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Durability of Highway Bridges Durabilité des ponts-routes Dauerhaftigkeit der Strassenbrücken

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# SUMMARY

Every Bridge Engineer must plan, design and construct bridges, as if they were to safely service the traveling public forever. For only then can the bridge engineer feel that he has satisfactorily executed his commission. He aesthetics. When he plans, designs and constructs with durability in mind his bridge will become functionally obsolete long before it becomes structurally deficient.

## RÉSUMÉ

Chaque ingénieur des ponts doit concevoir, calculer et construire des ponts, comme si ces derniers devaient remplir leur fonction avec sécurité et pour l'éternité. Alors seulement, l'ingénieur a le sentiment d'avoir correctement accomplisatâche. Il doit construire le meilleur pont pour le coût le plus bas sans sacrifier la sécur la qualité et l'estéthique. Lorsqu'il conçoit, calcule et construit un pont en ayant la durabilité présente à l'esprit, celui-ci sera obsolète longtemps avant de présenter des déficiences structurales.

## ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Jeder Brückeningenieur muss Brücken planen, bemessen und bauen, wie wenn diese dem Verkehr für ewig sicher dienen würden. Nur dann hat er das Gefühl, seinen Auftrag zufriedenstellend ausgeführt zu haben. Er hat die bestmögliche Brücke mit den kleinstmöglichen Kosten zu bauen, ohne Kompromisse zulasten von Sicherheit, Qualität und Aesthetik. Plant, bemisst und baut er jedoch schon mit der Dauerhaftigkeit als Ziel, so wird seine Brücke nicht mehr gebraucht, bevor ihre Lebensdauer erreicht ist.

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

How long is a highway bridge supposed to last? The obvious answer is that it is supposed to last as long as it is needed. Predicting how long a bridge must remain in service is essential to bridge planning, design, construction, and maintenance. And yet predicting the exact service life of <sup>a</sup> particular bridge at <sup>a</sup> given site is impossible. Too many factors are beyond the bridge engineer's control.

Often, the useful life of <sup>a</sup> bridge ends when it becomes functionally obsolete. The bridge is in good condition, but it is no longer able to carry the traffic loads or volumes existing at that location. This can happen for many reasons. For example, if legal load limits change, or if vehicles are heavier than expected, or if traffic volumes increase as development occurs—the life span of <sup>a</sup> structurally sound bridge may be shortened. To cite another example, water flow through the bridge opening or the frequency of flooding may have increased to <sup>a</sup> point that is no longer acceptable. In that case, <sup>a</sup> new bridge is required to reduce the impacts on surrounding developments.

In the United States, <sup>42</sup> percent of our 577,710 structures are deficient. Of these, 102,531 (18 percent) are deficient only because changes at their geographical location have made them functionally obsolete. In urban locations and high growth areas, more bridges are replaced because of functional concerns than structural considerations.

Of course, some bridges deteriorate to the point where they can no longer carry the necessary loads safely. In the United States, 135,826 (24 percent) of all bridges on public roads are structurally deficient. These bridges have deteriorated to the point that major rehabilitation or complete replacement is necessary.

Ideally, no bridge would be structurally deficient. Every bridge rehabilitation or replacement project would be the result of functional obsolescence, not deterioration of our engineered product. We know how to correct deterioration before it reaches the point where <sup>a</sup> bridge can no longer serve the motoring public safely. With proper planning, design, construction, and maintenance, this should be possible.

So why have these 135,826 bridges deteriorated? The overall reason is that we do not live in an ideal world. In an ideal world, bridges would be given the attention they need to serve us well for many decades, even centuries. In the real world, we do not always have the luxury to make the right choices. Our predictions about traffic and loadings may prove to be incorrect so <sup>a</sup> bridge deteriorates faster than expected. Government agencies may not have enough money for all needed maintenance and rehabilitation projects. In the real world, maintenance is deferred, rehabilitation is put off, and <sup>a</sup> bridge that could have had an extended life of many decades has to be replaced instead. Recent studies by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Bridge Division have shown that the average bridge in the United States is replaced when it is about <sup>70</sup> years old. By then, it would have been rehabilitated once.

Even in the real world, though, this premature deterioration is not inevitable. The cover of the American Society of Civil Engineers' (ASCE) <sup>1989</sup> calendar has

a picture of a covered wooden bridge built in the United States in 1866. It is still in service today. For September, the calendar used a picture of an Iron Bridge in Shropshire, England. This bridge, still in use, was built in 1779. These examples and many others prove that we can build durable bridges, if they are properly engineered, constructed, and maintained.

To achieve this durability, we have to explore what can go wrong and, more importantly, what can go right. We cannot control all the factors, such as geographic changes, budget limitations, or traffic volumes or weight. But to <sup>a</sup> greater extent, we can control the designs we use so they are capable of achieving maximum service life. We can also control the construction and maintenance procedures that will extend <sup>a</sup> bridge's life cost-effectively. In short, we, as engineers, should be able to select the best type of bridge for <sup>a</sup> given location, then combine proper materials, quality design, and pride in construction with protective strategies, including regular maintenance, to prevent premature deterioration, be it <sup>a</sup> timber, concrete, or steel bridge.

If we look at each stage in the life of <sup>a</sup> bridge we can find ways of increasing durability to extend effective service life. The first stage is planning.

#### 2.0 PLANNING

During the planning phase of project development, engineers determine the type, size, and location of the bridge. Site or other constraints dictate size and location. The type of bridge, however, is usually open, and the choice can have <sup>a</sup> significant effect on durability. We can see how by using an extreme example. We would not select <sup>a</sup> bridge for an Interstate highway that could not serve high volumes of traffic, much of it heavy trucks, well into the next<br>century. True, some bridges may be the lowest first-cost solution. But th True, some bridges may be the lowest first-cost solution. But that ignores the cost of replacements every <sup>20</sup> or <sup>25</sup> years and, more importantly, the cost of delays and inconvenience of traffic disruption each time. Therein the planning stage, we would program <sup>a</sup> bridge-type with <sup>a</sup> higher initial cost, but one that incorporates more "durable" materials.

The planning phase is also when the impact of the environment on the bridge is first discussed. To again cite contrasts, we can see that <sup>a</sup> bridge carrying mostly automobiles over <sup>a</sup> slow-moving river in <sup>a</sup> warm climate should be different from <sup>a</sup> bridge carrying <sup>a</sup> traffic with <sup>a</sup> high percentage of trucks over ocean salt-water in <sup>a</sup> cold climate with snow and ice throughout the winter. While this example suggests the difference between Florida and Alaska, even bridges within an urban area, or <sup>a</sup> county, or State can be subjected to considerably different environments—for example, piers on solid ground or in the bed of <sup>a</sup> rushing river. During the planning stage, bridges must be programmed to incorporate materials suitable to the environment.

If these factors are not recognized during planning, and adequate funds are not made available for design and construction with durable materials, the resulting bridge will not last as long as it could have.

#### 3.0 DESIGN

The design phase has the greatest impact on the quality—another name for durability—and cost of the bridge. In <sup>a</sup> publication entitled Quality in the Constructed Project, {1} the ASCE included <sup>a</sup> chart that illustrated the effect on quality: (Figure 1).





Opportunity to Influence Project Quality and Cost

#### Figure <sup>1</sup>

The ASCE defines quality as meeting the needs of the owner within the available budget. For some bridges, this definition may appear to consist of two mutually exclusive terms. The owner may want <sup>a</sup> bridge that will last <sup>100</sup> years but may have <sup>a</sup> budget that appears to cover only <sup>a</sup> 50-year bridge. That is why experienced designers play such an important role. The designer must know how the various engineered materials, under the given site conditions, will perform. That way, the designer can get the most value, if not <sup>100</sup> years, for the available funds. To borrow an old definition of "politics," bridge design is the art of the possible.

Bridge engineers decide on materials during the design stage. The two broad choices are usually concrete or steel. Within the concrete and steel industries, the pros and cons of each type are controversial. From the standpoint of dufability, though, the type of bridge is less important in most cases than the choices made after the type is chosen. What the designer has to recognize is that each setting is different. The skill of the engineer comes in understanding the differences, and making choices accordingly. We will illustrate this point with <sup>a</sup> few examples, beginning with concrete.

Many engineers include high-strength concrete in their designs. These engineers think that high-strength concrete is more durable than lowerstrength concrete. That sounds logical enough. And if stresses and strains were the only consideration, this assumption would be true. But the environment shows no respect for high-strength concrete, if such ingredients as "entrained air" are not included. Air entrainment reduces the strength {6} of the mix, if all other ingredients are kept constant (cement, water, etc.), but revising the mix design can provide both the needed strength and air entrainment.



Another factor that makes <sup>a</sup> major contribution to the durability of concrete bridges is the permeability of the final concrete mix. The lowest water-cement (w/c) ratio, compatible with workability, has to be specified for exposed concrete elements. Concrete with a w/c ratio of  $0.5$  (5 1/2 gallons per 94pound bag of cement) has <sup>a</sup> higher permeability than concrete with <sup>a</sup> w/c of 0.4. The lowest practical w/c that can be placed is about 0.32 (depending on temperature), and then only with special equipment for consolidation. To get <sup>a</sup> durable concrete, therefore, the designer has to recognize the interrelationship of strength, permeability, and workability when specifying the concrete mix required for the project. The designer should also know that adding high-range water reducers, fly ash, retarders, silica fume, etc., may require <sup>a</sup> different w/c ratio to achieve equivalent quality levels.

As with concrete, the durability of structural steel is influenced by the decisions made during the design phase. To cite one example, designers who do not keep up with the latest in fatigue resistant design are potentially burdening their client with excessive rehabilitation costs to achieve expected service life. This can occur, for instance, when <sup>a</sup> structural detail develops <sup>a</sup> fatigue crack that grows until it becomes <sup>a</sup> critical flaw. If the structure is non-redundant and the member fractures, the entire structure can be lost. These cracks rarely start because of the design of the main load-carrying mess shown is not because of the secondary members. If proper detailing is not used for the secondary members, however, "out-of-plane bending" that is not accounted for in the design can, and often does, cause cracks.

Too often, designers incorporate fatigue-prone connections in new structures well after the technical literature has fully documented the weakness of the joint. In this case, the designer has made the choice of a bridge-type, namely<br>steel, that can last many decades. Then a secondary choice may well cut that life short, with tragic consequences for any motorists on the bridge if the member cracks.

In making structural material choices, the designer must decide how to account for life-cycle cost in the analysis. Because of the rivalry between concrete and steel, this is always <sup>a</sup> controversial topic. No one answer seems to satisfy advocates of both types. Still, life-cycle cost is important to the owner of the bridge. Therefore, life-cycle cost must be important to the designer. It is influenced more by the designer's details than basic structural materials.

Life-cycle cost is the cost of all activities associated with <sup>a</sup> bridge during its life. It includes the cost of construction, but also the cost of any maintenance, rehabilitation, or reconstruction that may be needed during the life of the structure. Life-cycle cost allows designers to compare the cost of alternatives over the life of <sup>a</sup> bridge, instead of simply initial cost. <sup>A</sup> bridge with <sup>a</sup> low initial cost may be within <sup>a</sup> bridge owner's construction budget, but could be <sup>a</sup> poor investment if it requires rehabilitation three times during its service life instead of two.

In looking at the structures in the United States, we can see that any type of structure, properly designed, constructed, and maintained will have, comparatively, the same life-cycle costs. Therefore, the bridge owner's goal must be to develop <sup>a</sup> process that will allow only durable bridges to evolve.

Durability, in this regard, should be defined as <sup>a</sup> combination of engineered products or materials that will satisfy project needs at <sup>a</sup> specific site for <sup>a</sup> specific design life. This definition is useful because it makes clear the fact that "durable" does not always mean <sup>a</sup> "long-lasting" structure. Even

though we know <sup>a</sup> concrete bridge, for example, could last <sup>50</sup> years or more, if the completed bridge will be replaced in <sup>10</sup> years because of functional obsolescence, concrete might be <sup>a</sup> poor choice.

In considering life-cycle cost, we sometimes find that the calculations are less persuasive than the experience of the designer. Should the steel be painted or unpainted (so-called "weathering" steel)? Should the concrete be reinforced or prestressed? Depending on who is involved, different selections will be made based on experience. An engineer who has dealt mainly with steel structures during his professional life would probably argue the advantages of steel in life-cycle cost. Engineers who have dealt mostly with concrete structures would probably think the facts favor concrete.

Some aspects of life-cycle cost, though, have been recognized. Concrete bridge decks are an example. Premature deterioration of bridge decks--deterioraation occurring before the end of the bridge's service life--has occurred in localities where deicing salts are used to meet the need for winter travel. Because of the recognized effect of salt on reinforcing steel in concrete decks, experienced designers incorporate <sup>a</sup> "corrosion protection" system with higher quality concrete. That combats the influence of the salt, but with <sup>a</sup> higher initial cost. By calculating life-cycle cost, we can see that this extra cost is justified because the deck will now have <sup>a</sup> service life equal to the rest of the structure.

We can see <sup>a</sup> similar debate over the life-cycle cost of painting. <sup>A</sup> structural steel member, if properly designed, detailed, maintained, and painted will last, in theory, forever. The <sup>1779</sup> Iron Bridge mentioned earlier is an example. But repainting steel bridges can be costly and it affects traffic, presenting safety hazards to workers and motorists. These costs have to be added to the life-cycle analysis.

Many designers think the answer to the painting problem is "weathering" or unpainted structural steel. That avoids the added cost of repainting. Moreover, used in the proper environment with appropriate details, "weathering" steel will provide an acceptable service life with minimal costs. "Weathering" steel, though, is not durable in all environments. In <sup>a</sup> marine environment, "weathering" steel experiences accelerated, premature deterioration, with resultant maintenance or rehabilitation costs for the owner. Because of windborne salts, this deterioration may occur even though the structure is miles from <sup>a</sup> seacoast. It may occur hundreds of miles from <sup>a</sup> marine environment, in fact, if roadway deicing salts come into contact with the steel. The designer must have <sup>a</sup> full understanding of the limitations of this material in calculating life-cycle costs.

Bridge joints are perhaps the single biggest cause of premature deterioration of bridge components. In addition, they greatly influence the rideability of the roadway surface. Here, too, the designer must make choices that will affect the durability of the bridge as well as its life-cycle cost.

One such choice involves handling water that passes through the joint. Because water is often laden with salt, it could cause the superstructure and the substructure to deteriorate. Experience has shown that joints will not remain watertight over the service life of the structure. Aging joints, by leaking, can affect durability. At the same time, replacing joints every <sup>5</sup> to <sup>10</sup> years to retain water-tightness is unacceptable, especially on high traffic routes. To meet these circumstances, <sup>a</sup> skilled engineer may consider provisions to control the water under the joint rather than try to prevent the water from penetrating. Properly detailed and maintained joints can control this water for the life of the structure.



For smaller structures, "jointless" bridges have been used with great success in some States. Tennessee, for example, {8} has built <sup>400</sup> foot long steel, and <sup>800</sup> foot long concrete bridges without joints. The State has not had any significant problems as <sup>a</sup> result of this design decision. Of the 577,710 structures in the United States, over <sup>90</sup> percent are less than 500 feet long and may qualify for <sup>a</sup> jointless design. Even though this design could increase durability, designers use it infrequently.

Bridge drains are another area where water flowing out of control may subject <sup>a</sup> structure to significant damage. They are used too frequently on highway bridges, probably because of the thinking that "more is better." In fact, the reverse may be true. With fewer drains, more water must flow through each one, thus "flushing" out the drains. Maybe the answer to many of our bridge problems is "jointless and scupperless bridges." An FHWA research report on Bridge Deck Drainage Guidelines {2} provides good advice for the engineer on deck drainage design.

The number of drains is an example of how <sup>a</sup> little decision can create <sup>a</sup> big problem. We do not want to slight the big decisions. <sup>A</sup> designer should not develop <sup>a</sup> structure where premature deterioration of any single element, from whatever cause, will require total replacement of the bridge. This is the basic idea of redundancy. If one thing fails, another will do the job. Designing for redundancy may increase initial project cost by <sup>a</sup> small percentage. That small increase may affect the competitiveness of the design in comparison with another structural system. Nevertheless, every designer and every bridge owner has to recognize the importance of redundancy. We are not comparing apples-to-apples if we try to decide whether to use <sup>a</sup> bridge design that can survive the failure of <sup>a</sup> critical member or one that cannot.

If the structure will cross <sup>a</sup> river or stream, the designer has several other choices to make that, obviously, can affect durability. <sup>A</sup> bridge must be able to withstand major floods. Many bridges cannot, though. More structures are lost in the United States because of floods than for any other reason. We may blame these losses on "acts of nature," and that is correct up to <sup>a</sup> point. But the losses often are <sup>a</sup> direct result of designer and owner decisions.

Scour resistant designs, for example, should be mandatory for structures that cross <sup>a</sup> body of water. If the bridge footing cannot be placed on <sup>a</sup> nonerodible base, such as competent rock, the designer must find ways to build in stability. The bridge must be able to withstand the "design flood" (usually <sup>a</sup> 100-year storm) without damage. In addition, it must be able to remain stable at even greater flood frequencies (say <sup>a</sup> 500-year event), although with <sup>a</sup> smaller factor of safety.

Because initial cost is, inevitably, <sup>a</sup> consideration, this stabi1ity must be achieved without increasing the cost exorbitantly under the guise of safety. To <sup>a</sup> degree, this is risk management. How much additional cost will the owner be willing to bear so the structure can withstand <sup>a</sup> 100-year flood, <sup>a</sup> 200-year flood, and so on.

<sup>A</sup> well-engineered foundation should be able to withstand <sup>a</sup> "design flood" or worse without any significant changes in cost or constructibility. If the designer makes all the other best choices, but does not give proper weight to scour resistance, he will have saddled the bridge owner with a structure that is not as durable as it could have been.

In 1988, the FHWA issued <sup>a</sup> Technical Advisory {7} providing guidance on scour resistant designs. Using the procedures described in the advisory will result in scour-resistant, and thus durable, bridges.



# 4.0 CONSTRUCTION

The best planning and design can go for naught during the construction stage--<br>if the contractor is not "quality conscious," if the inspectors are not<br>conscientious, if can alle the user discussed are not conscientious, if any one of <sup>a</sup> thousand details are not done as shown in the plans, the bridge will not be as durable as it should have been.

In some cases, durability and quality may be compromised, even before construction begins, by the procedure used in selecting contractors. To secure the benefits of cost competition, bridge owners select contractors by "lowbid." To stay in business, each bidder must minimize time and cost for the project, yet ensure the bid price will provide <sup>a</sup> product that meets the contract requirements. Bidders will not adopt <sup>a</sup> more costly or more timeconsuming approach—they will stick to the specifications, no more and, we hope, no less. Thus, it is extremely important that the owner specify the type of structure and appropriate material specifications and procedures that have proven to be durable in other similar circumstances.

To be sure minimum quality level standards are met, the bidding documents must clearly indicate the requirements for the project. The criteria that will be used for acceptance or rejection must be clearly spelled out. Further, a balance must be struck. The contract documents should not over-specify material requirements or impose unnecessary construction restraints. And yet they must not be so ambiguous that the contractor will submit <sup>a</sup> bid thinking <sup>a</sup> lower priced product will be acceptable.

The bidder's level of experience is <sup>a</sup> consideration that is often overlooked, especially for state-of-the-art structures. The bridge owner and the contractor should be more conscious of experience. Many highway departments require financial prequalification before <sup>a</sup> contractor submits <sup>a</sup> bid, but few require technical qualification as well. The lack of technical prequalification has caused many problems when inexperienced contractors have used the claims process to try to recoup losses resulting from their not fully understanding the complexity of the work they bid.

Some bridge owners have begun requiring technical prequalification to minimize these problems. Industry, too, has recognized the need for technical prequalification. For example, the American Institute of Steel Construction has <sup>a</sup> three-level certification program for steel fabrication. Two of the levels deal with fabrication of steel bridge members. The Prestressed Concrete Institute has <sup>a</sup> four-level bridge member certification program. These programs require contractors (or precasters) to satisfy minimum quality control standards to become certified for the appropriate type of construction. Technical prequalification, combined with an adequate design and adequate contract provisions, could eliminate some of the problems we are seeing today.

Quality control is the responsibility of the contractor. Acceptance testing is the testing performed by the owner's representatives to be sure the contract provisions are met, and <sup>a</sup> durable bridge will result. Together these form the concept called Quality Assurance (Figure 2). The contractor must have an adequate quality control program. Just as importantly, the owner's representatives must understand the acceptance testing criteria and how to interpret the results to be sure the project will result in <sup>a</sup> durable structure meeting contract requirements.

Curing of freshly placed concrete offers <sup>a</sup> good illustration of the importance of quality construction. It is perhaps the least understood and most abused stage of concrete construction. This is especially true for bridge decks,



# DURABLE BRIDGES Quality Assurance Program



Figure <sup>2</sup>

where large surface areas are exposed to ambient conditions. Timing is vital to curing, but proper application is also important to ensure controlled evaporation rate of hydrating water. Otherwise <sup>a</sup> less durable, poor quality product will result, with early bridge deck failures occurring even if everything else during the design and construction phase was done properly.

The Portland Cement Association (PCA) addressed curing in its manual on Design and Control of Concrete Mixtures {3}. Concrete with exposed surfaces should not be placed if the evaporation rate exceeds, or is expected to exceed, <sup>a</sup> rate of 0.25 lbs/sf/hr. Figure <sup>3</sup> shows the PCA chart for calculating this rate. It considers humidity, wind velocity, and the temperature of the air and the concrete. Will the contractor measure these factors? Will the inspector be sure the measurements are taken? Will the construction manager catch this detail? If not, the results will be less durable concrete than the designer expected. Proper curing cannot make bad concrete good, but bad curing can make otherwise good concrete bad.

# 5.0 MAINTENANCE

Proper maintenance does not happen often enough. Because of reduced budgets or inadequately trained personnel, many organizations delay needed maintenance. Deferred maintenance that could have been performed at minimal cost leads instead to rehabilitation at major cost. All too often, we use our limited funds to rehabilitate <sup>a</sup> bridge that should not have needed rehabilitation for many years, and we replace <sup>a</sup> bridge that should have lasted many more years, all because of deferred—or ignored—maintenance. Deferring maintenance, therefore, is not only <sup>a</sup> false economy, but one that can directly affect durability.



Hocity on rate of a

Figure <sup>3</sup>

The bridge designer, in considering life-cycle cost, should be able to tell the bridge owner the type of maintenance <sup>a</sup> bridge will need. The bridge owner should use this information to establish a maintenance program for the bridge<br>before it is opened to traffic. Having the program is not enough, though. The before it is opened to traffic. Having the program is not enough, though. bridge owner must stick to the schedule. This schedule should be like the maintenance schedule that comes with every new car—the owner ignores it at his own risk.

Something as basic as repainting bridges is often deferred. When painting is deferred, for whatever reason, the bridge owner finds that what should have been periodic simple surface preparation with <sup>a</sup> new top coat is not sufficient. That simple job must be replaced by extensive blast cleaning, priming, and top coating. That is how <sup>a</sup> forced economy for lack of funds becomes <sup>a</sup> false economy, whether funds are available or not. In addition, while "saving" money on repainting, the bridge owner is exposing the bridge to the harmful influences of the environment that can shorten the life of the bridge.

Often, funding for regular repainting is not available. Bridge owners, however, usually overlook the next-best possibility. Spot painting can help to protect the more vulnerable areas of the bridge, such as under joints, and to replace sections of paint that failed prematurely. This maintenance strategy is rarely used, but it can significantly reduce the cost of retaining durability.

As in the contracting field, certification of painters can make <sup>a</sup> major difference in the quality of work. In the United States, the Structural Steel Painting Council is establishing <sup>a</sup> certification program for painters to be sure minimum quality levels are achieved. Bridge owners who do not rely on the certification can only hope the low bidder selected for the job is capable of at least minimum quality.

"Weathering" or unpainted steel, mentioned earlier in the discussion of lifecycle costs, eliminates one maintenance problem, namely regular painting. However, bridges built with "weathering" steel need maintenance, too. Debris

that collects on bridge members from pigeon nests, leaking expansion joints, wind blown dust, or other sources must be removed promptly. This material retains moisture and will cause accelerated corrosion. Salt-laden water coming through bridge joints evaporates, leaving salts that are highly corrosive. They must be flushed off. Some bridge owners have adopted <sup>a</sup> maintenance policy of washing their bridges, both painted and unpainted, at least once <sup>a</sup> year to extend their service life. This simple, basic practice is sure to pay high dividends in durability.

"Weathering" steel offers <sup>a</sup> good example of how <sup>a</sup> choice made during the design stage affects later stages. The designer may choose this type of steel to reduce maintenance costs and avoid traffic disruption. But that choice imposes special maintenance requirements on the bridge owner. If the bridge owner meets those requirements, the bridge will provide good service at minimal cost. If the bridge owner does not, the choice of "weathering" steel will lead to If the bridge owner does not, the choice of "weathering" steel will lead to needless rehabilitation costs and possible replacement of the structure years before its useful life should have run out.

Concrete surfaces also require attention. Debris, for example, should not be allowed to build up and remain on pier caps or abutment seats. Something as simple as the failure to clear debris from drainage openings can prevent <sup>a</sup> carefully designed, carefully constructed drainage system from operating properly. Instead of moving through the proper channels, polluted, or saltladen water may sit on the bridge for long periods or may drip over the side.

For surfaces under bridge joints, concrete sealers are recommended to provide the needed service life. In the United States, we often consult the Transportation Research Board's Concrete Sealers for Protection of Bridge Structures {4}. It provides the results of tests of numerous commercially available products that will seal the concrete surface and provide adequate protection.

We have already discussed the corrosive effect of deicing salts on bridge decks and some of the steps that can be taken to minimize this effect. Maintenance of bridge decks, however, may be needed for other reasons as well. The riding surface may rut or its skid resistance may be reduced by wear from high traffic volumes. Restoration of these properties is necessary under the maintenance program to ensure <sup>a</sup> safe, smooth riding surface on the bridge.

An asphalt overlay is the least costly of many ways of correcting the problem. If the concrete deck has an {3} adequate air entrainment system (as determined by ASTM Test Method C457) and <sup>a</sup> corrosion protection system, asphalt may be all that is needed. If either of these two characteristics is not present, an impervious overlay (concrete or polymer concrete) or membrane may be needed. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, the Associated General Contractors of America, and the American Road and Transportation Builders Association have set up <sup>a</sup> joint committee to develop comprehensive guidelines for overlays. The results will be published soon as <sup>a</sup> guide specification.

Another feature that inexperienced designers often overlook is "maintainability." For example, access to vulnerable parts of the structure must be convenient enough to allow effective maintenance. Access holes into closed spaces (box sections) must be large enough to allow easy access for personnel as well as equipment. It makes no sense to have to shut down traffic and remove <sup>a</sup> portion of <sup>a</sup> bridge deck to get inside <sup>a</sup> box girder for maintenance.

"Inspectability" is of equal importance. The designer must allow for easy

inspection of the entire structure. This helps to ensure early detection of problems. Discovering <sup>a</sup> fatigue crack when it is <sup>2</sup> inches long allows easy, economical repair. Compare that to shutting down the bridge and installing<br>falsework to repair a fractured element because the inspector could not inspect <sup>a</sup> particular detail. The designer should mentally "inspect" the bridge while designing it to ensure inspectability. That way, to cite another example, if he or she has <sup>a</sup> 36-inch girth, he or she won't detail 24-inch access openings.

#### 6.0 TOTAL REPLACEMENT

At some point in the life of <sup>a</sup> bridge, it may no longer be cost-effective to continue maintenance. This can happen for many reasons. For example, perhaps<br>the rate of deterioration is so great that it cannot be coped with. Or perhaps traffic volumes or other environmental factors have changed significantly, making the bridge functionally obsolete.

Deciding whether to replace <sup>a</sup> bridge or not is difficult. Cost, of course, is one reason. Another reason is that in most cases, the structure is carrying highway traffic that will have to be detoured during the replacement project. During the planning, design, and construction stages of <sup>a</sup> replacement bridge project, the same kinds of decisions must be made as in developing <sup>a</sup> bridge on new location. However, additional factors must be taken into consideration. For this type of work, the decisions made after the type of bridge is chosen may be even more important.

For example, the designer may choose higher cost materials such as polymer concrete instead of portland cement concrete. The higher cost materials can achieve higher strength in shorter time. To meet the project's time needs, precast elements may be favored over cast-in-place elements.

Contractors and engineers versed in the latest techniques for design and construction while maintaining traffic can, and have, produced fully satisfactory, durable bridges. Often, the bridge can be constructed in <sup>a</sup> remarkably short time. Because time is so important in these cases, bridge owners have offered significant incentives (namely bonuses) for early completion and penalties for late completion. These incentive/ disincentives have proven successful. They can help get the new bridge open faster than would otherwise be the case—and without sacrificing durability in the name of early completion.

Many times, only partial rehabilitation, such as bridge deck replacement, is needed. The question that has to be answered is what is the remaining life of the rest of the bridge? Will the beams, for example, last as long as the planned deck? If not, is the deck "over-designed" and, therefore, <sup>a</sup> poor investment?. In 1988, the Bridge Subcommittee of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials adopted <sup>a</sup> guide specifications entitled Guidelines for Strength Evaluation of Existing Steel and Concrete Bridges {5}. Considerable professional judgment, coupled with these guidelines, will allow the proper decisions to be made.

## 7.0 CONCLUSION

We would like to able to say that all of the above items—and many we did not have time to mention—are accounted for in each and every project. But history has shown it has not happened. With the diminishing resources available to bridge owners (time, money, and trained staff) and the large number of bridges



still in the "deficient" category, strict attention must be paid to the need for quality planning, design, construction, and maintenance. These project phases should be incorporated into <sup>a</sup> comprehensive Bridge Management System to be sure available resources are used effectively.

In closing, and in the words of English author, art critic, and social reformer John Rusk in:

Therefore when we build, let us think that we build forever. Let it not be for present delight, nor for present use alone. Let it be such work as our descendants will thank us for, and let us think, as we lay stone upon stone, that <sup>a</sup> time is to come when those stones will be held sacred because our hands have touched them, and that man will say as they look upon the labor and wrought substance of them, "See, this our fathers did for us."

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