

The idea of the unity of mankind

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V

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The Idea of the Unity of Mankind

THE IDEA OF THE UNITY OF MANKIND

THE title of this paper is rather different in character and range from the rest of our series. I think I should begin by trying to explain what I mean by it, and what I conceive to be its relevance to our theme. We are concerned in these discussions with a variety of factors which influenced and shaped the attitude of the Greeks towards foreign peoples. One factor of some importance in the picture—how much importance, remains to be seen—was awareness of the idea of the unity of mankind as a whole, realisation of the existence of a single human race embracing Greek and foreigner alike. The history of the concept of the unity of mankind does therefore deserve a place in our deliberations; but having said this much to justify my presence here, let me hasten to add that I propose to treat this vast subject only from one point of view, concentrating on those aspects of the idea of human unity which did have some effect on Greek thinking about the non-Greek world.

To limit my task still further, may I say that I shall confine most of my attention to the emergence of the idea as it appears in documentary evidence. I shall not attempt to play the hazardous game of inferring beliefs from events, nor shall I have much to say about the influence of events on the development of thought. Perhaps this is the point at which I should admit that one figure who has occupied the centre of the stage in some dramatic accounts of my theme in recent years—I refer, of course, to Alexander the Great—will play only a minor part in my version of the matter. Time is too short for me to discuss here the pros and cons of Alexander Philosophus, once championed by Plutarch and resurrected in modern times by Sir William Tarn. I can only state my view that of the three kinds of argument put forward in favour of his existence, none is effective. The documentary evidence cited by Tarn and

others seems to me to contain no proof that Alexander held any conscious belief in the unity of mankind; none of his actions necessarily implies it; and in the general history of the idea, as I see it, there is no gap towards the end of the fourth century B.C. which only he can fill, no sudden leap forward which only he could have made. His achievements did of course have their effect on the growth and spread of the concept of unity; and on the importance and extent of their influence I shall have more to say later. But Alexander the originator or conscious champion of the notion of universal human brotherhood will not appear in my account again.

The idea of the unity of man, as a doctrine clearly realised and explicitly stated, is not prominent in the documents surviving from Greek antiquity. It was never a central issue in Greek thought, as it is in our own. We take as a self-evident fact the existence of the human race as a distinct species, an aggregate made up of individuals whose present numbers are approximately known; and with almost equal readiness most of us draw the inference that between all these representatives of *homo sapiens* there is some sort of kinship or fellowship which should influence their behaviour towards each other. Other circumstances of our age—awareness of the benefits of international cooperation, fear of the dire consequences of conflict—press the concept of unity constantly on our attention and urge us on in the painful struggle towards fulfilment of the ideal of unity in practice. Among the Greeks both knowledge of the material facts of the human situation and compelling force of circumstances were lacking. In so far as the idea of the unity of mankind did develop among them, it arose incidentally and in spite of the Greek environment. Hence it is not surprising that there is no single Greek word or phrase to cover my theme. Various words — *ὁμόνοια* and *φιλανθρωπία*, for example — were important at different

stages in its history; but this is not a subject which one can deal with by the comparatively straightforward and comfortable process of collecting the instances and tracing the changing usage of this or that Greek term. What I am concerned with is the more complex problem of the emergence of an attitude of mind, which arose in a variety of forms describable in a variety of ways. The process was a far more gradual and complicated one than has sometimes been supposed. The concept of the unity of mankind has been treated as a doctrine « discovered » by a single individual, and variously attributed to Antiphon, Alexander, Zeno, and other rival claimants. But the history of thought is not so simple. After all, even the use of the word *ἄνθρωπος* implies some underlying notion, however unrealised, of a unified type to which the word refers. Even in Homer a sense of human unity, transcending differences of language, is already strongly present as something felt—a product, perhaps we may say, of the poetical imagination, though not yet a reasoned belief. Between this beginning and the conception of mankind which we find in Cicero lies a long and involved chain of development, revealed in many documents, philosophical and otherwise.

A single paper on so complex a subject must omit much, and simplify the rest to the point of distortion. I shall do my best to select those points which bring out what seems to me to be the main framework of the story—always, of course, with a particular eye to its relevance to our theme of the picture of foreign peoples in Greek literature.

* * *

I will say something first of the period down to about 400 B.C., hoping to be forgiven if this involves me in some very wide generalities, and in going over some ground which the preceding papers have already covered. During this time of the rise and consolidation of the city-state the

main emphasis in Greek thought about mankind falls on the very opposite of the idea of unity. What stands out, in contrast with the comparative homogeneity of human life in Homer, is increasing awareness of its diversity—not only the differences between the Greek cities, but all the variations of appearance, language and custom recorded by Hecataeus and Herodotus; and of course from the time of the Persian Wars, as Herr Diller has emphasised, we find that across the whole picture runs the deep dividing line between Hellene and «barbarian».

Nevertheless, among a minority we can trace some growth of the conception of the unity of all mankind, no longer as an unreasoned assumption or as a fruit of the poetical imagination, but as a product of conscious rational thought.

There were two routes by which the idea could be reached, distinguishable from each other, though both leading to the same result. One was awareness of the human race as an aggregate, the sum total of all individual men; a notion which we may perhaps call human geography, a commonplace in our thinking today. Such an approach is implied, no doubt, in the world maps of Anaximander and Hecataeus. A map shows the different sections of mankind; but it brings them together as well as setting them apart, and its maker must have seen the inhabited world as a single entity. As Herr Diller pointed out, the same assumption underlies the work of Herodotus, though it is difficult to know how far this implication took definite shape in his mind.

I shall return to this line of thought later, when it figures more prominently in our evidence. In the period down to the end of the fifth century it is easier to find indications of the conception of man as a *specific* being, a distinct type with certain typical characteristics that mark him off from gods on the one hand and from animals on

the other. In a sense this idea of humanity existed from the earliest times: it is implied, as I have said, in the use of the word ἄνθρωπος, and taken for granted in the Homeric picture of human life. But it is after Homer, and especially in the fifth century, that we can trace conscious formulation of the notion of the species man, although some of the main features ascribed to him are already familiar from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

Obviously, man is separated from other types by physical characteristics. One thinks of the helplessness of the species in Anaximander's strange picture of its origins (12 A 10); or of Anaxagoras' remarkable statement that man is the wisest of living creatures « because he has hands » (59 A 102). But much more prominent in the Greek mind than any physical feature was the gift we may briefly call λόγος: man's possession of articulate speech, and hence of reason. Man is, above all, a talking and reasoning animal. In Homer men had been αὐδήεντες. The importance of λόγος as the common, unifying attribute of all men is repeatedly apparent in later literature: in Heraclitus, for example; or in Alcmaeon's « only man understands, while the rest perceive without understanding » (24 A 5); or in Protagoras' myth with its distinction between man and τὰ ἄλογα (Pl. *Prot.* 321 c). Through his physical abilities and still more through his gift of λόγος, man has the further distinction of possession of the τέχναι, the crafts which are the means to material civilisation. This thought again was already latent in Homer's σῖτον ἔδοντες — not eaters of grass, like grazing animals, nor of raw meat, like the Cyclops, but « men that eat bread », beings skilled in the growing and use of grain. There is no need to point to the numerous fifth century pictures of man as master of the civilised arts — in the *Prometheus Vincit*, for example, or the ode on the wonders of man in the *Antigone*, or once more in the myth of Protagoras.

To physique, λόγος and τέχνηαι we may add one more distinguishing feature of man as the Greeks saw him: αἰδώς, δίκη, the acceptance of a common standard which is the spiritual basis of human civilisation. Hesiod had used this criterion to mark off man from the animals (*Op.* 276-280):

«For the son of Kronos fixed this law for men, that fish and beasts and birds should devour one another, since there is no δίκη in them; but to men he gave δίκη, which is far the best.»

Out of this line of thought comes a further conception which runs right through Greek thinking about the human situation, from Homer's picture of the Cyclops to Cicero's *humanitas*: the idea that only those who *are* civilised, who accept the implications of αἰδώς and δική, are truly human and can rightly be called «men».

These are some of the ways in which man appears as a distinct type in the literature of the fifth century and earlier. How far had such ideas led the Greeks by 400 B.C. towards a clear grasp of the concept of the unity of mankind?

The answer is, I think, that in the closing decades of the fifth century, when the traditional pattern of divisions between men was increasingly called in question, we find a good deal of evidence for growing awareness in many quarters—though still, no doubt, only among a minority—of the idea that all men, Greek and non-Greek, are members of a single human race. It occurs here and there in the dramatists: to quote only one example, in a choral fragment from the *Alexander* of Euripides¹, which develops denial of the importance of high birth into a striking assertion of the single origin and nature of mankind:

ὁμοίαν χθῶν ἅπασιν ἐξεπαίδευσεν ὄψιν.
ἴδιον οὐδὲν ἔχομεν...

¹ Nauck² Eur. 52.

The same view is voiced by the Sophists, notably of course by Antiphon in his double attack on divisions within society and between Greek and non-Greek. His appeal is to a universal physical characteristic: « we all breathe into the air through mouth and nostrils » (87 B 44). Thucydides has a place in the same picture, for his historical thinking, as Professor Jaeger has written, « is founded on the assumption that there is such a thing as ‘ human nature ’, always and everywhere the same ». ¹ Most important source of all, however, for this period is one with which both Antiphon and Thucydides have much in common: the works of the medical writers, whose evidence on this, as on some other subjects, has not received all the attention it deserves.

The character of the species man, physical and otherwise, is the doctor's natural concern. How widespread discussion of the subject became at this time is reflected at the beginning of the compilation included in the *Hippocratic Corpus* under the title Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου, in paragraphs which probably date from the closing decades of the fifth century: in pouring scorn on rival theorists the author shows incidentally that his theme is a regular topic for public debate. The breadth of the view of humanity which some medical men now formed is clearly implied in comments on their work and the diseases they had to treat, only one or two of which I can cite here. Thus the writer of *Prognostic*, probably Hippocrates himself, points out that the same symptoms have the same meaning everywhere:

« It must be clearly realised with regard to symptoms, certain and otherwise, that in every year and every region bad signs have a bad significance and good ones a favourable implication; for the symptoms mentioned above prove valid in Libya, in Delos, and in Scythia (25). » Similarly the author of *On Airs, Waters, Places*, who includes within his scope Asiatics and North Africans and peoples

¹ *Paideia*, III, 6, Eng. tr.

on the fringe of the known world, believes in a single basic human φύσις which takes on varying characteristics according to the environment in which it is placed; and he makes it clear that where the division of mankind on these rational lines cuts across the categories of current prejudice, the latter are to be thrust aside.

* * *

If by about 400 B.C. some Greek writers had advanced so far towards realisation of the unity of mankind, it might well be expected that during the next century, with further growth of knowledge of the outside world, the concept must have spread far more widely, and that after the conquests of Alexander it must have become a commonplace. Yet if my reading of the evidence is correct, the growth and extension of such ideas was slow: even after Alexander, they were by no means so highly developed or so generally accepted as is sometimes supposed.

It is true that the conception of the human race as a distinct species, differentiated from others by physical characteristics and above all by λόγος, was elaborated and more explicitly stated by Aristotle¹; and that between all members of the species Aristotle saw a bond of φιλία — a belief in which he was followed by Theophrastus. True, again, that attribution of the common gift of λόγος to all men is a basic assumption for Isocrates, in spite of his emphasis on the cleavage between Greek and barbarian. True, also, that Plato, especially in the later dialogues, shows much more awareness of the idea of humanity as a single whole than is commonly ascribed to him. Nevertheless, the unity of mankind cannot be said to occupy more than a very minor place in Greek thought in the fourth century or even, as I shall argue, in the third. It may be, of course, that the evidence for the time of the Peloponnesian War is

¹ *E. N.*, VIII, 1155 a, 16-22.

deceptive: much of it comes from the medical writers and those close to them, and their views may be untypical, giving us an exaggerated impression of the spread of such ideas in their time. One can all too easily overestimate the importance of beliefs expressed by a small intellectual minority, while forgetting that the majority found it difficult to see beyond the horizon of the πόλις or to overcome the limitations that slavery and other facts of their life imposed upon their sight. But I think it can also be said that in the fourth and third centuries the minds of those capable of a wider vision were dominated by two strains of thought which overshadowed the concept of mankind as a whole.

One of these was Pan-Hellenism, now more consciously realised, more positive, and in some minds more aggressive than before. In a sense this was a tendency towards a wider unity, but it also deepened the dividing line between Greek and «barbarian»; and the shift of view which now saw the antithesis as one between cultures rather than between races, bringing some foreigners by birth on to the Greek side of the fence, did little as yet to weaken the division itself. The outstanding spokesman of this outlook in the fourth century is of course Isocrates, and to show that he is no isolated exception there is the fifth book of the *Republic* and the *Menexenus*. After Alexander far be it from me to attempt to sum up in a single sentence the relationship between Greeks and the rest; but I take it to be largely true that the old antithesis persisted in a new form, setting those who shared the Hellenic language, education and mode of life apart from those who did not. The unity of the Hellenistic world was to a large extent a projection outwards of the unity of Greece, not a unification of mankind.

The second dominating line of thought which I have in mind is one perhaps less obviously relevant to my theme, but of the greatest importance, as I see it, in an analysis of

the development of the Greek view of mankind. I refer to that contrast between wisdom and folly, that conception of an aristocracy of the wise, which goes back at least to Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans and runs through all Greek thinking, but becomes especially predominant in the fourth and third centuries B.C.

In spite of all the emphasis we may place today on Greek democracy, the view of mankind we find in most Greek literature is—let us face it—aristocratic. From Homer onwards, the high are sharply distinguished from the low, the worthy from the worthless, οἱ σπουδαῖοι from οἱ φαῦλοι. Philosophy, embodied most strikingly in the person of Socrates, rejected the commonly accepted criteria of superiority, birth and wealth, but substituted another—true wisdom; and on this new basis the division between σπουδαῖοι and φαῦλοι was retained, more definitely and firmly established even than before. Men might all possess rationality, λόγος, but more important than this uniting factor was the gulf between those who made right use of it and those who did not. As Plato saw them, they were worlds apart—all the distance between « those who can apprehend the eternal and unchanging and those who are lost in the mazes of multiplicity and change ».¹ For others who also looked back to Socrates, the Cynics and, I believe, the early Stoics, the antithesis was equally strong.

To all this there was a corollary: not unity of all men, but unity of the wise; the conception of an aristocracy of the possessors of wisdom which transcends the normal barriers between human beings, bringing within the same circle rich and poor, man and woman, Greek and foreigner, perhaps even free man and slave. If the evidence is to be believed (and some of it, perhaps, should not be), this idea was by no means new in the fourth century. It had existed

¹ *Resp.*, 484 b, tr. Cornford.

among the Pythagoreans, and finds expression in the fragments of Euripides and Democritus¹; but only in the fourth century does it begin to find a prominent place in Greek thought.

* * *

With this background in mind, and with apologies for the sweeping generalities in which I have been indulging, I will now turn to what might well be regarded as my proper field of interest in this paper: those fourth and third century thinkers who are usually considered to be the earliest proponents of «cosmopolitanism» and upholders of the unity of mankind. In the first place, the Cynics.

For the Cynics, the antithesis between wisdom and folly is clearly a fundamental principle. I will not put myself in the camp of the foolish by attempting now to deal with the problems of the evidence for Cynic thought; but however we answer them, this point stands out. It is the wise man, in contrast with the unwise majority, who follows nature, instead of convention, and so transcends the conventional divisions between human beings. We need have little doubt, I think, that among the barriers which his wisdom overcomes is the contrast between Greek and non-Greek, although the evidence for this is slight. It is significant that Menippus was a slave of Phoenician descent.

This, surely, is the key to the so-called «cosmopolitanism» of the Cynics. Zeller and others, drawing what seems to me to be a false inference from a well-known passage of Plutarch to which I shall return later, ascribed to Diogenes and his fellow-Cynics the vision of «all mankind living together like a flock», «an all-embracing society of all men».² Similar conclusions have been inferred from Diogenes Laertius' statement (VI, 63) that Diogenes the Cynic described himself as *κοσμοπολίτης* in answer to the

¹ Iamblichus, *Vita Pythagorae* 237 (58 D 7); Nauck² Eur. 902; Dem. *Fr.* 247. ² *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, 275.

question where he came from or—probably a variant of the same story—declared *μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ* (VI, 72). Personally I do not believe that these phrases, even if they are correctly attributed to Diogenes, imply anything like a doctrine of the unity or brotherhood of all mankind. *Κόσμος* means the universe, the whole of nature, not mankind or the areas inhabited by man, and *κοσμοπολίτης* is a long way from «cosmopolitan»: far from suggesting that the Cynic is at home in every city, it implies that he is indifferent to them all. Independent of all the local affiliations of ordinary men, the wise man admits allegiance only to the universe. He is a vagabond with no fixed abode, and Nature is his only address. The Cynic's ideal is perhaps best preserved for us in the verses of Crates (Diog. Laert. VI, 85). Lying like an island of wisdom in the midst of the fog of folly and conceit in which most men live, it is no community at all, but *Πήρη*, the philosopher's own knapsack, symbol of that self-sufficiency through which he is independent of all communities.

In a sense, of course, the wise man has fellow-citizens—other wise men, fellow-bearers of the knapsack; so that Crates of Thebes can describe himself as a fellow-citizen of Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. VI, 93), and equally, no doubt, of a wise man of Persian or Indian or Egyptian blood. Scattered over the world though they may be, the wise form together a well-knit unity; but this united *πολιτεία* of men of wisdom is nothing like an all-embracing society of all mankind, or the doctrine of «mankind living together like a flock». If it can be described as a state at all, it is a super-state, a state outside all states, the members of which are cut off from the mass of humanity. The frontiers are transcended by a few, but not abolished for all. It is true that the Cynics regarded themselves as benefactors, like Heracles, of the rest of mankind, and Crates especially seems to have achieved a reputation for *φιλανθρωπία*, which it is

difficult to reconcile with the ideal of self-sufficiency. But this *φιλανθρωπία*, finding expression in the healing of individual souls, was a minor aspect compared with the great cleavage which the Cynics saw between the few wise men and the many fools who form the rest of the human race.

* * *

From the Cynics it is easy to pass straight to Zeno. But on the way I must pause to speak further of Alexander—not about his alleged dream of world brotherhood, but about the effect of his actions on Greek thought. It is often said that after his conquests, as never before, the time was ripe for the spread of belief in the unity of mankind: even those who do not attribute such ideas to Alexander claim that they emerged in the decades after his death, and were part of the « climate of thought » which his achievements created.

The situation that he bequeathed to his successors was not, of course, one of any lasting unity. On the contrary, its multiple divisions and conflicts, military and political, were probably the more obvious feature to the Greeks of the day. Nevertheless, two lessons stand out which they might have learnt from his achievements. His conquests and explorations brought an enormous extension of geographical knowledge, making far more definite, for those who had eyes to see it, the picture of the *οἰκουμένη* as a single geographical whole made up of many parts. Secondly, there was the lesson in race relations. Obviously there was food for deep thought for the Greek mind in the thoroughly un-Greek attitude which this Macedonian adopted towards « barbarians » who had other gods and spoke other tongues, treating at least one « barbarian » nation as equal to his own, and through inter-marriage and other means involving Greeks as well as Macedonians in a mixing of peoples which cut right across the prejudices that most Greeks had accepted for so long.

Taken together, the extension of the geographical horizon and *Verschmelzungspolitik* were enough to inspire some radical rethinking about the nature of mankind—if the Greeks had been willing pupils. Notoriously, however, they were not. While those with Alexander were outraged by measures like *προσκύνησις*, the vast majority of the Greeks at home turned their backs on him and his achievements. Their lack of interest in him after his death is clear from the pattern of our sources of information about him, which presents us, once we have passed the work of his own associates, with a long period of hostility, and still more of neglect.

The philosophers were no exception to this general picture of failure to grasp the importance of Alexander. The Peripatetic school was of course bitterly antagonistic towards him because of the execution of Callisthenes. But the other schools were also either hostile or indifferent. It is significant that the early Stoics and Epicureans took little interest in geography, in spite of the vast range of geographical knowledge which Alexander had opened up: there is no sign that this enlargement of the known world had much meaning for Epicurus or Zeno or Chrysippus. The truth is rather, as I see it, that although it would be foolish to belittle the impact of Alexander's conquests on the Greek mind, it was neither so immediate nor so revolutionary as is often supposed. All his transformation of the world did not prevent the two strains of thought which I have emphasised in the fourth century from continuing to dominate the Greek attitude towards mankind in the third: the cultural cleavage between Hellenic and alien standards and ways; and the antithesis between wisdom and folly, between the universal kinship of the wise and the divided and strife-ridden mass of the great majority of men.

This seems to me to be the position reflected in the documentary evidence, including our latest source of information—Menander. The general idea of a common human-

ity, summed up in the famous line of Terence's *Heautontimorumenos* (77), was evidently a prominent feature of Menander's plays. It reappears in the *Dyskolos*, which might be said to have for its underlying theme the need for εὐνοια among men. Cnemon is ἀπάνθρωπος τις ἄνθρωπος (6), a notable addition to the list, headed by the Cyclops, of those figures in Greek literature who stand apart from civilised society and are regarded as scarcely human at all. Yet we must be careful not exaggerate or misjudge the conception of human society implied in the *Dyskolos* or our other remains. Menander is not thinking of a world-wide community of which the Greeks and Greek civilisation, alongside others, are a part, but rather of the need among all men for the ideals of Hellenism, of which εὐνοια is one. There is nothing in the *Dyskolos* that looks beyond Attica, and when Onesimus in the *Epitrepontes* (875-886) pictures a thousand cities, it is doubtful whether his vision extends beyond Greece. Even in the fragment (533 K) which most strikingly transcends racial barriers the speaker is saying in effect: « See how Greek these 'barbarians' can be »:

ὅς ἂν εὔ γεγονῶς ἦ τῆ φύσει πρὸς τάγαθά,
 καὶν Αἰθίοψ ἦ, μῆτερ, ἐστὶν εὐγενής.
 Σκύθης τις; ὄλεθρος· ὁ δ' Ἀνάχαρσις οὐ Σκύθης;

It is significant that Anacharsis was a *Hellenised* Scythian sage.

What we find in Menander, I suggest, is an outlook on humanity broad in its disregard of division according to birth and race, yet still limited in that it sees Greek ways and ideals as the bond of unity. There is clear evidence here of a shift of attitude, but it is a change of emphasis within the same framework of ideas which we find, for example, in Euripides, not a sudden or radical transformation of the Greek approach to the outside world.

* * *

Turning once more to the philosophic schools, I must refrain from any lengthy discussion of the well-known passage of Theophrastus which Bernays unearthed in Porphyry's *De Abstinencia* (II, 22), remarking only that I see no more in it than an elaboration of Aristotle's account of the spread of *φιλία* outwards from the family to the whole human species: Theophrastus, in carrying its extension still further to include the animals, puts less emphasis than the Aristotelian version on the unity of the human race.

I will pass even more briefly over the Epicureans, who combined practical brotherhood of the wise, transcending all conventional barriers, with the theoretical denial of any general principle of human kinship. Where time is short I must concentrate on the Stoics, for it is among them, if anywhere in this period, that others have found a doctrine of the unity of mankind. There can be no doubt that the notion of human unity, based on man's common possession of reason, was implicit in Stoicism from the first. The problem that now confronts us is how far this implication was explicitly realised and stated by the early Stoics, how far it was elaborated and what emphasis it received. In Cicero, Seneca and other later writers the concept is of course explicit enough: the world is now seen as a single community, in which the common gift of reason makes all men kin. Many modern writers have ascribed such ideas in their full and explicit form to Zeno, seeing the rejection of all barriers and the championship of human brotherhood as the proclaimed doctrine of the Stoic school from its earliest days. If this is correct, the decades after Alexander's death did indeed see a radical change in Greek thought about mankind. But it seems to me highly questionable whether any such explicit doctrine of human unity was ever formulated by Zeno.

The key document in this connection must have been Zeno's *Πολιτεία*, one of our most tantalising losses from

the philosophical literature of antiquity. I have tried elsewhere to reconstruct from the scanty evidence some idea of the probable contents of this work.¹ If my conclusions are on the right lines, Zeno certainly put forward the idea of a unified society, and carried it to extraordinary lengths. Unity, concord, freedom from internal strife was the basic principle of his Utopia, embodied in its organisation, consolidated by the worship of Ἐρως, and the main purpose of its various rules of life. To ensure harmony and friendship throughout the community there were to be no families, no differences of clothing. Cities—for Zeno did not limit his ideal to a single πόλις, or make it of any particular size—were to lack temples, law-courts, gymnasia, all the buildings and institutions which gave individuality and distinction to the Greek city-state. I have no doubt that the instruments of war and private ownership of goods were to disappear as well.

Unity is the central feature of this remarkable society. But unity for whom? Whom did Zeno have in mind as its citizens? This is the vital question for our purpose, and it is one on which there has been much dispute. Controversy has been chiefly concerned with the problem of the relation of Zeno's concept to the division between the wise and the unwise. While some have followed Zeller in regarding Zeno's ideal as a «polity of the wise»², others claim that both wise and foolish were included, although only the wise may have been citizens in the fullest sense; and that Zeno was therefore putting forward the idea of a unified community embracing all humanity, a world-state.

To me it seems clear that Zeller was right. There can be no doubt that the early Stoics laid great stress on the cleavage between the few possessors of true wisdom and the folly of the mass of mankind. The distinction is one

¹ *J. H. S.* 1959, 3-15. ² *Philos. d. Gr.* III 1, 302.

of the main themes of Cleanthes' *Hymn*, and must certainly have played a major part in Zeno's thought; and we are told that in the Πολιτεία itself he emphasised one particular aspect of it—that only the wise, who through their wisdom are the good, are capable of concord and unity (Diog. Laert. VII, 32-33). This appears to me decisive for our problem. On the one hand, harmony and friendship is the first essential for the members of the ideal state. On the other hand, only the wise and good are capable of living in harmony: the unwise inevitably turn to conflict. The conclusion seems to be inescapable. Plato had included the δημιουργοί in his Utopia as an inferior class, because he believed they would contentedly accept their part in the whole. Zeno rejected this belief that those whose souls are not governed by reason could be free from strife, and regarded inclusion of the unwise, even with inferior status, as impossible. His ideal was a one-class, or classless, society, attaining unity through uniformity. The common denominator of its citizens was not mere rationality, in which all human beings have some share, but wisdom. Like the Epicurean circle of friends, with which Zeno's Utopia had not a little in common, they might be drawn from any of the accepted divisions of the human race—men or women, free men or slaves, Greeks or barbarians; but wisdom they must have.

There is one passage concerned with the Πολιτεία which I have not yet discussed, although I mentioned it in connection with the Cynics, and rejected Zeller's conclusion from it for reasons which will, I think, become apparent. It is the most frequently quoted account of Zeno's ideal, drawn from Plutarch's rhetorical essay *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* (I, 6):

Indeed the Πολιτεία of Zeno, founder of the Stoic school, which is thought so remarkable, is directed to this one main point, that our life should not be based

on cities or peoples each with its own view of right and wrong, but we should regard all men (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) as our fellow-countrymen and fellow-citizens, and that there should be one life and one order, like that of a single flock on a common pasture feeding together under a common law.

In 1885 Eduard Schwartz put forward the view that the whole chapter of Plutarch which begins with this passage is taken from Eratosthenes¹, and with various reservations many later writers on the subject have followed him. Without arguing the point in detail, I can only say here that his claim—although one does not lightly disagree with so great an authority—seems to me to be mistaken. Plutarch's essay is a patchwork: the author's manner throughout is to take various ideas and weave them into the highly rhetorical texture of his argument, deriving them no doubt from various ultimate sources of which Eratosthenes is one and Zeno's Πολιτεία, or some account of it, is another. In my view we just do not know the source of his impression of the Πολιτεία.

For the most part, it seems to be a fairly correct impression, coinciding well enough with the picture of a unified community which can be derived from the rest of the evidence. The real difficulty lies in the words πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγούμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, where Plutarch clearly has in mind a world-wide brotherhood of the entire human race, comparable with the vision of an all-embracing unity of peoples which he attributes to Alexander. How can this be consistent with Zeno's limitation of Utopia to the wise, and exclusion of the foolish? The only way to avoid this difficulty is to suppose that Zeno was thinking of some remote future time when (it might be hoped) all human beings will have attained to wisdom and goodness. If this

¹ *Rhein. Mus.* XL 252-4.

was indeed the theme of the Πολιτεία, Zeno's was a bold and radical conception, one of the most daring flights of speculation in antiquity; and it was the first full Greek vision of the possibility of the unity of mankind. But there is nothing to confirm such an interpretation in our other sources, and a good deal to suggest that the whole form of the book excluded it; and it would be rash to accept such a remarkable supposition on the evidence of a single short passage in a highly rhetorical treatise written some four centuries later, the whole trend of which was to read back later ideas into Alexander's time.

My conclusion is that on this point Plutarch's account is not likely to be correct. In accordance with the general tendency of his rhetorical exercise, he has given a twist to Zeno's ideas and brought them into line with that later Stoic conception of a «world state» which, he claims, Alexander realised in practice. If Zeno used the word πάντες or its equivalent, it was probably in the simple sense of «everybody», «all people», «this is what everyone ought to do»; which is very different from talk of «all mankind». Although the thought of human unity was implicit in the rationality of all men, in which he believed, and although he was greatly concerned with the question of unity within society, his outlook was dominated by the contrast between the ideal of wisdom and the prevailing folly, and it was a community of σπουδαῖοι, of wise and good men and women, that he envisaged, not a world-state embracing the entire human race.

* * *

What are the implications of all this for the Greek view of foreign peoples? By the beginning of the third century B.C. two trends of thought, neither completely new, had come to the fore to modify the attitude of some Greeks, at any rate, towards the old conception of the division between Greek and foreigner: first, acceptance of a type of

culture and civilisation, use of the Greek language and acknowledgment of Greek standards, rather than race, as the criterion marking off «Hellenes» from «barbarians»; second, the belief that true wisdom and moral worth can raise their possessors above such barriers, which have importance only for the conflict-ridden majority of mankind. Among those who held it this belief obviously went far towards undermining the idea of a divided world, Greek contrasted with non-Greek. We have not yet reached the picture, however, of a world-society in which not only those who enjoy Hellenic culture, not only the wise, but all peoples, or at any rate all civilised peoples, have a place. Of the philosophical schools perhaps the Peripatetics, represented by Theophrastus, had come nearest to such a conception of the unity of man; but a great further development of thought on the subject was necessary before the picture reached the clarity with which it is presented in Cicero.

When and where did this development arise? One place to look for it is among Zeno's immediate successors, and even in the thought of Zeno himself later than the *Πολιτεία*. «Stoic cosmopolitanism», «the Stoic world-state», are phrases commonly used in discussing the early Stoic school. The evidence on the point is slight—unless indeed we attribute to Chrysippus all the material brought together under his name by von Arnim. But such as it is, it points to the idea of a cosmic society whose members are the phenomena of nature or the heavenly bodies, not human beings. «All things in the universe are managed well, as in a well-ordered community», says an account which may reflect the views of Zeno (S.V.F. I 98). The other relevant passage comparing the universe with a state is in Plutarch, who in the course of criticism of Chrysippus ridicules the proposition that «the cosmos is a *πόλις* and the stars its citizens» (S.V.F. II 645).

It is Chrysippus, the elaborator of so many points in Stoic theory, who might well be expected to realise more fully and bring into the open the concept of human unity implied in the doctrine of the universal Λόγος; and clearly he did come nearer to the conception of a single human society by at any rate one line of thought—the universality of law as a natural compact by which all men are bound.¹ How far Chrysippus gave such ideas new emphasis and meaning within the Stoic context, we cannot tell; but it seems likely that for him, as for Zeno, any thought of human unity was overshadowed by the antithesis between the wise, linked to each other by the closest of bonds, and the unwise, always divided by discord and strife. It is not surprising that our few scraps of information about Chrysippus' *Περὶ πολιτείας* suggest that it followed the same lines as Zeno's work—a Utopian account of how the wise should live, stressing the ideal concord of the few philosophers, not that brotherhood of all which later Stoics saw as a present fact.

My own view is that this wider conception came later; and if among its various causes one principal factor is to be singled out, I should choose the impact of Rome, beginning in the third century and becoming the dominating feature of the situation in the second, and bringing to the Greeks a broader and more complex picture of the human race. In short, the idea of the unity of mankind in this broader sense was not Greek, but Graeco-Roman. It came into being not through the concept of cosmic unity, nor through further consideration of man as a species, but rather by the development of a line of thought which, I have suggested, did not easily arise in the Greek environment and had comparatively little part in earlier Greek thinking about the human situation. I mean the notion of mankind as an

¹ Cf. *S.V.F.* III 314, 322, 371.

aggregate, the sum-total of individual human beings spread over all the various countries of the inhabited world; mankind, in fact, more as we see it today.

I have already remarked that such human geography (if we may use that label) does not appear to have interested the early Stoics. It probably had a considerable place in the studies of the Peripatetics. But our first glimpse of its effect on Greek thought about mankind comes from Eratosthenes, in a passage which reflects the situation of his time, including the rise of Rome. I refer, of course, to the Strabo passage already mentioned by M. Peremans. Strabo, it will be remembered, states that Eratosthenes in his *Γεωγραφικά* criticised the division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, and also the advice given to Alexander (as Plutarch tells us¹, by Aristotle) to treat Greeks as friends and barbarians as enemies. He said it was better to make a division ἀρετῆ καὶ κακίας — according to good qualities and bad. «For many of the Greeks are bad, and many of the barbarians civilised (ἀστυεῖοι) — Indians and Arians, for example, and also Romans and Carthaginians, who conduct their political affairs so admirably. It was for this reason that Alexander, ignoring his advisers, welcomed and favoured all men he could of good repute» (I iv, 9). (This, I believe, is the end of Strabo's quotation or summary of Eratosthenes; the comment that follows is Strabo's own.)

We have seen that the attitude described in this passage was by no means new. Criticism of the antithesis between Greek and barbarian, together with the claim that the true division lay between good and bad, went back to various earlier thinkers; in this case, perhaps especially to the Stoic Ariston, who was one of Eratosthenes' teachers at Athens.² But Eratosthenes' version of the matter was evidently different from the familiar contrast between the few wise men

¹ *De Alex. M. Fort. aut. Virt.* I 6. ² Cf. *S.V.F.* I 371.

and the misguided many. The division he put forward in place of Greek and barbarian was something like «civilised» and «uncivilised», with good government, practised in many parts of the οἰκουμένη, as the criterion of merit. Looking at the world of his day with the geographer's eye, he argues that there are other civilised peoples besides those who can be labelled Greek. His examples fit the contemporary scene—not the time of Alexander nor that of Strabo, but the middle or late third century B.C. India and Ariana, East and West of the Indus, are two of the main sections of the Orient as Eratosthenes saw it; both were opened up to the Greeks by Alexander, and later cut off once more from the West by the power of Parthia. In the West Rome and Carthage are balanced against each other, as they were in the time of the Punic Wars. These countries are cited not as regions to which Hellenic culture has spread, but as areas each with an independent civilisation and language of its own. Here for the first time, or at any rate more clearly than ever before, we have the concept of a multi-racial and multi-lingual civilised humanity, put forward by a Greek whose picture of mankind included non-Greek centres of civilisation comparable with his own, to all of which the same standard must apply.

In the second century B.C. the shift of forces in the Mediterranean area produced a situation which must have impressed the point of view already taken by Eratosthenes on all thinking men, and especially on Greeks who were associated with Rome. It is not surprising to find that it flourished most strongly where educated Greeks and Romans came together, as they did in the so-called «Scipionic Circle». The group of which Scipio and Laelius were the centre brought some of the best intellects of both Greece and Rome into contact and through their interaction reached a point of view which was neither Greek nor Roman, but combined and transcended them both. Terence's *humani nil*

a me alienum puto had a fuller meaning for his patrons than for Menander's audience a century and a half earlier.

Against this background the *Universal History* of Polybius stands out as the earliest document which clearly presents the oneness of mankind as a Graeco-Roman concept. The geographical unity of the inhabited world is a basic principle for Polybius, as for Eratosthenes; to it he added his insistence on the unity of human history—a fresh element in the development of our theme, which is the burden of his introductory chapters and from Cannae onwards shapes his account of events. The main part of his work is indeed an embodiment of the idea of the unity of human affairs, springing directly from the rise of Roman power to balance the intellectual leadership of Greece.

Turning finally from geographer and historian to the philosophers, it is in this period, the second century B.C. and the early decades of the first, that we find the formation of the view of mankind known to us from the philosophical works of Cicero. I cannot of course venture now on any attempt to unravel the complexities of the evidence for this development. The last few minutes of a paper are no time for *Quellenforschung*, or for sorting out the tangled relationships in this period between the various schools. The main contributors to the process seem to have been Panaetius, Posidonius and Antiochus, probably in that order of importance; but I will not try to give each his separate role. All I wish to do is to mention three factors which appear to have played a part in the change from the view of mankind among the earlier Hellenistic philosophers to the broader, if also shallower and less dynamic, outlook of these later thinkers.

One is a continued interest in what I have called « human geography ». There are grounds for thinking that this was shared by Panaetius; but of course the most notable figure here is Posidonius, who as a result not only regarded man-

kind as a part of the complex unity of the universe, but also saw the human race itself as a whole made up of the many diverse parts which he knew and described in his writings.

Secondly we find at this time, and especially in Panaetius, a decline in emphasis on that contrast between wisdom and folly which for the early Stoics, I have suggested, was the principal division of mankind. Panaetius, on the contrary, stressed the common possession of reason by all men. He virtually ignored the view so strongly asserted by Zeno and Chrysippus, that the unwise are incapable of any degree of virtue or cooperation, and concentrated his attention on principles of conduct for the ordinary man; or rather, by writing on « external duties », he produced a moral code for the sage and the ordinary man alike. To quote Cicero's version of his thought in the *De Officiis* (I, 46):

Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum, in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat.

My third factor is a fusion of Stoic and Peripatetic views, which probably developed in the second century B.C. and is to be found complete in Antiochus: the combination of that idea of universal human kinship, οἰκειότης, which had been stated by Aristotle and elaborated by Theophrastus, with the theory of οἰκείωσις, awareness of what is akin to oneself, which had arisen among the early Stoics. Chrysippus, the earliest thinker to whom the concept of οἰκείωσις is clearly attributed, extends it to our offspring as the next stage after the parts of our own bodies (*S.V.F.* III 178, 179). By further extension outwards the doctrine could be seen as coinciding with the Peripatetic οἰκειότης; and so the notion of human unity, implicit in early Stoicism, could be

made explicit and given definite form by a pattern of kinship extending from self-love to a bond connecting the entire human race.

So we come to the philosophical works of Cicero, with their wide vision of the *genus humanum* and the *communitas* or *societas generis humani*, based on the belief that all men have a share in *ratio* and in the potentiality for *sapientia*. Added to it is the idea of *humanitas*: the conception of a common civilisation, now no longer equated with the outlook of the *πόλις* or with Hellenic culture, although it owed much to both, but enlarged to cover a far more comprehensive picture of civilised man; and an essential attribute of the member of civilised society, an essential aspect of *humanitas*, is awareness of kinship with the rest of the human race.

Although Cicero makes it clear that these ideas were common currency among the majority of thinking men in his day, they are of course an amalgam of those trends in Greek thought the development of which we have been tracing; and for this reason Cicero can fitly stand at the end of a review of Greek conceptions of the unity of mankind. But I will conclude with the suggestion that there is a further fitness here. My story has been Greek, but could not be complete, even down to the point to which I have brought it, without the influence of Rome; and it is not unfitting that we should read its final results in Latin.

DISCUSSION

M. Kwapong: As usual, I shall put my foot in it and set the ball rolling! I found Professor Baldry's point about the significance of the word ἄνθρωπος in Homer and the early writers very interesting — a significance which I had taken very much for granted and the nature of which had not struck me before. Although one must not exaggerate its importance, I think that the Cynic view of the κόσμος had a considerable influence on the evolution of the idea of the unity of mankind. It was a tremendous step to be able to ignore the narrow boundaries of the πόλις and to make themselves «vagabonds of nature» «with no fixed address» and to draw the contrast between the σπουδαῖοι and the φαῦλοι and to make only the σπουδαῖοι inherit their πολιτεία. The question which suggests itself to me in this connection and which I wish to put to you is this: what did they propose to do with the φαῦλοι?

M. Baldry: The attitude of the Cynics towards the foolish, I think, was that they can hardly be regarded as ἄνθρωποι at all. Diogenes Laertius, you remember, tells the story of how Diogenes the Cynic went searching in the streets of Athens with a lantern, and when asked what he was looking for, he replied: «a man». The story may be apocryphal, but it sums up the Cynic attitude: only the wise are truly men. It is true, of course, that the Cynics did seek to bring individuals from outside within their circle by individual conversion. This is where their φιλανθρωπία comes into the picture. But it is a question of individual conversion, not of extending wisdom outwards over the mass of mankind, with any conception of a united humanity envisaged as its objective. The Cynics, I suggest, were not interested in the mass of mankind who are without Cynic wisdom.

M. Dible: Sie haben, Mr. Baldry, sehr deutlich gezeigt dass für die philosophische Ethik seit der Sophistenzeit die Unterschiede zwischen Hellenen und Barbaren, Freien und Sklaven etc.

weithin zurücktreten, dass sich aber an ihre Stelle eher die neue Unterscheidung zwischen Weisen und Toren als die Idee der Einheit aller Menschen setzt. Muss man aber nicht einräumen, dass der Anspruch der philosophischen Unterweisung, den Menschen schlechthin zur ἀρετή zu verhelfen, mindestens die potentielle Gleichheit und damit Einheit aller Menschen impliziert? Gewiss betont gerade die ältere stoische Orthodoxie den tiefen Unterschied zwischen Tor und Weisem, doch gibt sogar Chrysipp zu, dass nur alle paar Jahrzehnte einmal ein Weiser zustande käme (*S.V.F.* III 662, 668, vgl. auch Panaitios *Fr.* 114 v. d. Str.). Die philosophische Unterweisung richtet sich also grundsätzlich an alle Menschen, sofern sie den Willen haben, προκόπτοντες zu werden. Panaitios' Rückkehr zur platonisch-peripatetischen Doktrin von der Ungleichheit der Menschen (vgl. Pohlenz, *Stoa* I, 201 m. Anm.) dagegen widerspricht dem Geist der orthodoxen Stoa ebenso wie den kynischen und epikureischen Lehren, also den repräsentativen Schulen der Alexanderzeit und des frühen Hellenismus.

Wir können hier übrigens eine Parallele zu den grossen Offenbarungsreligionen ziehen, die ebenfalls die potentielle Gleichheit und Einheit aller Menschen voraussetzen, jedoch auf den Unterschied Gläubige-Ungläubige weit mehr zu achten pflegen, sobald sie als Institutionen fest etabliert sind.

M. Baldry: Yes, I agree that that is another way of putting the position. It is a matter of emphasis. The early Stoics certainly had the idea of progress towards wisdom — τὸ προκόπτειν — and therefore of the potentiality for wisdom that exists among all men; but I believe that this was quite overshadowed by their concentration on the division between the wise and the unwise.

M. Diller: Die Offenbarungsreligionen, besonders das Christentum, haben den Menschen in seiner Unvollkommenheit von Gott abgegrenzt, das kynische und stoische Ideal des Weisen will das ζῶον λόγον ἔχον dem Göttlichen nach Möglichkeit annähern. Herr Baldry sprach in der Einleitung seines Vortrags

mit Recht davon, dass schon das 5. Jh. die Menschen als eine einheitliche Gruppe den Göttern einerseits, den Tieren andererseits gegenübergestellt habe. Er hat dabei mehr die Fähigkeiten hervorgehoben, die den Menschen über das Tier erheben (Handfertigkeit der Techne, Besitz des Logos). Auf der anderen Seite weist das 5. Jh. den Menschen immer wieder auf die Grenzen hin, die ihn vom Göttlichen unwiderrufflich trennen: man denke an die Aussagen des Delphischen Apollon, an Pindar, an die attische Tragödie. Damit ist das 5. Jh. vor der Einseitigkeit geschützt, die in der Verabsolutierung des Ideals des Weisen liegt.

M. Reverdin: En effet: l'idée de λόγος domine au point que dans le discours 36 de Dion Chrysostome, l'εὐδαίμων πολιτεία εἴτε πόλις est formée de tous les êtres doués de raison (ξύμπαν τὸ λογικόν), à savoir les hommes et les dieux (ἀνθρώπων σὺν θεοῖς ἀριθμουμένων).

M. Peremans: Au cours de son exposé, M. Baldry nous a parlé de la tradition relative à Alexandre, que nous retrouvons, par exemple, dans les fragments des historiens grecs, édités par F. Jacoby (N^{os} 117-153). Parmi les nombreux auteurs de cette série, nous voudrions citer tout spécialement les représentants du roman d'Alexandre. Car même si on est d'avis qu'Alexandre ne s'est pas proposé de réaliser l'unité du genre humain ou qu'il n'a pas réussi à faire partager ses vues soit par ses contemporains, soit par les générations suivantes, on admettra volontiers que le jeune conquérant doit avoir éveillé l'imagination des écrivains grecs. De cette façon il a contribué à préparer l'idée de l'unité du genre humain qui s'est répandue durant les siècles suivants.

M. Baldry: I should perhaps emphasise that all I want to deny with regard to Alexander is that he consciously held a theory of the unity of mankind. I am not of course saying that the tendency towards such a view was not embodied in his actions, or that these actions could not influence others in that direction.

M. Peremans: S'il est permis de nous arrêter encore un instant au cas d'Alexandre le Grand, je voudrais souligner une nouvelle

fois combien il est difficile de connaître les intentions de cet homme. Il suffit de songer à l'expédition en Asie, qui se subdivise en différentes étapes. Si l'on se rend compte, sans trop de difficultés, du but poursuivi par Alexandre au commencement de la campagne, il est beaucoup plus difficile de se prononcer sur ses intentions à la fin de l'expédition en Orient. Au début, en tant que roi des Macédoniens et des Grecs, il a voulu se venger des Perses. Plus tard il se proposa de conquérir le pays ennemi. Mais une fois ce but atteint, il n'était pas encore satisfait et contre la volonté de ses officiers et de ses soldats, il a voulu continuer. Quels furent donc les projets que la résistance de son armée le força d'abandonner ?

M. Kwapong: The question of Alexander's attitude to his own « divinity » has some bearing on this problem, in my opinion. Again I don't think one has to go the whole way with Tarn about the Exile's Decree being a « political sophisma » etc. and the whole problem of the visit to the Oracle at Siwah. But if he thought of himself as more than human, as « the son of God », was it not likely that he would tend to regard all others as inferior to him and hence on a more or less equal plane ? Would not his deification make his orientalising ways and treatment of the Macedonians and Greeks and Persians an avenue for this attitude ? What do you think ?

M. Baldry: The question of Alexander's attitude towards deification seems to me to be separate from the question whether he held a doctrine of the unity of mankind. As Dr. Badian has shown in an article in *Historia* (1958), the passage in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* about his encounter with Psammon, even if it is historically correct, is very far from showing that Alexander believed in universal human brotherhood. The point of it is Alexander's belief in his own superiority to the rest of humanity.

M. Dible: Herr Baldry hat auf das interessante Faktum hingewiesen, dass sich Stoiker und Epikureer in der älteren Zeit offenbar nur wenig für die Gestalt Alexanders interessierten. Das hängt vielleicht auch damit zusammen, dass es in den früh-

hellenistischen Systeme vor allem um eine Individualethik geht, die dem Menschen gerade in aufgeregten und wirren Zeiten, einen von allen politischen Ereignissen nicht tangierten Halt zu geben versucht. Die gewalttätigen Recken der Diadochenzeit, in deren Reihe sich Alexander dem Rückblickenden einordnet, erscheinen aus dieser Perspektive eher als Monstra denn als Staatsmänner und Feldherrn, deren Leistungen es sich moralisch zu würdigen lohnt. Bekanntlich gibt es in der späteren Alexandertradition eine peripatetische und eine stoische Wertung seiner Person. Beide mühen sich in erster Linie um eine Erklärung der in Persien zutage getretenen *διαστροφή* seines Charakters, beurteilen ihn also nach individualethischen, nicht nach politisch-historischen Kategorien.

M. Reverdin: Il serait intéressant de savoir si un certain universalisme s'est développé au sein de l'empire achéménide, universalisme qui aurait pu avoir une influence sur Alexandre et sur ses successeurs. Cet empire avait, en effet, duré deux siècles lorsque Alexandre le détruisit; deux siècles pendant lesquels des peuples fort nombreux et divers avaient vécu sous une même domination, sous un même régime militaire et fiscal. Mais je ne pense pas que notre information de source perse soit suffisante pour qu'on puisse même esquisser une réponse à ma question.

M. Dible: Eine schlüssige Antwort wird man auf Herrn Reverdins Frage kaum geben können. Aber vielleicht gibt ein gut bezeugtes Ereignis aus der Geschichte Alexanders einen Hinweis: Mit der Verbrennung der Königspalastes von Persepolis war der Rachezug zu Ende. Die griechischen Kontingente wurden entlassen, ohne dass man sie zwang, an der Eroberung der östlichen Teile der Perserreiche teilzunehmen. Daraus mag man schliessen, dass mindestens für die publizistisch zu beeinflussende öffentliche Meinung in Griechenland der Feldzug Alexanders nicht das Ziel hatte, ein griechisches Universalreich an die Stelle eines persischen zu setzen. Alles weitere ergibt sich dann wohl hauptsächlich aus dynastischen Gesichtspunkten: Alexander betrachtet sich, wie z. B. die Bestrafung des Bessos

lehrt, als Rechtsnachfolger der Achämeniden. Bei einer vollständigen Okkupation des Reichsgebietes bedarf es darum schwerlich ausserdem eines Appells an ein Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl der Reichsvölker.

M. Diller: Ich habe mich besonders darüber gefreut, dass Herr Baldry zu Anfang seines Vortrags auch auf die Bedeutung hingewiesen hat, die die Vorstellung von einer Einheitlichkeit der Menschheit für die wissenschaftliche Methode der hippokratischen Ärzte hatte. Im *Prognostikon* wird, wie er ausführte, gesagt, dass die prognostischen Zeichen unter den gleichen Bedingungen ebensogut auf Delos gelten wie in Skythien und Libyen. Gleiche Voraussetzungen bewirken gleiche Reaktionen. Das ist auch die Überzeugung des Thukydides für das Verhalten des Menschen in der Geschichte, wie er sie im Methodenskapitel und im Kerkyräerkapitel ausspricht. Seinem Thema gemäss spricht er davon, dass die Identität des menschlichen Verhaltens durch die *Zeiten* hindurch erhalten bleibt, während der Hippokratiker die entsprechende Aussage für Unterschiede des *Ortes* macht. Die oft behauptete Ähnlichkeit der wissenschaftlichen Anschauungen des Thukydides und der Hippokratiker ist also für das von Herrn Baldry behandelte Thema jedenfalls festzustellen.

M. Baldry: I fully agree with what Herr Diller has said. It confirms very neatly the comparison I suggested between Thucydides and the medical writers. As far as we can judge from Thucydides' history, however, his geographical outlook was much less wide than the outlook we find in Hippocrates.

The point on which I am doubtful is how far Thucydides, Antiphon and the medical writers can be regarded as typical of the intellectual outlook of their time. It is possible that they form a group, as it were, with a particular line of thought which was not shared by others, and that our knowledge of them leads us to overestimate the spread of the idea of human unity at the end of the fifth century.

M. Reverdin: Que simultanément — ou presque — Antiphon, Thucydide, l'auteur du *Περὶ ἀέρων* s'inspirent des mêmes théories

sur l'unité physiologique du genre humain n'est sans doute pas l'effet d'une coïncidence fortuite.

M. Dible : Herr Baldry sprach von der zunehmenden Aufgeschlossenheit für ethnographische und geographische Fragen innerhalb der mittleren Stoa (Poseidonios). Das ist ein Zeugnis für jene allgemeine Hinwendung zur Wissenschaft, die Stoiker und Epikureer der späteren Zeit vollziehen. Anders als die Peripatetiker, die niemals wissenschaftsfeindlich gewesen sind, betonen Epikureer und Stoiker ursprünglich, dass Wissen und Wissenschaft nur als Begründung der Ethik, nicht aber um ihrer selbst willen sinnvoll seien. Die Blüte der Fachwissenschaften jedoch und die Polemik der undogmatischen Philosophen zwingen auch Epikureer und Stoiker in den Bann der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, so dass es nachher stoische Geographen wie Poseidonios und Strabon und epikureische Mathematiker gibt. Höchst bezeichnend scheint mir in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Ariston von Chios, der besonders schroff die Unnötigkeit des nicht moralisch anwendbaren Wissens behauptet hatte, Lehrer des Eratosthenes war.

M. Baldry : Yes, there seems to be little evidence for the study of geography in the philosophical schools during the third century apart from the Peripatetics. It is notable that in the long list of works attributed by Diogenes Laertius to Chrysippus there is no title concerned with geography.

M. Peremans : Cette absence de contacts, à un moment donné, entre certaines écoles philosophiques et la recherche scientifique est d'autant plus étonnante qu'un vaste mouvement d'exploration de la terre se poursuivait de façon pour ainsi dire ininterrompue depuis les expéditions d'Alexandre le Grand.

Les renseignements que pouvaient recueillir les philosophes étaient nombreux et variés. La reconnaissance des terres et des mers continuait sous les successeurs d'Alexandre, comme le prouvent les écrits consacrés aux ports (Περὶ λιμένων), les périples et les périégèses.

Les relations internationales s'élargissaient sur le plan diplo-

matique. Au début du III^e siècle, sous le règne de Ptolémée II Philadelphe, Alexandrie entretenait des rapports avec Rome et avec l'Inde. Les explorateurs, les hommes d'affaires et les armées ouvraient un monde nouveau aux Grecs. Mais les philosophes n'y font aucune allusion.

M. Baldry: The failure of the Greeks to learn from Alexander is surprising. I can only say that in the writings of the philosophers there is little or no evidence for realisation of the lessons which his achievements might have taught. We are often given a picture of the early Stoics and others as thinkers whose eyes were opened to a new and broader vision of mankind as a result of the conquests of Alexander. I do not believe it. Like earlier Greek thinkers, these philosophers of the early Hellenistic period continued to be interested in man rather than in mankind — in man as they knew him in the streets of Athens, not in all the variety of the human aggregate. They did not greatly concern themselves with the facts of the human situation which now became available, any more than the Pre-Socratic thinkers paid any great attention to observation of the facts of nature.

M. Dible: Innerhalb der Philosophie sind es u.a. die verschiedenen Skeptiker gewesen, die an der Sammlung entlegenen Materials auch ethnographisch-geographischer Art interessiert waren, weil sie mit den Hinweis auf solche Fakten die generalisierenden Lehren der dogmatischen Schulen bestreiten konnten. Nicht zufällig gibt es in Sextus' *Hypotyposen* ziemlich viel ethnographisches Material.

In der Literatur im engeren Sinn, die der Unterhaltung und dem literarischen Genuss dient, sind die Vorstellungen von fremden Ländern immer nur durch wenige, sich besonders stark einprägende Ereignisse bestimmt gewesen. Indien ist für die gesamte hellenistische und nachhellenistische Literatur ausschliesslich Nordindien, obwohl man seit der Entdeckung der Monsunpassage am Ende des 2 Jh. vor Chr. viel engere kommerzielle Beziehungen zu Südindien unterhielt. Aber davon nehmen nur nautische Handbücher oder geschulte Geographen Notiz,

nicht indessen die Literatur. Der Name bzw. Titel Buddhas taucht erst bei Klemens von Alexandrien auf, wohl auf Grund direkter Informationen aus Südindien. Für die Literatur hat das Indienbild seine endgültige Prägung eben durch den Bericht des Megasthenes erhalten: In seiner Zeit aber genoss der Buddhismus noch nicht die Förderung der Maurya-Dynastie.

M. Reverdin: Les mercenaires rentrés dans leur patrie ont certainement contribué par leurs récits à répandre jusque dans les cantons les plus reculés de la Grèce — l'Acarnanie, la Locride, l'Étolie — des informations sur l'Orient. Informations fantaisistes en partie, car l'ancien combattant aime à se vanter; mais informations souvent exactes, et de nature à inciter d'autres à s'enrôler à leur tour. Les marchands aussi devaient colporter des récits sur les pays qu'ils visitaient. Mais, sur la nature de ces récits, notre information est bien fragmentaire. Que savons-nous de ces hommes d'affaires dont parlait à l'instant M. Peremans? Que savons-nous de leurs idées? De leurs sentiments? Pratiquement rien. Et, il est peu probable que les découvertes papyrologiques permettent jamais de répondre à ces questions.

M. Baldry: I think perhaps one of our difficulties is to realise fully the contrast between the ancient world and the modern in the matter of communication. We are so used to a situation in which information is easily available and rapidly spread to all, that we tend to forget the slowness with which it must have moved in the ancient world, and how easily its spread could remain incomplete. I wonder how many people in central Greece were aware of just what Alexander had done, or of the geography of the territories which he had visited.