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I

A. B. BOSWORTH

ARRIAN AND THE ALEXANDER VULGATE

The image of Alexander the Great which is most familiar to modern readers is that presented in the *Anabasis Alexandri* of L. Flavius Arrianus. This account of the Macedonian king has for centuries been regarded as the most authoritative, and it is used as the narrative spine of most modern histories. There is, however, another major source for Alexander's reign, the source used in the seventeenth book of Diodorus Siculus and in long passages of Curtius Rufus. It is detectable elsewhere, notably in Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus. This source, often termed the "vulgate"¹, gives an account of Alexander's reign which differs radically from the tradition in Arrian, both in outline and in factual detail. The vulgate accordingly tends to be accepted in so far as it supplements the central core of Arrian's narrative and discarded where there is a contradiction. There has been little attempt to assess the two traditions in detail and isolate their respective merits and

¹ For bibliography see J. SEIBERT, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt 1972), 26-8. The authorship of the vulgate is still controversial, but apart from Sir W. W. Tarn, no one has seriously doubted the existence of a common source for Diodorus and Curtius. Ed. SCHWARTZ, in *RE* IV 2, 1873-4, gives an impressive, but far from exhaustive, list of parallel passages.

defects. Yet such an assessment of the sources is a necessity, if we are to progress from the image of Alexander to any historical reality. Above all we must consider seriously whether Arrian deserves the preeminence he is usually assigned.

The *Anabasis Alexandri* was established as the palmary history of Alexander at a very early date. In 1775 the Baron de Sainte-Croix stated with admirable conciseness that the work should be considered not merely the supreme history of Alexander but the sole reliable source for his reign¹. Indeed Arrian's preeminence, he thought, could not be challenged "without equal harm to the laws of sound criticism and of equity". As yet the discussion was confined to the extant authors and their literary qualities. Sainte-Croix recognised that Diodorus and Curtius Rufus drew upon a common source for the reign of Alexander, and he went so far as to identify that source as Cleitarchus of Alexandria. He did not, however, try to reconstruct the outlines of the lost work or assess the veracity of the common tradition of Curtius and Diodorus. Instead he concentrated on the extant authors. Arrian attracted him by his clarity of style, his citation of sources, and his apparent general accuracy. On the other hand he was clearly appalled by the haphazard nature of Curtius' narrative. The famous dictum, *plura transcribo quam credo* (IX 1, 34), is held to typify Curtius' entire approach to history, and his work is dismissed as an artificial collage of anecdotes, selected for their sensational value and strung together to produce the maximum rhetorical effect. Whether or not this sharp contrast is justified must be considered later. For the moment it is perhaps sufficient to emphasise that the veracity of a historical statement has nothing to do with its literary presentation. A blatant lie can be presented, and is perhaps best presented, as a sober factual statement, whereas unimpeachable historical facts can form the

¹ G. de SAINTE-CROIX, *Examen critique des anciens historiens d'Alexandre le Grand* (Paris 1775; 2nd ed. 1810), 22 ff.; 35 ff.

framework of the most elaborate epideictic rhetoric. The only cogent point, if true, in this early literary approach is the assumption that Arrian both chose better sources and was more critical in his approach to them.

Nineteenth century criticism by contrast concentrated on the lost primary histories of Alexander¹, and discussion focussed remorselessly on one of the favourite chimeras of scholarship, the search for an infallible criterion of historical fact. Arrian's style was once more the foundation of the criticism. His narrative contains a series of reports of promotions, receptions of embassies, arrival of reinforcements, despatch of garrison troops and the like, which read as though they were extracted from some archival source. The narrative, it has been said, has the characteristics of a diary ("einen tagebuchartigen Charakter"). J. G. Droysen had inferred that much of Arrian went back through his primary source, Ptolemy, to two court journals kept by Alexander's chief secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, for the purpose of keeping satraps and generals in touch with events at court². The theory was refined in a famous article by Ulrich Wilcken, in which he pointed out the similarity between the *ὑπομνηματισμοί* of Roman Egypt, which described in detail the daily movements of the *στρατηγός*, and the *ἑφημερίδες* which Arrian and Plutarch use for their descriptions of the last days of Alexander. The *ἑφημερίδες*, U. Wilcken thought, were an official court journal dating back at least to the reign of Philip and providing a detailed day by day account of the king's words and actions. The journal was passed down first to Ptolemy and indirectly to Arrian, thus giving an un-

¹ B. G. NIEBUHR's damning indictment of G. de Sainte-Croix is typical of its period: « eine Arbeit, die für deutsche Philologie sehr ungenügend ist, und dafür so gut als nicht existierend betrachtet werden muss » (*Vorträge über alte Geschichte* II (1848), 423). Niebuhr, however, came dogmatically to the very same conclusion about Arrian: « in den Factis können wir uns sehr ruhig an Arrian halten ».

² J. G. DROYSEN, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* I² 2 (Gotha 1877), 383-6.

impeachable factual basis for the narrative of the *Anabasis*¹. Once expounded, Wilcken's thesis achieved the status of holy writ, and it is at the basis of the analyses of Arrian conducted by H. Strasburger and E. Kornemann². Both saw Arrian's work as an accretion round the central core of archival material, and Kornemann went so far as to reconstruct the original formulae of the ἐφημερίδες from the text of Arrian³. The result of this cumulative research was that the "reliable" Arrian was firmly enshrined at the head of the murky Pantheon of Alexander historians. He was not only the most lucid and the most critical. His sources were the best and had the ultimate sanction of the archives of Alexander himself. The general rule for modern scholarship was therefore glaringly obvious, and it is stated in its simplest and crudest form by Sir W. W. Tarn: "one's restoration must be based on Arrian and Arrian alone; it is as a rule useless trying to insert material of unknown value from Diodorus and Curtius" (*Alexander the Great* II (Cambridge 1948), 135).

The whole purpose of this paper is to show that the traditional argument for the supremacy of Arrian is a delusion, based upon a series of fallacies. The so-called journal need not detain us long. Recent work on the ἐφημερίδες actually published under the names of Eumenes of Cardia and Diodotus of Erythrae (*FGrH* 117) has, I think, shown that the document covered at most the last year of Alexander's life, and its con-

¹ U. WILCKEN, « ὑπομνηματισμοί », in *Philologus* 53 (1894), 84-126. The definitive statement is at p. 117: « es sei mir erlaubt, in kurzen Zügen die Hypothese hinzustellen, dass die Ephemeriden Alexanders die Hauptquelle für die Memoiren des Königs Ptolemaios I gewesen sind, die wiederum den Grundstock der Anabasis Arrians bilden ».

² H. STRASBURGER, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* (Leipzig 1934), esp. p. 17; E. KORNEMANN, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten* (Leipzig 1935).

³ See H. STRASBURGER's classic review (in *Gnomon* 13 (1937), 483-92); despite all his criticisms of Kornemann's method Strasburger still took as axiomatic the existence of « der aktenmässige Grundstock » for Arrian's work (p. 486).

tents were suspiciously slanted to emphasise Alexander's epic potations¹. The material for the document may in fact have been extracted from court archives, but it was certainly not a coverage of Alexander's reign in all its aspects. In the second place, the supposed archival material is not unique to Arrian. There are similar reports of receptions of embassies, routine appointments, and arrivals of reinforcements in the common tradition of Curtius and Diodorus. These reports sometimes corroborate Arrian, but very often they add supplementary material. One need look no further than the accounts of Alexander's appointments in Babylon, where the tradition of Curtius and Diodorus has every detail mentioned by Arrian and adds that Agathon of Pydna was appointed citadel commander in place of the Persian Bagophanes (Diod. XVII 64, 5; Curt. V 1, 43-44; cf. Arr. III 16, 4)². There are numerous other cases, particularly the appointments in Syria, where the vulgate tradition transmits details which supplement Arrian's account and are omitted by him. It has been thought that the vulgate tradition in these matters derives from Alexander's first historian, Callisthenes of Olynthus, who must have had first hand information about Alexander's official actions and pronouncements³. That may well be the case, but, if true, the theory demolishes the principle of Arrian's supreme authority in matters of fact. If Callisthenes' work was based on autopsy

¹ Cf. L. PEARSON, in *Historia* 3 (1954/5), 432-9; E. BADIAN, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964), 256-8; A. E. SAMUEL, in *Historia* 14 (1965), 1-12; A. B. BOSWORTH, in *CQ* 21 (1971), 117-23. F. SCHACHERMEYR, however, regards these attacks as hypercritical (*Alexander der Grosse*² (Wien 1973), 149 n. 141).

² Compare the accounts of the arrangements at Susa, where Curtius has far fuller details about the garrison and adds that Callicrates was placed in charge of the treasury (Curt. V 2, 16-17; Arr. III 16, 9). In the same context note the far fuller information in the vulgate tradition about the reinforcements from Macedon led by Amyntas (Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40-42; Arr. III 16, 10).

³ For the theory that Callisthenes' work formed the core of the vulgate tradition, a theory which goes back to J. G. DROYSEN (I² 2, 389-90), see F. JACOBY, in *RE* X 2, 1705 (with earlier bibliography); in *RE* XI 1, 651; and, most recently, F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Grosse*², 152-3.

and he had first-hand access to official documents, then the official material was public knowledge, certainly not restricted to Ptolemy and Arrian. There is a further obvious objection. An official journal need not necessarily be an impeccable source. U. Wilcken supposed that Alexander's court journal, like that of Ptolemy Philadelphus, was emended and edited by the king himself. The temptation was always present to alter sensitive facts to give the best possible interpretation to posterity. Indeed Wilcken's explanation of Alexander's motives for keeping a journal is astoundingly reminiscent of Mr. Nixon and his famous tapes: "Alexander may have placed some value in having his actions fixed in a form determined by himself, and one could recall the commission of Callisthenes, to exalt his deeds in Greek eyes"¹. The journal, then, may never have existed in a form uniquely accessible to Ptolemy, and, even if some of the tradition is archivally based, it is common to all sources and has no aura of infallibility.

We are forced back to Arrian himself, to his style and his use of sources. The first thing to notice is Arrian's deceptive simplicity of narrative. It has been a common and fatal assumption that Arrian's style is derivative from his sources. Wilcken, for instance, noticed that the diary-like style of Arrian began as early as the Danube campaign of 335 and assumed that the reason was that Ptolemy's narrative (and therefore Arrian's) was wholly derived from a court journal², a theory which E. Kornemann later took to extreme lengths, denying Arrian any originality of style or composition. But Arrian's simplicity of style was not unique to the *Anabasis*. Photius' evidence about his diction comes at the end of his digest of the *History*

¹ U. WILCKEN, *art. cit.*, 116.

² *Ibid.*, 119. The theory dies hard. N. G. L. HAMMOND has recently argued that Arrian's report of Alexander's Illyrian campaign is taken (at only one remove) from a day-to-day diary compiled "by Alexander either himself or through an amanuensis" (in *JHS* 94 (1974), 77-8).

of the *Successors*¹, and the verdict is equally applicable to the *Anabasis*. The apparent lucidity and clarity, he claims, is a carefully managed effect, produced by the skilful arrangement of common words for maximum emphasis. The narrative is simple enough, with no striking innovations of vocabulary, but enlivened by adept use of variation and ellipse. If the result is an apparent diary-like character, it is a contrived result not the product of slavish copying. Arrian's stylistic pretensions should never be underestimated. It is perfectly clear from the first to the last sentence of the *Anabasis* that Arrian considered his main qualities to be stylistic. He is quite open that his opinion is that Alexander's achievements have never been properly commemorated in literature and it is his self-appointed task as the leading man of Greek letters to rectify the situation (I 12, 2-5)². Arrian's work, then, is a literary memorial to Alexander, and his style is as skilfully varied as his claims would suggest, ranging from his normal lucidity of narrative to parenthetical passages of comment of Thucydidean complexity. The observations on Alexander's refusal to risk a night attack before Gaugamela and the presentation of the king's pre-battle speech (III 9, 6-10, 4) amount to an excellent pastiche of Thucydides, not imitation of any particular passage but genuine composition in Thucydidean style³. When dealing with Arrian we are faced with a writer stylistically competent, able to adapt the raw material of his sources in any way he chooses.

It is in the understanding and the basic selection of sources that Arrian is most vulnerable. If we can believe Photius, the

¹ Cod. 92, 72 b 40 ff. = T 26, in Fl. Arrianus, II, *Scripta minora et fragmenta*, ed. A. G. Roos (Leipzig 1967), p. LXVI sq.

² For discussion of this passage see G. SCHEPENS, in *Ancient Society* 2 (1971), 254-68; A. B. BOSWORTH, in *CQ* 22 (1972), 167-8; 174-5.

³ Note also the verbal echo of Thucydides I 97, 2 at *Anab.* I 12, 2. The excursus on the sack of Thebes is Thucydidean not only in theme (proof that the disaster was the greatest in Hellenic history) but in phraseology (I 9, 1; cf. Thuc. I 1, 2 with III 113, 5-6; VII 30, 4; VII 87, 5-6).

Anabasis was in a sense a prelude to what Arrian regarded as his major task, the *Bithyniaca*, the eight book history of his native province down to its incorporation in the Roman empire. Arrian felt himself not immediately competent to tackle the history and deferred it until he had written preliminary monographs on Dion and Timoleon and his history of Alexander¹. The reason for this delay cannot have been any stylistic deficiency, for in the *Anabasis* Arrian is supremely confident in matters of style. It is far more likely to be that Arrian needed practice in the composition of non-contemporary history, the welding of material from different primary historians into a unified narrative. The *Bithyniaca* covered a huge range, from mythological times to the death of the last Nicomedes (74 B.C.) and required the incorporation of a mass of material from different primary sources. It is hardly surprising that he felt the need for preliminary work on a more limited period. One reason, then, for writing the *Anabasis* was practice in the use of sources, not so much source criticism in the modern sense as the creation of a well-rounded and internally varied historical narrative from disparate primary sources. This lack of assurance in source manipulation coupled with complete mastery of style is, I think, a dangerous combination. On the one hand Arrian is demonstrably prone to all the errors one would expect in a secondary author: omissions of essential material, misunderstandings of technical exposition, inaccurate reading of sources, and uneasy confluences of variant traditions. Such errors are commonplace in Curtius, and there we expect them as a matter of course, but in Arrian they are less obtrusive because of the seamless flow of the narrative². But the crucial problem is the overall quality of Arrian's two major sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and one can only gain results in this area by a critical comparison of Arrian and the vulgate tradition, keeping

¹ *Bithyniaca* F 1, 3 Roos. For discussion see *CQ* 22 (1972), 178-82.

² For examples and full discussion see "Errors in Arrian", in *CQ* 26 (1976), 117 ff.

a consideration of the historical statements rigidly separated from their stylistic presentation.

I shall begin with the consideration of two interlocking passages which shed light both on the quality of the use of sources by Arrian and on the relative strengths and defects of the two traditions. At III 11, 9 Arrian is in the middle of a very detailed report of the Macedonian dispositions before Gaugamela, a report generally assumed to be taken from Ptolemy. He lists the phalanx battalions in order. After the battalion of Polyperchon comes that of Amyntas, son of Philippus, led in Amyntas' absence by his younger brother, Simmias. These details read convincingly enough. All sources attest Amyntas' absence at this time. He had been sent to Macedon on a recruiting trip after the siege of Gaza in late 332 (Diod. XVII 49, 1; Curt. IV 6, 30), and he only returned when Alexander was on his way to Sittacene, towards the end of December 331 (Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40; Arr. III 16, 10). The problem is that in the context of Gaugamela Arrian calls Amyntas son of Philippus, whereas he and every other source elsewhere terms him son of Andromenes (cf. Berve II Nr. 57)¹. There is no doubt that Arrian is in error about the patronymic in his narrative of Gaugamela².

The problem is compounded by the vulgate tradition. Diodorus and Curtius have an account of the Macedonian line of battle which corroborates Arrian in almost every way. There is one exception. The list of battalion commanders is the same

¹ H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols. (München 1926), hereafter Berve II.

² The mistake has of course long been known. In 1668 Nicolaus Blancardus emended Φιλίππου to Ἀνδρομένους (a correction also made that same year by J. PALMERIUS, *Exercitationes in optimos auctores Graecos* (Lugduni Batavorum 1668), 238). All subsequent editions down to A. G. Roos followed his lead, and Ἀνδρομένους is printed without comment or hint of any textual variant in the Teubner edition of K. SINTENIS (and K. ABICHT) and the Loeb edition of E. I. ROBSON. Although A. G. Roos left Φιλίππου in his text and observed correctly "Arriano error imputandus", the mistake is far less familiar than it deserves to be.

as Arrian's and listed in the same sequence, but in place of Simmias deputed for his brother they report Philippus, son of Balacrus as commander (Diod. XVII 57, 3 ; Curt. IV 13, 28). This gives us the solution to the error in Arrian ; we have an unwitting conflation of two traditions. Arrian presumably was faced by two army lists, one of which named Simmias temporary commander of Amyntas' battalion and the other Philippus, son of Balacrus. Arrian opted for the Simmias version, most probably because he found it in Ptolemy, the source he regarded as of paramount authority (cf. VI 2, 4 : ὃ μάλιστα ἐγὼ ἔπομαι) ; but the variant tradition of Philippus, son of Balacrus, remained at the back of his mind, so that he let the name slip in as the patronymic of Amyntas.

The error in Arrian is plain enough, but the problem of choice between the two traditions is more complex. It looks as though the majority of sources favoured Philippus. The name occurred both in the source of the vulgate and in a subsidiary source of Arrian, probably Aristobulus. Simmias, however, seems unique to Ptolemy. Most modern scholars, if they have noticed the problem at all, have automatically opted for the Ptolemaic version ("zweifellos richtig" : Berve II Nr. 778). In that case the origins of the variant tradition are difficult to explain. Philippus, son of Balacrus, despite his impeccable Macedonian name is otherwise unknown, unless he is to be identified with the veteran of Alexander's campaigns who acted as adviser to Demetrius before the battle of Gaza (Diod. XIX 69, 1 ; Berve II Nr. 786). There seems no reason to insert a figure so obscure into the army list at Gaugamela, which is otherwise attested in all sources without significant variants.

It is more profitable, I think, to reverse the question and ask whether Ptolemy had any motive to insert the name of Simmias. The answer, I think, is given by a later passage, describing the course of the battle itself. During the Macedonian advance, according to Arrian III 14, 4, Simmias' battalion was unable to keep pace with the rest of the phalanx and a gap occurred

through which a group of Indian and Persian cavalry burst to attack the baggage train. This is a problematic passage in its own right ¹, and I can here only deal with it in outline. Alexander's line of battle consisted of a double phalanx of infantry (cf. III 12, 1), and a break-through of this nature, which on any interpretation occurred towards the middle of the battle line, ought to have been covered by the reserve line of infantry. Yet Arrian's narrative reads as though the commanders of the reserve infantry only learned of the irruption when the Persian cavalry was attacking the camp. The other, more substantial point is that in the vulgate tradition the Persian attack on the camp was a highlight of the battle. It came as a formidable well-planned circling movement ordered by Mazaeus, the commander of the Persian right, and it was the motive for an appeal for help by Alexander's lieutenant Parmenion, which was stingingly rebuffed by Alexander himself (Diod. XVII 59, 5-8; Curt. IV 15, 5-11; Plut. *Alex.* 32, 5-7). The incident was clearly a standard part of the tradition of Gaugamela, and in all probability it goes back to Callisthenes ². There is, however, no trace of a planned attack by the Persians in the account of Arrian. The only reference to an attack on the Macedonian camp is the story of the limited break-through in the centre, small in scale and easily dealt with by the reserve infantry.

¹ W. W. TARN, *op. cit.*, II 180-1 built the episode into the major incident of the battle, "the charge of the Persian guard" (followed with modifications by G. T. GRIFFITH, in *JHS* 67 (1947), 84-5). Arrian's description, however, suggests a limited break-through, small in scale and easily crushed (so E. W. MARSDEN, *The Campaign of Gaugamela* (Liverpool 1964), 59-60). The problem is that Arrian differs fundamentally from the rest of the tradition in his account of the scale, purpose, and success of the attack on the camp, and one cannot accept his version without some attempt to explain the alternative tradition. See A. R. BURN, in *JHS* 72 (1952), 88-90, who accepts the vulgate tradition of a deliberate flanking move by Mazaeus.

² For Callisthenes' portrait of Parmenion see *FGrH* 124 F 37; cf. F. JACOBY, in *RE* X 2, 1700-1; *FGrH* II D pp. 429-30; L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander* (London 1960), 47-8; J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander* (Oxford 1969), 89.

What is more, Arrian's statement that there was an attack on baggage and prisoners is inconsistent with his earlier statement (III 9, 1-2) that the Macedonian baggage was left with the prisoners in a base camp over thirty stades from the battlefield proper¹. It was hardly possible for the reserve infantry to be thrown back more than four miles and still catch the Persian cavalry, apparently without warning, in the act of plundering the camp. The vulgate account of a premeditated and largely successful attack on the base camp is certainly the more plausible, and it was apparently embarrassing to Ptolemy. If we can judge from Arrian's account, he transformed it into a limited and haphazard irruption, caused by the failure of Simmias to keep the Macedonian line intact.

Why was Simmias cast in this role? For elucidation we should turn to a later passage in Arrian (III 27, 2). In the aftermath of the trial and execution of Philotas the four sons of Andromenes were accused of complicity in the alleged plot. Their case was made far more serious by the flight of the youngest brother, Polemon, after the arrest of Philotas. According to Arrian, Amyntas made a powerful speech in his own defence and secured his acquittal. He then led the search for his fugitive brother and brought him back on the same day. Curtius, however, has a different story (Curt. VII 2, 1-10), and in it Polemon is the hero of the piece. After Amyntas' speech for the defence, a powerful composition which won the admiration even of W. W. Tarn, Curtius introduces Polemon, who had been brought back to justice by an official search party, overtaken while agonising whether or not to return. The youth made an appeal to the army assembly which resulted in the

¹ Arrian says explicitly that the Macedonian army began their march οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔτι μὴ ὅπλα φέρουσιν (III 9, 1), and, though baggage may have been moved up during the day of reconnaissance (III 9, 3-4), there is no hint or likelihood that prisoners were also moved up to the front line. In that case the prisoners who joined the attack on the camp (III 14, 5) can only have been the prisoners left in the base camp four miles to the rear.

acquittal of all the brothers. Once more this is a variant not usually noted or casually dismissed. H. Berve, for instance, dismisses Curtius' story as "dramatisch ausgeschmückt" (II 322, Nr. 644), a phrase which recurs like a clarion call—or a parrot cry—in his criticisms of the vulgate tradition. Of course Curtius' narrative is shaped for its pathetic effect; after Polemon's appeal there is literally not a dry eye in the assembly (VII 2, 7). But it is quite another thing to suggest that Curtius or his source has deliberately warped the facts to produce a display piece of rhetoric. Arrian's version had equal possibilities. Amyntas pleading with his brother to return and face justice was a theme which would have fired every rhetorical school in the ancient world. There were certainly two traditions about the return of Polemon, that of Curtius which places the fugitive himself in the limelight, and that of Arrian which makes Amyntas the undisputed hero.

Arrian's account of the trial of the sons of Andromenes probably comes from Ptolemy. At least the λέγουσι at the head of the chapter explicitly takes up the original reference to Ptolemy and Aristobulus with which Arrian began his account of the Philotas affair (III 26, 1). Now Ptolemy was a declared enemy of the sons of Andromenes, at least of Attalus and Polemon; Amyntas was decently dead shortly after his acquittal in late 330 (Arr. III 27, 3)¹. Both Attalus and Polemon were prominent members of Perdiccas' faction after Alexander's death. In 321 they had commanded the force sent to intercept the body of Alexander, and they almost succeeded in preventing Ptolemy spiriting it into Egypt as the virtual talisman of his régime (Arrian, *De hist. succ.* F 24 Roos)². In the subsequent civil war Attalus, Perdiccas' brother-in-law, commanded the

¹ It may be significant that Amyntas' battalion is associated with that of Perdiccas in Ptolemy's famous story of the unauthorised attack on Thebes (Arr. I 8, 2 = *FGrH* 138 F 3).

² On this episode see E. BADIAN, in *HSPb* 72 (1967), 189; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (München 1969), 110-11.

fleet for the invasion of Egypt, and Polemon was closely associated with him. The two brothers were captured with Perdikkas' brother, Alcetas, in their final refuge in Pisidia and imprisoned together in a fortress in Asia Minor (Diod. XVIII 45, 3; XIX 16, 1). These facts shed some light on the variant tradition of the trial in 330. Both sources agree that Polemon's flight put his brothers in jeopardy, but Curtius represents him as the instrument of their acquittal. In Arrian's story Amyntas wins his own salvation and procures the liberty of Polemon himself. It is more than possible that Ptolemy gave the story a malicious twist in order to place the actions of an enemy in a worse light. The case of Simmias is more complex. Here Ptolemy seems to have been unique in assigning him the command of his brother's battalion. It is at least possible that Simmias had held a subordinate position under his brother and later under Philippos, son of Balacrus. His younger brother, Polemon, was only a stripling in 330 (Curt. VII 2, 4: *primo aetatis flore pubescens*), and Simmias himself may not have been fully mature. In that case Ptolemy elevated him to the rank of battalion commander, so that he could lay at his door, by implication at least, the break of the Macedonian line and the attack upon the base camp. The whole procedure resembles closely Ptolemy's allegation that the Macedonian attack on Thebes was prematurely set in action by Perdikkas; the unauthorised advance resulted in a limited defeat, which the other sources attribute to Alexander himself (Arr. I 8, 1 = *FGrH* 138 F 3; cf. Diod. XVII 12, 3; Polyaeus, IV 3, 12). In both cases Ptolemy implied that his future enemies were responsible for military reverses during Alexander's reign.

Ptolemy's treatment of the sons of Andromenes takes us directly into the politics of the early years of the Successors. It seems that Ptolemy deliberately slanted his narrative in order to discredit his own later enemies and adherents of Perdikkas. Ptolemy's work, as far as such things can be proved, consistently minimised and deprecated the role of Perdikkas during

Alexander's lifetime and suppressed the achievements of men prominent in his faction¹. Why Ptolemy should have gone out of his way to falsify the record in these matters needs explanation, and the reason, I think, is directly connected with the posthumous *charisma* of Alexander. It is perfectly clear that proven service during his reign was the most important claim that dynasts could make in the generation after his death. In 316 B.C., when Antigonos learned of the intended revolt by Peithon, satrap of Media, he had to behave with great circumspection, for, says Diodorus, "it was no easy matter to arrest by force a man who had gained preferment from Alexander on grounds of merit" (Diod. XIX 46, 2). The same was true of Cassander's actions against Aristonous. Aristonous had great prestige because of his promotion under Alexander and so had to be put away in secret (Diod. XIX 51, 1). Service under Alexander was more than an insurance policy against political enemies. It had great weight diplomatically. In 317 Peucestas was the automatic choice for the command of the coalition against Antigonos because of his position as *σωματοφύλαξ* at Alexander's court and his promotion for valour (Diod. XIX 14, 4; 15, 1); and Seleucus was to claim a year later that he had received his satrapy of Babylonia for his services during the lifetime of Alexander (Diod. XIX 55, 3). All this evidence comes indirectly from a contemporary source, Hieronymus of Cardia, and there is no doubt that it was a prominent factor in the propaganda of the Successors. Now it is a well-known fact that the works both of Ptolemy and Nearchus of Crete were to a great extent monuments of their own achievements in Alexander's reign². The achievements of others were played

¹ See particularly R. M. ERRINGTON, in *CQ* 19 (1969), 235-42.

² For the characteristics of Ptolemy see C. B. WELLES, *The Reliability of Ptolemy as a Historian*, in *Miscellanea Rostagni* (Torino 1963), 101-16; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.*, 1-26. On Nearchus see particularly L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander*, 131-9, arguing that he modelled his account of his adventures upon the *Odyssey*. Odysseus, it will be recalled, was not only a wanderer but a liar! See now E. BADIAN, in *YCIS* 24 (1975), 147-70.

down or suppressed. In Arrian's narrative at least the principal heroes apart from Alexander himself are men who were dead shortly after Alexander's own death—Hephaestion, Craterus and Leonnatus. The principal dynasts in Ptolemy's own reign, Antigonus, Seleucus and Lysimachus, are notable for their obscurity under Alexander¹. If it was natural to exaggerate one's own services, it was equally natural to discredit one's enemies and imply that during Alexander's reign they had been failures, so that no services in the past could be placed against their current account.

The influence of contemporary propaganda is a trait which is fairly evident in Ptolemy/Arrian. There are, however, other tendencies less easily observed and more intractable to explain. As an example I should like to examine the historical tradition of the siege of Tyre, which is both extensive and relatively unpolluted by modern scholarship². If we look closely at Arrian's narrative, there appears an unmistakable apologetic tendency. His account of the seven month siege of Tyre makes the whole operation run very smoothly. What setbacks there are tend to occur in the earlier part of the siege, the Tyrian attacks on the end of the mole and the damage inflicted by the fireship (II 18, 5 - 19, 5). After the arrival of the fleet from Sidon towards the end of April 332, the reverses virtually disappear. The Tyrians pointedly refuse battle (II 20, 6-10),

¹ For Antigonus see Berve II Nr. 87. Seleucus' role under Alexander is summed up by Berve as "durch nichts hervorragend" (Berve II Nr. 700); he himself claimed to have enjoyed considerable success (Diod. XIX 55, 3). The career of Lysimachus is equally blank (Berve II Nr. 480). We know incidentally from Arrian that he was *σωματοφύλαξ* by 326 (V 13, 1; 24, 5; VI 28, 4), but there is no hint how or why he achieved that lofty rank.

² There has been only one important recent article on the subject, an investigation by W. RUTZ of the narrative technique of Curtius Rufus ("Zur Erzählungskunst des Q. Curtius Rufus", in *Hermes* 93 (1965), 370-82). It deals only peripherally with the value of the sources and is not central to my theme. There are passing remarks about the siege in E. W. MARSDEN, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969).

and a surprise attack on the Cypriot squadron is repelled with relative ease and complete success (II 21, 8-22, 5). The narrative underlines the successes and moves inexorably to the final assault, an impressively executed shipborne assault, which surmounted the walls and mastered the city with the loss of a mere 20 hypaspists to 8,000 Tyrian casualties (II 24, 4). There were reverses, of course. Arrian cannot conceal the fact that the attacks on the city wall from the siege mole itself were ineffective (II 21, 3), and the first shipborne assault was unsuccessful (II 22, 6-7). But even here Arrian represents the failure as limited. A large portion of the walls was shaken and Alexander made a small-scale trial attack (*ἀπεπειράθη ἐς ὀλίγον τῆς προσβολῆς*) which the Tyrians were able to beat back without excessive difficulty. Neither in this passage nor in any part of his account of the siege does Arrian even hint at substantial Macedonian casualties, which is hardly surprising if one reflects that his figure for the entire casualties during the siege is a mere 400 dead (II 24, 4).

The vulgate tradition is far more explicit about failures during the siege. Diodorus' narrative mainly covers the period after the arrival of the fleet, and he speaks of continued attacks upon the siege mole. A surprise attack upon the construction workers was completely successful, whereas an attempt by Alexander to occupy the main harbour by cutting their rear failed completely (Diod. XVII 42, 1-4; cf. Polyæn. IV 3, 4). In future Alexander used a protective screen of ships during his construction work, but even so the north-east gale caused severe damage (XVII 42, 5-6). But it is the final naval assaults which provide the most dramatic contrast with Arrian. Diodorus mentions *two* unsuccessful preliminary thrusts, the first making a breach in the wall which the Tyrians succeeded in repairing (43, 4-5); the second was apparently a joint land and sea assault which was repelled with immense losses by the sophisticated defensive tactics of the Tyrians (Diod. XVII 43, 5 - 45, 6). Curtius substantially agrees with this account. He mentions

the first attack by the fleet, which he claims was partially frustrated by the wind rising and breaking the lashings of the Macedonian troop transports (IV 3, 11-18). That was a hazard familiar to Arrian's source, for he stresses that Alexander chose a windless day for the final assault (*νηνεμίαν φυλάξας*: II 23, 1). After an interlude about the Carthaginian embassy, including details about Punic human sacrifice taken, it seems, directly from Cleitarchus (Curt. IV 3, 23; cf. *FGrH* 137 F 9), Curtius gives an account of Tyrian siege tactics which digests the longer version of Diodorus (IV 3, 24-26). Both accounts lead up to Alexander debating seriously whether or not to break off the siege (Diod. XVII 45, 7; Curt. IV 4, 1-2).

Which of these traditions deserves more credence? Tarn opted unreservedly for Arrian, but for very eccentric reasons¹. He argued that from XVII 43, 6 onwards Diodorus' account is excerpted from a Hellenistic siege manual, which had nothing to do with the siege of Tyre. Diodorus, he claimed, conflated the actual seaborne attack on Tyre with an unhistorical land assault. If Curtius has the same material, it is not through use of a common source but because he has decided to use Diodorus directly. This is clearly an absurd position, but it is worth refuting because of the misconceptions about the siege it involves. In the first place Tarn seems to think that the siege mole never reached the island of Tyre, as Diodorus states (43, 5). It is, however, perfectly clear from Arrian (W. W. Tarn's "good" tradition) that siege engines were brought to bear against the walls on the mole itself (*κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ χῶμα προσαγόμεναι διὰ ἰσχύϊν τοῦ τείχους οὐδὲν ἤνυσον*: II 22, 6). More importantly, Tarn believes that Diodorus' account of assault bridges (*ἐπιβάθραι*) thrown onto walls from towers is only appropriate to a land attack (Diod. XVII 43, 7; 46, 2). That is a consequence of his view that the assault against Tyre was conducted *at sea level* through breaches opened in the walls

¹ *Alexander the Great*, II 120-1.

from top to bottom¹. But once again he is refuted by his own "good" tradition. Arrian makes it as clear as crystal that the attackers first mounted the walls and secured the turrets and intervening parapets before *descending* into the city by way of the palace (II 23, 5-6). What is more, the capture of Massaga in 327 was effected by land, on scaling bridges thrown from siege works; Arrian says explicitly that Tyre had been stormed in this way (IV 26, 6; 27, 1). Arrian and Diodorus are in full agreement, and Diodorus gives the more helpful details. Alexander's siege engines were mounted on triremes lashed together and these engines included siege towers (Diod. XVII 46, 1-2; Curt. IV 4, 11). Towers mounted on ships were nothing new. They are attested on a small scale during the siege of Syracuse in 413 B.C. (Thuc. VII 25, 6), and shortly after Alexander's death we find Demetrius using them on a tremendous scale in the siege of Rhodes; like Alexander's towers they were mounted on ships lashed together in tandem (Diod. XX 85, 1). Later still Marcellus mounted *turres contabulatae* on pairs of *quinquiremes* for his naval assault on Syracuse (Livy XXIV 34, 7). The technique used by Alexander was clearly not to breach the walls from top to bottom, which would have required an unconscionable amount of pounding, but rather to shake the battlements sufficiently to dislodge the defenders and allow bridges to be thrown across (cf. Arr. II 23, 5; Diod. XVII 45, 5 etc.). Shipborne towers and crossbridges are integral to the final assault, and Diades, the engineer commemorated as the architect of the victory at Tyre, is said to have claimed the invention of both mobile towers and siege bridges (Athen. Mech. 10, 10). Unfortunately he refrained from describing in detail the use of the bridges and the shipborne *ἔργα* used in the assault (Athen. Mech. 15, 5 f.). It seems clear none the less that

¹ This appears to be a general assumption among modern historians of Alexander, cf. J. R. HAMILTON, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973), 72-3; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Grosse*², 218; R. LANE FOX, *Alexander the Great* (New York 1973), 190.

Diodorus' towers and bridges were shipborne and that the assault was directed against the battlements of Tyre. It was in fact a somewhat ponderous anticipation of the famous use of *sambycae* during the Roman siege of Syracuse¹.

The vulgate tradition cannot be impugned on matters of detail, and its general picture of repeated Macedonian setbacks and heavy losses seems cogent enough. There has been a recent suggestion that the Diodoran tradition may have inserted pictorial effects to make the fighting appear more evenly poised². Given the circumstances of the attack upon Tyre, however, there seems to have been no reason to invent an equally balanced contest. The defenders were in an island fortress, and their movements, concealed as they were from the enemy, had all the advantages of surprise. Nor are the horrendous details of Tyrian defensive measures unconvincing³. The defenders had seven months to develop anti-personnel weapons, and it is not surprising that they were effective. Where the bias lies is not in the vulgate but in Arrian, and the bias is not rhetorical but apologetic. Arrian's source clearly minimised the setbacks and the enormous casualties, representing the siege as a virtual catalogue of success against superhuman obstacles.

There is a very significant omission in Arrian which underlines the point. After the siege of Gaza at the very end of 332 Amyntas, son of Andromenes, was sent back to Macedon to levy recruits. The incident is reported by Diodorus and Curtius (Diod. XVII 49, 1; Curt. IV 6, 30-31; VII 1, 37-40). Although it was approaching mid-winter Amyntas was committed to the perils of the Mediterranean with ten triremes. Alexander must have been in urgent need of reinforcements,

¹ For the *sambyca* see Polybius, VIII 4, 2 ff.; Andreas of Panormus, *FGrH* 571 F 1; Appian, *Mithr.* 26, 103; 27, 105; with the discussion of J. G. LANDELS, in *JHS* 86 (1966), 69-77.

² P. A. BRUNT, in *CQ* 12 (1962), 148.

³ E. W. MARSDEN, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 102, accepts the anti-catapult measures as historical beyond question.

and Curtius makes the point explicitly: *namque etiam secundis atterebantur tamen copiae* (IV 6, 31). Now there is not a word about Amyntas' mission in Arrian's account of 332; it is only mentioned in later retrospective references (III 11, 9; 16, 10). What is more, Arrian says nothing about the numbers of troops raised by Amyntas. They are supplied by the vulgate, and they are impressive; over 15,000 troops in all, including 6,000 infantry from Macedonia alone, half the number of the phalanx troops at the start of the campaign (Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40-42; cf. Diod. XVII 17, 3). Arrian's sources appear to have omitted the original mission of Amyntas and concealed the extent of his activity. The omission is probably deliberate. Too much information about his recruiting would have shed unwelcome light on the appalling casualties of the sieges of 332, which are consistently minimised in his historical narrative.

This glossing over of Macedonian reverses and losses is not unique to the narrative of the siege of Tyre. It is a consistent motif in Arrian. There is a parallel in his description of the final sortie of the defenders of Halicarnassus two years earlier. The Persian defenders made a combined sortie, concentrating their attack on the apex of the Macedonian siege works. According to Arrian the assault was easily beaten back (οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπεστράφησαν) by a hail of missiles and the hand-to-hand attack of Alexander's men (I 22, 1-3). Diodorus has a much more detailed and quite different story. Two thousand picked defenders under the Athenian Ephialtes issued forth at daybreak in a deep phalanx and attempted to destroy the principal siege tower (XVII 26, 6). It was a brilliant attack. The Macedonians fell back in confusion, and Diodorus adds that Alexander was completely at a loss (εἰς πολλὴν ἀμηχανίαν ἐνέπιπτεν). The tide of battle was only reversed by the intervention of the Macedonian veterans held in reserve, who caught Ephialtes' men in the flush of victory and drove them back into the walls (27, 1-4). The story, it is true, is highly dramatic and provides a classic example of *περιπέτεια*, but that does not make it any

the less historical. The incident is mentioned by Curtius in the context of the Cleitus affair, where the behaviour of the veterans at Halicarnassus is brought up in vindication of the men of Philip's army (VIII 1, 36). The principal agent in the recovery is named and is a familiar figure in the vulgate tradition: Atarrhias, son of Deinomenes (Berve II Nr. 178). It looks as though the apologetic motif is again at work in Arrian; a serious reverse, rectified with the utmost difficulty, is transformed into an effortless victory. The same thing happened at an earlier stage of the narrative. The night attack launched by two drunken members of Perdikkas' battalion is presented by the vulgate as an unmitigated disaster. Many Macedonians were killed, and Alexander was forced to parley for the return of the bodies (Diod. XVII 25, 5-6). In Arrian this impromptu attack is almost a success: *παρ' ὀλίγον δὲ ἤλθε καὶ ἀλῶναι ἡ πόλις* (I 21, 3). There is no hint of serious Macedonian losses and not a word about Alexander suing for the return of his dead. Once more a humiliating Macedonian setback has been transformed into near victory, and the moral defeat of leaving the dead in enemy hands, an event almost unique in the reign¹, is totally omitted.

It is also possible to detect a more positive bias, to exaggerate the obstacles faced by Alexander in such a way as to enhance his achievement in surmounting them. Once more the siege of Tyre provides useful examples. According to Arrian the height of the city walls in the vicinity of the siege mole was no less than 150 feet and their breadth was comparable (II 21, 4). This is incredible. In the same breath Arrian states that the Tyrians increased the height of their walls still further by means of wooden towers, implying that the Macedonian siege works overtopped the walls. In that case they were far bigger than

¹ After the first abortive attack on the Persian Gates Alexander was forced to leave his dead on the battlefield (Diod. XVII 68, 4; Curt. V 4, 3; not in Arrian); but he did not on this occasion sue for their return.

Demetrius' gigantic *belepolis* at Rhodes. That monster was apparently the greatest siege engine hitherto constructed, nine stories high and with sloping sides of 100 cubits (Diod. XX 91, 3-4), and it towered up to twice the height of the walls of Rhodes. If we accept Arrian's figure, the walls of Tyre were higher than the most colossal siege engine of the Hellenistic period. It must be a deliberate exaggeration to turn the capture of the city into a superhuman feat. The same seems true of his account of the dredging operations in front of the walls. Great stones were piled up in the form of a breakwater, and they had to be winched out by triremes specially secured by iron chains. They were then loaded onto catapults and shot into deep water (II 21, 7). All this reads very circumstantially, but, one asks, how large were these stones? In fact the greatest weight of a catapult shot recorded during the Hellenistic period is three talents (c. 180 lbs.) on board Hieron's monstrous *Syracosia* (Moschion, *ap.* Athen. V 208 c). Those catapults had been specially designed by Archimedes, and they must have had far greater tensile power than Alexander's machines. In other words, either the rocks before Tyre were surprisingly small for a defensive breakwater, or Arrian's source has unscrupulously exaggerated the power of Alexander's catapults.

These exaggerations pale into insignificance when we move to the siege of Gaza. Arrian's account begins with a debate on the possibility of attack. Alexander's siege engineers claimed that the wall was impregnable because of the height of the mound on which the city was built. The king's opinion was that the more impregnable the city the greater the necessity to capture it—words prophetically reminiscent of his motive for the attack on the rock of Choriene (II 26, 2 ; cf. IV 21, 3). It comes as a surprise therefore to find that the modern city of Gaza is clustered on a low hill only 60-100 feet in height and two miles in circumference—hardly the lofty fortress Arrian claims. No other source so much as hints that Gaza was at all elevated. Arrian moves to Alexander's siege technique, the

creation of a siege mound all round the city to provide a foundation for his engines (II 26, 3). At a later stage he gives the dimensions of the mound, no less than two stades broad and 250 feet high (II 27, 3). There was surely no time during the two month siege for the construction of such a gargantuan work, and certainly no marks have been left on the landscape, as was the case with the siege works at Smyrna and Masada, or Alexander's own siege mole at Tyre. The siege mound at Gaza does not feature so prominently in the other tradition. Curtius claims that the early siege work consisted of undermining the walls, an operation which was easy enough in the sandy soil of Gaza and which Arrian himself mentions in passing (Curt. IV 6, 8; cf. Arr. II 27, 4). The siege mound appears only at a later stage of Curtius' narrative, as a support for the siege towers which overtopped the defensive superstructure of the walls of Gaza (Curt. IV 6, 21-22). There is, however, no hint that the mound encircled the city or that it played a vital part in the siege. The principal damage in Curtius' view was done by mining (IV 6, 23). Arrian's sources represented Gaza as a far more formidable fortress than it was, in order to increase the glory of its capture and maximise the effectiveness of Macedonian siege techniques. There is a similar exaggeration (for apologetic reasons) of the defensive position of the citadel of Celaenae. Arrian describes it as *πάντη ἀπότομος* (I 29, 1), whereas in fact the acropolis is connected by a neck of land to the hills on the east and is unlikely to have deterred anyone from assault¹. Alexander, however, renounced a direct attack and left a force to blockade the acropolis (Arr. I 29, 2 f.; cf. Curt. III 1, 7-8). His apologists may have

¹ For the geography of Celaenae see D. G. HOGARTH, in *JHS* 9 (1888), 349; P. BRIANT, *Antigone le Borgne* (Paris 1973), 111-2. Briant correctly emphasises the encomiastic element in Ptolemy/Arrian; his suggestion (pp. 112-6) that Curtius' narrative of the episode is an isolated excerpt from Hieronymus of Cardia is less happy.

distorted the topography and represented the fortress as precipitous all round.

Arrian's narrative, especially the military narrative, displays two distinct and complementary tendencies. Macedonian setbacks are either omitted altogether or turned into partial victories. On the other hand there seems a conscious exaggeration of the physical difficulties overcome in the course of the Macedonian victories. The overall picture is one of continuous and effortless success in the face of overwhelming obstacles. There is nothing surprising in this, even if we supposed that Arrian's material were derived ultimately from the royal archives. Encomiastic exaggeration of personal success and suppression of the unpalatable is characteristic of the official records of the ancient world from the Annals of the Hittite kings to the *Res Gestae* of Augustus, and should be startling only to those who regard the official seal as the seal of authenticity. There is, however, a halfway house between the royal archives and the histories of Ptolemy and Aristobulus; that is the work of Callisthenes of Olynthus, who wrote the first account of the campaign at the king's side and took his account down to 330 at least. It was a contemporary work, obviously written before Callisthenes' unfortunate demise in spring 327, and its tendency was overtly encomiastic¹. He apparently claimed that the fame of Alexander and his *res gestae* depended on his literary presentation. Admittedly Arrian is slightly sceptical about the authenticity of the remark (εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ζυγγέγραπται : IV 10, 1), but it is the unanimous verdict of antiquity from Timaeus onwards that Callisthenes was the archetypal court flatterer².

Some idea of his approach can be gained from Polybius' criticisms of his narrative of the battle of Issus, and it is, I think, symptomatic that his account contains the same exaggeration of

¹ On Callisthenes see particularly F. JACOBY, in *RE* X 2, 1674-1707; L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander*, 22-49, with E. BADIAN, *Studies...*, 251-2.

² Cf. *FGrH* 124 T 20-21; F 14 a.

difficulties of terrain that we detected in Arrian's descriptions of Gaza and Tyre. In particular he described the Pinarus, the river across which the battle was fought, as precipitous and inaccessible throughout its intersection of the plain of Issus (Plb. XII 17, 5 ; 22, 4). Despite the precipitous nature of the banks, the battle was apparently decided by a Macedonian cavalry charge across the river, and the difficulty of reconciling Callisthenes' description with the actual battle has bedevilled all modern reconstructions¹. It is very likely that Callisthenes exaggerated the steepness of the banks in order to place the Macedonian victory in the most favourable context. This distortion, however, recurs in Arrian's narrative. The banks of the Pinarus are twice described as precipitous, and Arrian adds that the more accessible areas were fortified by a palisade (II 10,

¹ See particularly the observations of the Austrian colonel A. JANKE, *Auf Alexanders des Grossen Pfaden* (Berlin 1904), 55-74 ; *Klio* 10 (1910), 155-62. Janke noted the impossibility of a cavalry charge across banks as steep as those described by Callisthenes, Arrian and Plutarch, and he supposed that the ancient Pinarus was the modern Deli Çay, a river whose banks are extremely level and no encumbrance to a cavalry charge. The Deli Çay, however, is too far north to be reconciled with the detailed distances of the approach march given by Callisthenes. W. DITTBERNER, *Issos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (Berlin 1908), 105 ff., reverted to the old identification of the Pinarus with the Pajas, a water-course whose banks are uniformly steep and whose position, roughly 12 miles from Iskenderun, corresponds to the 100 stades of Callisthenes (Plb. XII 19, 4). The difficulty of the cavalry charge subsisted, and Dittberner conjured from maps a relatively level stretch of terrain to the east of the Pajas, which he thought wide enough to allow Alexander passage. A. JANKE promptly drew on his first-hand knowledge to prove this level stretch apocryphal (*Klio* 10 (1910), 155 ff.), and the Deli Çay held the day as the site for the battle despite its incompatibility with the distances given by Callisthenes. The entire impassioned debate has an air of unreality when two additional factors are adduced. The whole of the coastline around Issus may have changed, and probably has changed, since antiquity. In that case Janke's painstaking measurements are irrelevant. Secondly, ancient descriptions of the Pinarus are encomiastically distorted, and the data about the steepness of the banks are especially suspect. Whatever the identification of the river, no charge at speed was possible in conditions such as those described by Callisthenes and Arrian. For a graphic description of what might happen see Arrian, IV 5, 7-9, a passage certainly derived from Ptolemy.

1 and 5). This detail about the palisade may have entered the tradition after Callisthenes, for it does not figure in Polybius' criticisms of the Macedonian manoeuvres (XII 18, 11; 22, 4), although it would have strengthened his argument. More significantly, the palisade does not recur in Arrian's battle narrative. It is obvious, however, that if any part of the banks was level enough to permit a cavalry charge at speed (*δρόμῳ*) that was the place most naturally fortified by a palisade. Arrian's narrative suggests no obstacle to the Macedonian onslaught. The palisade looks suspiciously like a supplementary fiction to exaggerate the strength of the Persian defences and so enhance the glory of victory. A more famous fiction is Ptolemy's account of the Persian casualties. Callisthenes had mentioned reports that the majority of Persians perished in the ravines created by the rain-swelled torrents from the mountains north of the battlefield (Plb. XII 20, 4). Ptolemy recorded that in the pursuit he was able to cross such a ravine upon a bridge of corpses (Arr. II 11, 8 = *FGrH* 138 F 6). Modern scepticism about this claim is surely justified, for Ptolemy was with Alexander in the van of the pursuit and the Persian dead he encountered were casualties of their own side, trampled down by their cavalry in flight (Arr. II 11, 3; Diod. XVII 34, 7). Whatever the panic in the *στενοχωρία*, the self-inflicted slaughter cannot have been as immense as Ptolemy implied.

It is perhaps a more awkward problem why Ptolemy, a veteran of the entire campaign in Asia, transmitted encomiastic distortions which he must have known were distortions. The answer can only be that he approved of Callisthenes' treatment of Alexander. One must always remember that Ptolemy had possession of the mummified body of Alexander and referred his whole legitimacy as ruler of Egypt to the king's conquests¹.

¹ It was only after 321 that Ptolemy could refer to the land as acquired (*δορίκτητος*) by his own efforts. His defeat of Perdiccas and later of Antigonus made Egypt peculiarly his (Diod. XVIII 39, 5; 43, 1; XX 76, 7), but he held it originally through right of conquest by Alexander. Not surprisingly, in the famous pro-

Indeed the Lagids had an official genealogy which associated Ptolemy with the Argead house through his mother, Arsinoe ; and it was contemporary dogma that Alexander and the rulers of Egypt were of one blood ¹. Under those circumstances it is hardly surprising that Ptolemy embraced the encomiastic history of Callisthenes. But much of the encomium concerned not only the king but the army. The Macedonians were also ἀνίκητοι and performed prodigious feats to acquire their victories. From Callisthenes' point of view this was perfectly understandable. He was writing against the background of rising disaffection in mainland Greece, which was to erupt into Agis' War of 331, and he had an immediate practical object in portraying the Macedonian army as unconquerable. Similar motives, however, existed in the time of the Successors. Having served with Alexander was one of the most formidable claims a fighting man could make. When Attalus, Polemon and six other associates broke out of their prison in Asia Minor in 316, they were able to hold several hundred guards at bay and were only subdued after reinforcements had been summoned from adjacent regions ; so great was their skill and daring, commented Hieronymus, because of their experience with Alexander (Diod. XIX 16, 1). But it was not only the officer class who were prized as veterans. The famous ἀργυράσπιδες of Antigenes played a decisive role in the long struggle against Antigonos, and it was only the fact of their changing sides, after their families had fallen into Antigonos' hands, that led to the capture and death of Eumenes (Diod. XIX 43, 9). The ἀργυράσπιδες

cession of Ptolemy Philadelphus images of Alexander and Ptolemy Soter appeared in the closest proximity (Callixenus, *FGrH* 627 F 2, *ap.* Athen. V 201 c ; 202 a ; cf. V. EHRENBERG, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford 1938), 2-7 ; P. GOUKOWSKY, in *REA* 71 (1969), 328).

¹ Cf. Satyrus, *FGrH* 631 F 1 ; *POxy.* 2465 ; with C. F. EDSON, in *HSPb* 45 (1934), 224-5 n. 2. As early as Ptolemy's lifetime a story had arisen that he was the bastard son of Philip II and therefore brother of Alexander (Curt. IX 8, 22 ; Paus. I 6, 2 ; cf. W. W. TARN, in *JHS* 53 (1933), 58).

numbered only 3,000, and they were only a fraction of the veterans of Alexander, albeit the most formidable. The rest of the phalangites seem to have been dispersed, and significantly a large number found refuge with Ptolemy. When Perdiccas invaded Egypt in 321, he was plagued by massive desertions, affecting his Macedonian troops (Diod. XVIII 33, 2; 36, 1-6). These will have comprised mainly the phalanx infantry inherited from Alexander after his death at Babylon. Subsequently the deserters formed a formidable nucleus for Ptolemy's own army. A substantial proportion of his 8,000 Hellenic infantry at the battle of Gaza (312) were of Macedonian extraction (Diod. XIX 80, 4); whereas his enemy, Demetrius, had no more than 2,000 Macedonians, who had to be supplemented by native troops and mercenaries to a total of 11,000 (Diod. XIX 82, 4). Ptolemy might well have been proud of the Macedonian core of his armies, and any propaganda extolling the invincibility of Alexander's army could only redound to the credit of his own men. The encomiastic elements of Callisthenes' history would have been more than welcome ¹.

Not all the themes propagated by Callisthenes would have been useful or relevant to Ptolemy in the generation after Alexander's death. The treatment of Parmenion is a case in point. It is well known that Callisthenes represented his behaviour at Gaugamela as ineffectual and insinuated motives of disaffection. He also suggested that it was Parmenion's second appeal for help which enabled Darius to escape capture (Plut. *Alex.* 33, 9-10 = *FGrH* 124 F 37). In Arrian's account of Gaugamela, however, Parmenion plays a perfectly honourable role. He sends one message for help when his wing was in severe difficulties (III 15, 1). Far from resenting the message, Alexander returns promptly, to find that the heroism of the Thessalians has already turned the tide (III 15, 3). That is the

¹ Note Arr. II 10, 6: *καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς φάλαγγος, ὡς ἀμάχου δὴ ἐς τὸ τότε διαβεβοημένης, μὴ ἀφανίσαι.*

only message; there is no earlier appeal during the Persian attack on the Macedonian camp (so Plut. *Alex.* 32, 6; Curt. IV 15, 6), and indeed the Macedonian camp virtually disappears from Arrian's narrative. In the prelude to the battle, moreover, Arrian has the unique detail that Parmenion proposed reconnoitring the battlefield and carried his view (III 9, 3). It is true that Arrian records a snub administered to Parmenion for his advice to attack the Persians by night. The story, however, is presented as a λεγόμενον, that is, taken from Arrian's subsidiary sources, not from Ptolemy¹. That is interesting, for the story is common to Plutarch and Curtius, and it may well derive from Callisthenes' portrait of the incompetent Parmenion. Ptolemy appears to have ignored the derogatory anecdote and included instead an illustration of Parmenion's effective generalship. The whole picture is different from that of Callisthenes, who was inevitably preparing the ground for the murder of Parmenion late in 330. The old man, he implied, was incompetent, perhaps treasonably so.

Something should perhaps be said about the series of dialogues between Alexander and Parmenion, which is such a feature of Arrian's narrative. On five occasions the old general makes suggestions which the king rejects². These debates were a feature of the general tradition of Alexander's reign; it is symptomatic that an exchange between the two men is included in Josephus' apocryphal story of Alexander's visit to Jerusalem (*AJ* XI 333-336). It is usually, and plausibly, argued that the originator of the tradition was Callisthenes³.

¹ Cf. Arr. *proem.* 3; II 12, 8; H. STRASBURGER, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, 35.

² Arr. I 13, 3-7 (Granicus); I 18, 6-9 (Miletus); II 25, 2-3 (Euphrates frontier); III 10, 1-2 (Gaugamela); III 18, 12 (Persepolis). Note also the rejection of Parmenion's letter of warning against Philip the Acarnanian (II 4, 9). For the counter-tradition of Parmenion's advice being *accepted* see Arr. III 9, 3; Curt. III 7, 8-10.

³ F. CAUER, *Jahrbücher für class. Philologie*, Suppl. 20 (1894), 33-4; H. STRASBURGER, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, 23; 25; J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander*, 89.

To add substance to his later insinuations of incompetence and disloyalty the court historian may have constructed a series of debates, representing the old general as pedestrian and unimaginative, the perfect foil to his epic portraiture of Alexander. In that case what probably gave rise to the whole tradition was the debate over Darius' proposal of a frontier at the Euphrates, the only debate which is recorded by all extant sources¹. A genuine disagreement and a genuine snub by Alexander at this point could have given the inspiration for a series of fictional debates. It is, however, uncertain how far Ptolemy followed this tradition. As we have seen, he omits the purported advice at Gaugamela to attack by night, and none of the other debates can be surely attributed to him. The advice to accept the Euphrates frontier is presented by Arrian in *oratio obliqua* as a λεγόμενον, and the debate before the crossing of the Granicus occurs immediately before a list of the Macedonian army which seems derived from Aristobulus². It is possible and probable that the entire series of debates in Arrian comes from Aristobulus and not Ptolemy. There is perhaps one exception. The debate over a sea battle at Miletus has a number of eccentricities which cannot be attributed to Callisthenes. It is Alexander who is the cautious party, rejecting on pragmatic grounds the proposal to join battle with the more numerous Persian fleet, and his language echoes that allegedly used at the Granicus by Parmenion³. Even more strikingly, Alexander hints openly that revolt in Greece would be the immediate result of a Macedonian

¹ Arr. II 25, 2-3; Plut. *Alex.* 29, 7-8; Diod. XVII 54, 4-5; Curt. IV 11, 11-15; Iust. XI 12, 10; *Itin. Alex.* 44; Val. Max. VI 4, ext. 3.

² Arr. I 14, 1-3. The phalanx battalions are here described as *phalanges* instead of τάξεις, a very rare usage (cf. III 9, 6; V 20, 3; 21, 5; Polyæn. IV 3, 27). The hypaspists are uniquely termed οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἐταίρων. These variants from Arrian's usual military terminology are likely to derive from Aristobulus.

³ Arr. I 18, 8: οὐ μικρὰν τὴν βλάβην ἔσεσθαι ἐς τοῦ πολέμου τὴν πρώτην δόξαν.
Arr. I 13, 5: καὶ τὸ πρῶτον σφάλμα ἐς τε τὰ παρόντα χαλεπὸν...

defeat¹, an admission hardly likely to have occurred in the writings of the contemporary Callisthenes, directed as they were at the contemporary Greek world. The Miletus debate, then, is atypical. There is no hostile animus against Parmenion; Alexander merely disagrees and considers Parmenion's interpretation of the eagle omen implausible (τῇ γνώμῃ ἀμαρτάνειν... καὶ τοῦ σημείου τῇ οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβλήσει). This debate may rest on fact and *may* be a corrective by Ptolemy himself of the Callisthenean picture of an over-cautious Parmenion.

It seems the case that, when Arrian's narrative is derived from Ptolemy, Parmenion is always handled respectfully and his abilities are unquestioned. Most importantly there is no attempt to represent his death as anything other than political murder. If there is any hint of his involvement in the "conspiracy" of Philotas, it is presented as a personal suspicion by Alexander alone (III 26, 4 = *FGrH* 138 F 13). After Alexander's death there was no reason to pursue the vendetta against Parmenion. He was dead, as were his sons, and his political influence had disappeared. On the other hand his memory had been respected by the Macedonian troops and his murder was bitterly resented. It is hard to see any advantage Ptolemy might have gained from blackening the memory of Parmenion, but there may have been disadvantages in attacking a man who had been so popular with the army during his lifetime.

Ptolemy's work, then, must always be viewed from the perspective of the generation after Alexander. It reflects the political bias of his day, not necessarily that of Alexander, and the encomiastic portrait of the king and his army had its uses long after the death of Callisthenes and of Alexander himself. But Ptolemy is a relatively accessible figure. The vulgate tradition presents far more difficult problems of interpretation. How can it be that its material is so much less encomiastic than

¹ Arr. I 18, 8: τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας νεωτεριεῖν. Compare the hints of Greek unrest at I 29, 6, a passage probably deriving from Ptolemy.

the Ptolemaic tradition and so rich in information, particularly from the Persian point of view? Until it can be proved that the source of the vulgate is in fact Cleitarchus, all speculation is necessarily inconclusive. It is, however, worth emphasising that Cleitarchus probably wrote before 300 B.C., perhaps before Ptolemy and in the immediate aftermath of Alexander's campaign. He was presumably able to question survivors, and there are traces in the vulgate of discussion of contemporary sources¹. What is more, Cleitarchus' father, Deinon, had written a *Persica*, a fact which may explain the emphasis the vulgate tradition gives to happenings at Darius' court². But whatever the background of the vulgate tradition, it seems undeniable that it represents a stream of historiography quite different from the sources of Arrian; and it certainly appears less permeated by the distortions of the official tradition. The prime task of the historian is to strip the factual statements in the vulgate away from the rhetoric which surrounds them in Diodorus and Curtius and to place them critically alongside the tradition of Arrian³. Until that is done, histories of Alexander will continue to repeat the distorted literary *proskynesis* of the king, which is the hallmark of the uncritical acceptance of Arrian as the only Alexander historian worth consideration.

¹ To wit, discussion of the disbanding of the Macedonian fleet (Diod. XVII 23, 1); the burning of Persepolis (Plut. *Alex.* 38, 8); and the death of Darius (Diod. XVII 73, 4). Cf. F. JACOBY, in *RE* XI 1, 651.

² *Testimonia* and fragments: *FGrH* 690. Note particularly Nepos, *Con.* IX 5, 4: *Dinon historicus cui nos plurimum de Persicis rebus credimus*.

³ This is a procedure which has been occasionally advocated (most eloquently by E. BADIAN, in *CQ* 8 (1958), 148-50). It is, however, very rarely put into practice.

DISCUSSION

M. Schachermeyr : Ich freue mich darüber, dass Herr Prof. Bosworth in der Quellenfrage zur *Vulgata* einen ganz ähnlichen Standpunkt einnimmt wie ich ihn in meinen *Alexander*-Büchern von 1949, 1968 und 1973 vertreten habe.

Die sogenannte *Vulgata* wird vor allem von drei Autoren vertreten, von Diodor, Curtius Rufus und Justinus. Sie findet sich bei Diodor am reinsten, bei Curtius und Justinus aber vermischt mit anderen Versionen. Ich möchte diese *Vulgata* auf Kleitarch zurückführen, der wieder auf folgenden Informationen beruht :


- a) schriftlich : Kallisthenes (offiziös, stark panegyrisch, aber Zeitgenosse und z.T. Augenzeuge), bestens orientiert, von Alexander z.T. inspiriert und für den griechischen Leser berechnet ;
- b) mündlich : 1) Mitteilungen von Offizieren und Soldaten Alexanders ; von Hofbeamten, usw. ;
2) Mitteilungen von Offizieren und Soldaten in persischen Diensten.

Kleitarch lebte nachher in Alexandrien und schrieb daselbst unter Ptolemaios I. (vermutliche Abfassung des Werkes vor 310 v.Chr., da bei der Aufzählung der Schandtaten Kassanders durch Diodor (Kleitarch) die Ermordung des jungen Alexander (nach 311) noch nicht erwähnt wird, weil man in Ägypten immer noch nach diesem Alexander datierte).

Wert der kleitarchischen Nachrichten verschiedenartig : Offiziers- und Beamtennachrichten sehr gut ; kallisthenische Nachrichten wegen der panegyrischen Färbung mit Vorsicht zu geniessen, sonst aber sehr wertvoll. Soldatenerinnerungen geben Augenblicksbilder, sind aber oft ungenau, neigen zu Übertreibungen, ja u.U. zu willkürlicher Erfindung.

Die Abhängigkeiten kann man so darstellen :

Überblick über das Verhältnis der einzelnen Alexander-Quellen zu einander



M. Badian : As regards Cleitarchus, I hope I established in *Proc. of the Afr. Class. Assoc.* 8 (1965) that he claimed to have been in Babylon in 323. He may therefore have written of the events following Alexander's death as an eyewitness, and it has occurred to me to wonder whether he could be the source of Curtius' account of these events, filtered, of course, through Curtius' own experiences (at whatever time—on which I need not commit myself) under the early Empire. This would obviate the assumption (which I have myself made in the past) of a change of source on the part of Curtius after Alexander's death, which nothing in Curtius' own narrative seems to impose. The actual date of Cleitarchus' work, though (as has just been shown) probably not after 310, could be at any time before, and indeed need not be much later than 323.

As regards Ptolemy, the view that he wrote his account of the campaign in his dotage, because while king he would have no time to write, seems to have been passed down unscrutinised for genera-

tions. In my review of L. Pearson's *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (in *Gnomon* 33 (1961)), I suggested that rulers and politicians have often found time to write, especially for a political purpose, and that Ptolemy might well have written his history much earlier, while actively engaged in the struggles of the Successors and as a weapon in those struggles. (I expanded this in the Introduction to my *Forschungsbericht* in *CW* 65 (1971-2).) After R. M. Errington's article in *CQ* 19 (1969), now reinforced by Mr. Bosworth's paper we have just heard, we may perhaps hope that the uncritical consensus has at last been broken and that—at least within this room—the easier and more obvious interpretation of Ptolemy's work will gain acceptance. The precise date and precise political purpose of his composition (and they would be interdependent) cannot yet be fixed with any confidence.

M. Wirth: Wie Herr Schachermeyr mit Recht betont, hat das Referat ausgezeichnet wiedergegeben, worauf es uns, worauf es künftiger Forschung ankommen muss.

Die Frage indes, die wie ich glaube noch einmal aufgeworfen zu werden verdiente, ist die nach Arrian schlechthin und von hier aus auch die nach Ptolemaios.

Im Gegensatz zu Herrn Bosworth nun möchte ich an der Spät-datierung für Arrian festhalten. Selbstzeugnisse betonter darstellerischer und sachlicher Kompetenz — man mag über diese denken wie man will — lassen sich m.E. doch wohl nur aus Erfahrungen eines Lebens und daraus resultierender Autorität verstehen. Dazu kommt persönliches, allzu persönliches Bekenntnis, wie ich es von einem Jüngeren in solchem Zusammenhang einfach für unmöglich halte. So wäre dieser Arrian mit seiner Alexandermonographie demnach im Raume zwischen Traian und Mark Aurel, nahe dem letzteren, anzusiedeln. Nach einer Reihe historischer Schriften (*Bithyniaca*, *Parthica*) von irgendwie persönlichem Bezug gab es für ihn, Taktiker und Handbuchverfasser mit eigenen Erfahrungen genug Gründe, sich das Alexandersujet zu wählen. Das Herrscherbild, gezeichnet von dem Philosophen Arrian, damit exemplifiziert, passt in solchen

Zusammenhang, ja gab vielleicht den Ausschlag. Scheint Arrians Anliegen aber das des Militärs und des literarisch versierten Staatstheoretikers — seine Darstellungsweise (vgl. *RE* XXIII 2, 2467 ff.) entspricht diesem Bemühen um Eindringlichkeit und Verständlichkeit im Detail. Für die grossen Szenen und Affären ist nicht vielleicht zuletzt deshalb sein Interesse gering; ein gleiches könnte selbst für die grossen militärischen Ereignisse gelten, Schlachten, Belagerungen, die in ihrer Einmaligkeit doch wenig an Effekt versprochen. Möglich wäre sehr wohl auch, er habe im einzelnen seine Hauptquelle korrigiert. Und nur deshalb, zur Rechtfertigung, dokumentiere er seine Belesenheit so auffallend.

Was nun diese Hauptquelle, Ptolemaios betrifft, so bleibt zu fragen, was denn Arrian mit diesem so eigenartig verband. Geringe Benutzung von dessen Opus fällt auf, besonders auffallendes, zum Nachdenken anregendes Material kann er demnach kaum gebracht haben. Obendrein, Arrians berühmte Einleitung und das *μάλιστα ἔπομαι* ... lassen an etwa grundsätzlicher Abhängigkeit in allen Dingen zweifeln. Dann aber bliebe wohl nur eine gewisse Verwandtschaft der Interessen in den Intentionen, die Arrian in seiner Quelle finden zu können glaubte. Das hiesse aber denn doch wohl, in seiner Darstellung müsse Ptolemaios den militärischen, taktischen Sektor herausgearbeitet haben. Dass dieser freilich allein sein Anliegen war, ist nicht gesagt.

Ich glaube nicht, dass die neuerdings wieder diskutierte Frage nach dem Zeitpunkt des ptolemäischen Alexander bei all dem von grossem Belang ist.

An politischen Gründen für eine solche Publikation gab es zu allen Zeiten genug; den Grad etwa von Altersdebität des Diadochen nach Amtsübergabe kennen wir nicht, und mit einem Demetrios von Phaleron im Hintergrunde halte ich alles für möglich.

Herr Bosworth hat nun am Beispiel der Andromenessöhne und der Perdikkasrolle bei Ptolemaios recht deutlich die Paradebeispiele herausgearbeitet dafür, in welche Richtung diese Gegenwartsabsichten gegangen sein könnten, dazu etwa passt sein berühmtes Perdikkasbild und andererseits, was er für sich selbst als Assoziationen

anklingen lässt. Viel mehr, fürchte ich, wird sich mit unseren Möglichkeiten auf direktem Wege kaum erarbeiten lassen. So wären es denn zwei Dinge, die auffallen. Das Militärische, m.E. bewusst für den Bereich des Trivialen herausgearbeitet, und das Politische, d.h. die Abqualifizierung von Personen, die Ptolemaios je im Wege gestanden hatten. Indes, erfüllte Ptolemaios möglicherweise mit solcher Darstellung ein literarisches Desiderat, gerade dieser militärische Aspekt liess sich dann sehr wohl als Insinuationsmedium für den zweiten, eben jenen aktuell-politischen, verstehen. Politische Propaganda bestand zu allen Zeiten nicht zuletzt in Verwendung einer Vielfalt von scheinbar frappierenden Möglichkeiten: Was hier sich böte, passte gut zu den anderen Raffinessen, an denen anderen Quellen nach ptolemäische Politik der ersten zwanzig Regierungsjahre keineswegs arm zu sein scheint.

M. Errington: One point about the military aspect of the narratives of Ptolemy and Arrian, for the quality and competence of which both have been so widely praised, seems to emerge from Bosworth's paper, which has much wider implications. If, as now seems probable, Callisthenes was responsible for much of the exaggeration which Bosworth has exposed, then Ptolemy and Arrian, both men with military interests and experience must in turn have taken over quite thoughtlessly (or deliberately) the military nonsense of Callisthenes, some of which was publicly criticised at least as early as Polybius. Thus the value of the narratives, even judged merely as military narratives, seems now to have been made questionable; and this contributes still further to my doubts as to the mainly military nature of Ptolemy's narrative.

On a different point, Mr. Badian has suggested the possibility that Cleitarchus may have been the eyewitness source whose account Curtius followed for events at Babylon after Alexander's death. I have earlier suggested that this may have been Hieronymus of Cardia, writing on information supplied by Eumenes. Merely to give a name to an eyewitness (in view of the progressive rehabilitation of Cleitarchus) need no longer be a major pre-occupation of

source critics, as long as the central importance of the need to use Curtius here is recognised. Nevertheless I still incline towards Eumenes as being the ultimate source of these chapters, since the hypothesis seems to me to explain best Curtius' apparent knowledge of what the high officers were doing.

M. Schachermeyr: Der Ausdruck *Vulgata* stammt aus der Zeit der « Geheimratshistorie », in der man nur den offiziellen Äusserungen bedingungslos glaubte, und alles übrige verdächtigte. Heute wissen wir, dass gerade offizielle und offiziöse Nachrichten als besonders verdächtig zu gelten haben. Ebenso aber auch alles Inoffizielles. Es muss eben alles als verdächtig gelten und kritisch untersucht werden. So kann man z.B. auch Aristobul im letzten Buch Arrians mit seinen Nachrichten über Alexander und Babylon nicht ohne Kritik hinnehmen, denn sie wirken wie mündliches Gerede. Ich würde den Gegensatz *Vulgata* — *Nichtvulgata* am liebsten fallen lassen. Ebenso missfällt mir der in neuerer Zeit konstruierte Gegensatz Militärisch (so Ptolemaios und Arrian) zu Nichtmilitärisch (Kallisthenes), denn auch Kallisthenes könnte sich als Historiker (vgl. seine phokische Schrift) für Militärisches interessiert haben und Kleitarch hatte vieles von Offizieren und Technikern. Ich rate daher zu gleichmässiger Kritik bei allen Quellen und rate von einer blinden Ptolemaios-Verherrlichung ab.

M. Bosworth: I should like to make a few, somewhat unconnected points. In the first place I agree with Prof. Wirth that Arrian took a very serious view of his literary task. He claims that the subject attracted him because of the inadequacy of the subject required his own special talents. Indeed the success of his work would guarantee his primacy in Greek letters (*Anab.* I 12, 5). But the pretensions are a very different thing from the actual performance, and Arrian can be almost incredibly negligent in his use of sources and in particular his combination of variant authorities. It is difficult to take too seriously an author who can in consecutive sentences place a battalion at different places in the battle line, as Arrian does in the

case of Craterus at the Granicus (I 14, 2-3), or give a double report of an important event such as Craterus' march to Carmania, which is placed at two different places without any attempt to reconcile the variants (VI 15, 5 ; 17, 3). It is the literary presentation, above all the encomiastic picture of Alexander, which concerns him ; scrupulous accuracy in his reproduction of the sources is clearly a secondary matter.

This carelessness on Arrian's part helps in one of the most difficult problems in the dating of the vulgate. Prof. Schachermeyr, Prof. Badian and myself have argued for dating Cleitarchus in the first generation after Alexander's death, in the last decade of the fourth century. The primary obstacle to that dating is the famous vulgate story of Ptolemy's wound at Harmatelia and his cure at the hands of Alexander, enlightened in a dream by a friendly snake (Diod. XVII 103, 7-8 ; Curt. IX 8, 22 ff.). It is hard to believe that Ptolemy, if he wrote after Cleitarchus, would have passed over such a golden opportunity to commemorate his closeness to Alexander. But the only evidence that he omitted the episode is the fact that it does not occur in Arrian. That is clearly an unsafe deduction given Arrian's general carelessness, and indeed the description of the Indus journey between the Malli town and Patala is one of the most confused episodes in Arrian, with constant oscillation from source to source. He might easily have passed over Ptolemy's account of the stirring events at Harmatelia. At all events silence in Arrian does not guarantee an omission by Ptolemy.

The principal problem facing Alexander historians is to determine the limits of the vulgate and of Ptolemy/Arrian. Criteria for deciding between them can only be established by continuous and rigorous examination of the two traditions, and the yardstick will often be the vague concept of "innere Wahrscheinlichkeit". What is needed is a continuous assessment of the *facts* transmitted by the two traditions, viewed in isolation from their literary and rhetorical presentation and without preconceived notions of their relative value. That, I think, is a principle that everybody here would agree upon.

M. Wirth: Eine Frage an Herrn Bosworth wäre es m.E. noch, wie er den Mangel an Hinweisen auf Griechenland bei Arr. *Anab.* III (Jahr 331) sich erklärt, springt das Abbrechen mitten in der Agis-affäre doch geradezu ins Auge. Dass Ptolemaios sich an Kallisthenes hielt und über ihn hinaus von Hellas nichts mehr brachte, wäre möglich, gesetzt den Fall, Kallisthenes hat alles auf Griechenland Bezogene überhaupt noch in extenso bringen können. Für möglich halte ich, Ptolemaios vermied einfach, was heisses Eisen wohl zu Lebzeiten Alexanders und wohl auch noch bei Abfassung seines Werkes war. Und auch dies liesse sich dann als Politicum verstehen.

Was Arrian betrifft, ich würde dabei sogar so weit gehen, zu behaupten, Unstimmigkeiten, *lapsus calami* und offenkundige Fehler legten nahe, zur eigentlichen Vollendung sei es gar nicht mehr gekommen. Verweise auf die *Indike* widersprechen dem nicht.

M. Bosworth: Personally I hardly think the *Anabasis* shows any sign of incompleteness. That is a position only tenable on the hypothesis that the work was produced in Arrian's old age, so that he died before its final revision. If, as the evidence strongly suggests, it was a relatively early work, preceding the *Bithyniaca*, *Parthica*, and the *History of the Successors*, one can only conclude that Arrian himself considered the work a finished product (as its last sentence implies). In that case the inaccuracies and omissions are the result of historical incompetence; they cannot be viewed as symptoms of incompleteness.

It is certainly true that the reports of events in Greece, which are a prominent feature of the narrative of Books II and III, end after Hegelochus' report in Egypt (III 2, 3-7). Arrian never gives us the story of the end of Agis' War and the Macedonian victory at Megalopolis. I tend to think that the incompleteness results from the abrupt termination of Callisthenes' work. As H. Strasburger argued, the reports of events in Greece tend to be presented as reports to Alexander by the officers in charge. Now the report of Megalopolis can hardly have reached Alexander before spring 330, probably too late for incorporation in Callisthenes' work. That

may be over-speculative, but it seems to me certain that the omission of Megalopolis is either the sign of an omission in Arrian's sources or of sheer negligence. It is hardly a sign that the *Anabasis* is incomplete.

M. Milns: Mr. Bosworth is correct in emphasising the political aims of Ptolemy's history in the context of the struggles of the successors. But it is necessary to exercise caution lest we give the political aspect an emphasis beyond its due. It is possible that the political justification of himself—and the denigration of his enemies, such as Perdiccas—was only an *incidental* aspect of the work, not the main object, and that Ptolemy was indeed intending to write a more accurate "official" history of the military and administrative aspects of the campaign than had hitherto been done. We may accept the priority of Cleitarchus over Ptolemy and Aristobulus; but Schachermeyr rightly demonstrates that Cleitarchus' work contains much first-hand information from such eyewitnesses as soldiers and court-officials. This kind of evidence is likely to give a lively, but incomplete picture. Ptolemy, it could be argued, was attempting to correct this tendency by giving the overall and more factually accurate picture of the *course* of events. The incident of the Malli town can only be explained as proof of the priority of Cleitarchus to Ptolemy.

Whilst I am reluctant to accept Bosworth's argument that the *Anabasis* was intended by Arrian to be, as it were, a "trial piece" for his *Bithynian history*, I believe that he rightly emphasizes Arrian's concern with his *style*.

The impression we get, indeed, is frequently that of a transcriber rather than an analytical historian; and Arrian's reputation as a military man is hardly enhanced by his narrative in the *Anabasis*, especially in such matters as his accuracy in giving troop-details and in describing and holding together the threads of several contemporary events. In general, one receives the impression that Arrian knew and understood as little as, if not less than, we do about the technicalities of Macedonian military and political institutions.

M. Bosworth: Other works of Arrian hardly inspire confidence in Arrian's abilities. I am thinking of the *Parthica* in particular, certainly a work of his maturity. If we can trust Photius' summary, it gave a highly romanticised account of the origins of the Arsacid house and it is basically inaccurate. The accounts of Strabo and even Justin are far preferable (as J. Wolski has shown), and attempts to use Arrian result in hopeless confusion.

M. Schachermeyr: Ptolemaios wurde m.E. durch folgende Motive zur Abfassung seines Werkes veranlasst:

- 1) Er wollte vielerlei Falsches, was er in der Alexander-Literatur fand, korrigieren und ein militärisch-sachliches Alexander-Bild entwerfen.
- 2) Da die Metaphysik des hellenistischen Königtums (und damit auch seines eigenen Königtums) auf der Metaphysik der Würde Alexanders beruhte, sollte sein Alexander-Bild die hohe und unantastbare Würde des Welteroberers herausstellen. Der Welt sollte ein offizieller Alexander (ganz ohne Intimes und ohne private oder sonstige Schwächen) gezeigt werden.
- 3) Das Werk sollte auch den Aufstieg des Generalstäblers Ptolemaios in v o r n e h m e r Weise und ohne Übertreibungen anschaulich machen.
- 4) Bei dieser Gelegenheit konnte auch einiges Missgünstiges gegenüber Perdikkas und anderen eingeflochten werden.

M. Schwarzenberg: Mr. Bosworth suggests Arrian's use of Callisthenes for passages in which the dangers and difficulties overcome by Alexander are exaggerated. Indeed he is likely to have heightened Tyre's walls and increased the enemy's losses to an improbable, an impossible extent.

Mr. Bosworth sees in these gross exaggerations so much propaganda demanded by Alexander to counter disaffection in Greece.

Now the heroic nature of Callisthenes' epic prose was apparent not only in the assimilation of his characters and situations to those

of Homer, but also in the size of his landscape and the number of the slain. Callisthenes took the liberties demanded by his encomiastic genre.

To see reasons of state behind such simple fun seems to me far-fetched.

M. Bosworth: I would not disagree that the Callisthenean picture of Alexander results from the man's literary ambitions. If Arrian's statement of his intentions (as is likely) is derived ultimately from the preface of the *Πράξεις Ἀλεξάνδρου* (cf. Arr. IV 10, 1), there is no doubt that his work was blatantly and overtly encomiastic. But I cannot believe that Alexander was indifferent to events in Greece. Arrian repeatedly stresses his suspicions of both Athens and Sparta (cf. I 18, 8; 29, 6; II 15, 5; III 6, 3), and suggests that he felt it necessary to intimidate the cities of Greece. What is more, Alexander of all men should have known how acutely his constant demands for reinforcements had affected Macedonian reserves of manpower. At least in 331 Antipater had serious difficulty in raising an army to meet the crisis in the Peloponnese. Under those circumstances there was an immediate practical purpose in emphasizing that 8000 Tyrians could be killed for the loss of 20 hypaspists, and Alexander doubtless encouraged his historian to underline the point.

M. Errington: One must consider the potential audiences for whom the authors were writing. It must surely be the case that Callisthenes, whatever his ultimate objectives in writing and whatever form the final work would have taken, intended his purple passages—I am thinking particularly of the Homeric colouring of events in Asia Minor—to be read in the first instance for the entertainment of Alexander himself.

In the case of Ptolemy the question is more difficult and touches on the problem of the character of the whole work. However, what is perhaps more important for the history of Alexander than the question when the work was actually written are the clear indications in Arrian, which Bosworth's paper has again emphasized, that at

least part of Ptolemy's purpose was personal and justificatory, in at least this limited sense therefore political. But since the work was clearly not a political pamphlet with an obvious flagrant message which could be quickly reacted to, we should perhaps seek this political context in Alexandria, where the legitimacy of Ptolemy's rule through his connection with—or at least importance under—Alexander most needed to be asserted (and where his book was most likely to be read and his version of events to find acceptance). This means therefore that the book was written at a time when this need was still deeply felt; and an earlier rather than a later date during his period of rule still seems to me most likely.

M. Hurst : Une question plus nettement littéraire, mais qui a son importance pour l'histoire et se situe dans l'axe d'un certain nombre de remarques faites à propos du style d'Arrien : certes, on aimerait disposer d'une œuvre théorique d'Arrien lui-même sur l'art d'écrire (dans ce sens, on a plus de chance avec Plutarque : on pourrait se risquer, non sans résultats, à lire sa *Vie d'Alexandre* à la lumière du *De audiendis poetis*, par exemple); pourtant, il existe peut-être une direction indiquée involontairement par Arrien lui-même. Le défi sur lequel se termine sa préface fait irrésistiblement songer à la remarque fondamentale d'Aristote sur le style : διαφέρει γὰρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὥδι ἢ ὥδι εἰπεῖν (*Rh.* 1404 a 9-10). D'autres indices pointeraient encore, semble-t-il, vers une influence de l'art poétique des péripatéticiens; mais peu importe : nous sommes ramenés à l'importance du μῦθος dans la *Poétique*, et c'est là que j'aimerais en venir. Entre le fait « pur » que voudrait atteindre l'historien et l'analyse de la λέξις d'Arrien, sur laquelle on a beaucoup écrit, il y a peut-être place pour un examen des μῦθοι, des schèmes littéraires à grande échelle (par opposition à l'examen des figures rhétoriques), dans la mesure où l'on peut en déceler de constants (le professeur Bosworth indique pratiquement cette voie lorsqu'il décèle une περιπέτεια par exemple). Ce qui est incohérence aux yeux de l'historien ne pourrait-il pas en définitive se révéler, chez un écrivain aussi conscient de son

art, comme le résultat d'une prééminence de l'écrit et de ses contraintes propres, sur l'observation et l'expérience ?

M. Bosworth : One would dearly like to know how far Arrian has transformed the raw material of his source in the compilation of his work. But, unlike Lucian, he has given us no historiographical principles, and in the absence of his primary sources there is no possibility of carrying out the sort of detailed analysis which is possible with Polybius and Livy. M. Hurst has certainly raised an important question, but given the deficiencies of the source tradition, no answer is possible, even in principle.