

Numenius and Ammonius

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I

E. R. DODDS

Numenius and Ammonius

NUMENIUS AND AMMONIUS

WHEN our kind host honoured me with an invitation to take part in these *Entretiens* and offered me a choice of subjects, I chose Numenius; Ammonius was added later at his request. The reasons for my choice were two. It happened that I had a long-standing interest in this author: more than thirty years ago my earliest research pupil, Mr. B. S. Page, did some work on Numenius, and we studied the fragments together. The other consideration was that in seeking to unravel the sources of Plotinus one's best hope of reaching anything positive lies in beginning at the end. We know that Numenius was read in Plotinus' seminar¹; we know that Plotinus was accused of stealing his ideas²; and we can see for ourselves that their philosophies are products of the same general climate of opinion. The answers of Numenius differ from the answers of Plotinus, but at least they are answers to the same questions. Can we say as much of the Stoics and Plotinus, or of Aristotle and Plotinus? Can we say it even of Plato and Plotinus?

Since I first read Numenius, study of his fragments has been made easier by the publication of M. Leemans' edition of them³, to which I shall refer throughout this talk; and understanding of his thought has been greatly advanced by M. Puech in the admirably lucid and well-documented paper which he published in 1934⁴. I have done my best to disagree with M. Puech wherever I could — it is of course our duty in these *Entretiens* to disagree as much as possible —

¹ Porph., *vit. Plot.*, 14, 10, Henry-Schwyzler. ² *Ibid.*, 17, 1. ³ E. A. LEEMANS, *Studie over den Wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea met Uitgave der Fragmenten* (Mém. de l'Acad. roy. de Belgique, classe des lettres, XXXVII, 2, 1937). In my references T stands for the *testimonia*, F for the fragments, as numbered in this edition. ⁴ « Numenius d'Apamée et les théologies orientales au second siècle », *Mél. Bidez*, 745 ff.

but I confess that I have found it unusually difficult, while my obligations to him will be obvious throughout. I must also acknowledge a debt to Beutler's long and careful article in Pauly-Wissowa¹; but in this case the task of disagreement has proved less difficult. Finally, I must mention the pages which my friend Festugière has devoted to Numenius in his great work on the *Hermetica*², and Mr. Armstrong's short discussion in the first chapter of his book on Plotinus.

My object in this talk is to compare Numenius' teaching with that of Plotinus. But before I do this, I must face two preliminary questions, both of them controversial. First, how far does Numenius represent an injection of alien elements into the Greek philosophical tradition? Second, how far can we construct from the available evidence a coherent picture of Numenius' theology? Until we have made up our minds on these two points we cannot hope to understand Numenius' part in the formation of Neoplatonism. When I have dealt with them, I shall then try to make some comparisons with Plotinus. And finally I shall say a little about Ammonius — not much, for what I have to say is, alas, entirely negative, and the most important part of it has already been said in print by M. Dörrie.

I

The great scholars of an earlier generation, Norden, Bousset, Praechter, Cumont³, all saw in Numenius the exponent of a Greco-oriental syncretism; and the evidence for this view of him was brilliantly set forth by M. Puech,

¹ Supp.-Band VII (1940), 664-678; cf. also his article in *Gnomon*, 16 (1940). ² *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, esp. III, 42-7, IV, 123-132.

³ Cf. NORDEN, *Agnostos Theos*, 72 f., 109; BOUSSET, *GGA*, 1914, 716 ff.; ÜBERWEG-PRAECHTER, *Philosophie des Altertums*, ed. 12, 520 f.; CUMONT, *Lux Perpetua*, 344 f.

whose conclusion was that he « opened the gates of western philosophy » to Gnosticism, and through Gnosticism to eastern religious attitudes generally. Their opinion has, however, been challenged by Beutler and Festugière, who find in him no more « orientalism » than in any other Middle Platonist. This is, of course, part of the general reaction against the tendency to overstress oriental influences on later Greek thought. In the case of Plotinus I think most of us would agree that the reaction was wholly justified; and perhaps we should agree that there were substantial grounds for it also in the cases of Philo and the *Hermetica*. We should, however, remind ourselves of the fatal law by which every reaction sooner or later overshoots the mark and, as we say in my country, empties out the baby with the bath-water. If we are to avoid this, each case must be examined on its merits.

Numenius' *interest* in oriental beliefs and practices, especially Jewish ones, is of course undeniable: he claimed to find the teaching of Plato and Pythagoras confirmed on certain points by the rituals, the doctrines and the consecrations (ἱδρύσεις) of the Brahmans, Jews, Magians and Egyptians (F 9 a); to this end he quoted « prophetic sayings » from the Jewish scriptures (T 46, F 9 b, 19, 32) and the evidence of Egyptian iconography (T 46, F 33); he is even alleged to have told a story about Jesus, though without mentioning his name (F 19). By itself, however, this is hardly decisive. The « mirage oriental », as Festugière has called it, was no new thing among Greeks¹. It most often took the form of interpreting oriental sayings or customs in the light of Greek ideas, and proceeding to claim them as evidence for the truth, or at least the antiquity, of those ideas. Now this is just what Origen accused Numenius of doing (F 9 b), and this is what we find him doing with the

¹ Cf. *La Révélation d'Hermès*, I, 19 ff., and DÖRRIE, *Hermes*, 83 (1955), 442 f.

second verse of the first chapter of *Genesis*: he interprets it in the light of Heraclitus' dictum about wet souls (we might say in the light of Sigmund Freud, if Numenius could have read that author). If it were safe to generalise from this single example (our only one), we might urge that instead of describing Plato as « Moses talking Attic » (T 1) Numenius *ought* to have described Moses as « Plato talking Hebrew ».

Incidentally, I have some difficulty in accepting the tentative suggestion of Bigg and Puech that Numenius was himself a Jew. His acquaintance with the first chapter of *Genesis* does not prove it. The author of the *de Sublimitate* could quote from the same chapter, which was known also to Galen, to some of the Hermetists, and perhaps to Ocellus Lucanus¹; and we can see from Tacitus, Pliny and Juvenal that by the beginning of the second century Gentiles took quite considerable interest in Jewish customs and doctrines. On the other hand, it would be a very unorthodox Jew who described Jehovah as « father of all the gods » (F 34), and put the Egyptians on a level with the Jews in the matter of divine knowledge (F 9 a). And would any Jew, orthodox or not, allow that the Pharaoh's magicians, Iannes and Iambres², were a match for Moses (F 18)? The assumption is in any case unnecessary, for, as Puech himself has pointed out, in his native Apamea Numenius would have ample opportunity of getting to know both Jews and Gnostics. (To be fair, one should perhaps add that we do not know how long Numenius remained in Apamea. One authority, Lydus, calls him ὁ Ῥωμαῖος (F 35); if this is not a mere blunder, it perhaps means that he taught at Rome. And I see nothing improbable in that: it would go far to explain

¹ *De Sublim.*, 9, 9; R. WALZER, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 23 f.; R. HARDER, *Ocellus Lucanus*, 129 ff.; C. H. DODD, *The Bible and the Greeks*, Part II. ² The name Iannes was known also to Pliny (*N. H.* 30, 11) and Apuleius (*Apol.* 90). But Iambres, it would seem, appears otherwise only in *2 Tim.* 3, 8 and in Christian writers dependent on it (GANSCHINIETZ in P.-W. s. v.).

the special interest which was evidently taken in him by the members of the Plotinian circle.)

However, these are not the questions that matter. The crucial question is whether Numenius has any *doctrines* to which analogues existed in the oriental world but *not* in the tradition of greek thought. The negative condition is as important as the positive one: without it, the existence of oriental analogues cannot establish, though it may confirm, the hypothesis of direct oriental influence. Thus we need not see in the uncompromising dualism of Numenius' system a direct reflection of Gnostic ideas; for we know that in this matter he had precursors in the Pythagorean School (T 30, cf. Sext. Emp., *adv. Phys.* II, 276-7, 282). And again, while Numenius' supreme god, who is ἀργος ἔργων ζυμπάντων καὶ βασιλεύς (F 21) certainly recalls the *hebes deus* of Marcion (Tert., *adv. Marc.* 5, 19, 7), we should remember also the sixth chapter of the *de mundo*, where the supreme god is too great a prince to soil his hands with work (397 b-398 b). A stronger case, I think, is Numenius' theory that every man has two distinct souls (T 36). No doubt authority of a sort for this belief could be found in the *Timaeus*, where the irrational soul is described as ἄλλο εἶδος ψυχῆς (69 c). But before Numenius the doctrine is not stated in this radical form, so far as I am aware, anywhere in the native Greek tradition¹. On the other hand, it is attested for the Hermetists by Iamblichus (*de myst.* 8, 6), for the Basilidean Gnostics by Clement (*Strom.* 2, 20, 113), for the Manichaeans by Augustine (*c. Jul.* III, 372)², and for the Mazdeans as early as Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 6, 1, 41). Here we may fairly say there is a *prima facie* presumption of oriental

¹ The references without indication of source in Porphyry, *de abst.* 1, 40, and Nemesius, *nat. hom.* 115 f., 213 f. Matth., may well be to Numenius.

² Cf. BOUSSET, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Exkurs iv. I omit the « other soul » in which Plotinus' Gnostics believed (*Enn.* II 9, 5, 16), since this seems to be a world-soul, not a human soul.

influence. And I think the presumption is confirmed when we go on to ask *how* man acquired his evil second soul. According to the Hermetists, he acquired it ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορᾶς, from the successive spheres through which the rational soul passed in its descent (*loc. cit.*, cf. *Corp. Herm.* 1, 25 f.). According to Numenius, evil was added to the soul ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξωθεν προσφουμένων (T 35). This is a vague phrase, but its meaning is made clear in a passage of Macrobius which depends on Numenius (T 47): there the descending soul acquires in each successive planetary sphere « certain increments of starry body » (p. 105, 13 Leem.) and at the same time certain faculties (p. 109, 3 ff.). If this is right, the agreement with the Hermetist is complete; we are reminded also of the Gnostic Bardesanes, for whom man has « a body from the Evil Ones and a soul from the Seven »¹.

I must add that this explanation, which is Bousset's, is rejected by Beutler, who denies that Numenius is Macrobius' source here; in the long passage about the descent of the soul which occupies most of chapters 10 to 12 of Book I of Macrobius' commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* (T 47)² he admits as Numenian only a few sentences (I 12, 1-3 = p. 105, 19 — 106, 12 Leem.). I am convinced that Beutler is mistaken about this, not only because the passage forms a continuous piece of exposition with no perceptible break in thought, but because doctrines and expressions attested as Numenian appear throughout its length. I will give a brief list.

1. Macrobius begins by appealing to the *sacra caerimniarum* of various nations as supporting the views of Plato

¹ Ephraim, *Hymn* 53, p. 553 F. Cf. the title of Isidorus' work, περὶ προσφουῶς ψυχῆς (CLEM., *loc. cit.*), and in general BOUSSET, *op. cit.*, Kap. I.

² Leemans prints as certainly Numenian 11, 10 to the end of 12; but Macrobius seems to mark the excerpt as beginning at 10, 8 (so Puech). I agree with Puech and Leemans, against Cumont, that c. 13, which deals with a quite different topic, has nothing to do with Numenius.

and Pythagoras (10, 9); Numenius supported these views from the τελεταί and ιδρύσεις of eastern peoples (F 9 a).

2. They held, according to Macrobius (10, 9, 12, 16, p. 110, 10 L.), that earthly life is really death; and Numenius quotes Heraclitus in the same sense, ζῆν ἡμᾶς τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον (T 46).

3. Macrobius restricts the term caelum (οὐρανός) to the ἀπλανῆς σφαῖρα (11, 10, p. 104, 25); so does Numenius (T 42, p. 100, 11).

4. Macrobius believes in evil astral influences (12, 4, p. 106, 22); so does Numenius (T 30, p. 95, 6).

5. The soul's centre (*punctum*) is for Macrobius the monad (12, 5, p. 107, 5); and the monad is the supreme god of Numenius (T 30, p. 91, 8), with which the soul is in its essence identical (T 34).

6. In Macrobius the descending soul experiences *silvestrem tumultum* (12, 7, p. 107, 14); in Numenius matter is a κλύδων (T 45) — a word which Augustine too translated by *tumultus* (*Conf.* 9, 25).

7. In Macrobius « Nous allows itself to be divided and again returns to unity, and thus fulfils the duties of the cosmos while not deserting the secrets of its own nature » (12, 12, p. 108, 31); in Numenius the (second) Nous is split in two by matter, on which in return it confers unity (F 20), and « being double, it creates both its own shape and the cosmos » (F 25).

8. Both for Macrobius (12, 17, p. 110, 15) and for Numenius (T 45) the soul will eventually be released from the cycle of birth.

I have wearied you with these parallels because they seem to me decisive against Beutler's view,¹ and because the

¹ Beutler's only counter-argument is that the « geometrical » language of 12, 5 (p. 107, 2-4) is inconsistent with Numenius' definition of the soul as a number (T 31). But 12, 5 is not a definition; it is merely a metaphorical description of the soul's transition from unity to multiplicity, which is symbolised by the figure of a cone (*conum*, mistakenly altered to *ovum* by Leemans).

evidence of this passage, if we accept it, is in several ways important for the question of orientalism. It shows Numenius as a firm believer not only in the influence of the stars, both pre-natal and post-natal (thus confirming Proclus' charge that he mixed Platonism with γενεθλιαλογικά, T 42, p. 100, 19), but also in the astral body or « luminous vehicle » (12, 13, p. 109, 6, *luminosi corporis amicitur accessu*). It likewise shows him interpreting the σπαραγμός of Dionysus on the same supposedly « Orphic » lines as the hellenised Manichaeans of Alexander of Lycopolis (12, 12, p. 108, 26 ff., cf. Alex Lyc. 8, 5). Another fragment (F 33) deals with the fabrication of magical images — the art which Numenius calls ἕδρουσις (F 9 a) and Proclus τελεστική (*in Tim.* III, 155, 18; cf. T. 42, p. 100, 19). Now both the astral body and the making of magic statues were prominent parts of the theurgy which the later Neoplatonists learned from « Julianus the Chaldaean », the author of the *Chaldaean Oracles*. And this raises the question of Numenius' relationship to that singular work. That there was *some* relationship seems to me fairly certain from the striking parallel between the *Oracles* and F 26. The *Oracles* say « The Father entrusted all things to a second Mind, which all ye race of men call the first » (p. 14 Kroll). Numenius has « It is as if Plato said « Ye men, that Mind ye guess at is not the first; prior to it is another Mind, older and more divine ». » The two passages agree closely in expression as well as thought. But which is the original? Beutler and Festugière appear to assume without argument that it is Numenius, and the late Hans Lewy in his book on *The Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy* says the reverse relationship is « out of the question » (p. 320, n. 27); but the only reason he offers is that « the philosopher never gives any sign of knowing the *Oracles* ». If this were true, it would not mean much, since we are dealing with fragments on both sides; but in fact it is either false or question-begging. As Festugière points out (*op. cit.*

III, 53-7), the two theologies have a good deal in common — in particular, two divine Minds, of which the first or « Father » is transcendent and ἀργός, while the second is in some sense « double », being concerned both with the Intelligible and with the Sensible World. My own suspicion is that the *Oracles* are the original, since the address to mankind is both natural and usual in oracles, whereas in a philosophical dialogue it is anything but usual¹ and has in fact the air of being dragged in by Numenius. It has always seemed a little odd that the *Oracles*, composed under Marcus Aurelius, should have remained unknown until Porphyry discovered them, perhaps more than a century later. If I am right, the missing link will be Numenius, whose strong influence on Porphyry is attested by Proclus (T 18); Plotinus will have ignored the *Oracles*, recognising them for the theosophical rubbish that they are. And I see no chronological difficulty in supposing that Numenius was writing in the time of Marcus (161-180) or even a little later.

However that may be, my general conclusion should now be clear. M. Puech is right: there *was* an oriental baby in the bathwater, probably a whole litter of babies. The main fabric of Numenius' thought is no doubt derived from Neopythagorean tradition (I should call him a Neopythagorean rather than a Middle Platonist). But because he was, as Macrobius says, *occultorum curiosior* (F 39), he welcomed all the superstitions of his time, whatever their origin, and thereby contributed to the eventual degradation of Greek philosophical thought.

¹ The « parallel » adduced by FESTUGIÈRE (*Révélation*, IV, 130), namely Plato, *Prot.* 337 c 7 ὃ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ πάροντες, seems to me no parallel: the speaker there addresses not mankind but the assembled company.

II

I turn next to consider some difficulties in Numenius' theology, which obscure its relationship to the theology of Plotinus. Briefly, Numenius' main theological statements, and the main problems they raise, are as follows.

1. The First God is called πατήρ or πάππος (T 24) or βασιλεύς (F 21). He is identified with the Pythagorean monad (T 30) and with the Platonic τὰγαθόν (F 25), but Numenius does not use the term τὸ ἓν¹. He is αὐτόν (F 26) and περὶ τὰ νοητά (F 24), yet prior to Being and Form (F 25). He is ἐστῶς (F 24) and ἀργὸς ἔργων ζυμπάντων (F 21); yet he is also the πρῶτος νοῦς (F 25, 26) and πρῶτος δημιουργός (T 24, F 25). His στάσις is his κίνησις σύμφυτος (F 24), and is the cause of the order, permanence and safety of the cosmos (*Ibid.*).

Problem: how can the First Principle be at once passive and active, an idle yet creative νοῦς? The question is raised by Plotinus (II 9 [33] 1, 26 ff. Henry-Schwyzler) in relation to kindred Gnostic views. And how can this Principle be περὶ τὰ νοητά, yet prior to Being and Form?

2. The Second God is called ἔγγονος or ποιητής (T 24) or νομοθέτης (F 22). He is identified with the Platonic δημιουργός (F 21, 25, 28). He is a second νοῦς (F 26), characterised by movement (F 24), and is good by participation in the First God (F 28). He «unifies Matter, but is split by it» (F 20); and «being double, he creates both his own ἰδέα and the cosmos» (F 25).

Problem: what do these last phrases mean? what is this «doubleness» of the Second God?

¹ We need not make him do so by emending τὸ ὄν to τὸ ἓν at the end of F 11, since the First God is αὐτόν (F 26).

3. The Third God is called ἀπόγονος or ποίημα (T 24); and «the Second and Third Gods are one» (F 20). This is *the whole* of our direct information about the Third God, apart from the statement that the doctrine of three Gods goes back to Socrates (F 1, p. 115, 1), i. e., as Puech points out, to the *Second Platonic Letter* (312 e, 314 c).

Problem: if the Third God is the cosmos, as the term ποίημα suggests and as Proclus in one place explicitly asserts (T 24), how can the cosmos and the demiurge be one? And indeed, since all Matter is evil (even that of the οὐρανός, T 30, p. 96, 18), how can the cosmos be divine at all? Beutler (col. 672) and Festugière (IV, 123 f.) conclude that Proclus has misunderstood Numenius and has misled all the modern interpreters.

I think a little light is thrown on some of these dark places by another passage of Proclus (T 25), where he explains how Numenius found his three Gods in a famous sentence of the *Timaeus*. Plato's sentence runs as follows: «Whatsoever Forms understanding (νοῦς) beholds in the living creature that truly is (τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον), in their kinds and numbers, such and so many he (the δημιουργός) purposed (διενοήθη) that this world also should receive» (39 e 7, tr. Taylor). Proclus tells us: «Numenius equates his First God with τὸ ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον, and says that he νοεῖ by calling in the help of the Second God (ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ δευτέρου); he equates his Second God with νοῦς, and says νοῦς creates by calling in the help of the Third (ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ τρίτου); he equates his Third God with *the purposer* (τὸν διανοούμενον).» There is a slight textual complication here. One primary manuscript has the masculine participle, the other the neuter; Leemans printed the neuter, but the masculine is certainly right, since Proclus uses the masculine just below, in refuting Numenius' view — ἕτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸν νοοῦντα νοῦν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν διανοούμενον. And surely this makes it clear that διανοούμενον is not

passive, as virtually all commentators have taken it, but has its ordinary middle sense (the passive use of this verb is exceedingly rare)¹. νοῦς διανοούμενος as opposed to νοῦς νοῶν surely means «νοῦς exercising διάνοια», and corresponds to Plato's phrase (νοῦς) διενοήθη. In the other passage, T 24, Proclus may possibly have misunderstood the participle as passive; he has not misunderstood it here.

On this view, the account we obtain is, I think, intelligible, though extremely compressed. The three Gods are characterised by three different levels of mental activity, but the distinctions are blurred by the concept of πρόσχρησις. νοεῖν is the distinctive activity of the Second God, and of the Second only: in virtue of the reflexive consciousness which νόησις involves he «makes his own ἰδέα». The First can νοεῖν only by calling in the help of the Second; in so far as he does this, he too is νοῦς, but his *distinctive* activity (or passivity) must be something other than νόησις proper. Similarly, the Second God can abandon νόησις and exercise διάνοια, but only by calling in the Third God; in so far as he does this, he *becomes* the Third God, and «the Second and Third Gods are one». What causes him thus to abandon his proper activity is the necessity of creating a material world, which can only be done by διάνοια; in this sense he is «split in two by Matter», and the δημιουργός of Plato's text becomes distinct from νοῦς. The Third God is characterised solely by διάνοια, and thus corresponds not to the material cosmos but to the Plotinian world-soul. As Plotinus says, διάνοια is οὐ νοῦ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς (III 9 [13] 1, 35). These three levels of consciousness have as their «objective correlates» three grades of reality (F 25). The highest grade of οὐσία is σύμφυτον with the First God

¹ LSJ quotes no instance of the present tense used passively. FESTUGIÈRE (IV, 124, n. 1) recognises that the participle must have the same sense in both places, but opts for the passive — mistakenly in my view, since it will not fit the plain meaning of the second sentence.

(who is thus αὐτοόν); we are warned against identifying it with ἡ ἰδέα, which is « junior » to the First God and caused by him. To the Second God corresponds a different οὐσία which includes his own ἰδέα and presumably all the ἰδέαι. The objective correlate of the Third God is the physical cosmos which « imitates » the second οὐσία but is itself γένεσις: hence Numenius could apply the term ποίημα to the Third God.

The difference between the First and the Second δημιουργός is illustrated in the simile of the Farmer and the Labourer (F 22). The First God is like the farmer: he « sows the seed of every soul » in its appropriate receptacle. The Second God or δημιουργός proper is like the labourer: he tends the seedlings, pricks them out, and transplants them into individual men. This is evidently based on *Timaeus* 41 *cd*; but the function of Plato's δημιουργός is here confusingly transferred to the *First* God, and the function of his « Younger Gods » to the Second. I cannot explain this unless by the doctrine of πρόσχρησις: the First God sets the process going by an intellectual act ἐν πρόσχρησει τοῦ δευτέρου; the Second exercises individual providence by διάνοια, discursive planning, ἐν πρόσχρησει τοῦ τρίτου. The obscurity is increased by a textual corruption, which makes Numenius appear to say that the First God *is* the seed of soul which he sows (ὁ μὲν γε ὢν σπέρμα πάσης ψυχῆς σπείρει). This can hardly be right: as Scott said, « a sower does not sow himself »; if we make σπέρμα the predicate of ὢν we make nonsense. Yet ὢν must have some predicate: ὁ ὢν, « He that *is*, κατ' ἐξοχήν » cannot be convincingly defended as a Hebraism¹. I suggest reading ὁ μὲν γε α' ὢν (= πρῶτος ὢν)². — I think the same loss of the

¹ FESTUGIÈRE, III, 44, n. 2. ² Just as Galen found τετάρτη written Δ' in his oldest texts of Hippocrates (*C. M. G. V.* 10, 2, 1, p. 156); and as a scribe of about 900 writes τοῦτο β' for τοῦτο τὸ δεύτερον (*Olymp. in Alc.* 197, 16).

word *πρῶτος*, written *α'*, may be responsible for another puzzle. In F 25, after the statement that the Second God creates both his own *ἰδέα* and the world, the text continues *ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως*. But *ἔπειτα* seems meaningless in this context, and *θεωρητικὸς ὅλως* would more naturally apply to the *First* God, who is *περὶ τὰ νοητά*, whereas the Second is *περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητὰ* (F 24). Hence Scott brutally altered *ἔπειτα* to *ἐπεὶ* and added *ὁ πρῶτος* at the end of the sentence. But we can achieve the same result with more economy by changing a single letter: read *ἐπεὶ ὁ α' θεωρητικὸς ὅλως*.

I do not pretend that with these few remarks I have cleared up all the obscurities of these fragments. Even if we had all six books of Numenius' *περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ*, I suspect we should still agree with the judgment of Longinus (T 22) that on the subject of the *ἀρχαί* Numenius lacked *ἀκρίβεια* as compared with Plotinus, and with that of Amelius (T 23) that his meaning is obscured by inconsistencies. I have sought only to simplify a little the comparison with Plotinus, to which I must now turn.

III

Since Plotinus was accused of plagiarising Numenius, scholars have naturally searched the *Enneads* for verbal echoes of the fragments of the *περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ*. But their harvest has been small, and so far as diction is concerned I have little of consequence to add to it. The best-known verbal agreement is between F 11, where Numenius speaks of *ὁμιλῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον*, and several passages in the *Enneads*: I 6 [1] 7, 8 *ἕως ἄν... αὐτῷ μόνῳ αὐτὸ μόνον ἴδης*: VI 7 [38] 34, 7 *ἵνα δέξηται μόνῃ μόνον*: VI 9 [9] 11, 50 *φυγῆ μόνου πρὸς μόνον*, all of which describe the vision of

the Good¹. But too much should not be made of this. The phrase is in itself a very common one, e.g. Demosthenes uses μόνος μόνῳ ξυνιέναι of a private conversation (18, 137). And Numenius was not the first to apply it to the private vision of a god. Thessalus, in the first century A. D., begs the Egyptian priests for the favour of an interview with Asclepius εἰ μόνῳ μοι πρὸς μόνον ὁμιλεῖν ἐπιτρέψειεν². Does this suggest that the Numenian usage comes, as Cumont thought, from Egyptian cult?³ I do not think so. Marcus Aurelius has it: 12, 2 μόνῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ νοερῷ μόνων ἄπτεται (τῶν ἡγεμονικῶν ὁ θεός). And Plato already uses an analogous expression: *Phaedo* 111 b 8, the blessed souls in the Earthly Paradise enjoy αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς. Numenius' use of the phrase is relatively common-place and colourless; it was Plotinus who gave it significance by the new metaphysical meaning he attached to μόνος, and magic by the inspired addition of φυγή — « the *escape* of the Alone to the Alone ».

Nevertheless, this fragment of Numenius is an impressive piece of writing, and I think Plotinus was familiar with it; at any rate it shows a number of other small agreements with the *Enneads*. After the words μόνῳ μόνον Numenius continues ἔνθα μήτε τις ἄνθρωπος μήτε τι ζῷον ἕτερον, μηδὲ σῶμα μέγα μηδὲ σμικρόν. And in the same chapter of VI 7 where he uses the μόνῳ μόνον formula Plotinus writes οὔτε σώματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται... οὔτε ἑαυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, οὐ ζῷον, οὐκ ὄν, οὐ πᾶν. The choice of the same series of words, σῶμα, ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον, could easily be coincidence; but it could also be an unconscious echo. Again, Numenius' description of the Good as ἐποχούμενον

¹ Plotinus also uses εὔχεσθαι μόνους πρὸς μόνον of private prayer in distinction from communal worship, V 1, 6, 11, as do Christian writers, e. g. Eus. *vit. Const.* 4, 22. ² *C. C. A. G.* VIII, 3, p. 136, 31. Cf. FESTUGIÈRE, *Rev. Bibl.* 48 (1939), 45 ff. ³ « Le culte égyptien et le mysticisme de Plotin », *Mon. Piot* 25 (1921/2) 87. See, *contra*, E. PETERSON, *Philol.* 88 (1933), 30 f.

ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ seems to be echoed in Plotinus' description of God as ἐποχούμενον τῇ νοητῇ φύσει (I 1 [53] 8, 9); this metaphorical use, common in Plotinus, appears not to be attested before Numenius. Again, the rare use of βολή in the sense of « a glance » recurs in one of Plotinus' earliest essays, I 6 [1] 2, 2 (where Volkmann needlessly altered it to ἐπιβολή¹); and the old poetic word ἀγλαΐα, used by Numenius to describe the splendour of the Good, is often applied by Plotinus to the splendour of the Intelligible World². Individually, these agreements are not very significant; collectively, they have some weight. I shall return in a few minutes to fragment 11, from which all of them come.

There are other Numenian images which recur with slight variations in Plotinus, such as the word κλύδων, which Numenius seems to have applied to the « troubled sea » of Matter (T 45), while Plotinus speaks of ὁ τοῦ σώματος κλύδων (V 1 [10] 2, 15). Again, Numenius compares the δημιουργός to a steersman sailing over the sea of Matter (F 27), while Plotinus applies the comparison to the individual soul (IV 3 [27] 17, 22); but here there is a common source in Plato (*Polit.* 272 e, *Tim.* 42 e). Similarly, the prayer for divine help in understanding divine mysteries, which occurs both in Numenius and in Plotinus³, goes back to a common model in Plato (*Tim.* 27 c, 48 d).

Far more important than these trifles are the *doctrinal* similarities. If I was right in my tentative interpretation of Numenius' theology, the two systems are closer, at least in their broad outlines, than scholars have generally recognised. In both systems there are three, and only three, divine Principles or ὑποστάσεις. In both, the First Prin-

¹ Cf. the use of βαλεῖν in the sense of ἐπιβαλεῖν at II 4, 5, 10; III 8, 10, 32; and V 1, 3, 3 (where VOLKMANN read ἐπιβαλεῖς). ² III 8, 11, 30; V 8, 12, 7; VI 7, 21, 6; VI 9, 4, 18. Of the splendour of the *sensible* world, IV 3, 17, 21. ³ F 20, p. 137, 26; *Enn.* IV 9, 4, 6; V 1, 6, 8; V 8, 9, 13.

ciple is the Good, which is also pure unity, transcends Being and Form, and transcends all « works ». In both, the Second Principle is characterised by νόησις, the Third by διάνοια. To the eyes of the uncritical, this alone would appear enough to substantiate a charge of plagiarism. And we have evidence that in fact Plotinus, when he began to think out his own system, used that of Numenius as his starting-point. The main evidence is contained in the first of those early fragments — « probeweisen Ausarbeitungen », as M. Harder rightly calls them — which Porphyry put together under the heading ἐπισκέψεις διάφοροι to form *Enn.* III 9 (13). It is an attempt to interpret the same sentence of the *Timaeus* whose interpretation by Numenius we have already considered; and the view to which Plotinus here inclines is something much nearer to Numenius' scheme than to his own mature system. The ὁ ἔστι ζῶον, he says, cannot be what it seems at first sight to be, a pure νοητόν, for the νοητά cannot be outside of νοῦς: it must at the same time be νοῦν ἐν στάσει καὶ ἐνότητι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ — Numenius' νοῦς ἐστώς (F 24). The νοῦς of Plato's sentence must then be a second νοῦς, an ἐνέργεια proceeding from the first νοῦς. There remains τὸ διανοούμενον (here unmistakably middle in sense). « It is thought », he says, « that Plato covertly intends a distinction between this principle and the other two » — a clear allusion to Numenius' view — though others hold that the three principles are one. This third principle is Plato's δημιουργός, responsible for creation and division. What is its nature? In one sense, Plotinus suggests, you could call it νοῦς, for νοῦς is the ultimate source of multiplicity; in another sense it is not νοῦς but ψυχή, for διάνοια is the proper function of ψυχή. Thus the second and third principles are in a sense identical and in a sense distinct — which is precisely Numenius' doctrine (F 20). The two interpretations agree in finding *two* νόες in Plato's sentence, and in distinguishing the δημιουργός from both of them.

But this fragmentary essay is extremely hesitant in tone; it is surely an early draft which Plotinus later discarded. In the essay *Against the Gnostics*, which belongs to his middle period, he returned to Plato's sentence (II 9 [33] 6, 14 ff.), and this time he explicitly rejected Numenius' explanation of it: we cannot, he says, distinguish a νοῦς ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ from a νοῦς θεωρῶν (or κινούμενος, II 9, 1, 26)¹. And in his own mature system he radically simplified and rationalised Numenius' theological scheme, mainly by doing three things to it:

(i) He rooted out from the First Principle the Aristotelian νοῦς with which not only Numenius but Albinus and other Middle Platonists had identified it;

(ii) He freed the Second Principle of its ambiguous « doubleness » by transferring the creative function to the Third Principle, the World Soul, leaving the Second as a purely self-contemplating νοῦς-νοητόν having no contact with Matter;

(iii) He confined each Principle to its own function by eliminating the doctrine of πρόσχησις.

It must be said, however, that this simplified scheme left him with residual problems on his hands, which were in part at least the same problems that Numenius had in his muddled way recognised and tried to meet. For example, if the self-consciousness of the One is neither νόησις nor διάνοια, what is it? In an early essay, V 4 [7], Plotinus still uses language suggestive of Numenius: he attributes to the One a κατανόησις αὐτοῦ οἷον εἰ συναισθήσει οὐσα ἐν στάσει ἀιδίῳ καὶ νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν (2, 18). Later, he appeals to mystical experience as showing

¹ Observing the contradiction between III 9, 1 and II 9, 6, HEINEMANN argued that the former passage was spurious (*Plotin* 19-25), but curiously failed to notice its source in Numenius. Plato's sentence is quoted once more at VI 2 [43] 22, 1, where Plotinus notes its « enigmatic » character.

that νόησις is *not* the mode of consciousness of the One, VI 7 [38] 40; but he finds no better term to describe it than ὑπερνόησις (VI 8 [39] 16, 33). Again, while he relieves νοῦς of the actual task of creation, in an early essay Plotinus still calls it οἷον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι, V 9 [5] 5, 28 — echoing, but significantly modifying, a term applied to the Second God by Numenius (F 22)¹. And in fact νοῦς, though no longer « double », remains for Plotinus ἀμφίστομος « facing both ways »: as an ἐνέργεια ἐν διεξόδῳ (another Numenian phrase, F 21), νοῦς looks towards the cosmos; but in contemplating the One it looks backwards and retreats from its own nature (III 8 [30] 9, 29-35). And again, Numenius' problem of the relationship of Mind to Matter reappears as Plotinus' problem of the relationship of soul to body. Numenius says of the δημιουργός that « through beholding Matter and caring for it he becomes careless of himself » (F 20); Plotinus says of the individual souls that « because the bodies they illuminate demand attention they insensibly neglect themselves » (IV 3 [27] 17, 21-28). Furthermore, at the first point of contact with Matter both thinkers help themselves out with the distinction between οὐσία and δύναμις : Numenius said of « the gods who direct γένεσις » that their δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι are mixed with Matter but their οὐσία remains uncontaminated (T 26); Plotinus applies the same doctrine to the World Soul and the souls of stars (IV 8 [6] 2, 31 ff.).

When we turn from the divine principles to man and the material world, comparison is more difficult, since here we have only secondhand and very incomplete reports of Numenius' views. It is obvious that Plotinus reacted strongly *against* the violent dualism of Numenius. For him, Matter is neither an independent principle nor an active

¹ On Numenius' use of the term νομοθέτης see BEUTLER, *Gnomon* 16 (1940) 112, and FESTUGIÈRE, *Révélation* III 44, n. 3. The text was mistakenly doubted by Scott and Leemans.

source of evil, and incarnation as such is not necessarily an evil state as Numenius had asserted (T 40, p. 99, 23); the world as a whole is good. Nor will Plotinus have any truck with the notion of an independent «second soul» either in the cosmos or in man; he recognises a higher and a lower soul in both, but the lower is an emanation from the higher and is a necessary element in the perfection of the world (cf. e. g. II 9, 4; IV 8, 6 f.). All this is part of the «defence of the West», to use M. Puech's phrase; he is maintaining the rational Hellenic tradition against the pessimistic otherworldliness which found its fullest expression in Gnosticism. In the same spirit he rejects Numenius' astral determinism (*Enn.* II 3).

But he took over one very important article of faith from Numenius. What made the world endurable, it would seem, to Numenius was his belief (attested by Iamblichus) in the «indistinguishable identity» of the soul with its divine Grounds (ἀρχαί, T 34)¹; he held that the individual soul in some sense *contains* «the Intelligible World, the gods and daemones, the Good, and all the prior kinds of Being» (T 33). Similarly Plotinus can say ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός (III 4, 3, 22). This belief in the identity of the soul with its Ground is the characteristic faith of «theistic» mystics² the world over, whether Greeks, Christians, Hindus or Muslims; it both explains their religious experience and is in their view empirically established by it. We know that Plotinus had such experience. We do not *know* that Nume-

¹ Arguing from the context in Iamblichus, FESTUGIÈRE would limit the application of this to the *disembodied* soul (*Révélation* III, 47); but cf. T 33 and F 23, p. 140, 2. ² I borrow this term from the important recent book of my Oxford colleague Prof. R. C. ZAEHNER, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane*, where «theistic» and «monistic» mysticism are distinguished from each other and from nature-mysticism or «pan-enhenism». Plotinus' experience must, I think, be classified as theistic (despite certain possible objections); and T 34 points in the same direction for Numenius.

nus had: Mr. Armstrong thinks that « his fragments show no trace of mystical devotion »; Festugière, on the other hand, inclines to see « a mystical element » in F 11¹ — the fragment about the vision of the Good which appears to have particularly impressed Plotinus. In view of the doctrine just mentioned, I should be disposed to agree here with Festugière; but certainty is obviously not possible. In any case, I share the opinion of both Armstrong and Festugière² that for the doctrine itself we need seek no exotic origin: as Armstrong has shown, it has a good Greek foundation in Aristotle as interpreted by Alexander.

In conclusion, I would point out that two of the main structural laws or postulates of Neoplatonism are explicitly formulated by Numenius. One is the principle of participation, that in the Intelligible World all things are in each thing, but modified in each by its special character — ἐν πᾶσιν πάντα εἶναι, οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἐκάστοις (I 33). So Plotinus, ἐξέχει δ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἄλλο, ἐμφαίνει δὲ καὶ πάντα (V 8 [31] 4, 10); and so all the later Neoplatonists, who use this postulate as a means of bridging all gaps in the system³. The other is the principle of « undiminished giving », which implies non-reciprocating causal relations, so that the cause is never dissipated among its effects — τὰ δὲ θεϊὰ ἐστὶν οἷα μεταδοθέντα, ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖθι γεγεννημένα, ἐνθένδε οὐκ ἀπελήλυθε (F 23). This is cardinal for Plotinus, who like Numenius uses the illustration of communicated knowledge (IV 9 [8] 5, 4-9; III 9 [13] 2), and for all subsequent Neoplatonists, pagan and Christian: it is what saves Neoplatonism from turning into pantheism. It is not original with Numenius; I have argued elsewhere⁴ that it is a product of the Middle Stoa. But Numenius

¹ ARMSTRONG, *The Intelligible Universe in Plotinus* 73; FESTUGIÈRE, *Révélation* IV, 131. ² ARMSTRONG, *op. cit.* 34-42; FESTUGIÈRE, *op. cit.* IV, 131 f. ³ Cf. my note on Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 103.

⁴ *Ibid.* on props. 26-7; cf. R. E. WITT, *C. Q.* 24 (1930), 206 f.

states it more clearly and in a more generalised form than any one else before Plotinus.

IV

I have left myself little time in which to discuss Ammonius. But, as I warned you, I have little to say. I should indeed have found virtually nothing to say about him, were it not that other scholars have found a great deal. At least four contemporary students of ancient thought have devoted substantial essays to him, Heinemann in 1926 (*Hermes* 61, 1-27), Seeberg in 1942 (*Ztschr. f. Kirchengeschichte* 61, 136-170)¹, M. Dörrie in 1955 (*Hermes* 83, 439-478), and most recently Langerbeck (*J. H. S.* 77, 1957, 67-74). They have reached strangely different conclusions. For Heinemann Ammonius is a major Greek philosopher, « a creative personality of the first rank » (*l. c.* 13); for Seeberg he is an Indian missionary; for Dörrie he is « a Pythagorean Wundermann and ecstatic » (*l. c.* 439); for Langerbeck he is a Christian theologian, though of somewhat doubtful orthodoxy.

Such violent differences of opinion among competent professional scholars would be incomprehensible if all of them were interpreting the same evidence. But of course they are not. And before one starts speculating one must first get clear what is and what is not evidence for the philosophical views of Ammonius. In this fundamental matter my own judgment diverges widely from those of Heinemann, Seeberg and Langerbeck; but I am happy to find myself in close agreement with M. Dörrie. Specifically, I agree with him on the following points:

1. Ammonius wrote nothing (it has become necessary to say this, since despite Longinus' express statement *apud*

¹ E. BENZ, *Abb. Mainz* 1951, Nr. 3, p. 197 ff., follows Seeberg without adding anything but some additional inaccuracies.

Porph. *vit. Plot.* 20 Langerbeck thinks he wrote a treatise « On the agreement of Moses with Jesus »). Nor were his lectures preserved: the *collectio Ammonii scholarum* mentioned by Priscian (*Solut. ad Chos.* 42, 5) has nothing to do with our Ammonius.

2. The views attributed to « Ammonius and Numenius » in the second chapter of Nemesius (= Numenius T 29) are simply the traditional views common to the two anti-materialist schools, Platonists and Pythagoreans. Ammonius is named as the second founder of Platonism, Numenius as the leading Pythagorean. The opinions quoted are in no way distinctive of either of them, though no doubt both held them.

3. The third chapter of Nemesius contains an argument (§§ 55-9), demonstrably derived from Porphyry, to prove that the soul is united with the body ἀσυγχύτως. The original author of this opinion is stated (§ 56) to have been Ammonius; but there is no indication whatever that any of the arguments for it go back to Ammonius¹. (And I would add that even the language in which the opinion itself is formulated (§ 57) is Porphyrian; what we have is not a « fragment of Ammonius » but a well-known doctrine of Plotinus and Porphyry which the latter believed had already been held in substance by Ammonius.)

4. In the excerpts made by Photius (codex 251: cod. 214 is a summary of the same book) from Hierocles' lost work *On Providence* there is again one and only one statement about Ammonius, namely that he demonstrated the essential agreement of Plato and Aristotle — an undertaking which in the third century was no longer very novel. There is no reason

¹ DÖRRIE (*loc. cit.* 454) would like to attribute to Ammonius Nemesius' description of the soul as τὸ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐν διασφύζουσα, on the ground that this is a Pythagorean doctrine and Ammonius was a Pythagorean. Neither premiss seems to me to be established (as to the second, see below); but even if both are accepted, the argument suffers from undistributed middle.

whatever to attribute to Ammonius any other of Hierocles' opinions. Hierocles' source is unknown. (M. Dörrie thinks he got his historical information from Porphyry, even though his opinions are clearly *not* those of Porphyry. I should myself have thought it a likelier guess — if one must guess — that both the information and some at least of the opinions come from the pagan Platonist Origenes, whom Hierocles names along with Plotinus as Ammonius' best pupils, and to whose work entitled "Ὅτι μόνος ποιητῆς ὁ βασιλεύς (*v. Plot.* 3, 32) Hierocles perhaps alludes in the words πάντων δὲ βασιλεύειν τὸν ποιητὴν ¹. But for our purpose the point is not very important. If my guess is the right one, the chain which connects Ammonius with Photius is shortened by one link, and we can understand better why Hierocles represents the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle as Ammonius' supreme achievement; for we know that Origenes himself preached this reconciliation — he held the Peripatetic view that νοῦς was the highest ὑπόστασις ².)

Thus in my opinion, as in M. Dörrie's, the only passages which throw any *direct* light on Ammonius' teaching are one sentence in Nemesius and one sentence in Hierocles. If this opinion is accepted, you will perhaps excuse me from any further discussion of the hypotheses of Heinemann, Seeberg and Langerbeck, all of which rest on evidence that M. Dörrie and I reject. There remains M. Dörrie's own hypothesis. It is perhaps a little surprising that he should feel able to advance one; for he remarks at the end of his paper that « Nothing personal can be said of Ammonius, no detail of his doctrine can be established, in no point can a special position be assigned to him » — a statement with

¹ Pointed out by HEINEMANN, *loc. cit.* 19. LANGERBECK makes the same guess, *loc. cit.* 73; but both he and Heinemann draw conclusions for Ammonius which seem to me unjustified. ² Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* 2, 4 *init.*, p. 90 Portus.

which I am in almost complete agreement¹. Nevertheless M. Dörrie feels able to make three positive assertions about Ammonius: that he was a Pythagorean; that he was a « Wundermann » (should I be right in translating this « miracle-worker » ?); and that he was an « ecstatic ». Personally, I still feel certain doubts about all these assertions, which I should like to express, since, most happily, M. Dörrie is here to resolve them for me, and, as I said, it is our duty to disagree where we can.

1. « Ammonius was a Pythagorean ». For this the strongest argument, according to Dörrie, — I should myself say, the only serious argument — is the vow of secrecy concerning his teaching alleged to have been taken by his pupils Herennius, Origenes and Plotinus (*v. Plot.* 3, 24). This is evidently modelled on the vow of secrecy said to have been taken by the pupils of Pythagoras; and what is more curious, the two stories end in exactly the same way — one of the pupils breaks his vow, and this releases the others. The coincidence raised certain doubts in the suspicious mind of Zeller. And there are other difficulties in the story. It appears to imply that in the course of his life Ammonius had only three pupils; yet Porphyry himself names at least four others², and a fifth is mentioned by Proclus. We could perhaps assume that besides his public teaching Ammonius had an esoteric doctrine which he communicated to no one save an inner circle of three persons. But what was it?

¹ *Loc. cit.* 465. There is one personal detail about Ammonius which I should accept on Porphyry's authority (*apud Eus. Eccl. Hist.* 6, 19), though Dörrie doubts it, viz. that Ammonius was brought up a Christian. But as Dörrie says, the point has little importance, since according to Porphyry Ammonius abandoned Christianity as soon as he began to think for himself. It would be a mistake to look for « Christian influence on Neoplatonism » in this quarter. That Ammonius was still any sort of Christian when he taught Plotinus (as maintained by Langerbeck) seems to me wholly incredible. ² *V. Plot.* 7, 18; 10, 1; 20, 37; *adv. Christ. III apud Eus. Eccl. Hist.* 6, 19, 6. Proclus in *Tim.* 187 B adds a certain Antoninus.

We ought to be able to guess, since Plotinus eventually put it into writing, but we can't. The most obvious guess, that it was the doctrine of the One and of mystical union with the One, is almost certainly wrong; for we happen to know that Origenes, a member of the supposed inner circle, denied the existence of the One¹. In view of these difficulties I should myself hesitate to base any doctrinal inference on the story of the vow. Porphyry does not claim to have heard the story from Plotinus; and by the time that as an old man he came to write his master's life, his master's master was already a legendary figure. We can accept Porphyry's honesty; but we should not forget that in a hothouse atmosphere like that of the third century legends grow quickly. And we should remember some other things: that Ammonius' pupil Longinus called him a Platonist (*v. Plot.* 20, 36), not a Pythagorean; that « Ammonius the master of Plotinus » is coupled by Nemesius with « Numenius the Pythagorean » in a way which surely implies that Ammonius was *not* a Pythagorean; and that Hierocles praised him for demonstrating the agreement of Plato and Aristotle — surely *not* the sort of demonstration we expect of a Pythagorean. To my mind, this testimony decidedly outweighs any inference from the dubious story of the vow. Nor can I attach any serious weight to the argument that since Plotinus in his youth had some curiosity about Persian and Indian thought (*v. Plot.* 3, 15), his master must have been a Pythagorean. The « mirage oriental » was not confined to Pythagoreans; neither Plato nor Aristotle was entirely free from it, and in the third century it was widespread². But if we assume that Plotinus *must* have acquired this interest from a Pythagorean source, the most obvious source was surely Numenius, who did suffer badly from the « mirage oriental ».

¹ Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* 2, 4, p. 90. In any case, the notion of philosophy as a mystery not lightly to be divulged is not confined to Pythagoreans (cf. e. g. Epictetus, 3, 21, 13). ² FESTUGIÈRE, *Révélation*, I, 19 ff.

2. « Ammonius was a Wundermann ». The evidence is (a) Porphyry's story (*v. Plot.* 10, 1-13) about the magical attack made on Plotinus by a certain Olympius who had been for a short time a pupil of Ammonius; (b) the fact that Origenes the pagan, another pupil of Ammonius, published a work entitled *περὶ τῶν δαιμόνων*. I must confess that I find little force in either argument. (a) Porphyry does not say or imply that Ammonius taught magic; his words would rather suggest that Olympius took to magic out of frustrated ambition (*διὰ φιλοπρωτίαν*) because he had proved a failure at philosophy. The use of aggressive magic was a familiar part of daily life in Greco-Roman Egypt, as the magical papyri prove; no Ammonius was needed to instruct the prentice magician. And secondly, Porphyry does not say or imply that Plotinus took magical counter-measures; he says the strength of Plotinus' personality was such that the assault recoiled automatically on the assailant¹. (b) As for the treatise on *δαίμονες*, one could infer on similar evidence that Xenocrates, Poseidonius, Plutarch, and even Plato himself (whether it was he or a pupil who wrote the *Epinomis*) were all of them Wundermänner. The status and function of *δαίμονες* was in fact a traditional topic of discussion in the Academy from the generation of Plato's immediate pupils onwards.

3. « Ammonius was an ecstatic », i. e. « his teaching was founded on a revelation acquired in ecstasy » (*l. c.* 464). If this is true, it is evidently of the first importance: it removes Ammonius (and by implication Plotinus also?) from the history of philosophy, and puts him into the same

¹ The passage has been fully discussed by MERLAN, *Isis* 44 (1953), 341 ff. He points out that Plotinus admits the possible efficacy both of aggressive magic and of defensive counter-magic (*Enn.* IV 4, 43, 7); but it seems rash to infer that Plotinus himself used magic on this or any other occasion. I agree with Harder and Merlan that the pains which Plotinus described, and attributed to magic, are his own pains, not those of Olympius.

category as the *Chaldaean Oracles*. But is it true? M. Dörrie's main evidence is the word ἐνθουσιάσας, applied by Hierocles to Ammonius. This word can of course mean, as it meant originally, «having fallen into a state of possession». A sceptic might object that states of possession are something very different from the *unio mystica* described by Plotinus, and that the latter never in fact speaks of *unio mystica* as ἐνθουσιασμός¹. But there is a stronger objection. Hierocles' phrase is ἐνθουσιάσας πρὸς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινόν. I do not know how M. Dörrie would translate this. I can only translate it «being inspired with a passion for philosophy». This metaphorical sense of ἐνθουσιάζειν is as old as Plato²; and in the expressions ἐνθουσιάζειν (or ἐνθουσιᾶν) πρὸς τι, εἰς τι or περὶ τι, it is the normal and (I think) the only admissible sense. To quote a single example, Plutarch tells us that Carneades (who was certainly no «ecstatic») caused his pupils ἐνθουσιᾶν περὶ φιλοσοφίαν³. Unless M. Dörrie can produce decisive contrary instances, this argument, I fear, falls to the ground; and with it goes the interpretation of θεοδίδακτος as implying knowledge acquired in ecstasy. As Inge saw⁴, this word is probably no more than a polite equivalent of αὐτοδίδακτος; *pace* M. Dörrie, I should be inclined to link it with the

¹ Plotinus *compares* the two states in a way which implies that they are different: V 3, 14, 9, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες καὶ κάτοχοι, VI 9, 11, 12, ὡσπερ ἀρπασθεῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιάσας. Dörrie refers to *v. Plot.* 14, 2, where we are told that Plotinus wrote τὰ πολλὰ ἐνθουσιῶν καὶ ἐκπαθῶς φράζων. This cannot mean that he composed his essays while enjoying *unio mystica*; it surely means that he generally composed in a state of excitement («in höherer Begeisterung», Harder). Cf. *de Sublim.* 15, 1, where ἐνθουσιασμός and πάθος are similarly associated, as characterising the imaginative writer. ² *Philebus* 15 *e.* Aristotle could say of Isocrates (!) that he caused his audience ἐνθουσιάσαι (*Rhet.* 1408 *b* 14); Dionysius of Halicarnassus could use the same word to describe his reaction to Demosthenes (*Dem.* 22). ³ *Cato ma.* 22. The metaphor is still further debased at Aelian, *N. A.* 4, 31, where the elephant is described as ἐνθουσιῶν ἐς μίξιν. ⁴ *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, third edition, I, 115, n. 1.

nickname Sakkas as indicating the philosopher's humble origin.

You see, then, why I cannot for the moment accept as proven any one of M. Dörrie's hypotheses about Ammonius. Still less can I accept the much wilder hypotheses of Heinemann, Seeberg and Langerbeck. And, as I warned you, I have no hypothesis of my own to offer, since I possess no foundation on which to base one. There is perhaps one angle from which the problem might in principle be attacked. Two of Ammonius' pupils, Plotinus and (*pace* M. Dörrie) Origen the Christian¹, have left extensive works. It would be possible to list those doctrines and modes of thought and expression which these two writers have in common; and from this list it would be possible to *deduct* those doctrines and modes which appear in earlier authors. The remainder, if any, might with some show of probability be held to represent Ammonius' personal contribution; *not*, however, with certainty, since Plotinus and Origen had other sources in common which are now lost, including Numenius (T 17). A modest start in this direction has been made by a Dutch scholar, de Jong². I am disqualified from judging his

¹ I see no good reason to doubt Porphyry's statement, *apud* Eus. *Eccl. Hist.* 6, 19, 6, that Origen the Christian was a pupil of the Neoplatonist Ammonius. The conflicting assertions of Porphyry and Eusebius are most economically explained by assuming that each drew one (and only one) false though quite natural inference. (a) From the knowledge of pagan philosophy displayed by Origen the Christian, whose works he knew well but whom he had met only once in boyhood, Porphyry mistakenly inferred that he was a convert from paganism; he did *not* confuse him with Origenes the pagan. (b) Knowing from Porphyry that Ammonius had begun life as a Christian, Eusebius identified him with the author of certain Christian theological works, and thus mistakenly inferred that he had remained a Christian; he did *not* deny that he was the διδάσκαλος τῶν φιλοσόφων μαθημάτων mentioned by Origen himself in the letter which he quotes. ² *Plotinus of Ammonius Saccas?* (Leiden 1941). Cf. SCHWYZER in *P.-W. s. v.* Plotinus, col. 480 f., where some concordances between Plotinus and Origen are listed.

pamphlet alike by ignorance of patristics and by ignorance of the Dutch language; but from what I can make out not much of real substance appears to remain after deduction (which de Jong does not attempt) of what is attested earlier. And so for me, as for M. Theiler¹, Ammonius is still, alas, « ein grosser Schatten » and nothing more.

¹ W. THEILER, « Plotin und die antike Philosophie », *Mus. Helv.* 1 (1944), 215.

DISCUSSION

M. Theiler: Wenn die alten Neuplatoniker zusammengesessen sind, vielleicht nicht so grossartig wie wir eben hier, haben sie Probleme besprochen ausgehend gern von einem Vortrag oder der Lektüre z.B. von Numenius, von dem wir jetzt durch Herrn Dodds das Bild gegenwärtig in uns tragen. Ich greife heraus die für mich erregende Nachdatierung des Numenius gegenüber den chaldäischen Orakeln. Selber hatte ich, vielleicht ohne viel nachzudenken, angenommen, dass Numenius der Ältere ist. Einfach deswegen, weil die Orakel in mancher Beziehung eine Abspiegelung damals gängiger Gedanken sind; man ist nicht ohne weiteres geneigt, ihnen eine besondere Originalität zuzuweisen. Doch in der Behauptung, dass es neben dem Gott, den die Menschen allgemein akzeptieren, einen höheren Gott, den wirklich ersten Gott gibt, ist etwas ausgedrückt, was nicht auf der Strasse liegt. Damit hängt ja nun ein sehr wichtiges Problem zusammen, das wir in der ganzen Fülle hier nicht angreifen können: das Problem der Begründung der Gnosis. Ist die Gnosis eine eigenwüchsige Schöpfung des Ostens, die sich sozusagen erst nachträglich mit der Philosophie des Westens verbinden konnte, oder ist sie dem Gedankengehalte, nicht den mythologischen Darstellungsmitteln nach, eine heruntergekommene Philosophie? Und da wir immer noch bereit sind, den Numenius zum Philosophen zu machen, die chaldäischen Orakel aber irgendwie zur heidnischen Gnosis zu stellen, liegt es eben darum nahe, dem Philosophen gegenüber das gnostische Werk für abgeleitet anzusehen. Nun hat Herr Dodds ein sehr interessantes stilistisches Argument vorgebracht: für ein Orakel passt es, sagt er, die Menschheit anzusprechen, sich missionarisch an die ganze Welt zu wenden, während in dem Dialog des Numenius über das Gute ein solche Hinwendung etwas weniger am Platze sei. Das muss überdacht werden; ich erinnere immerhin, dass es auch in der älteren, ja sogar platonischen oder pseudoplatonischen Literatur

solche Anrufe an die Menschen gegeben hat. Im *Kleitophon* 407 b ποῖ φέρεσθε ἄνθρωποι; bei Dio von Prusa (nach einem Sokratischer?) 13, 16. Daran knüpfte die Hermetik an; 7, 1 ποῖ φέρεσθε ὧ ἄνθρωποι, μεθύοντες τὸν τῆς ἀγνοσίας ἄκρατον λόγον ἐκπιόντες; dass die Gnostiker den Philosophen vorangegangen sind in der Lehre von den zwei Seelen, in der von der schlechten Materie, ist auch nicht sicher. Jedenfalls haben gebildete Gnostiker wie Basileides und sein Sohn Isidor sich von den Philosophen anregen lassen. Zum κλύδων der Materie bei Numenius hat Herr Dodds die interessante Stelle aus dem Anfang der besonders berühmten Abhandlung Plotins über die drei Hypostasen V 1 [10] 2, 16 angemerkt σώματος κλύδων. Möglicherweise geht aber Plotin auf noch ältere Philosopheme zurück, wie eine Parallele bei Marc Aurel 12, 14, 4 zeigen könnte. Die Dreihypostasen-Lehre ist Herr Dodds geneigt schon weitgehend bei Numenius zu finden. Aber nicht nur dadurch, dass bei ihm die erste Hypostase Geist ist, zeigt sich ein Unterschied zu Plotin, auch die ganze innere Bewegung der Seele, die zum Geist und dann hinauf zum ersten Guten führt, um rückwärts wieder abzustiegen, ist in diesem Sinne noch nicht bei Numenius ausgestaltet gewesen. Es ist auch bezeichnend, dass Plotin gewisse Schwierigkeiten hatte, den Demiurgen in sein eigenes System einzubauen. Er schwankte, ob er den Geist oder die Seele Demiurg nennen soll.

Ein letztes noch zu Ammonios; da kann ich meine Zustimmung weitgehend erteilen. Wir haben Herrn Dörrie unter uns, der seinen eigenen Stand verteidigen wird. Ich bin ebenfalls zur Meinung gelangt, dass wir aus ἐνθουσιάζσας nicht zu viel schliessen dürfen, dass der Ausdruck die Begeisterung für die Philosophie bezeichnet und nicht auf eine spezielle überschwängliche Philosophie weist. Was Herr Dodds auch angemerkt hat, dass die Überlieferung richtig sein wird, Origenes der Kirchenvater sei Schüler des Ammonios gewesen, unterschreibe ich ganz. Herr Dörrie hat an sich mit Recht darauf hingewiesen, dass Ammonios ein patristisches Werk verfasst hat und H. Langer-

beck hat (*Journ. Hell. St.* 77, 1957, 68) weiter geschlossen, dass wirklich der Philosoph Ammonios ein Christ war und fähig, ein solches Werk zu verfassen. Herr Dörrie lehnt das richtig ab. Aber ich halte es für plausibel, dass es zwei Ammonii gegeben hat, die beide Lehrer des Christen Origenes gewesen sind, der zu trennen ist von Origenes dem Neuplatoniker, dem Kommilitonen des Plotin; zwei Ammonii, der eine eben der Verfasser theologischer Werke, der andere, unser nicht schreibender Ammonios, der grosse Schatten. Herr Dörrie hat im übrigen, das scheint mir richtig zu sein, hervorgehoben, dass ein für Plotin so wichtiges Philosophem wie die Überordnung des unfassbaren Guten über das Schöne am Ende nicht einmal schon von Ammonios eingeführt worden ist, eben weil wir wissen, oder glauben zu wissen, dass der Heide Origenes diese Auffassung nicht geteilt hat, die man doch bei ihm zu erwarten hätte, wäre sie von Ammonios gelehrt worden. Und auch Hierokles, der sich auf Ammonios beruft, kennt diese Lehre nicht. Damit wird wohl doch das Originelle des Plotin selber noch stärker ans Licht gerückt.

M. Puech: M. Ernst Benz a publié naguère une communication faite à l'Académie de Mayence sur Ammonius Sakkas (*Indische Einflüsse auf die frühchristliche Theologie*, Akademie der Wissenschaft und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1951, n° 3, Wiesbaden, 1951, pp. 29-34 = pp. 197-202). Benz pense que Sakkas voudrait dire le « Sace », le *Saka*, ce qui prouverait l'origine indo-scythe du philosophe. Il met aussi ce nom en rapport avec celui de Çâkyamouni, le Bouddha. Les allusions d'Origène le chrétien aux migrations des âmes viendraient d'Ammonius. Ces hypothèses paraissent très contestables. Benz esquisse, en tout cas, la comparaison entre Plotin et Origène le chrétien que souhaite M. Dodds.

Ammonius ne semble pas avoir professé la doctrine de l'Év transcendant au νοῦς. Origène, de son côté, dans le *De Principiis* (I, 1, 6) se pose bien, avec toute son époque, la question: le Dieu suprême est-il conscient, est-il personnel? Dieu est-il Monade, Hénade, ou νοῦς? Mais il se décide pour un Dieu qui est et qui

se pense lui-même: ὁ ὦν et non τὸ ὄν. Il s'accorde ainsi avec Ammonius pour préférer un Dieu-νοῦς à un Dieu-έν. Ne fait-il là cependant que le suivre ?

Je tiens, pour ma part, qu'il faut distinguer entre un Ammonius païen et un Ammonius chrétien, aussi bien qu'entre un Origène chrétien et un Origène païen.

Qui était l'Ammonius païen ? Un professeur de philosophie, un « maître des disciplines philosophiques », dont Origène déclare avoir, ainsi qu'Héraclas, suivi les cours (Eusèbe, H. E. VI, 19, 13). Il n'était pas nécessairement un *Wundermann*: plutôt un « didascale » enthousiaste, inspiré (ἐνθουσιάσας πρὸς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινόν, dit Hiéroclès).

Pour passer maintenant à Numénus, il faut dire, je crois, qu'il y a, chez lui, au point de départ, un effort de systématisation du platonisme, comme je l'indiquais, du reste, dans mon article des *Mélanges Bidez*. Cette systématisation a été surtout opérée en fonction de l'*Épître II* et du *Parménide* de Platon, d'où l'on a tenté de dégager une hiérarchie fixe et constante d'hypostases. Sans doute ai-je parlé alors, en 1934, impressionné par l'*Agnostos Theos* de Norden, d'influences orientales: on n'échappe pas à son temps. Il me semble aujourd'hui plus délicat de définir ce que recouvrent exactement, à l'époque considérée, les termes « Orient » et « Occident ». Il faut bien, en tout cas, poser le problème: qu'est-ce qui a conduit Numénus à distinguer un premier et un second Dieu ? C'est là, en effet, ce qui différencie son attitude de celle du platonisme moyen ? Le premier Dieu, pour celui-ci, est un Démiurge. Peut-on dériver l'opposition entre le Démiurge et le Bien d'une interprétation systématique du platonisme, rattacher exclusivement l'une à l'autre par une sorte de continuité dialectique ? Remarquez que pareille opposition peut prendre, et prend, dans le gnosticisme, des formes variées, distinctes de celles qu'elle a chez Marcion. Dans le valentinisme, par exemple, et singulièrement chez Héracléon, le Démiurge est un être inférieur, obtus, médiocre plutôt que franchement mauvais, bon même, si l'on veut, dans la

mesure où son action est voulue, ou plus ou moins inconsciemment inspirée, par le Logos.

De toute façon, n'y a-t-il pas chez les gnostiques et chez Numénius un problème analogue ? Problème d'ailleurs lié à celui de la Matière comme mal absolu, et à celui de la condition humaine: il s'agit de décharger Dieu de la responsabilité du Mal. On imagine en conséquence des intermédiaires entre le Bien suprême, ou le Dieu souverainement bon, et la Matière, ou le monde: des hypostases, des archontes ou des anges dont le chef sera finalement assimilé à Iahvé, le dieu de la *Genèse* et de la Loi. Quels étaient, en effet, les entités susceptibles d'assumer la responsabilité de la création ? Nécessairement, ou bien le Dieu de la Bible juive (à la fois δημιουργός et νομοθέτης), ou bien le Démoniurge du *Timée*.

On trouve chez Numénius et chez les gnostiques le même enchaînement de problèmes. Plotin, attaquant les gnostiques, attaque, semble-t-il, en même temps Numénius. Au début du traité II 9, au chapitre 1, il s'en prend, comme l'a montré M. Dodds, au νοῦς ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, au νοῦς ou au θεὸς ἀργός de Numénius, mais sa critique porte aussi, et du même coup, contre les gnostiques. Le débat avec la gnose (*Enn.* II 9, 6; cf. peut-être, III 9, 1) est centré sur l'interprétation du passage du *Timée* 39 e, si important pour Numénius ainsi que M. Dodds l'a également souligné. Il apparaît que les gnostiques essayaient de répandre leur doctrine sous le couvert de commentaires de Platon. Il y a une sorte de chassé-croisé entre leur interprétation de Platon en fonction de leur doctrine et la transposition de leur doctrine en termes platoniciens.

C'est de la même manière que des propagandistes manichéens agiront un peu plus tard, à la fin du même III^e siècle, aux dires d'Alexandre de Lycopolis: la tentation est permanente pour les systèmes gnostiques de s'offrir comme des platonismes supérieurs ou de se couler dans le moule du platonisme. Plotin a dû ressentir lui-même l'analogie entre la pensée de Numénius et celle des gnostiques. Je n'irai pas jusqu'à dire que Numénius s'explique

par la gnose; mais je parlerais volontiers, à son propos, d'une « gnose païenne », en employant une expression que ne renierait pas, je crois, le Père Festugière.

Je n'ai rien à objecter à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les Χαλδαικὰ Λογία auraient été influencés par Numénius. En tout cas, il faut reconnaître la présence de certains éléments iraniens dans ces oracles. Hans Lewy, dans son dernier travail (*Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*, Le Caire, 1956) a bien signalé les thèmes et le vocabulaire gnostiques qui s'y trouvent. Si Numénius a bien été la source des Oracles chaldaïques, ce serait une raison de plus de reconnaître les affinités de Numénius avec le gnosticisme.

Un des bienfaits de la découverte de Nag Hamâdi aura été de nous mettre en contact avec une gnose vivante. Nous comprenons, nous saisissons par là l'effet de séduction — encore sensible sur nous — qu'elle a pu produire, qu'elle a effectivement produit en divers milieux. Il y a là tout aussi bien des témoignages d'une expérience humaine et mystique très profonde, très émouvante, que des exposés abstraits et rigoureusement systématiques qui — tel le quatrième traité du « Codex Jung » attribuable à Héracléon — sont de véritables sommes de théologie ou de métaphysique.

Evidemment, le problème de l'influence que la gnose a pu exercer sur Numénius est, comme celui du gnosticisme lui-même, plus facile à traiter phénoménologiquement qu'historiquement. Je suis frappé des similitudes qu'offre l'attitude de Numénius avec celle des gnostiques. Son cas paraît analogue à celui des *virii novi* d'Arnobé, sortes de gnostiques païens à mettre, semble-t-il, en rapport avec Porphyre. Certains passages dans le *De abstinentia* de ce dernier ont une extraordinaire allure de gnosticisme. Tout récemment, je relevais un parallélisme étroit entre la *Lettre à Marcella* de Porphyre (C. 10) et un fragment — conservé par Epiphane (*Pan.* xxvi, 13, 2-3) — de l'*Évangile* (gnostique) *selon Philippe*: il est question, ici et là, de la σύλλεξις, du rassemblement opéré par l'âme de ses « membres dispersés ». R. Reitzenstein (*Historia monachorum et Historia Lausiaca*, Göttingen, 1926, pp. 97-100) croyait y apercevoir les traces d'un mythe oriental, de celui

d'Osiris en particulier. A.-J. Festugière (*Personal Religion among the Greeks*, Los Angeles, 1954, p. 59; *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, IV, Paris, 1954, p. 215 et n. 1) fait, au contraire, appel au *Phédon* (67 c), sans mentionner, au reste, *L'Évangile de Philippe*. Chacun ne voit qu'un aspect de la question: il y a, en fait, revêtement platonicien d'une image ou d'un thème gnostique d'origine sans doute mythique. *L'Évangile de Philippe* substitue un terme johannique (*Joh.* XI, 52) à celui du *Phédon* pour exprimer la dispersion des « membres » de l'âme.

Dans mon article de 1934, j'avais, à propos de la doctrine des deux âmes (l'une bonne, l'autre mauvaise), rapproché Numénius du manichéisme aussi bien que du gnosticisme proprement dit. C'était trop me fier aux affirmations de saint Augustin. En réalité, pour les manichéens, il n'y a pas deux âmes, il y a une seule âme qui ne peut être que bonne en soi et par nature, mais qui, actuellement liée et mêlée à la substance mauvaise, subit les tentations du Mal et tend par là au Mal; en d'autres termes, la prétendue « âme mauvaise » ou « démoniaque » n'est que l'âme considérée dans la condition présente et charnelle, le « moi » en tant qu'il est plongé dans une situation mauvaise. En revanche, je pense qu'il n'y a pas loin des conceptions de Numénius à celles que les valentiniens, les basilidiens et d'autres gnostiques se font, soit d'une « âme adventice » (προσφυής ψυχή), formée de l'agrégat de προσαρτήματα, soit d'un « esprit contrefacteur » (ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα), surajouté à l'âme au moment de la conception et instrument de la Εἰμαρμένη.

Pour en revenir à Porphyre, je croirais assez volontiers qu'il s'est produit chez lui une sorte d'affaiblissement de l'influence rationaliste de Plotin, après la mort de celui-ci. L'évolution religieuse de Porphyre mériterait d'être étudiée pour elle-même. Il faudrait tenir compte des rapports très étroits qui le relie à Numénius.

M. Theiler: Ich fühle mich durch die Ausführungen von M. Puech sehr gefördert. Die Gnosis ist nicht gering zu schätzen. Das *Evangelium veritatis*, das Herr Puech mitveröffentlicht hat, ist ein Stück, das mir grossen Eindruck gemacht hat. Wie

Herr Puech schon bemerkt hat, die von den Kirchenvätern hervorgezogene Aeonendramatik, die uns, wenn nicht abstösst, doch merkwürdig berührt, tritt dort gar nicht heraus, sondern wir haben etwas von einem Zug zum Geistigen; wenn historische Ereignisse zu geistigen Akten uminterpretiert werden, entspricht das einem weiten menschlichen Bedürfnis. Die tiefsinnigen Ausdeutungen könnten vielleicht in unserer Zeit dem vielfach so bedrohten Christentum wieder Freunde gewinnen. Das gleiche Sehnen nach dem Geistigen kommt im Platonismus in allen tieferen und höheren Formen immer wieder zum Ausdruck. Nur eben nirgends so eigenartig, nirgends so individuell wie bei Plotin.

M. Dörrie: Zunächst möchte ich einige Worte zu dem sagen, was wir eben von Herrn Dodds über die Theologie des Numenios gehört haben. Liegt nicht etwas Erstaunliches darin, dass es vielen zunächst so schien, als führe Plotins Lehre garnicht über Numenios hinaus? Plotins Schüler Amelios hielt sich für verpflichtet, in einem Buch eigens darzustellen, worin Plotin sich von Numenios unterscheide, und Porphyrios, der in der *Vita Plot.* 17, 4 ff. davon berichtet, kommt 18, 4 auf diesen Punkt mit Nachdruck zurück.

So merkwürdig das ist, man findet doch eine Erklärung, wenn man ein wenig auf die Diskussionen schaut, die im Platonismus zu Numenios' Zeiten anhuben. Um die Mitte des zweiten Jahrh. n. Chr. begann eine Erörterung darüber, ob die bis dahin gültige Anschauung, dass es zwei Seins-Stufen — τάξεις τῶν ὄντων — gibt, zulänglich sei. Wir lesen ja im theologischen Kapitel des Albinos (*did.* 10; 164, 19 Hermann) so ein halbes Zugeben: « Es ist möglich, dass über den uns ergreifbaren Stufen des Göttlichen noch eine oder mehrere weitere bestehen»; wir lesen in etwas gewollt dunkler Einkleidung bei Plutarch, *De gen. Socr.* 22; 591 b, jene Symbolisierung der *Moirai* mit mehreren σύνδεσμοι und zugleich mit mehren Formen des Existierens. Aber zu einer systematischen Ausformulierung war man noch nicht gekommen.

Soviel man sehen kann, ist Numenius der erste gewesen, der die Zahl der Seins-Stufen präzise auf drei festlegte; daher konnte wohl eine doxographisch registrierende Darstellung in diesem Punkt eine grundsätzliche Gleichheit zwischen Plotin und Numenius feststellen: beide postulierten drei Seins-Stufen.

In diesem Zusammenhang erscheint die Datierung des Numenius auf die Zeit des Kaisers Marc Aurel, also jedenfalls in das Ende des zweiten Jahrhunderts, als eine glückliche Lösung; denn sie enthebt uns der Schwierigkeit, der man begegnet, wenn man, wie üblich, das Wirken des Numenius ins dritte Jahrhundert, also nicht allzu fern von Plotin ansetzt: den Dreischritt, ja, das schon zur Manie entartete Spiel mit triadischen Einteilungen finden wir bei dem herzlich unbedeutenden Harpokration; diesen kann man sich nur schwer ohne ein Vorbild denken, wie es Numenius bot. Dieser Grund legt es nahe, den Numenius, der ja eine viel grössere Weite gehabt hat, vor Harpokration zu ordnen. In der grossen Doxographie über den Demiurgos bezeugt Proklos (*in Tim.* I 302, 25 ff.), Harpokration sei Schüler des Attikos gewesen; doch wird diese Notiz dem Wesen des Harpokration viel zu wenig gerecht.

Zugleich muss nun aber unterstrichen werden, dass Numenius doch ersichtlich nur zögernd die drei Seins-Stufen in die Dogmatik des damaligen Platonismus einführte; er scheut sich, sie als absolute Werte unverbunden neben einander zu setzen; vielmehr betont er, dass das Erste nur ἐν προσχώρῃσει mit dem Zweiten denke, das Zweite nur ἐν προσχώρῃσει mit dem Dritten schaffe (test. 25 Leemans = Proklos, *in Tim.* III 103, 28 Diehl). Keine dieser Hypostasen vermag also ohne « Das nach ihr » zu wirken, — ein Punkt in dem Plotin nachmals radikal anders entschied. Bei Numenius behalten die niederen Hypostasen als ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ noch einen gewissen ontologischen Wert, während die plotinische Hypostase kein ἀτίον neben sich oder unter sich duldet.

Nun ist dies Zögern vor der letzten Konsequenz typisch für den Mittelplatonismus; man gibt so ungern das bisher Gelehrte

auf, und nur widerstrebend, mit Einschränkungen und oft mit der Tendenz zu Rückschritten folgt man der Entwicklung, die sich längst angebahnt hat.

Dies muss gewiss auch in Betracht gezogen werden, wenn man die Probleme um Ammonios erörtert. Hier ist zu fragen: wie haben die beiden Platoniker Origenes und Plotin die Nachfolge des Ammonios vollzogen? Ganz gewiss hat ja Plotin Ernst gemacht mit dem Postulat, es gelte das Eine als überseienden Seinsgrund über alles Sein und Denken hinauszuhoben; und eben dies Postulat schreibt Porphyrios mit Entschiedenheit dem Ammonios zu; bezeugt ist das bei Nemesios, *De nat. hominis* 3; 129, 9 ff. Matthaei — die einzige Stelle, die über eine Lehre des Ammonios Positives und Stichhaltiges ausgibt.

Dem steht nun entgegen, dass der Mitschüler Plotins, der Platoniker Origenes, sich ebenso entschieden weigerte, dies Postulat als gültig anzuerkennen; das Zeugnis hierfür steht bei Proklos, *in Plat. theol.* II 4. Origenes erklärte in offenkundig polemischer Absicht, einzig der βασιλεύς — das war Fachwort für das höchste Wesen — sei der Schöpfer; er liess also nicht zu, dass das Schöpferische unter dem Höchsten Denkbaren hypostasiert wurde; damit widersetzte er sich dem Gedanken einer Stufung im Transszendenten überhaupt. Ich möchte aber dabei zu bedenken geben, dass er damit sehr konservativ im Sinne einer Schultradition spricht, die schon den Numenios veranlasste, den Demiurgos für das αὐτοαγαθὸν σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ, fragm. 25 Leemans, zu erklären. Hat nun Plotin oder Origenes die Linie des Ammonios folgerichtig fortgesetzt? Man muss sehr damit rechnen, dass der — im Vergleich zu Plotin — weniger selbständige Origenes in den Schulplatonismus zurücksank; und es scheint mir bedenklich, ihn als Zeugen dafür in Anspruch zu nehmen, dass Ammonios eben auch nur Schulgemässes gelehrt habe; dem steht ja nun alles entgegen, was Porphyrios über diesen Mann niedergelegt hat.

Das Ammonios-Problem spitzt sich auf die Frage zu: sollen wir, gestützt auf das Origenes-Zeugnis (Proklos, *in Plat. theol.*

II 4) dem Ammonios die Lehre von $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ und von der $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ absprechen? Dann wäre Plotin ein ganz kühner Neuerer gewesen, und Porphyrios' Aussagen über Ammonios müssten als stark gefärbt angesehen werden. Oder dürfen wir, gestützt auf das einzige die Substanz berührende Zeugnis (Nemesios 3; 129, 9), das dort dem Ammonios zugeschriebene Dogma von der $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ als echt und gültig bezeugt ansehen? Dann würde wenigstens in einem einzigen Punkt klar, wieso Ammonios der Vorläufer Plotins war. Doch ist es wohl verfrüht — vor allem nachdem Herr Langerbeck wichtige Gesichtspunkte hierzu vortragen hat — diese Frage mit « sic » oder « non » zu entscheiden.

Nun möchte ich in grösster Knappheit einige Punkte wenigstens streifen, die Herr Dodds zum Ammonios und zugleich zu meinem Aufsatz berührt hat. Für jeden, der hieran arbeiten will, ist die Aufgabe schwierig; denn was die Substanz seiner Lehre anlangt, so lässt sich nur der schon genannten Nemesios-Stelle, und vielleicht (doch dies mit grossen Zweifeln) einem bei Photios erhaltenen Zeugnis des Hierokles etwas abgewinnen. Diesem Mangel gegenüber schien es wichtig, einmal alles zusammenzufassen, was wir aus dem Umkreis des Ammonios und über seine Wirkung wissen: jene seltsamen Mitteilungen aus seiner Schule gehören hierher, die dem Porphyrios durch Plotin, ebensogut aber auch durch Longin zugeflossen sein können, der sich ja rühmte, auch Ammonios' Unterricht genossen zu haben. Ein weiterer Ansatzpunkt, von dem aus ich versuchte, einen Schluss zu ziehen, war die Richtung, in welche Ammonios offenbar den Plotin gelenkt hat, sodass er die Reise nach Indien versuchte; kurzum, ich versuchte etwas von der Atmosphäre, die den Ammonios umgab, wieder einzufangen; und ich kann nicht anders sagen: da mutet doch manches sehr pythagoreisch an, — nicht zuletzt die Lebensweise, die Plotin nachmals führte.

Was die Scheidung der zwei Ammonioi und der zwei Origeneis anlangt, so bin ich für die freundliche Zustimmung, die diese These hier gefunden hat, sehr dankbar. Eusebios an der berühmten Stelle in der Kirchengeschichte VI 19, 5 weiss mit der Notiz,

die er Porphyrios' Buch wider die Christen entnimmt, nichts anzufangen. Erstens, so muss er konstatieren, ist die Aussage über Origenes insofern falsch, als der ihm, Eusebios, allein bekannte Origenes garnicht von heidnischen, sondern von christlichen Eltern stammte; und zweitens erweist sich als falsch, was Porphyrios da über Ammonios gesagt hat. Denn derjenige Ammonios, den Eusebios — wieder als einzigen — kennt, war ja ein christlicher Lehrer der Philosophie; offenbar war er der Vertrauensmann des Christen Origenes, zu dem er seine Katecheten schickte, damit sie sich in heidnischer Philosophie zu apologetischen Zwecken vervollkommneten. Hierbei wäre nun sehr in Frage zu stellen (falls ich Herrn Puech richtig verstanden habe), ob man aus der Notiz des Eusebios (H. E. 6, 19, 9 ff.) über jenen Christen Ammonios auch nur das Geringste über den Schulbetrieb des uns interessierenden nicht-schreibenden Ammonios ableiten darf. Wieder muss ich auf die *Vita Plotini* des Porphyrios, vor allem auf Kap. 2 hinweisen. Dieser Ammonios, von dem dort die Rede ist, war weder Schulplatoniker noch Christ; die Geisteshaltung dieses Mannes, der Plotin zu fesseln vermochte, hat uns Herr Theiler ja soeben kurz vor Augen geführt; es ist das eben die Haltung, die Oswald Spengler als « magisch » bezeichnen wollte. Nimmt man alles zusammen, was Herr Theiler eben anklingen liess, so liegt es doch am nächsten, die Verbindung zum Pythagoreertum herzustellen; dort jedenfalls wird jene Geisteshaltung am ehesten greifbar. Wir dürfen ja nicht vergessen, dass das Pythagoreertum der Kaiserzeit in vielem von dem der archaischen und klassischen Zeit verschieden war.

Angesichts der Argumente von Herrn Dodds und Herrn Puech möchte ich meine Interpretation jenes ἐνθουσιάζειν (so Hierokles bei Photios, *bibl.* 461 a 33) zurückziehen. Ich wehrte mich dagegen, es in dem blassen Sinne von « begeistert » zu interpretieren, den dies Wort im Deutschen angenommen hat; nun muss ich mich aber dem Einwand beugen, dass ἐνθουσιάζειν eine analoge Abwertung im Griechischen durchgemacht hat. Wesentlich mehr Wert möchte ich auf das θεοδίδακτος (so Hierokles bei Photios,

bibl. 461 a 32) legen und dazu die Frage stellen, ob man hier nicht ein Belehrt-Werden des Ammonios aus einer Inspiration heraus verstehen muss.

Im Ganzen gesehen, ist der Satz zweifellos richtig, ja sogar sehr glücklich formuliert: « Ammonios ist für uns ein grosser Schatten. » — aber gerade darum hoffe ich sehr, dass es gelingen wird — wenn man nur alle Einzelheiten zusammen nimmt —, die Umrisse dieses Schattens mit einiger Bestimmtheit nachzuzeichnen.

P. Henry: M. Dörrie (*Ammonius, der Lehrer Plotins, Hermes*, 83, 1955, pp. 466-467) a fait remarquer avec beaucoup de pertinence que *le surnom Sakkas* ne vient que dans des témoignages tardifs, celui de Théodoret et le texte, extrêmement maladroit, d'Ammien Marcellin 22, 16, 16. Il est quand même curieux de voir cet Ammonius entre des grammairiens. Cet argument me paraît très sérieux: Sakkas serait une interpolation dans le texte d'Ammien. Eric Seeberg (*Zeitschr. f. Kircheng.* 60, 1941, pp. 136-170) soulevait une autre difficulté, d'ordre grammatical, la position insolite de l'article dans le texte de Théodoret, *Gr. aff. cur.* 6, 60; Raeder 169, 11: Ἀμμώνιος ὁ ἐπίκλην Σακκάς. Cette argumentation vous paraît-elle fondée philologiquement ?

M. Dodds: Cela ne m'a pas convaincu. I do not think that the word-order proves anything. As for the very strange position of Ammonius in this list of persons, it is impossible to decide whether this is the author's error or that of a later interpolator. I do not think it safe to assume that the error is due to interpolation.

M. Puech: Ὁ Σακκάς ne pourrait-il pas s'expliquer comme une forme abrégée de ὁ καὶ Σακκάς, « Ammonius, celui qui est surnommé Sakkas » ? Théodoret fait de Σακκάς un équivalent de σακκοφόρος (lat. *saccarius*), terme qui est effectivement employé par Suidas (ou la « Souda ») dans sa notice sur notre philosophe et qui signifie d'ordinaire « portefaix »; d'où ce qu'il rapporte d'Ammonius abandonnant, pour se livrer à la philosophie, les sacs dans lesquels il avait auparavant pour profession de trans-

porter le froment. Mais ne peut-on pas songer à un autre sens de « saccophore », « celui qui se revêt d'un sac en guise de cilice », qui porte par mortification, dans un esprit d'humilité et de pauvreté, un vêtement grossier ? Le port du *σάκκος*, du *saccus cilicinus*, est bien attesté parmi les pratiques de l'ancien monachisme chrétien. Est-ce cet habit d'ascète qui a valu son surnom à Ammonius ? Je ne suggère qu'avec réserves pareille interprétation.

M. Dodds : Saccas is not found as a personal name anywhere else, is it, except in relation to Ammonius ?

M. Dörrie : Ich fand den Namen Sakkas noch ein zweites Mal: Nämlich in der *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca* wird ein heiliger Apollonius Sakkas erwähnt.

M. Puech : *Σακκοφόρος* — ainsi que *σακκοφορεῖν* — se retrouve également ailleurs. Notamment dans plusieurs lois impériales du IV^e siècle dirigées contre les Manichéens : ceux-ci y sont accusés de chercher à dissimuler leur identité sous le masque d'une vie ascétique, de se cacher sous les noms fallacieux d'« Encratites », d'« Apotactites », d'« Hydroparastates » ou de « Saccophores ». Ces appellations visent ici des spirituels ou des sortes de moines pratiquant un ascétisme outré et suspects d'hétérodoxie.

M. Dörrie : Die Interpretation Theodorets ist aber wahrscheinlich eine abwertende und spöttische Interpretation !

P. Henry : L'argument de M. Dörrie, à savoir que le témoignage de Théodoret est isolé et tardif, nous porterait-il à déclarer que nous n'avons pas de garantie qu'Ammonius s'appelait *ὁ Σακκᾶς* ? Voilà la question.

M. Puech : Ce n'est toutefois pas Théodoret qui a inventé *ὁ Σακκᾶς*.

M. Dörrie : An diesem Punkt gibt es die grosse Schwierigkeit. Möglicherweise sind sämtliche Nennungen und Bezeugungen des Ammonius nur durch Porphyrios vermittelt. Allein in der Frage des Hierokles ist die Diskussion darüber offen; aber ich neige dazu, auch da den Porphyrios als Mittelsmann irgendwie anzunehmen. Die Frage muss also präzisiert werden: Hat Porphyrios den Namen Sakkas gekannt ? Denn wenn alle Kenntnis von

Ammonios über Porphyrios gelaufen ist, dann müsste auch der Name Sakkas, falls er echt ist und dem historischen Ammonios zukommt, irgendwo bei Porphyrios gestanden haben.

M. Dodds: I suppose that one possible answer to Herr Dörrie's question is: Yes, Porphyry knew this perhaps not very complimentary term Saccas, he preferred not to use it of this honoured master of his master, but instead he described him as θεοδίδακτος, which is a way of saying, as I understand it, that he was αὐτοδίδακτος. I think these two terms may possibly hang together.

P. Henry: Un des points les plus importants du travail de M. Dodds, c'est tout de même les trois hypostases dont nous avons très peu parlé. Voici découverte, peut-être, une source immédiate aux trois hypostases de Plotin avec cette restriction que chez Numénius elles sont non pas séparées, mais encore liées par la πρόσχησις, au sens où l'hypostase supérieure dans son action « se sert » de l'inférieure et, sous cet aspect, en dépend. La découverte est très importante et nous ramène à une idée à laquelle, personnellement, en réaction sans doute contre les exagérations manifestes de F. Heinemann (*Plotin*, 1921), je ne croyais pas beaucoup, à savoir la possibilité d'un développement de la pensée de Plotin, des premiers traités aux derniers.

M. Theiler: Es hatte sich durch die Interpretation von Herrn Dodds gezeigt, dass nicht ganz wenige Beziehungen zwischen Numenius und Plotin aufweisbar sind, dass es bei Numenius schon eine Vorform der Dreihypostasen-Lehre gibt. Wir sind freilich nicht einmal sicher, sagten wir, ob Ammonios das höchste unfassbare Gute schon abgetrennt hat vom Schönen, dem Intellegibeln. Wenn Plotin in der frühen Schrift III 9 [13] 1 einer Interpretation des Numenius näher folgt als in späteren Äusserungen, so wird die Chronologie der Werke Plotins, die in der Übersetzung von Herrn Harder deutlich wird, wichtig. Ich bin geneigt, eine gewisse Entwicklung, nicht gerade im Sinne einer inneren Konversion Plotins anzunehmen, aber doch derart, dass gewisse Punkte in späteren Schriften mehr her-

vorgetreten sind, gewisse Themen gegenüber andern erst später Wichtigkeit bekommen haben. Glücklicherweise war die Formulierung des Herren Puech einer « attitude gnostique », von der aus schon die Vorneuplatoniker ausgegangen sind. Es war nicht mehr das alte ungebrochene griechische Lebensgefühl, das am Grunde ihres Philosophierens stand, es sind gerade durch die inneren Wandlungen der Seele auch Kontakte mit dem Orient möglich geworden, und damit ist die Schulfrage, ob die Gnosis eine östliche oder westliche Erscheinung ist, überflüssig oder nicht so von Belang, wie es zunächst scheinen könnte. Plotin selber liegt wie auf einer Insel, um die der Strom des Gnostischen oder Magischen fließt — gebrauchen wir in vorsichtiger Weise den Ausdruck von Spengler.

M. Hadot: Je voudrais poser une question à M. Dodds au sujet des trois hypostases de Numénius. M. Dodds a proposé une correction au texte de Numénius, exactement au texte du fragment 25 qui se termine par ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως. M. Dodds dit que le contexte de ce fragment oblige à corriger le texte, c'est-à-dire à transformer ἔπειτα en ἐπεὶ ὁ α' (πρῶτος). La correction est très élégante, mais je me demande si elle est nécessaire.

1^o Le premier νοῦς peut-il être θεωρητικός seul, puisqu'en fait il se sert du second νοῦς pour penser. Peut-on dire que le premier νοῦς est vraiment θεωρητικός ?

2^o Ne pourrait-on pas interpréter ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως dans un sens proche du stoïcisme, c'est-à-dire de la manière suivante. Le second νοῦς, après avoir créé sa propre idée et le monde, et après l'économie, διοίκησις, se retourne vers le premier Dieu pour le contempler. En somme le ἔπειτα garderait tout le souvenir de toute l'économie du monde. Je rapprocherais ce texte des textes stoïciens concernant la contemplation de Zeus après la fin du monde: par exemple, Sénèque, *epist.* 9, 16: « adquiescit sibi cogitationibus suis traditus ». Ne peut-on interpréter la triade de Numénius comme celle d'un νοῦς qui est presque déjà l'Un plotinien, (je suis d'accord avec vous là-dessus, il n'a pas l'activité de pensée, le mouvement qui sera impliqué par la pensée), et d'un second νοῦς qui est double,

parce que, d'une part, il a un premier mouvement créateur (il crée sa propre idée et celle du monde; il se tourne vers la matière) et qu'il a ensuite une conversion par laquelle il se retourne vers le premier νοῦς. En somme je pense que ἔπειτα peut être gardé et signifie après la fin du monde, après l'économie de toute la nature.

M. Dodds: I did consider carefully the view that you have expressed. I thought it would not do because it implies or appears to imply an interpretation of the *Timaeus* as involving a sequence in time. Other fragments, I think, make it clear that Numenius did not believe, as Plutarch presumably did, in a temporal succession in the *Timaeus*. And if that is so I find it hard to give meaning to the ἔπειτα. This was my main reason for rejecting your view.

M. Hadot: Mais comment peut-on expliquer que le premier νοῦς soit θεωρητικὸς ὅλως? Qu'est-ce qu'il contemple?

M. Dörrie: Darf ich daran erinnern, dass θεωρητικὸς νοῦς bereits ein Fachausdruck ist bei Aristoteles *de Anima* B 3. Da scheidet Aristoteles den νοῦς, wie er sich in den Seelenfähigkeit der Menschen manifestiert, und den θεωρητικὸς νοῦς und erklärt es für unmöglich eine Verbindung zwischen beiden herzustellen; und ich glaube, dass die Scheidung mehrerer Grade des νοῦς durchaus auf diese Anschauung des Aristoteles zurückgeht. Wir müssen also bei der Untersuchung wohl mithören, was Aristoteles an der immer wieder beachteten Stelle sagt. Und der θεωρητικὸς νοῦς ist natürlich derjenige, über den wir in *Metaphysik* Λ 9 ausführlich hören. Also wenn wir die Stelle aristotelisch lieber verstehen dürfen, wäre Ihre Frage beantwortet. Aristoteles sagt, *de Anima* B 2, 413 b 25, dass der auf Abstraktes gerichtete νοῦς für ihn, für Aristoteles, nicht in direkte Verbindung zu bringen ist mit den übrigen νοῦς-haltigen Seelenfähigkeiten des wahren Erkennens, Erinnerns u.s.w. In die Doxographie ging nochmals die Formel ein θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν, was aus der Schrift *gen. animal.* B 3, 736 a 28 und B 6, 744 b 22 herausentwickelt ist. So ist die Scheidung zweier Aspekte des νοῦς bei Aristoteles vorbereitet.

M. Hadot: Oui, mais je ne vois pas pourquoi le premier a besoin du second νοῦς pour penser.

M. Dörrie: Bezieht sich diese Frage auf das ἐν προσχρήσει ?

M. Hadot: C'est le sens de ἐν προσχρήσει qui est en jeu. Parce que, ou bien ce premier νοῦς est un νοῦς aristotélicien qui est un, justement parce qu'il se pense lui-même, pour qui, la pensée de lui-même fait son unité, ou bien alors il est νοῦς pré-plotinien (comme dit Plotin, un νοῦς ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ) donc qui, par lui-même, n'a pas d'objet, donc, qui ne peut pas être θεωρητικός. C'est un νοῦς inconscient, si l'on peut dire.

M. Dodds: We are told by Numenius (fragm. 25) that the second νοῦς creates his own ἰδέα. There you have the reflexive consciousness of the Aristotelian νοῦς contemplating itself. This is quite intelligible. But in what sense the first νοῦς can νοεῖν or can be theoretical, I do not know and possibly Numenius did not know, because, as I tried to point out this morning, Plotin also has very great difficulties in explaining the kind of consciousness which can be attributed to the One. The nearest he can get to describing it is to call it ὑπερνόησις (VI 8, 16), which means nothing. This is a real difficulty in the system of both writers.

M. Hadot: Dans le système de Numénios, le premier νοῦς peut-il être θεωρητικός ?

M. Dodds: It is said to be περὶ τὰ νοητά in Numenius (fragm. 24): ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος περὶ τὰ νοητά. Then there is again the same problem here too: if he is a pure intelligence without object, how can he be περὶ τὰ νοητά ?

M. Hadot: Quel est le sens exact de περὶ ?

M. Dodds: « En relation à ».

M. Hadot: Le περὶ τὰ νοητά καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά laisserait bien entendre que le second νοῦς se tourne vers le sensible et ensuite se retourne vers l'intelligible.

M. Dodds: Tout cela vient de la seconde Lettre de Platon: δεύτερον δὲ περὶ (πέρι?) τὰ δεύτερα (312 e 3, cf. *Enn.* I 8, 2, 31 and V 1, 8, 2).

M. Hadot: Oui, mais c'est l'inverse, parce que, dans la lettre de Platon, ce sont les choses qui sont *autour* du Bien.

P. Henry: Pour vous, *περὶ* est un mouvement descendant ?

M. Hadot: Peut-être veut-il dire « chargé de ». Si le second νοῦς est *περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά*, il connaît les *αἰσθητά*. L'objet de sa pensée sera sensible.

M. Dodds: Yes, and this I think is explained by the doctrine of ἐν προσχρήσει so far as it is explained at all: with the πρόσχρησις of the third God, the second is able to « think » also the sensible things.

M. Hadot: Mais, à ce moment-là, si l'on utilise la notion de ἐν προσχρήσει, le premier νοῦς atteint les νοητά, avec l'aide du second νοῦς. Donc, par lui-même, en lui-même, il n'est pas θεωρητικός.

M. Puech: Il est purement intelligence, c'est un νοητόν et non un νοερόν.

M. Hadot: Il me semble d'ailleurs que M. Dodds l'a dit: « *his distinctive activity must be something other than νόησις proper* ». Je vois dans le second νοῦς une conversion, il est διττός, justement parce qu'il a une conversion; il est tourné d'abord vers les choses sensibles, et ensuite vers les intelligibles. Je crois d'ailleurs que, dans les *Oracles Chaldaïques*, 14 b Kroll, il y a quelque chose de ce genre, le second Dieu a une fonction intellectuelle et une fonction sensible.

M. Theiler: Wir müssen zugestehen, dass die Interpretation von Herrn Hadot möglich ist und eine Änderung bei einem so schwierigen Text, wo wir den Zusammenhang zu wenig kennen, gefährlich ist. Wenigstens den ersten νοῦς des Numenius kann man nicht ganz in die Nähe schon des ἐν des Plotin rücken, das gewiss nicht θεωρητικὸν genannt werden könnte.

P. Henry: You said you were afraid of introducing with ἔπειτα a temporal succession. Couldn't we say that it is used here in a purely logical sense? There would then be no need of emendation. The νοῦς both contemplates and creates, he does one « after » the other, but it really is at the same time.

Plotinus himself, alluding to Plato's expressions (*Enn.* III 5 [50], 9, 24-29; V 1 [10], 6, 19-22) distinguishes «order» of realities and temporal succession.

M. Hadot: Il y a le même problème pour le νοῦς plotinien lui-même qui, par un aspect de lui-même, contemple l'Un, et par un autre, contemple le monde des Idées. On peut dire qu'il peut faire les deux choses à la fois.

M. Dodds: This is a problem of Platonic interpretation, which I think we encounter on a somewhat crude and confused level here in Numenius; we encounter it again on a more subtle and delicate level in Plotinus.

M. Theiler: Ich würde eine rein logische Bedeutung des ἔπειτα annehmen, also «weiterhin» und gar nicht an eine zeitliche Folge denken. Man kann vielleicht noch — ich will Herrn Hadot damit stützen — an den Umfang der θεωρία bei Plotin III 8 erinnern.

M. Armstrong: There is a conception of the relationship of the principles which we encounter in Albinos (and again in Plotinus) which may possibly be relevant here: this is the conception of the first νοῦς (in Albinos) supplying the second with its ideas. The second νοῦς, having been set in order and supplied with its thoughts by the first νοῦς, creates the cosmos, and the first νοῦς, so to speak, creates through it. Plotinus in at least two places, I think, V 9 [5] 3, 26 and II 3 [52] 18, 15, speaks of νοῦς as the true Demiurgos, and he means this in the same sense, that νοῦς supplies Soul, which is of course, the actual making principle in Plotinus, with the λόγοι, the necessary forms for creating the cosmos. Is there perhaps in Numenius some crude and confused form of the doctrine of the co-operation of the two principles, both in thinking, as in Albinos, where the first supplies the second νοῦς with its ideas by directing it towards its own thoughts, and in creating? I do not think that this explanation is quite satisfactory, because of this extraordinary remark that the first νοῦς cannot think without the help of the second. That seems to me peculiar to Numenius, and at present quite impossible to explain, without knowing a little more about his

system. But my suggestion might possibly help to explain how a νοῦς could create, being θεωρητικὸς ὅλως, if it was creating by supplying what Plotinus would have called λόγοι to the Third God. Is that possible?

Another point I should like to make is perhaps simply to underline something already said. I do sometimes find it very difficult to discover any sort of dependable criterion of orientalism in late Greek thinkers, but there was one thing remarked upon in Numenius which seems to me to supply at least a limited and partial criterion. That was the statement preserved by Chalcidius that for Numenius there is evil *in caelo*, in the heavens, and also the suggestion in Macrobius that the second soul that came from the stars was evil. Now that seems to me to be a suggestion that any post-Platonic genuinely Greek thinker would have greeted with cries of horror. The genuine Hellenist, whether Stoic or Platonist, would have absolutely denied that there was evil in the superlunary regions, ἐν οὐρανῶ. That is a region of perfection for all genuine Hellenic thinking. So perhaps we have here at least one indication of non-Hellenic thinking in Numenius, and something which, when it occurs elsewhere, might be taken as a clear indication of non-Hellenic influence, i.e.: the belief in evil in heaven, or in the spheres above the moon. Even Plotinus, who regards the matter of the sense-world as the principle of evil, denies that matter in the heavens is evil (cf. II 9 [33] 8, 35-6).

M. Dodds: And I think this perhaps was in the mind of Proclus when he complains against Numenius that he mixed up Platonism with τὰ γενεθλιαλογικὰ with the doctrine of the astrologers (test. 42 Leemans).

M. Armstrong: Yes, Plotinus argues against it too in εἰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἄστρα (II 3 [52]).

M. Dodds: I think this is a good criterion: perhaps, if I might revert to a point made this morning, I think, by M. Puech, a safer criterion than the one he suggested, namely the separation of the Demiurgos from the First God. That, of course,

is a characteristic of Gnosticism; but one which after all can be rationally if wrongly inferred from some passages in Plato, particularly in the *Timaios*; so I do not feel certain that this is an un-Greek thought. But, that there is evil *in caelo* is, I think, an un-Greek thought.

M. Henry: Est-elle vraiment très répandue chez les Orientaux, l'idée du mal dans le ciel ?

M. Puech: Il y a, au moins, une exception avec les Iraniens. Les manichéens tiennent le soleil et la lune pour bons, contrairement aux planètes. Ils n'en restent pas moins fidèles à la notion de sept planètes mauvaises, quitte à ne pas compter le soleil et la lune au nombre de ces planètes. Mais, en général, pour les gnostiques, tout ce qui est visible et matériel — et, dans le firmament, le στερέωμα — est mauvais. Le κόσμος, pour eux, c'est la totalité des choses visibles comprenant le ciel et la terre. L'exception faite par les manichéens en faveur du soleil et de la lune est conforme à la tradition iranienne. Les gnostiques, eux, opèrent à partir de la vision grecque du monde — d'un monde qui est « ordre » réglé par des lois, c'est-à-dire à leurs yeux, contrainte, esclavage, abaissement insupportable, chose mauvaise en un mot. Aussi, dans leur révolte, condamnent-ils en bloc le κόσμος tout entier, y compris le ciel visible et les sphères planétaires.

M. Harder: Ich denke, dass Herr Armstrong Recht hat, wenn er die Vorstellung, von Himmel könne Böses kommen, als ungriechisch bezeichnet. Ungriechisch ist aber nicht etwa die Astrologie als solche; ungriechisch ist nur der Gedanke, die Sterne könnten Böses verursachen, und gegen solche Vorstellungen wendet sich Plotin in seiner Schrift II 3 [52] εἰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἄστρα.

M. Puech: Il ne faut pas oublier que Numénius, au grand scandale de Proclus, mettait les enfers dans les planètes. Proclus considère que c'est une opinion absurde. Il y a des planètes, comme Arès ou Cronos, qui sont considérées comme maléfi-ques. Pour Proclus (*de Malo*) elles ont un double aspect: elles peuvent être maléfi-ques ou bénéfiques.

M. Theiler: Oder wie dies einmal bei Plotin heisst, dieses Übel, das bis zu einem gewissen Grade auch von Plotin nicht abgeleugnet wird, ist nicht irgendwie auf προαίρεσις, also auf ein böses Wollen der Götter zurückzuführen, sondern liegt in der physikalischen Notwendigkeit; denn Gott kann nur Gutes wollen. Das ist der eigentlich griechische Gedanke seit Platon.

M. Schwyzer: Herr Dodds hat uns mehrfach aufgefordert, mit ihm nicht einverstanden zu sein; aber er hat es uns schwer gemacht, diesem Wunsche nachzukommen. Mir scheint er Plotin etwas zu stark an Numenios herangerückt zu haben, während umgekehrt von Ammonios wenig übrig geblieben ist. Mit seiner Kritik an Heinemann, Seeberg und Langerbeck hat er entschieden Recht, aber auch Dörries Aufsatz ist im Negativen überzeugender als im Positiven. Ammonios scheint sich also in ein Nichts aufzulösen. Demgegenüber darf man aber doch betonen, dass sich eines nicht aus der Welt schaffen lässt, nämlich der in der *Vita Plotini* 3, 13 überlieferte Ausruf Plotins: τοῦτον ἐζήτουν. Plotin stand damals im 28. Lebensjahr; elf Jahre ist er darauf bei diesem Lehrer geblieben. Wer einen Plotin in diesem Alter so lange zu fesseln wusste, muss eine Persönlichkeit von einem erstaunlichen Charisma gewesen sein. Ein Schatten war der historische Ammonios jedenfalls nicht; ein Schatten ist er nur für uns. Herr Dodds hat am Schluss auf die Schrift de Jongs, *Plotinus of Ammonius Saccas*, Leiden, 1941, hingewiesen, wo Ammonios aus Übereinstimmungen zwischen Origenes dem Christen und Plotin zurückgewonnen wird. Dieser Versuch geht allerdings davon aus, dass Porphyrios bei Euseb. *H. E.* VI 19, 6 unsern Ammonios meint, wenn er sagt, Origenes der Christ habe bei ihm gehört. Aber auch wenn diese Nachricht nicht auf unsern Ammonios geht, könnte es sich lohnen, die Untersuchungen de Jongs weiterzutreiben; einige der Übereinstimmungen, die er gefunden hat, sind nämlich überraschend. Ob allerdings bei solchen Parallelen Ammonios herauskommen wird, ist alles andere als sicher. Die Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Origenes dem Christen und Plotin können sich nämlich ebensogut als platonische Schultradition herausstellen.

M. Theiler: Die letzte Bemerkung wird leider sehr ernst zu nehmen sein; es ist mit einem grossen Stück vorneuplatonischer Schultradition zu rechnen, die für Origenes von grösserer Wichtigkeit ist, als Ammonios. Es sei denn, dass Ammonios nur ein Organ dieser Schultradition ist; aber das ist gerade das Unwahrscheinliche. Denn « diesen suchte ich » (*Vita Plotini* 3) lässt erwarten, dass es ein anderer Mann war als die dutzendweise herumlaufenden Philosophen.

M. Harder: Origenes und Plotin sind gleichsam die zwei Fussschenkel des Stammbaums, der bei Ammonios zusammenläuft. Das erhellt aus einer viel zu wenig beachteten Schrift: ich meine die des Gregorios Thaumaturgos — eine Quelle ersten Ranges! Die Parallele zu Plotin liegt auf der Hand; die beiden waren nicht nur Zeitgenossen; auch Gregorius fand einen (nämlich den Origenes), den er zuvor garnicht finden wollte. Davon berichtet die erhaltene Schrift; sie stammt aus dem Archiv des Origenes, ist erhalten bei Eusebios, und ihr liegt die Abschiedsrede zu Grunde, die Gregorios gehalten hat, als er aus dem Unterricht des Origenes ausschied. Das ist nun ein *cursus completus* dessen, was dort gelehrt wurde — und zwar ganz wesentlich Philosophie. Hier kommt viel zum Ausdruck, was Sie, meine Herren, vorplotinisch nennen würden — vieles freilich in banaler Form, denn der Redner ist seiner Aufgabe nicht ganz gewachsen. Aber dessen ungeachtet findet sich hier vieles (sowohl den Umständen nach, wie der Art des Schullebens nach, wie aber auch der Lehre nach), was sich unmittelbar neben Plotin stellen lässt. Und das würde ja nun den Ammonios völlig in den Vorneuplatonismus hineinbeziehen.

M. Theiler: Dann wäre Ammonios auch ein solcher Traditionalist gewesen, was wir nicht gern glauben.

M. Harder: An die Überlieferung haben sich auch Origenes und sein Schüler Gregorios geklammert: Von diesem begeisterten Schüler wird ja immer wieder betont, wie alt das alles ist, was die Lehre umfasst. Im übrigen wird dort das Besondere, das völlig Eigenartige seiner Lehre und seines vorbildlichen Lebens

ganz grossartig geschildert; beide Gesichtspunkte sind durchaus vereinbar.

P. Cilento: Una breve parola ancora su Ammonio: « er ist für uns ein grosser Schatten » (Theiler, *Plotin und die antike Philosophie*, in *Mus. Helv.* I, 215). Quanto al suo insegnamento, che impressionò il giovane Plotino, non possiamo creder né a Ierocle che, ai tempi di Proclo, lo « origenizza », né al vescovo Nemesio di Emesa che lo « noumenizza ». Meglio è, come è stato detto, duplicare Ammonio, anche a costo di darli entrambi maestri ad Origene, il cristiano: avremmo così un Ammonio teologo, quello di Eusebio, e il porfiriano, non scrivente, Ammonio, una specie di Socrate alessandrino, l'Uomo che Plotino finalmente trovò. Come nel caso dei due Origene — che Cadiou vuole ancora ridurre a una sola persona e Daniélou giustamente distingue — a me sembra di vedere in tali problemi che la storia rinnova sempre senza risolvere mai, il passaggio insensibile delle dottrine e delle fedi in cui è il fascino più grande del neoplatonismo. Ond'è che si arriva dall'uno all'altro Ammonio, dall'uno all'altro Origene, o, per estrema concessione, dall'uno all'altro momento dello stesso unico Ammonio o, più difficilmente, dello stesso, unico Origene, nella continuità dialettica della umana daimonia: *desinunt ista, non pereunt*. In questo senso e in questo limite accetto la parola « Wundermann » che corre, espressa o rifiutata nel confronto di Ammonio, nel dialogo Dodds-Dörrie. Ammonio è, sì, un « uomo meraviglioso », ma solo teoricamente tale, nell'ambito della « Contemplazione » e della « Daimonia » plotiniana. Occorre staccare questa meravigliosa umana saggezza dalla pratica teurgica, ierofantica, popolare. Mi ripugna credere che si tratti di un autore di prodigi sul tipo di Apollonio di Tiana. Come l'avrebbe potuto e cercare e trovare e amare Plotino, ch'è così severo nel voler restare sempre entro i limiti dell'umanità e del pensiero e che perciò rimprovera agli gnostici quel loro ἔξω νοῦ πεσεῖν? Ho sempre trovato un contrasto tra la parola severa delle *Enneadi* — in cui è la verace vita di Plotino — e la *Vita Plotini*, in cui è piuttosto la mente, già un po' superstiziosa

e perciò predisposta al futuro fanatismo anticristiano di Porfirio. Non mi riferisco naturalmente a Porfirio filologo che rispetto; e non sospetto neppure di Porfirio come storico. Temo solo le sue interpretazioni e i suoi giudizi. E la storia è giudizio. Quanto a Numenio, io sono d'accordo con le conclusioni di Puech nel suo *Numénius et les théologies orientales au II^e siècle (Mélanges Bidez, Bruxelles 1934, II, pp. 746-778)*.

M. Theiler: Pater Cilento hat mit südlicher Wärme gesprochen, gleichsam ein Genosse von Ammonios und von Plotin, der ungefähr in seiner Vaterstadt eine Platonopolis gründen wollte. Irgendwie ist also der Geist dieser Alten noch lebendig bei ihm am Golf von Neapel. Nun es ist auch meine Meinung, und sie ist so schon zum Ausdruck gekommen, dass Plotin ein Eiland ist, das im Strom des so merkwürdigen gnostischen Geistes herausragt, und dass etwa Porphyrios nach dem Tode des Plotin gleichsam in diesen Strom zurückgesunken ist. Das Letzte konnte nicht einmal der nächste Schüler des Plotin ganz verstehen, und möglicherweise verstehen wir es besser, als selbst ein Porphyrios. Ja die Art, wie auch sonst die Schüler, Amelios und andere, das Erbe Plotins weiterverwalteten, ist nicht einnehmend für den Geist dieser Epigonen. Es liegt in Plotin etwas Besonderes, der Zeit im letzten Sinn nicht voll Verständliches. Die Zeit schätzte zwar die Philosophie als den Weg zur Reinheit und Gottbeschauung in Konkurrenz mit der bestenfalls noch etwas tieferen Theurgie und Magie, wie das etwa bei Jamblich in Erscheinung tritt. Bei Plotin fassen wir ein leise herablassendes Dulden dieser Praktiken in seinem Kreise: sie zu pflegen ist immer noch besser als Materialist zu sein. Im ganzen stand er darüber. Um gewisse Erscheinungen zu deuten, braucht er zwar den Ausdruck Magie öfters auch, aber in einem viel wissenschaftlicherem Sinne, der auf ältere griechische Behandlung der Probleme zurückweist. Ich glaube, die klare Abtrennung des Ammonios von Geistern wie Apollonios von Tyana ist durchaus berechtigt und meine zu hören, dass Herr Dörrie die einst etwas bewusst übersteigerte Auffassung des Ammonios als eines Wundermanns nicht mehr so

aufrecht hält. Ein grosser Mann wird Ammonios gewesen sein, wie auch Plotin, von den meisten nicht voll verstanden.

P. Henry: Dans les discussions de ce matin et dans celles de cet après-midi, on a cité le fameux passage de Plotin de V 4 [7], 2, 18 sur la συναίσθησις: on a souligné deux fois que c'est un passage des premiers traités, et M. Schwyzer a apporté au dossier V 1 [10], 7, 12, également un des tout premiers traités. Mais l'expression que M. Dodds a citée, ὑπερνόησις, se trouve dans VI 8 [39], 16, c'est-à-dire un traité de la maturité. J'admets bien qu'il vient dans un passage qui est considéré par Plotin comme incorrect. Mais, quand vous analysez les deux passages VI 8, 16 et V 4,2 parallèlement vous voyez qu'ils sont rédigés tous les deux avec la même précision, avec l'adjonction du correctif οἶον et en VI 8, 16 avec le rappel que l'Un est au-dessus de l'Être et de la Pensée. Je ne crois donc pas que l'on puisse faire de cette idée d'une certaine conscience de l'Un, un reste de l'influence de Numénius, dont Plotin se serait détaché plus tard; je ne crois donc pas qu'il y ait lieu de voir ici un développement chronologique de la pensée de Plotin.

M. Dodds: I do not disagree. But I suppose that in a way the ghost of Numenius haunted Plotinus all his life because they were the same unsettled and in the end insoluble problems which both men had attempted to deal with. And this is one of them, this question of the kind of consciousness one can assign to the highest God.

P. Henry: A mon avis VI 8, 16 est l'équivalent de V 4, 2. Ὑπερνόησις de VI 8 correspond à peu près à V 4, 2, 18 ἐν νοήσει ἐτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν, de même ἐγρήγορσις de VI 8 à συναίσθησις de V 4. Et même, des deux côtés, nous avons l'identité de l'acte et du sujet, en VI 8 ἐγρήγορσις οὐκ ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος comme en V 4 ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτό. Dans les deux textes il y a le même οἶον, l'un devant συναίσθησις, l'autre devant ἐγρήγορσις. Et, dans le passage de VI 8, dans un passage déclaré incorrect et non technique, tout de suite après l'image du « réveil » et de l'« hyperconscience » il y a la reprise

du thème classique de la *via negativa* et de l'absolue transcendance: ἡ δὲ ἐγρήγορσις ἐστὶν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἔμφορος. Je crois donc que les deux textes, chronologiquement distants et dont l'un serait correct, l'autre non, nous présentent en fait la même technique.

M. Theiler: Wir müssen da Herrn Schwyzers Vortrag erwarten.

P. Henry: Oui, mais je le signalais ici parce que nos discussions auraient pu donner l'impression que V 4, 2 et V 1, 7 contenaient un reste de théories de Numénius, que Plotin aurait ensuite abandonnées. Je ne crois pas que ce soit exact.

M. Dodds: Even granting that one could discover some residuum of matter common to Plotinus and Origen and apparently absent from earlier tradition, we have still to reckon with possible lost sources. I think that any one who undertakes this comparison must also compare Porphyry's list of authors read in the seminar of Plotinus with his list of those whom in his opinion Origen the Christian had read (*apud* Eus., H. E., 6, 19,8); the two lists have names in common, notably Numenius. An example will make the point clear. M. Puech suggested that we could infer something for Ammonius' theology from the fact that Origen calls God *μονὰς ἡ νοῦς*. But both these terms are applied to the First God by Numenius; and Origen had certainly read Numenius, whom he cites several times. I do not see how to decide whether Origen's source here is Ammonius or Numenius or both. — As to the conflict of evidence between Porphyry and Eusebius about Ammonius and Origen (H. E. 6, 19), more than one solution of this puzzle is in principle possible. In a note to my paper (p. 30 n. 1) I have stated what seems to me the simplest and most economical hypothesis; but I recognise that more complicated theories, including that of Mr. Dörrie, cannot be excluded.

As to Numenius and Plotinus, I set out to find connecting links, with the result that I have perhaps a little overstressed the relationship and not said enough about the differences. Mr. Theiler put his finger on one very important difference, namely that so

far as we know Numenius is quite without the characteristic Plotinian movement of *πρόοδος* and *ἐπιστροφή*. Of course Numenius may have had it; we judge him from fragments. But it is missing in what we know of him, so that to us his system appears relatively dead and static, whereas that of Plotinus pulses with a peculiar and characteristic life. Nevertheless there is sufficient evidence that Plotinus had read Numenius rather carefully (as is indeed obvious from the *Vita*), and also that in his early work he starts from an interpretation of the *Timaeus* which is not very different from that of Numenius, though he later abandoned it.

I gathered that Mr. Puech would now be willing to describe the *περὶ τᾶγαθοῦ* of Numenius as a «pagan gnosis». My own feeling is that this is a little onesided. It leaves out of account the strong Pythagorean element in Numenius: he proclaims Pythagoras as his master (test. 30, fragm. 1 Leemans), and the earlier authors who quote him always refer to him as «the Pythagorean». And I feel there is a very great difference in style between the works of Numenius and such Gnostic writings as I have come across. Numenius seems to me to write as a professor of Greek philosophy; if occasionally he breaks into a passage such as the one I compared with the Chaldaean oracle, this at once strikes the reader as exceptional. In the *περὶ τᾶγαθοῦ* he follows the tradition of the Greek philosophical dialogue; and his other work, the lectures on the history of Platonism, is quite clearly a professorial course with the usual professorial jokes. In neither do we find the atmosphere of private revelation that one senses in most Gnostic works. Of course the Gnostic influence is there; but I should have called it, on the whole, a marginal influence.

