associated with brahminhood.¹⁰¹ At this point, Patañjali reminds us of our axiom (with the sole difference of the use of the simple participle *vṛttāḥ* instead of *pravṛttāḥ* taken apart):

M 1.411 ll. 19 *ad* A 2.2.6: *samudāyeṣu ca vṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api vartante* |

Word-forms utilised mean whole groups are also used to mean their parts.

and, after the same series of examples mentioned above (M 1.12) to which the colour name *kapila* ‘tawny’ is added (*tad yathā | pūrve pañcālāḥ | uttare pañcālāḥ | tailaṃ bhuktam | gṛtaṃ bhuktam | śuklaḥ nīlaḥ kapilaḥ kṛṣṇa iti*), the following sentence occurs: *evam ayaṃ samudāye brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ pravṛtto ’vayaveṣv api vartate jātihīne guṇahīne ca* “In this way the [questioned] word-form ‘*brāhmaṇa*’ employed for the whole group (of features) is also involved in its parts, even when devoid of [the required] birth or devoid of [distinctive] qualities”. Thus, the negation in *a-brāhmaṇa* may also target one of the distinctive features¹⁰² or some commonly shared ones.¹⁰³

The third M occurrence is included in the commentary on the *bahuvrīhi* general rule,¹⁰⁴ in a passage with a lengthy discussion on the analysis of the compound *ardhatṛtīyāḥ* ‘two and a half’ as *ardhaṃ tṛtīyam eṣām* ‘the third of them is a half’. In particular, the expression *ardhatṛtīyā droṇāḥ* ‘two and a half *droṇas*’ (where *droṇa* is the well-known measurement of capacity corresponding to the measure of an ordinary wooden bucket) is questioned (M 1.426 l. 27 *ad* vt 22 *ad* A 2.2.24), since the word-form *droṇa* is employed to mean a whole, and therefore cannot be applied to a part (*ayaṃ droṇaśabdaḥ samudāye pravṛtto ’vayave nopapdyate*). The whole passage quoted above from M 1.12 ll. 18–20 is repeated, and the series of stock examples is thus concluded: *evam ayaṃ samudāye droṇaśabdaḥ pravṛtto ’vayaveṣv api vartate* “In this way the [questioned] word-form ‘*droṇa*’, employed to mean the whole also occurs to

101 M 1.411 ll. 18–9 *ad* A 2.2.6: *tathā gauraḥ śucyācāraḥ piṅgalaḥ kapilakeśa ity etān apy abhyantarān brāhmaṇye guṇān kurvanti* | “Thus they consider ‘fair-complexioned, clean-living, ruddy-faced, brown-haired’, as nearly related properties in the Brahminhood.”

102 The example imagined by Patañjali is that of a person who is characterized by many properties of Brahminhood (knowledge, complexion, behaviour), but is not Brahmin by birth.

103 As occurs when stating that a Brahmin who behaves inappropriately (such as eating while walking) is a non-Brahmin.

104 A 2.2.24 *anekam anyapadārthe* “Two or more *padas* optionally combine to denote the object of another *pada* (i. e. the object of a *pada* different from the combined *padas*)”.

mean its parts”. A last provision states that this extension of meaning is allowed, provided that it deals with parts that cannot be dissociated from the whole.¹⁰⁵

It is quite evident from the above that we are dealing here with a maxim based on mundane practice and language, which Patañjali does not need to prove, if not with some stock examples taken from everyday language. In all the occurrences the discussion is raised only by Patañjali, and we have no clue as to what Kātyāyana’s position would be on the problems in question.

During the first discussion, the maxim is evaluated against the axiom of the treatment as if it were the specific designation, a principle already mentioned by Kātyāyana, although not in this specific passage. Incidentally, the two principles, although they have some points in common,¹⁰⁶ do not completely overlap. Here, Vyāḍi seems to make a choice of some sort, discarding Kātyāyana’s axiom, while simultaneously adopting an almost concurrent one, which will nevertheless only become part of a *paribhāṣā*-collection with Nāgeśa (NPBh 30). This is a choice he also makes on other occasions, for example, when he accepts all the *paribhāṣās* traditionally connected to the *ekānta*-view of markers and, on the other hand, does not quote the alternative view *anekāntā anubandhāḥ* in his collection.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, if we now turn to a couple of competing *paribhāṣās* – never quoted by Kātyāyana, although Patañjali mentions the first one fifteen times and the second one once – known as *kāryakāla* and *yathoddeśa paribhāṣās*, we again notice that Vyāḍi only records the first one. The exact interpretation of these ‘choices’ can only come from a thorough analysis of all Kātyāyana’s axioms (which often become *paribhāṣās* in later texts) and which are not quoted by Vyāḍi: this would perhaps even enable us to provide arguments regarding the dependency-relationship of the two texts.

On the other hand, what can be safely stated at the present moment is that Vyāḍi’s attitude does not seem to be that of a collector of the traditions of his times. He seems to make choices and aim at a coherent set of interpretative rules tailored to match a specific text.

105 M 1.427 ll. 4–5 *ad vt 22 ad A 2.2.24*: *keṣv avayaveṣu | yo ’vayavas taṃ samudāyaṃ na vyabhicarati | kiṃ ca samudāyaṃ na vyabhicarati | ardhadroṇo droṇam | ardhāḍhakaṃ punar vyabhicarati* / “What kind of parts? The part that cannot be dissociated from the whole. What is [the part] which cannot be dissociated from the whole? *ardhadroṇa* [cannot be dissociated] from *droṇa*, while contrarywise *ardhāḍhaka* can be dissociated [from *droṇa*]”.

106 In both cases, his point is to make a word also work for denotates that do not exactly cover the required meaning conditions.

107 “The markers are not integrated [to the word-forms they are appended to]”, matching with NPBh 4 and already quoted by Kātyāyana, such as *vt 8 ad A 1.1.20*.

To return now to VPBh 79, the author of the *Paribhāṣāvṛtti* first limits himself to using one of the examples occurring three times in the just-quoted M passages: *kathaṃ jñāyate | lokataḥ | tad yathā loke tailaṃ bhuktaṃ ghṛtaṃ bhuktam iti* / “How is this known? From everyday life. For instance, in the common world one says ‘oil has been consumed, ‘ghee has been consumed’”. But then, the already-emphasized tendency to find *jñāpakas* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, which suggests and almost certifies the existence of the supposed pbh, prevails in the text. The locative *śāstre* seems to be opposed to the ablative form *lokataḥ*:

śāstre 'pi jñāpakaṃ yad ayaṃ vare sthānivadbhāvasya pratiṣedhaṃ śāsti |
In the corpus of rules there is also an indication, that is to say, the fact that he (= Pāṇini) teaches the prohibition (A 1.1.58) of the *sthānivadbhāva* principle before the [affix] *-vara*.¹⁰⁸

The commentator then proceeds to specify why the mention of *-vara* in A 1.1.58 is an indication and begins by showing that there should be no need to deny *sthānivadbhāva* to account for cases of zero before the suffix *-vare* (except those accounted for by the mention of *ya-lopa*). In fact, if we take the example *yāyāvara*,¹⁰⁹ we see that the phonic substance of intensive *ārdhadhātuka* affix *yaṅ* is zero-replaced in two steps: firstly, *a* followed by any *ārdhadhātuka* affix (as taught by A 6.4.48), then *y* in accordance with A 6.1.66 *lopo vyor vali* for the phonemes *v* and *y* before any consonant excluding *y*. No *sthānivadbhāva* can actually be resorted to in the case of zero substitute (A 6.1.66) of the consonant *y* of *yaṅ* (because it is not the object of any exception to A 1.1.56, and it deals with a pure *alvidhi*). On the other hand, the zero of *a* might be entitled to such a treatment with respect to the *lopa* of a preceding vowel according to A 1.1.57: we thus get a suffix that we could symbolically indicate as $\emptyset^y a^{\emptyset} \dot{N}$ to show the difference between the two zeroes.

Now, another (undesired) zero replacement is taught by A 6.4.64 *āto lopa iṭi ca* before an *ārdhadhātuka* affix beginning with a vowel: “Zero in place of the final *ā* of a pre-affixal base also before [an *ārdhadhātuka* affix beginning with a

108 The segment *vare* of rule A 1.1.58 *na padāntadvirvacanavareyalopasvarasavarṇānusv-āradīrghajaoecarvidhiṣu* is traditionally taken apart from *yalopa* from the *Mahābhāṣya* onward by means of the so-called *yogavibhāga*-procedure. No serious justification really makes the *yogavibhāga* acceptable, even though Pāṇini possibly mentions *vare yalopa*- “*lopa* of *y* in case of *-vare*”. For Patañjali’s assumed difficulty in dealing with phonic restrictions determined by the involvement of the *aṅga* pattern such as this one, see Candotti/Pontillo forthcoming.

109 The word-form *yāyāvara*- ‘one who constantly goes about, wandering (ascetic)’ is derived by the affixation of the affix *varaC* after the verbal stem *yā*- ‘to go’ followed by the intensive affix *yaṅ* applied according to A 3.2.176 (***yāyā-ya-vara*) and reduplicated by A 6.1.9.

vowel marked with *K* or \dot{N} or] with augment *iṬ*.)” But this would not concern the second \bar{a} of *yāyā-vara* because “the *status* of an *ārdhadhātuka* is proper to the whole [affix] $ya\dot{N}$, while this ($\emptyset^y a^\emptyset \dot{N}$) is merely a part of [the affix] $ya\dot{N}$, it is not [actually] an *ārdhadhātuka*. Thus, no zero-replacement of the sound \bar{a} is actually realized. There is no scope for prohibition of the *sthānivadbhāva* principle”¹¹⁰.

Thus — and this is the conclusion of the reasoning — if Panini felt the need to specify *-vare*, it is because he thought that A 6.4.64 could, undesirably, apply in the above-mentioned case of *yāyāvara-*:

*evaṃ siddhe sati yad varesthānivadbhāpratiṣedhaṃ śāsti taj jñāpayati
samudāyeṣu pravṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api vartante iti |*

Since this is well-established in this way, his (= Pāṇini’s) teaching a prohibition of the *sthānivadbhāva* principle before the [affix] *-vara* makes known that word-forms employed for whole groups are also involved in their parts.

Thus, the commentator states that we must reckon that Pāṇini did indeed think it possible that the expression “an *ārdhadhātuka* affix beginning with a vowel marked with *K* or \dot{N} ” also denoted the affix $\emptyset^y a^\emptyset \dot{N}$, since it is precisely A 1.1.58 which expressly prohibits it. And this is possible because Pāṇini must have had some implicit principle in mind such as the one formalised by VPBh 79 *samudāyeṣu ca vṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api vartante* “Word-forms involved for whole groups are also involved in their parts”.

The difficulty in the formation of the word *yāyāvara-* had already been pointed out by Patañjali in his commentary *ad* A 1.1.58¹¹¹ and is solved:

either by reading “*vare ’yalopa*” (> *vare ayalopa*), i. e. *sthānivadbhāva* is negated for operations concerning the *lopa* of *a* and *y* in case of *vare*, or by splitting the rule, and thus *sthānivadbhāva* is negated for any operation in case of *vare* and in case of *lopa* of *ya-*.

This implies that Patañjali also envisaged the risk that the suffix $\emptyset^y a^\emptyset \dot{N}$ could be described as one of the *ārdhadhātuka* affixes beginning with a vowel

¹¹⁰ *kathaṃ kṛtvā jñāpakam | iha yāyāvara iti yo ’sau yaṅo ’kāro lupto ’to lopa iti (A 6.4.48) tasya sthānivadbhāvapraṣedhaḥ śiṣṭaḥ | ākārālopa mā bhūḍ iti | ārdhadhātuke ’ci kṛti ākārālopo vidhīyate | tatra kaḥ prasaṅgo yad uta yaṅo ’vayave ’ci lopaḥ syāt || iha yaṅaḥ samudītasārdhadhātuka < tva > m ayaṃ yaṅo ’vayavaḥ < na > ārdhadhātukaṃ naivākārālopaḥ prāpnoti < nārtho > sthānivadbhāvapraṣedhena |.*

¹¹¹ M 1.152 ll. 5–10.

marked with *K* or *Ñ* mentioned by A 6.4.64. Here Patañjali does not state on what grounds he considers this risk possible; he could have the same principle in mind which states that “word-forms involved for whole groups are also involved in their parts”, which he indirectly recalls in different words, while commenting on the general rule on substitution:

M 1.136, ll. 21–23 *ad* A 1.1.56 vt 11: *naitan mantavyaṃ samudāya āśrīyamāṇe ’vayave nāśrīyate iti | abhyantaro hi samudāyasyāvayavaḥ | tad yathā | vṛkṣaḥ pracalan saḥāvayavaiḥ pracalati |*

Still, we should not think that when we rely on the whole, we cannot rely on the part. A part is included in the combination. Like this: a tree when it shakes, shakes with its parts.

But he could also implicitly refer to another well-known and partly competing principle, the one stating that “an element that has undergone a change in one part does not become different”. This last principle is already found in vt 10 *ad* A 1.1.56 *ekadeśavikṛtasyānanyatvāt siddham*, which rejects the proposed addition (*upasaṃkhyānam*) made by vt 9 (*ekadeśavikṛtasyopasaṃkhyānam*), of the ‘partially modified’ elements on the grounds that the partially modified elements are not different from their unmodified counterparts.¹¹² And this was also to become a very well-known *paribhāṣā*, recorded and commented on by a number of later collections. However, once again, it is not mentioned by Vyāḍi who, on the contrary, is the only one to quote the aphorism *samudāyeṣu ca vṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api vartante* as a *paribhāṣā*.¹¹³

Furthermore, Vyāḍi’s commentator concludes by looking for a purpose for the indication of the maxim:

¹¹² cf. M 1.136 ll. 9–10 *ad* A 1.1.56 vt 10: *tad yathā | śvā karṇe vā pucche vā chinne śvaiva bhavati nāśvo na gardabha iti |* “Like this: when a dog has an ear or its tail cut off, it remains a dog indeed. It does not become a horse or a donkey.”

¹¹³ As far as the specific problem of the formation of *yāyāvara* is concerned, we feel that a specific provision in A 1.1.58 is not necessary. The provision taught by rule A 6.4.64 is actually conditioned by the term *aṅga*, i. e. the *ā* which is assumed to be zero-replaced has to be the final sound of the unit, after which the prescription mentioning the *ārdhadhātuka*-affix beginning with a vowel with marker *Ñ*, i. e. $\emptyset^{\vee}a^{\emptyset}\dot{N}$ is applied. *yāyā-* is not the *aṅga* of this phantom unit *aÑ* (obtained by means of such a phonic replacement), but is self-evidently the *aṅga* of *yaÑ* according to A 3.1.22 *dhātor ekāco halādeḥ kriyāsamabhihāre* “[The affix *yaÑ* is preferably introduced] after a monosyllabic verbal stem which begins with a consonant when the action is repeated/intensively performed”.

kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuka ity (1.1.4) atra dhātvayavavalope kṛte guṇavṛddhipratishedhaḥ siddho bhavati |

What is the purpose in this indication? The prohibition of *guṇa*- and *vṛddhi*-replacements by A 1.1.4 is well-established when only a part of the verbal base is zero-replaced.

Patañjali on A 1.1.4 self-evidently interprets the *bahuvrīhi dhātulopa* as referred to a partial *lopa* of a *dhātu*, as is plainly demonstrated by the examples involved, such as *loluva* “who often cuts” (where a zero-replacement of the mere intensive affix *ya* applies to the whole intensive verbal base *lo-lū-ya*-). The problem is briefly dealt with by Kaiyaṭa:

kṛtsnasya dhātor lope guṇavṛddhiprasaṅgā ’bhāvād anarthako niṣedhaḥ syād iti sāmartyād dhātvekadeśalopo ’tra dhātulopo ’bhimataḥ |

If it dealt with zero-replacement of the whole verbal base, the prohibition would be useless, because of the absence of the automatic involvement of *guṇa*- and *vṛddhi*-substitutions: here, *dhātulopa* is interpreted as a partial zero-replacement of the *dhātu* because the rule needs to make sense.

Thus, the commentator seems quite independent in his search for hints and scopes of his proposed implicit meta-rules. He brings about a *jñāpaka* independently from the supposed source of the axiom itself, i. e. Patañjali; moreover, the rule-interpretation he uses as *prayojana* of this *paribhāṣā* — even though certainly implicitly accepted even by early commentators — was not linked to this specific *paribhāṣā* by them, possibly because such a rule-interpretation was reckoned as compulsory, not needing specific provision.

5.3 Looking for Vyāḍi’s target

The last example of Vyāḍi’s pbh we shall investigate is also included in all the pbh-commentaries (Puruṣottamadeva, 86; Śiradeva, 87; Nilakaṇṭha, 111; Haribhāskara, 90; Nāgeśa, 111; Śeṣādrisudhi, 103).

The selected pbh is the 58th *parjanyaaval lakṣaṇapravṛttiḥ* “The application of rules is like the rain”. The commentary starts with an example taken from everyday experience:

tadyathā parjanyo yāvad ūnaṃ pūrṇaṃ cābhivarṣati + nāpūrṇam <eva> abhivarṣati + | evaṃ lakṣaṇam api bhavati | dīrghasya dīrghatvaṃ bhavati | cicīṣati bubhūṣati |

Thus for example a cloud/the rain falls on both that which is defective and that which is fulfilled. It does not merely rain upon that which is not fulfilled. A rule also behaves in this way. The long vowel replacement [can be] proper for a [vowel which is already] long. [Compare, e. g.] *cicīṣati* “he wants to pile up” [with] *bubhūṣati* “he wants to become” (where, even though the middle vowel of the former verbal base, i. e. *ci-*, is short, while that of the latter one, i. e. *bhū-*, is long, the long vowel replacement prescribed before the desiderative affix *-sa-* by A 6.4.16 always applies).

Then the possible *jñāpaka* is highlighted:

How is this known? Because when the texts says *pravāhaṇasya dha* (= A 7.3.28) he teaches a prohibition¹¹⁴ of the first *vṛddhi*-replacement of the first syllable “of the following *pada*” [when the *taddhita*-affix *ḌhaK* = *eya* follows] in the case of the word *vāhana*, which is already endowed with the *vṛddhi* vowel. Nonetheless, the Master sees the application of the *vṛddhi*-replacement even where there is [already] a *vṛddhi* vowel, since the application of rules is like the rain.¹¹⁵

The last step consists in singling out – as usual – a specific purpose for the *paribhāṣā* itself:

*kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | khaṭvāḍhakam ity atra dīrghasyāpy akaḥ
savarṇe dīrghatvaṃ bhaviṣyati |*

What is the purpose of the indication of this [*paribhāṣā*]? When it says *khaṭvāḍhakam* (*khaṭvā* + *āḍhakam*), the replacement of an *aK* (*a, i, u, ṛ, ḷ*)¹¹⁶ vowel before a homogeneous vowel will apply, even though it (this *aK* vowel) is already long.

The maxim analysed here is also found in Patañjali’s commentary on A 1.2.9, where he looks for the purpose of the extension rule teaching (under some given conditions) the affix *saN* as if it were marked with *K* (a marker that

¹¹⁴ For this interpretation by Vyāḍi’s commentator, see below.

¹¹⁵ *kathaṃ jñāyate | yad ayaṃ pravāhaṇasya dha iti* (A 7.3.28) *vṛddhasyāpi vāhanaśabdasya pūrvavṛddhipratīṣedham śāsti | paśyati tv ācāryaḥ yatrāpi vṛddhir asti tatrāpi vṛddhir bhavati | parjanyaaval lakṣaṇapravṛtteḥ |.*

¹¹⁶ Following A 6.1.101.

blocks the *vr̥ddhi* and *guṇa* replacement as taught in A 1.1.5). The technical details of the whole section do not interest us here; suffice it to say that, while discussing the form *cicīṣati*, the question is asked whether the substitution of the final *i* of the verbal base with a long one taught by A 6.4.16 would not be sufficient to block the undesired substitution of that same vowel with a *guṇa*-vowel. But the answer, already anticipated by the ślvt 1 *ad* A 1.2.9, is that this could not work in any way for bases whose vowels are already long: *dīrghāṇām tu prasajyate* “But [the *guṇa*-replacement] of long vowels is automatically involved”.

What this obscure assertion exactly means is explained by Patañjali as follows:

M 1.196 ll. 6–16 *ad* A 1.2.9 (*ad* ślvt 1): *dīrghāṇām tu khalu guṇaḥ prāpnoti | nanu ca dīrghāṇām api dīrghavacanasāmarthyād guṇo na bhaviṣyati | na dīrghāṇām dīrghāḥ prāpnuvanti | kiṃ kāraṇam | na hi bhuktavān punar bhunkte na ca kṛtaśmaśruḥ punaḥ śmaśrūṇi kārāyati | nanu ca punaḥpravṛttir api dṛṣṭā | bhuktavāṃś ca punar bhunkte kṛtaśmaśruś ca punaḥ smaśrūṇi kārāyati |*

But [the *guṇa*-replacement] of long vowels could apply. – On account [of being prescribed] the long-replacement (A 6.4.16) will indeed also replace the long vowels: thus there will be no *guṇa*. – Long substitutes cannot apply to long vowels. – Why? – One who has already eaten, does not [need to] eat once again. One whose beard has been shaved, does not [need to] shave again. – Nevertheless a new application is also seen. One who has eaten will eat again; one whose beard has been shaved will shave again.

Thus, reasoning only on non-technical grounds, it is difficult to establish whether a given rule can also apply (or can apply again) where it is not necessary. Both options seem to be available in our everyday experience. Patañjali’s argument then resorts to the principle of *sāmarthyā*, i. e. that a rule *must* find its scope to justify its being uttered:

sāmarthyād dhi punarbhāvyam | sāmarthyāt tatra punaḥpravṛttir bhavati bhojanaviśeṣāc chilpaviśeṣād vā | dīrghāṇām punardīrghatvavacanena na kiṃcit prayojanam asti | akṛtakāri khalv api śāstram agnivat | tad yathā | agnir yad adagdham tad dahati || dīrghavacana etat prayojanam guṇo mā bhūd iti | kṛtakāri khalv api śāstram parjanyaavat | tad yathā | parjanyo yāvad ūnam pūrṇam ca sarvam abhivarṣati |

In fact a new application is due through the force of an injunction. – Through the force of the injunction in a specific context,¹¹⁷ there is a new application; because of the specific feature of food or of the specific feature of (a barber's) skill. – Now, there is no purpose for a new utterance of a long-replacement of long vowels. – The treatise indeed produces that which has not yet been produced, like fire. See, e. g., a fire that burns that which has not been burned already. – In this rule this is [actually] the purpose of a long-replacement [of long vowels], i. e. that a *guṇa*-replacement can be avoided! – The treatise indeed [also] produces that which has already been produced, like a cloud. See, e. g., a cloud that rains upon both that which is defective and that which is fulfilled.

Thus the discussion shifts here to the interpretation of the *sāmarthya* of rules, i. e. to their being effective because of being uttered. The principle, as we see from Patañjali's discussion, is not limited to rules teaching something new, but also to rules that, at least in part, have no new results to boast, just like a cloud that rains upon both that which is defective and that which is fulfilled.¹¹⁸ Once again the axiom is – so to speak – only proved through parallel experience in everyday life, and no additional clue is put forward to give more substance to the claim that rules in grammar act as clouds.¹¹⁹

As far as the *jñāpaka* is concerned, it is noteworthy that only Patañjali and Vyāḍi's commentator share the quoted reading of *sūtra* A 7.3.28, including the *anuvṛtti* of *na parasya* from A 7.3.27, while the rest of tradition is different. According to Patañjali and to Vyāḍi's commentator, on the one hand, rule A 7.3.28 teaches the optional *vṛddhi*-replacement of the 'first constituent' (*pūrvapada* A 7.3.19) and, on the other, it prohibits the *vṛddhi*-replacement of the first syllable of the following *pada* (*na... parasya* A 7.3.27) in the compound denoting the descendant of Pravāhana.

117 It seems that Patañjali proposes a restrictive interpretation of *sāmarthya* here, limiting it to specific teachings/exceptions. Then he comes back to the more general interpretation, nearer the position expressed by the ślvt, by which a rule acts because it is uttered, and thus in need of a scope.

118 The discussion continues but the role of *sāmarthya* and the fact that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the rule can also apply without bringing about new results are never questioned as such.

119 The same arguments are employed in M 3.89 ll. 6–16, i. e. in the commentary on the *sandhi*-rule A 6.1.127 (*iko 'savarṇe śākalyasya hrasvaś ca*) which teaches, in accordance with Śākalya's authority, that a *pada*-final vowel *i, u, r, ḷ* retains its form before a non-homogeneous vowel and is replaced by the corresponding short vowel. The replacement of a short vowel with a short vowel through the application of this rule allows the *svarasandhi* to be avoided.

As a consequence, two alternative stems are derived, i. e. *prāvāhaneya* and *pravāhaneya*. This actually shows the application of the optionality between *pra-* and *prā-* but not the optionality of the prohibition of the *ṛddhi*-replacement on the first syllable of the second constituent, since the word *vāhana* is already endowed with the *ṛddhi* vowel. However, the crucial point is to recognize this latter application of the *ṛddhi*-replacement of the *ṛddhi* vowel *ā*, so that a further rule (A 6.3.39) conditioned by a suffix causing a *ṛddhi*-replacement may apply.

In this M passage, there is no hint at the *jñāpaka* advanced by Vyāḍi's commentator for reading Pāṇini's rules as working in a manner similar to rain-clouds. Patañjali merely points out that if the *ṛddhi*-replacement of the first syllable of the second constituent in the compound *pravāhaneya* is prohibited by A 7.3.28, then according to this specific reading the *taddhita* *-eya* cannot be considered a cause for the *ṛddhi*-vowel of *vāhaneya*. As a consequence, A 6.3.39 *ṛddhinimittasya ca taddhitasya araktavikāre* “[A feminine nominal base 6.3.34] ending in a *taddhita*-affix which determines a *ṛddhi*-replacement [of the initial syllable of that base], excluding those denoting a colour or a transformation, [is not treated like the corresponding masculine before the final constituent]”, i. e. its prohibition is not realized. We deduce that the undesired form, which could be automatically involved, is ***pravāhaneyabharyaḥ*.

Nonetheless, Patañjali does not reject the *anuvṛtti* of *na* in A 7.3.28 and resorts to A 6.3.41 instead of 39 to get the desired feminine form *pravāhaneyibhāryaḥ*. Vyāḍi's commentator extends the assumed rain-mechanism of rule-application to this rule. The *anuvṛtti* of *na* has no function but Vyāḍi uses it as a *jñāpaka*. We wonder whether he mechanically applies a schema Patañjali uses elsewhere – without realizing that both the prescription of the *ṛddhi*-replacement and its prohibition are *de facto* useless from the operational point of view – or rather, does he hint at the solution of the shortcoming temporarily assumed by Patañjali? What does he mean when he says that “the Master sees the *ṛddhi*-replacement even where there is [already] a *ṛddhi* vowel”? If this *ṛddhi*-replacement can be considered as an applied rule, the supposed shortcoming is actually solved, and as a consequence, Vyāḍi's pbh 58 would help to read other rules which need to be applied, although their effect is already included in the starting point itself, in order to realize some requirement of a further rule.

6 Conclusions

Of course, bold statements on the topics discussed so far require a thorough analysis of all the available evidence, especially when it comes to the relationship

between Vyāḍi and the Vyāḍi-commentator and the earliest Pāṇinian tradition. Some safe statements can, however, be put forward. First of all, right from the beginning, implicitly by Pāṇini and then, explicitly by Kātyāyana, the basic principle founding the whole normative activity brought about by grammar is that not all rules need to be stated, be they meta-rules or operational ones. A first, relevant, corollary to this basic principle is that all rules are limitative by nature. The point of many Kātyāyana's arguments is to establish what norms are needed, and what are not: anything that can be obtained correctly without the need of an explicit norm, will be normed. A number of general hermeneutical rules, shared by a number of other schools or traditions, can be obtained without any specific norm, to which the commentator may have recourse to when necessary. This neither implies nor negates the existence of a specific tradition of collecting and commenting on *paribhāṣās* contemporary to Kātyāyana, but it certainly hints at the existence of well-grounded shared exegetical practices. On the other hand, when it comes to more specific exegetical points, Kātyāyana takes far more liberties than later traditions in proposing additions to the text. Some statements, later recognised as *paribhāṣās*, are additions (or comments) in the *vārttikas*. He acts as a philologist trying to establish a perfect text rather than as a commentator.

In Patañjali, the change of attitude is radical —and somewhat bewildering, if we consider the short gap of time generally considered between the two authors. Patañjali seems to deal with a huge amount of what are sometimes even contradictory exegetical principles. Some may even present difficulties, since they compete with existing *paribhāṣās* (as occurs for A 1.1.68 and in part also A 1.1.56), or they create problems for proposed solutions. On the other hand, Patañjali does offer us a first attempt at limiting some *ad hoc* statements or additions. He uses various devices to avoid modifying an already fixed and inviolable text, such as indirect indication, common everyday experience, recourse to previous parts of the text derived by *anuvṛtti*, splitting of rules, condensed utterances (*prasliṣṭanirdeśa*).

It is against such a background that we need to evaluate the specific contribution of the first collectors and of commentators on grammatical *paribhāṣās*, despite difficulties in establishing their relative chronology. What seems clear, as far as Vyāḍi is concerned, is his intention of creating a grammar-specific exegetic manual by selecting, among the available exegetical principles, the strictly Pāṇinian ones, in order to create a coherent system of interpretation whose bases have still to be studied. This attitude is reinforced by the Vyāḍi commentator who, showing a remarkable independence from Patañjali, looks for a *jñāpaka* for each and every *paribhāṣā* collected by his author. No longer is the *jñāpaka*, as in Kātyāyana, a device to prove the validity of a given interpretation, but is now viewed rather as a clue, willingly 'left behind' by the source-author himself to replace the fully-fledged axiom. The sacralisation of the text (which makes each syllable therein not only

significant but necessary) has somehow provided commentators with a powerful tool to make this text signify more than what is stated without any need for modification. Commonly shared hermeneutic principles are no longer accepted, but each and every principle, however general it may be, must find its validation within the text itself.

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