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### III

ROBERT D. MILNS

## THE ARMY OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

The topic is one which, surprisingly in view of the fact that the reign of Alexander is largely the story of a military campaign of eleven years' duration, has received comparatively slight treatment from modern scholars. Proof of this can be gained by comparing the slender amount of space devoted by J. Seibert in his *Alexander-Forschungsbericht* to "Das Heerwesen" with the vastly swollen body of literature cited in the same work on such a peripheral matter as Alexander's visit to Jerusalem. There is still no major book devoted entirely to the subject and the most significant general discussions are still those of J. G. and H. Droysen, A. von Domaszewski, H. Berve and W. W. Tarn, supplemented by discussions in the general histories of Alexander—the views of Professor F. Schachermeyr may be singled out here for special mention—and a not too bulky list of journal articles on specific subjects, such as those of G. T. Griffith, P. A. Brunt and E. Badian on the Macedonian cavalry, G. T. Griffith and J. R. Hamilton on the various battles and myself on various aspects of the infantry. The most recent and up-to-date discussion of the Macedonian elements in Alexander's army is the still unpublished doctoral thesis of Dr. R. Lock, a pupil of Professor E. Badian. This is a fine, scholarly piece of work, of which I had the privilege to be an

examiner and of which I have made extensive use in this paper. It is to be hoped that Dr. R. Lock will not be long in publishing his more important conclusions.

Not only is the topic an important one, but it is one of great extent, covering the fields of administrative organisation, tactics and strategy and politics ; and each one of these three major divisions would be capable of book-length treatment.

Nor are we given much help by our ancient sources when examining all these problems. Contemporary accounts are virtually non-existent ; and of our surviving Alexander-historians, Plutarch, Diodorus and Curtius have little knowledge of or interest in the technicalities of Macedonian military institutions. Arrian is still, *faute de mieux*, our best—that is, our most informative—guide. Arrian, because he was a soldier himself and because he used Ptolemy, contains much detailed information on such matters as the technical terminology current in Alexander's army, the size of troop-detachments and their commanders. But, on the other hand, Arrian, either because he was a soldier himself and assumed that all his readers would be in the same position, or because he himself did not understand the information he found in Ptolemy, never gives us any indication of the composition and structure of the individual units and hardly ever goes beyond hinting at or alluding vaguely to important changes in organisation and functions within the army.

The problems, then, are numerous and the scope is vast ; and it is for this reason that I have decided that in a paper of this length more profit would be gained by a narrowing down of the topic, with a more detailed examination of the issues involved. I have, accordingly, limited myself to looking at some of the questions concerning that most enduring and solid section of the Macedonian army, the so-called "phalanx" of the *pezbetaeri*. My justification for this limitation of extent is not only the near impossibility of dealing adequately with the whole army in so short a space of time, but also the fact that

I believe that several new conclusions about the general nature of Alexander's aims and policies can be gained from a detailed study of these phalangites. Moreover, a particular impulse in this direction has recently been given by the publication of Professor A. B. Bosworth's important paper on *asthetaeri*, to which I shall make frequent reference.

#### THE ORIGINS OF THE PEZHETAERI

There seems to be general agreement among scholars that the phalanx had its origins in the levies of the peasantry of the individual districts of Macedonia and was organised and recruited on a territorial basis<sup>1</sup>. On the basis of the famous fragment 4 (Jacoby) of Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72), the soldiers of the phalanx were, at some time, given the collective name *pezhetaeri*, Foot Companions, being thereby placed in a position of equality, *vis-à-vis* the King, with the Companions of the cavalry. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 348) gives a definition of who the *pezhetaeri* were and how they were recruited. The two fragments are crucial to any discussion of the term *pezhetaeri* and may be set out here in full:

*Theopompus, F 348 Jacoby*: Θεόπομπός φησιν ὅτι ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπίλεκτοι οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι ἔδορυφόρου τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πεζέταιροι.

*Anaximenes, F 4 Jacoby, ap. Harpocr. s.v. Πεζέταιροι*: Δημοσθένης Φιλιππικοῖς. Ἀναξιμένης ἐν α' Φιλιππικῶν περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου λέγων φησὶν· ἔπειτα τοὺς μὲν ἐνδοξοτάτους ἰππεύειν συνεθίσας ἑταίρους προσηγόρευσε, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς εἰς λόχους καὶ δέκαδας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς διελὼν πεζεταίρους ὠνόμασεν, ὅπως ἑκάτεροι μετέχοντες τῆς βασιλικῆς ἑταιρίας προθυμότατοι διατελῶσιν ὄντες.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 113; KROMAYER/VEITH, 99; TARN II 144; R. D. MILNS, *Alexander the Great* (London 1968), 46 ff.

It will be noticed immediately that there are important discrepancies between the two fragments. Anaximenes extends the name *pezbetaeri* to all the Macedonian infantry; Theopompus regards them as picked troops (ἐπίλεκτοι) and as Royal Bodyguards (ἐδορυφόρου τὸν βασιλέα), not as line-infantry<sup>1</sup>. Anaximenes attributes the institution to a King Alexander; Theopompus—as cited in the fragment—makes no attribution. Demosthenes, speaking about 350 B.C. and the earliest contemporary evidence for the *pezbetaeri*, gives no indication of the nature of the troops except that they were extremely well trained. The problem is one of reconciling the accounts of the two fragmentary historians. Were the *pezbetaeri* a picked force (as Theopompus states) or were they the native Macedonian levy (as Anaximenes implies with his use of τοὺς πλείστους)?<sup>2</sup> Are Theopompus and Anaximenes talking about

<sup>1</sup> This "bodyguard" idea is found consistently in the other lexicographers who discuss the term (and often with specific reference to bodyguards of Philip II). Cf. *Etymol. Magn.* s.v. Πεζεταίρους: τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Φιλίππου φρουροὺς. Ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι καὶ πρῶτοι καὶ ἰσχυροί; Hesych. s.v. Πεζεταίροις: τοῖς περὶ τὸν βασιλέα δορυφόροις; Phot. *Lex.* s.v. Πεζέταιροι: ... Δημοσθένης δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Φιλίππου φρουροὺς οὕτως ὀνομάζει, οἱ ἦσαν καὶ πιστοὶ καὶ ἰσχυροί... (Demosthenes, in fact, says nothing about their being Philip's *guards*). It would seem highly probable, from the words used, that Theopompus is the ultimate source of each of these lexicographers. We might note, at this point, that the word *pezbetaeri* is of quite rare occurrence in ancient literature and, with one exception (Plut. *Fam.* 17, 8), confined to the period of Philip and Alexander the Great. As far as I can see, outside of the references and citations in the *lexica* and the Plutarch passage, Arrian is the only other ancient writer to use the term. In A. G. Roos' 1967 Teubner edition of the *Anabasis* the word appears eight times in the text. A. B. Bosworth has recently pointed out to us (in *CQ* 23 (1973), 245 ff.) that in the majority of the occasions on which the word appears in the editions of Arrian's *Anabasis* the correct reading of the text should be ἀσθέταιροι or ἀσθέτεροι, this being the original and best attested reading of the mss. of Arrian and πεζέταιροι being the emendation of Nicolaus Blancardus. This is true; but there are still three passages in the *Anabasis* (I 28, 3; VII 2, 1; VII 11, 3) where πεζέταιροι is undoubtedly the correct reading and must be retained. Arrian almost certainly took the word over from Ptolemy. The term *astbetaeri* will be discussed later.

<sup>2</sup> I cannot see the need to excise as a gloss the words τοὺς πεζοὺς from Anaximenes' text, as does A. MOMIGLIANO, *Filippo il Macedone* (Firenze 1934), 9.

the same thing? Who was the King Alexander who, according to Anaximenes, so organised 'the majority and the infantry' and called them *pezbetaeri*? The general tendency among scholars has been to accept the account of Anaximenes, whilst either ignoring or explaining away the conflicting testimony of Theopompus, and to try to determine which of the three Macedonian kings named Alexander is meant by Anaximenes. Several scholars, indeed, have gone further than this: arguing that the Alexander *must* be Alexander II, they say that the brevity of his reign (369-8 B.C.) meant that such extensive reforms as Anaximenes describes could only have been carried out by a King who had both the energy and the opportunity to put them into operation. This was obviously Philip II, under whose reign (c. 350) the *pezbetaeri* first appear, and who is credited by Diodorus<sup>1</sup> with the introduction of the phalanx and the sarissa. The reforms described by Anaximenes and Diodorus are obviously one and the same thing; and Anaximenes' accuracy in his attribution is saved by the assumption that Alexander II was the *originator* of the idea, but Philip the man who translated it into reality. Among the proponents of Philip have been such distinguished scholars as W. W. Tarn<sup>2</sup>, G. Plaumann<sup>3</sup>, J. Kaerst<sup>4</sup>. I also, in my article on 'Philip II and the Hypaspists'<sup>5</sup>, worked on this assumption when arguing about the institution of the corps of the hypaspists and argued that when Theopompus called the King's bodyguard *pezbetaeri*, he really meant the hypaspists. His confusion, I argued, was due to the very recent formation of the hypaspist-corps and to the fact

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVI 3 and XVI 13.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. II 141: "some earlier King, probably his [*sc.* Alexander's] father ... made the national Macedonian levy of infantry his Companions."

<sup>3</sup> In *RE* VIII 2, 1378.

<sup>4</sup> *Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters* I (Leipzig 1901), 194.

<sup>5</sup> In *Historia* 16 (1967), 509-12.

that their equipment was identical with that of the levies of the phalanx, from whom the hypaspists were recruited—a confusion easily made by “Greeks not intimately connected with the Macedonian military circle”. I must confess now that this was a somewhat cavalier way of dismissing the testimony of Theopompus, who, if any Greek, could be called intimate with Macedonia, its court, army and institutions <sup>1</sup>; and must acknowledge the sense of V. Costanzi’s remark about Anaximenes, that (p. 167) “Uno storico che ha intitolato l’opera sua proprio Φιλιππικὰ, e per giunta contemporaneo, non può aver commessa tale inesattezza” (viz. as to attribute the army reform to ‘Alexander’, if Philip were the innovator) <sup>2</sup>. V. Costanzi argues that Diodorus only attributes to Philip the introduction of the phalanx-formation and the sarissa, not any of the other innovations spoken of by Anaximenes, and concludes (p. 165), “specialmente perché Anassimene ne ha parlato nel libro I, che probabilmente conteneva un riassunto introduttivo del periodo anteriore a Filippo”, that the Alexander must be Alexander I, Philhellene. A. Momigliano, both in his *Filippo il Macedone* <sup>3</sup> and his article ‘Re e popolo in Macedonia’ <sup>4</sup>, also argues for Alexander I and dismisses the arguments advanced for Alexander II on the ground that, if it were indeed Alexander II, the reforms made by Archelaus, mentioned by Thucydides (II 100, 2), would be reduced to nothing. This particular argument is a dubious one, since it depends on one’s willingness to interpret the ὄπλα of Thucydides’ text as meaning ὄπλιται and ignores the evidence of writers such as Polyaeus <sup>5</sup> and Xenophon <sup>6</sup>, who indicate quite clearly that in the early part of the

<sup>1</sup> On Theopompus’ sojourn in Macedonia, see now *RE* V A 2, 2176 ff.

<sup>2</sup> V. COSTANZI, in *Athenaeum* N. S. 8 (1930), 157 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 8-11.

<sup>4</sup> In *Athenaeum* N. S. 13 (1935), 3 ff.

<sup>5</sup> II 1, 17, on 394 B.C.

<sup>6</sup> *HG* V 2, 40, on 379 B.C.

fourth century B.C. Macedonia was still lacking in properly trained and equipped infantry forces. Among the very rare group of scholars who have argued for Alexander the Great is O. Abel<sup>1</sup>, who argues that the Anaximenes fragment refers to the introduction of Persians by Alexander into the *betaeri*. This view, however, is quite untenable, since, firstly, it would have been quite absurd for Harpocration, in commenting upon a passage in Demosthenes which refers to a military institution early in Philip's reign, to cite a passage referring to a very controversial innovation at the end of Alexander's reign; and, secondly, the one thing that Alexander the Great did not do when he organised his Persian 'Macedonian' units after the mutiny of Opis<sup>2</sup>—units which, moreover, seem to have been organised purely as a psychological means of breaking the resistance of the Macedonians and to have been disbanded as soon as the mutiny was ended—was to use the mass of the Persians in the infantry, but the specially picked and trained Persians, either the so called *Epigoni* or the 20,000 Persians under Peucestas<sup>3</sup>.

Recently there have been two further attempts made at interpreting the Anaximenes and Theopompus fragments, both, unfortunately, still unpublished. One is the discussion of R. Lock, in his doctoral thesis on Alexander's army<sup>4</sup>, the other a long note by G. T. Griffith in two parts, entitled 'Theopompus F 348 and Anaximenes F 4' and 'Pezhetaeri and Asthetaeri'. This note is intended, I understand, to be included

<sup>1</sup> O. ABEL, *Makedonien vor König Philipp* (Leipzig 1847), 131 n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. VII 11, 3.

<sup>3</sup> For the *Epigoni*, see Arr. VII 6, 1; for the Persians under Peucestas, Arr. VII 23, 1.

<sup>4</sup> R. LOCK, *The Army of Alexander the Great*, doctoral thesis in the School of History in the University of Leeds, supervised by Professor E. Badian.



as an appendix in G. T. Griffith's volume of the *History of Macedonia*; and I had the pleasure and benefit of discussing the note with the author during 1974, when I was resident in England. R. Lock (p. 18 ff.) points out that Demosthenes, in the passage in the *Second Olynthiac*, is making a clear distinction between the privileged *pezbetaeri* and the mass of Macedonians in general, who derive no benefits from Philip's policies; therefore, he argues, the implication is that the *pezbetaeri* did not consist of the whole infantry levy of Macedonia—at least, at the time when Demosthenes was speaking—as has commonly been believed, but “was a select body formed to be a household guard, alongside the *betairoi* cavalry, and it is to the creation of this unit that Anaximenes is referring” (p. 19). R. Lock argues for Alexander II as being the King responsible for the innovations described by Anaximenes and believes that this élite corps of *pezbetaeri* was trained in phalanx-tactics and that it was from these troops that there eventually developed the Macedonian phalanx as we see it in the reigns of Philip and Alexander the Great. R. Lock's explanation of the institution of the *pezbetaeri* as a select, élite guard of the King (in his view, Alexander II) has the merit of doing justice to the implications of the Demosthenes passage and the specific statement of Theopompus, to whom, despite his censorious nature, much credence should be given. It does not, however, satisfy the definite statement of Anaximenes that the Alexander in question organised τὸς πλείστους in the manner described and called them *pezbetaeri*. Here we may turn to G. T. Griffith's note on the subject. Griffith makes the very sensible point that it is reasonable to assume that Theopompus is describing the *pezbetaeri* as he saw and knew them in Macedonia in the late 340's and that Theopompus means neither more nor less than what he says: the *pezbetaeri* of Philip were a picked force of king's guards, not the general levy of the Macedonians. For the detailed accuracy of the Anaximenes fragment Griffith has little but contempt, and Anaximenes, it may be noted, did not enjoy

a high reputation as an historian in antiquity<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, Theopompus may be regarded as a good witness, having been resident in Macedonia. The only possible way of reconciling the two passages, if we accept the veracity of Theopompus, is to assume that Anaximenes, in a confused and garbled manner, is saying that Alexander the Great widened the application of the existing name of Companions to include or embrace all the Macedonian heavy cavalry, as compared with the Royal Squadron, which had hitherto been exclusively the cavalry Companions of the King<sup>2</sup>, and the application of the existing name of Foot Companions to include all the Macedonian infantry of the phalanx. In this way the two passages under discussion, Theopompus F 348 and Anaximenes F 4, can be brought into harmony and there is now, to use Griffith's words, "at least a sequence of development here that makes sense". The reason for this extension by Alexander to all the heavy Macedonian cavalry and all the phalanx-infantry of the honorific title of Companions was precisely as Anaximenes says: "in order that each of the two classes, by sharing in the royal Companionship, should be always exceedingly loyal [*sc.* to the King]." Alexander the Great, as has been pointed out by some scholars<sup>3</sup>, was in a comparatively insecure position at the start of his reign and virtually in the tutelage of the family of Parmenion, which held nearly all the senior positions in the expeditionary force. Alexander's two most pressing problems in the early years of his reign were to prevent any recrudescence of local separation among the Macedonian dynastic houses and to break the power of Parmenion's faction and win the loyalty

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dion. Hal. *De Isaeo* 19 (= *FGrH* 72 T 13) for a general assessment of Anaximenes' qualities and G. T. GRIFFITH's comment on this passage: "A writer capable of stuff like this perhaps was capable of the ultimate in silliness."

<sup>2</sup> For the Royal Squadron, ἑλη βασιλική, as the original cavalry Companions, see TARN II 139.

<sup>3</sup> On Alexander's position at the start of his reign, see especially E. BADIAN, in *TAPhA* 91 (1960), 324-38, and R. D. MILNS, *Alexander the Great*, 33 ff.

of the troops to himself alone. Hence this extension of the honorific title from the originally small and élite forces of the Household infantry and cavalry to all the heavy cavalry and the infantry of the phalanx. As W. W. Tarn says <sup>1</sup>, "It made no real difference ; but people will often welcome a name in place of a thing."

Now if we accept Griffith's argument—and I find them very persuasive—there is a further deduction that can be made. It is highly unlikely that the original footguard, the *pezbetaeri*, were disbanded or disappeared and quite possible that some attempt would have been made to enable the corps to retain some outward sign of its specially close relationship with the King, as compared with all the other phalangites, who were now all his Companions. I would suggest tentatively that it was at this time that the élite infantry-corps received the name which we know so well from the pages of Arrian : the hypaspists. I argued in my article on "Philip II and the Hypaspists" <sup>2</sup> that the name hypaspists was given to the corps to distinguish it from the *pezbetaeri*—though, of course, here I was thinking in terms of Philip II—and that the name was perhaps deliberately chosen as not having the connotations of the mercenary guard of tyrants that is contained in the more common word *δορυφόροι*. The known figure of 3,000 hypaspists early in Alexander's reign <sup>3</sup> would also seem reasonable, if we regard them, not simply as the King's personal bodyguards, but also and originally as the King's personal standing infantry-force <sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> II 141.

<sup>2</sup> *Art. cit.*, 509.

<sup>3</sup> The figure 3,000 is deduced from the fact that the corps at Issus occupied the same space as two *taxeis* of the phalanx ; Arr. II 8, 3-4 and cf. BELOCH, 330.

<sup>4</sup> It should be stated here that I do not accept the arguments of those scholars who believe that the hypaspists were armed differently from the rest of the phalangites. TARN II 153 shows clearly that the only differences between the phalangites and the hypaspists were in their historical development and method of recruitment. For proponents of the view that the hypaspists were more lightly armed, see H. DROYSEN, 16 ; KROMAYER/VEITH, 99 ; SCHACHERMEYR,

At this point in the discussion, we may conveniently turn to the problem of *astbetaeri*. There are six passages in Arrian where the correct manuscript reading is *astbetaeri* (or a very similar form) not *pezbetaeri*<sup>1</sup>. It is a word that is found nowhere else in ancient literature and the question naturally arises: who and what were these *astbetaeri*? The existence of the word *pezbetaeri* in Arrian's text, on one occasion (VII 11, 3) in the same sentence as *astbetaeri*, proves that this is not simply another term for *pezbetaeri*; and the same argument can be advanced for the hypaspists. Yet the context on each occasion that *astbetaeri* are mentioned indicates clearly that they are *Macedonian* infantry of the phalanx, that they have a particularly close relationship with the King, and that there is no reason to assume that they had a different military function from the *pezbetaeri* (i.e. they were not 'light' armed or missile troops). A further point may be noted immediately, which may have some significance: unlike the word *pezbetaeri*, the term *astbetaeri* is, with one exception, always accompanied in Arrian's text by the participle *καλούμενοι* or *οἱ καλούμενοι*<sup>2</sup>. Noteworthy too is the fact that,

155; von DOMASZEWSKI, 25 n. 1. Their use on rapid, forced marches proves only that they were better trained than the territorial levies, not that they were more lightly armed. On the question of the precise date of the introduction of the term hypaspists, in place of *pezbetaeri*, there may be a clue in the narrative of the campaign across the Danube in 335 B.C. At Arrian I 3, 6 it is said that 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry crossed the river with Alexander; at I 4, 2, Alexander τὴν φάλαγγα δὲ ἐν πλαισίῳ Νικάνορα ἄγειν ἐκέλευσε. The figure 4,000 is significant, since it is the combined total of Alexander's favourite troops, the hypaspists and the Agrianians; equally significant is the fact that Nicanor is the commander of "the phalanx", since Nicanor, in Asia, is the commander of the hypaspists. Is it not possible that we see here a situation in which the troops whom we know as the hypaspists were still the phalanx, i.e. the élite troops referred to by Demosthenes and Theopompus as the *pezbetaeri*? If this is so, then the extension of the honorific title of *pezbetaeri* to the rest of the Macedonian infantry did not occur until the very beginning of the Asian expedition.

<sup>1</sup> The passages are II 23, 2; IV 23, 1; V 22, 6; VI 6, 1; VI 21, 3; VII 11, 3.

<sup>2</sup> The one exception is VII 11, 3, which speaks of ἀσθέτεροι ἄλλοι, excised by Fr. Schmieder without any justification. It is interesting to note that D. G. HOGARTH, in his article "The Army of Alexander", in *Journal of Philology* 17 (1888),

whilst at the first appearance of the word (II 23, 2), there seems to be but one *taxis* of *asthetaeri*, in all subsequent references they are referred to by the plural *taxeis*. Indeed, at VI 21, 3, the number of *asthetaeri-taxeis* appears to be equivalent to half the number of known phalanx-*taxeis*. A. B. Bosworth<sup>1</sup>, noting that the *asthetaeri-taxeis* included at least those of Coenus and of Polyperchon and that these *taxeis* came from "the old Kingdoms of Upper Macedonia" (viz. Elimiotis and Tymphaea), concludes (p. 250) that "ἀσθέταιροι was a technical term, used to denote the infantry from Upper Macedonia" and that "These troops were absorbed into the national army long after the infantry had been organised into regular cadres and given their title of πεζέταιροι . . . . They were latecomers, and it would have been logical and understandable if they were given a separate title of their own to distinguish them from the main body of the phalanx." But what is the significance of the word? Bosworth rejects the possibility that it is derived from some obscure dialect word, unique to Macedonia and unintelligible to the rest of the Greek world, on the ground that the second component part of the name is recognisably Greek and one would therefore expect that the word as a whole would be of Greek derivation, "rather than a strange bastard hybrid" (p. 250). His suggestion for the meaning and origin of the

1 ff., observes that, with the possible exception of I 28, 3, the references to *pezbetaeri* in Arrian never refer to the *whole* phalanx, but always to single *taxeis* or to the forces used when an expeditionary-force is made up of a part only of the whole army (p. 11); that in several of the Arrian passages the epithet οἱ καλούμενοι is attached to the word—a sure indication of something unusual; and that there seems to be a close connection between the *pezbetaeri* and Coenus. D. G. Hogarth, of course, was working on the basis of the reading πεζέταιροι on every occasion; had he read his apparatus criticus with the care that, since A. B. BOSWORTH'S article, we all now realise should have been employed, he might well have anticipated several of the conclusions or conjectures put forward in this paper. O. HOFFMANN, it is to be remarked, makes no mention of the word *asthetaeri* in his book on *Die Makedonen, ihre Sprache und ihr Volkstum* (Göttingen 1906).

<sup>1</sup> *Art. cit.* (cf. *supra*, p. 90 n. 1), 247 ff.

first part of the word is that it is a contraction of ἄσιστα, a very rare by-form of ἄγχιστα, in the sense of "closest of kin"<sup>1</sup>. The original word would have been \*ἄσισθέταιροι, "presumably contracted by haplology into the form we meet in Arrian", and would mean 'closest-in-kin Companions', a phrase which, suggests Bosworth, would have encapsulated nicely their Macedonian nationality and their previous independence from the central monarchy (p. 251). Bosworth's arguments on this point, however, do not seem particularly compelling.

A different approach to the problem of the origin of the *asthetaeri* is taken by G. T. Griffith, in the note previously referred to. On the question of the derivation of the word, Griffith is inclined to accept the suggestion that had already been rejected by Bosworth (p. 251 n. 3), that the word is a "Thessalian" contraction of ἀριστο-ἑταῖροι, "Best Companions", and answers Bosworth's objection that "there is no reason why Philip should have used this peculiarly Thessalian contraction" by pointing out that there are common factors in the Thessalian and Macedonian dialects<sup>2</sup>. I would myself, however, be inclined to agree with Bosworth's objection, since all other technical Macedonian military terms, which are formed as compounds, are recognisably "Attic" in both parts (e.g. σωματοφύλακες, ὑπασπισταί, πρόδρομοι, πεζέταιροι; we may except σαρισσοφόροι, as the sarissa was purely a Macedonian weapon) and it is difficult to see why there should be such a dialect variation in this particular instance. More convincing, I feel, is Griffith's suggestion concerning the origin of the unit or units. Arguing from the facts that the first reference to *asthetaeri* in Arrian's text occurs during the assault on Tyre (II 23, 3) and that at that time there was apparently only one *taxis* of *asthetaeri*, that of Coenus, and that at Issus the *taxis* of

<sup>1</sup> See LIDDELL/SCOTT/JONES, s.v. ἄγχιστος.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the example of ταγοναγία, and the discussion of V. COSTANZI, in *Athenaeum* N. S. 8 (1930), 157 ff., and O. HOFFMANN, *op. cit.*, 77.

Coenus has won 'promotion' from its position at the Granicus and keeps it at Gaugamela, in both battles holding the position of honour on the right of the phalanx, next to the hypaspists, Griffith argues that this *taxis*, and this alone, has by 332 been honoured with the name *astbetaeri* (in his view 'Best Companions') as a recognition of their performance in battle and without any reference to their Elimiot origin (as Bosworth argues). It is, says Griffith, a battle honour, making them (by a modern usage) "King's Own". By the time of India, the same honour has been extended to two more *taxeis*—possibly three—one of which is that of Polyperchon. Support for this view is gained from the fact that on the three occasions in India where the army is divided and Alexander has about half of it under his personal command, his part of the phalanx is, on each occasion, the *astbetaeri*, along with the inseparable hypaspists<sup>1</sup>; and that on another occasion, when only one *taxis* of the phalanx is included in Alexander's personal command, it is a *taxis* of the *astbetaeri*<sup>2</sup>. The fact, says Griffith, that certainly two and perhaps three of the three or four *astbetaeri taxeis* were levies from the *ethne* of Upper Macedonia is to be seen as an 'Aristotelian accident', in the sense that they had been awarded this status, not because they came from Elimea or Orestis, but because they had distinguished themselves in action. An analogy, in fact, might be made with the distinguished service and hence distinguished reputation of Scottish Highland brigades in the British army.

To sum up the discussion so far : we can say, with a reasonable degree of probability, that after the early years in Asia there were at least three distinct elements in the phalanx : the *pezbetaeri*, the *astbetaeri* (who were, of course, also *pezbetaeri*), and the hypaspists. I myself do not believe that there was any difference between the *pezbetaeri* and the hypaspists in respect

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Arr. IV 23, 1 ; V 22, 6 ; VI 21, 3 ; and A. B. BOSWORTH, *art. cit.*, 247-9.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. VI 6, 1.

to their arms and armour—I shall return to this point again when discussing the significance of the adjective κοῦφος in Arrian's narrative—and it seems reasonable to assume the same with respect to the *asthetaeri*. We can further say that the naming of these units was largely the responsibility of Alexander the Great. For, though he did not invent the term *pezhetaeri*, it was he who early in his reign extended it to the whole of the infantry-levy of Macedonia<sup>1</sup>; who changed the name of the original *pezhetaeri* to hypaspists; and who devised the honorific title *asthetaeri*, which he conferred on certain particularly distinguished *taxeis* of the phalanx. This concern which Alexander showed in devising and conferring honorific titles on his Macedonian soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, if we accept Griffith's interpretation of the Anaximenes fragment, is also indicative of the great need that Alexander felt, in the early years of his reign, of binding to himself the Macedonians by emphasising their close personal relationship to himself; and hence the measures must be seen in the context of the political struggles current in the Macedonian court-circle.

#### THE ORGANISATION OF THE PEZHETAERI

The general consensus among scholars is that, at the time of the crossing into Asia, the *pezhetaeri* were organised in six *taxeis* (which, in Arrian's imprecise terminology, can also be called *phalanges*)<sup>2</sup> of c. 1500 men each, recruited or levied on a territorial basis and each commanded by a *strategus* or a *taxiarch*, who was usually a member of the district of Macedonia in which the *taxis* was raised<sup>3</sup>. The figure of 1500 is reached as follows:

<sup>1</sup> It is, of course, impossible to say whether the term *pezhetaeri* was limited only to those *taxeis* who were serving with the King at any particular moment.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. TARN II 136.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. BERVE I 113; TARN II 142; H. DROYSEN, II; KROMAYER/VEITH, 99. J. G. DROYSEN, 242, makes a subtle distinction between the term *strategus* and *taxiarch*, to the effect that *strategus* denotes the overall commander of the *taxis*,



the whole phalanx, *pezbetaeri* and hypaspists, numbered 12,000 at the time of the crossing into Asia<sup>1</sup>; it is almost certain that there were six *taxeis* of the *pezbetaeri* in each of the three major battles down to 331<sup>2</sup>; and the hypaspists, as can be seen from their position at Issus, occupied the same frontage as two *taxeis* of *pezbetaeri*<sup>3</sup>. Thus 12,000 men equals eight *taxeis*, i.e. 1500 men per *taxis*.

A brief word may be in order here on the question of the arms and equipment of the phalangites. The best and most convincing discussion, it seems to me, is still that of G. T. Griffith in his article "Μακεδονικά: Notes on the Macedonians of Philip and Alexander"<sup>4</sup>. Griffith demonstrates that the phalangites of Philip II and Alexander were not hoplites or heavy infantry in the same way as their counterparts in the Greek *poleis*; and this was the result of social and economic factors. The Macedonian phalangite lacked the *thorax* and had a much smaller shield than the Greek hoplite, the absence of protective armour being compensated by the *sarissa*, which gave him the advantage in battle of the first strike. To speak of the soldiers

*taxiarch* the field commander: "... jede Phalanx wird neben ihrem Strategen einen Taxiarchen gehabt haben." I do not find his explanation convincing; surely we have here yet another example of Arrian's looseness in the use of technical terms.

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVII 17, 1 ff.; the hypaspists are not mentioned in Diodorus' list; they must be included in the 12,000 Macedonian infantry.

<sup>2</sup> For the *taxeis* commander at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, see Arrian I 14, 2-3; II 8, 3-4; III 11, 9-10. A convenient list of *taxis*-leaders is given in BERVE I 114 and 116. A dissentient voice to the view that there were six *taxeis* down to 331 is that of BELOCH, 326 ff. J. Beloch argues, on the basis of the information given at Arr. I 29, 4 of the arrival of 3,000 Macedonian infantry at Gordium, that a new *taxis* was formed there. The arguments whereby he justifies the presence of only six *taxeis* at both Issus and Gaugamela are ingenious, but, because of the manipulations that are involved with the texts of Curtius (IV 13, 28), Arrian (III 11, 9) and Diodorus (XVII 57, 2) cannot be sustained; J. Beloch has found few supporters for his view.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. TARN II 150.

<sup>4</sup> In *PCPhS* N. S. 4 (1956-7), 3 ff.

of the phalanx as "heavy infantry", "Schwerbewaffnete" or "hoplites" in the Greek sense is misleading<sup>1</sup>; they seem to have occupied a place midway between the Greek hoplite and the peltast<sup>2</sup>.

On the question of the method of recruitment of the phalanx-*taxeis*, there seems to be almost complete unanimity that each *taxis* represented the levy of a particular 'district' or 'Gau' of Macedonia<sup>3</sup>. The main pieces of evidence for this view come from the descriptions of Diodorus and Curtius of the battle of Gaugamela, in which are mentioned the *taxeis* of Elimea, Orestis and Lyncestis and Stymphaea (=Tymphaea)<sup>4</sup>; their commanders were, respectively, Coenus, Perdiccas and Polyperchon. In addition, we learn from Arrian<sup>5</sup> that the reinforcements who reached the army late in 331 B.C. were distributed *κατὰ ἔθνη*,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. SCHACHERMEYR, 114; J. G. DROYSEN, 245; TARN II 142.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, we may note, is guilty here, as everywhere else, of lack of precision in his terminology. On at least eight occasions he refers to the phalangites as *ὀπλίται*—I 1, 8; I 3, 3; I 6, 1; I 13, 1; I 21, 1; I 27, 8; II 8, 2; II 8, 3—, on all of which occasions there can be no doubt that phalangites are meant. There are five further occurrences of the word in the *Anabasis*: I 5, 12 (Cleitus' Illyrian troops); II 8, 6 and II 8, 8 (Darius' Greek infantry and the Evaces at Issus); V 15, 6 (Porus' infantry); and VI 18, 3, which could refer to phalangites, though Greek mercenaries are just as possible and where, moreover, the word is used simply as a contrast to *ψιλοί*. It may be of significance that the only occasions on which the word certainly refers to the phalangites occur in Book I and in the description of the battle of Issus in Book II. Does this give a clue to Arrian's—or Ptolemy's—sources for the early part of Alexander's reign and campaigns? Callisthenes' description of Issus, as is well known, was *the* famous one (cf. Polybius' criticisms at XII 17-22) and his was the first full account of the early years of the expedition. Anaximenes may well have described the Illyrian campaigns. Greeks writing for Greeks, they would tend to use the common Greek term "hoplite", rather than the Macedonian term *pezbetaeri* or a word such as *φαλαγγίτης* (whose first attested appearance in Greek literature dates to the time of Polybius; cf. LIDDELL/SCOTT/JONES, s.v.). Ptolemy, writing forty or more years later and himself a very minor figure in the early years in Asia, may simply have taken over this term, where he found it in his source, without questioning its precise applicability.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., among others, BERVE I 114 ff.; VON DOMASZEWSKI, 42 ff.; TARN II 142.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XVII 57, 2; Curt. IV 13, 28.

<sup>5</sup> III 16, 11.

which seems to imply strongly some form of territorial organisation. The evidence, then, is slight, but nevertheless has produced a great mass of theories, of which the most widely accepted is perhaps that of Berve<sup>1</sup>. Working on the statement of Diodorus in the army-list, that Antipater retained 12,000 infantry and on the belief that Alexander's 12,000 included the 3,000 hypaspists<sup>2</sup>, he arrives at a total of 18-20,000 *pezbetaeri*, recruited from twelve or thirteen recruiting areas. The three *taxeis* whose territorial area is named all stem, observes Berve, from "die westlichen Fürstentümer" or "das altmakedonische Land"<sup>3</sup>. These principalities, he argues, still claimed "eine gewisse Sonderstellung"; hence their commanders had to be appointed from the local dynastic families; thus Coenus, from the dynastic family of Elimiotis, commanded the *taxis* of Elimiotis and so on. Ten unnamed *taxeis*, however, were recruited from districts in Central Macedonia—"Kernmakedonen"—where there was greater unity and loyalty to the crown; hence there was no need for their leaders to be chosen from the local aristocracy, "sondern vom Könige aus dem Adel ganz Makedoniens ausgewählt werden konnten" (p. 115). Thus Craterus, from Orestis, and Meleager, from Tymphaea, do not command *taxeis* from these districts, but from 'Kernmakedonen'. Berve categorically excludes the possibility that the *pezbetaeri taxeis* in Alexander's army in the early years could have been recruited from the coastal districts of Macedonia, i.e. the areas of mainly Greek settlement; this is, he believes, "nach der hochbedeutenden, durchaus das makedonische Volk repräsentierenden Stellung, welche die Pezhetairen in Alexanders Heerlager einnahmen... unzweifelhaft" (p. 115). He is, however, prepared to accept that the new, seventh *taxis* that joined

<sup>1</sup> I 113 ff.

<sup>2</sup> BERVE also believes (I 113 n. 4) that Antipater had some hypaspists in his 12,000.

<sup>3</sup> But the obvious implication is that neither Orestis nor Lyncestis individually could supply sufficient infantry to form a full *taxis*.

the army after Gaugamela<sup>1</sup> may well have been from the "Küstengebieten"<sup>2</sup>. It seems however best and safest to treat arguments such as Berve's with extreme caution; to assume that it is purely an accident that in Diodorus' narrative three *taxeis* are given geographical origins; and to draw no conclusions about the origin and method of recruitment of the other three (later four) *taxeis*, other than to say that the Arrian passage (III 16, 11) seems to indicate 'ethnic' organisation.

R. Lock<sup>3</sup> accepts—and I would agree with this—the arguments of J. Beloch<sup>4</sup> that there were no hypaspists left in Macedonia with Antipater and that the 12,000 infantry left with the Regent was the rest of the national levy. He assumes (p. 48) that both the troops with Alexander and those with Antipater were organised territorially; hence, at 1,500 men to each *taxis* and a total levy of c. 21,000 men, there would have been fourteen territorial *taxeis*, though, as the example of Orestis-Lyncestis shows, there may well have been more than fourteen territorial levy-areas. The date by which the definitive administrative reforms, which established these recruiting areas, had been completed is placed by Lock (p. 41) at c. 340 B.C., by which time, he argues, the boundaries and population of the Macedonian kingdom had reached some degree of stability at Philip's hands. However, I do feel reluctant to accept Lock's contention that the infantry and cavalry forces of the Greek *poleis* incorporated in Macedonia by Philip were used in the Companion Cavalry and the *pezbetaeri taxeis*. For, to speak only of the infantry, it is difficult, in view of the strong ethnic antipathy that existed between Greeks and Macedonians<sup>5</sup>, to see

<sup>1</sup> That of Philotas; see below.

<sup>2</sup> I 116 n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, 36 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, 326 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the probably apocryphal, but certainly illuminating anecdote in Diod. XVII 100-101. The attitude of Demosthenes was probably not unrepresentative of common Greek opinion of the Macedonians.

how conquered—and hostile—Greeks could be placed side by side with their despised Macedonian conquerors, in a position of equality, in units of the Macedonian army, which have rightly been described as *the* representatives of the Macedonian people <sup>1</sup>.

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHALANX, 334–323 B.C.

Having discussed the origins and composition of the infantry of the phalanx up to the time of Alexander's accession and during the first years of his reign, we may now look at the developments, in terms of organisation, composition and function, which took place with the corps during the course of the Asian expedition. The first question that requires attention, since many other questions depend on the way in which this one is answered, is that of reinforcements from Macedonia and of losses during the campaign <sup>2</sup>.

Reinforcements from Macedonia are recorded in 333 B.C. <sup>3</sup>, when 3,000 Macedonian infantry reached the army at Gordium. Callisthenes <sup>4</sup> records that 5,000 infantry reached the army between 334 B.C. and the battle of Issus. The discrepancy between the figures of Arrian (=Ptolemy) and Callisthenes is probably to be explained by the argument that Callisthenes' figure includes infantry other than Macedonians <sup>5</sup>. No other reinforcements of *Macedonians* are reported until after the battle of Gaugamela, though at least 7,000 Greek mercenaries joined

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 115; J. G. DROYSEN, 245: "Wie hätten τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων αἱ τάξεις (Arr. IV 23, 1) auch Nicht-Makedonen enthalten können?" It makes no difference whether we read πεζεταίρων or ἀσθεταίρων.

<sup>2</sup> The most comprehensive, though not necessarily most accurate, discussion of this question is that of BELOCH, 330-49. J. Beloch's computations are truly a *tour de force*, but based all too often on assumptions and conjectures. A more recent treatment of the subject is that of R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 130 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. I 29, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *FGrH* 124 F 35, *ap. Plb.* XII 17-22, especially 19, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. BELOCH, 332.

the army in 332 B.C.<sup>1</sup> In my article on "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion"<sup>2</sup>, I argued that reinforcements and losses of Macedonians between the crossing into Asia and Gaugamela, including the battle, were more or less equal<sup>3</sup>; hence the *taxeis* in the battle still contained c. 9,000 men altogether<sup>4</sup>. The next batch of Macedonian infantry reinforcements recorded in the sources reached the army at or near Susa, in November/December 331 B.C.<sup>5</sup> They numbered 6,000. It is impossible to say how many, if any, of these 6,000 were hypaspists; but Arrian's statement that τούς πεζοὺς δὲ προσέθηκεν ταῖς τάξεσι ταῖς ἄλλαις, κατὰ ἔθνη ἐκάστους ξυντάξας strongly implies that the large majority of these troops were *pezhetaeri/asthetaeri*, since the hypaspists were, in all probability, not organised or recruited κατὰ ἔθνη<sup>6</sup>. This addition of c. 6,000 men was offset by losses in battle and garrison-duty amounting, up to the time of Persepolis, to c. 4,800 men<sup>7</sup>. Lock argues (p. 31) that I am mistaken in accepting the figure of Curtius, V 6, 11, of 3,000 for the garrison of Persepolis; since "Alexander had left Persepolis in

<sup>1</sup> Arr. II 20, 5 and Curt. IV 5, 18.

<sup>2</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 162 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Under the heading "losses" I include troops detached from the main army for such purposes as garrison-duty or siege-operations.

<sup>4</sup> I find J. BELOCH's arguments on the army strength at Gaugamela (p. 333 ff.) quite arbitrary and unconvincing. R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 130, criticises my figures for Macedonian losses during these years as being "disproportionately high" and assumes a figure of c. 1,500 for these losses, thus making a total of c. 10,500 phalangites who lined up at Gaugamela. But it is likely that it would be in Asia Minor, the Levant and Egypt, which were populous, vital to communications and—most significantly—with large Greek cities, that one would expect to find Alexander preferring to use reliable Macedonians. The further east he penetrated, the more he could afford to use Greek mercenaries as garrison-troops.

<sup>5</sup> Arr. III 16, 10; Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. R. D. MILNS, in *Historia* 20 (1971), 186 ff. I must concede the possibility that there is at least a modicum of truth in R. LOCK's statement (*op. cit.*, 150) that "the omission of details of additions to the hypaspist body when a general infantry reinforcement was taking place would rate as one of Arrian's more forgivable inaccuracies."

<sup>7</sup> R. D. MILNS, *art. cit.* (cf. *supra* n. 2), 164.

ruins, he would hardly have spared 3,000 crack troops on these ; these 3,000 men were only a temporary garrison, until the treasure could be moved to Susa." This may be so ; yet Persis itself, of which Persepolis was the centre, was the heart of the Persian empire and here, if anywhere, strong local resistance was to be expected ; hence the need for a strong garrison of the best troops available <sup>1</sup>. The 6,000 reinforcements in late 331 B.C. are, it is to be noted, the last Macedonian infantry reinforcements recorded by our sources. Beloch <sup>2</sup> argues that the *taxis* of Cleitus, which first appears in India in 327 B.C. <sup>3</sup>, is a new *taxis*, formed from reinforcements of Macedonians who reached the army probably in the winter of 329/8 B.C. They were, he argues, among the 8,000 'Graeci' sent, according to Curtius (VII 10, 12), by Antipater. Tarn <sup>4</sup>, who also believes that the *taxis* of Cleitus was a new one (in his view, the seventh), argues that it came, together with reinforcements for the other six *taxeis*, in 327 B.C., when Alexander was at Nautaca ; and in this he has been followed by P. A. Brunt <sup>5</sup>. I find myself, however, unable to accept the arguments of these scholars. Moreover, general considerations militate against the notion of Macedonian troops being sent for or dispatched to join the main army in the Far East and India. The distances from Macedonia were vast and the army's movements, once it penetrated the Punjab, were uncertain. Much better and more sensible to make use of the many Greek mercenaries who were already in Asia and hence more accessible—a policy which would have the further advantage of preventing any additional strain on Macedonia's military resources for a few years. My

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 181, who finds no difficulty in accepting the permanent nature of this garrison.

<sup>2</sup> P. 342.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. IV 22, 7.

<sup>4</sup> II 147 n. 3.

<sup>5</sup> In *JHS* 83 (1963), 39.

own feeling is that the reason for the silence of the sources with respect to Macedonian reinforcements from 331 B.C. onwards is that there were no more such reinforcements, because Alexander at this time made a deliberate policy-decision to summon no further troops from Macedonia in the foreseeable future (a decision that would have been all the easier to make as at that time no further large-scale opposition was to be expected) <sup>1</sup>. I would suggest—and it can be no more than this—that the three officers sent in 328/7 B.C. from Bactria were given instructions to recruit troops in Macedonia and to set out for Asia only when they heard of the return of the main army to the central provinces of the empire. Hence I would suggest that there *may* have reached Babylon in 323 B.C., not only Menidas with his cavalry, but other officers—perhaps amongst them Sopolis and Epocillus—with infantry reinforcements; but before this there were no other Macedonian reinforcements for the army. The argument is advanced by Lock <sup>2</sup> that Macedonian infantry reached Alexander in Carmania at the end of 325 B.C., brought by the generals from Media <sup>3</sup>. However, Arrian, at III 19, 5-8, despite his usual lack of precision in describing military dispositions, can only be interpreted as saying that the army of Media, left behind in 330 B.C. at Ecbatana with Parmenion, consisted of Greek mercenaries, Thracians and non-Macedonian cavalry. There were certainly no Macedonian infantry left with Parmenion other than the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 182: "Der makedonische Zuzug von 331 scheint bis auf weiteres der letzte gewesen zu sein; das Fehlen der Makedonen in dem 329/8 eintreffenden gewaltigen Ersatz (19,000 Mann) und ebenso am Hydaspes weist darauf hin, dass das Schweigen der Überlieferung bezüglich der Makedonen eine sachliche Berechtigung hat... ».

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 137.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arr. VI 27, 3: ἦγον δὲ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ οἱ ὑπολειφθέντες ἅμα Παρμενίωνι ἐπὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ἐν Μηδίᾳ, Κλέανδρός τε καὶ Σιτάλκης καὶ Ἡράκων, τὴν πολλὴν τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ οὗτοι ἄγοντες.



temporary guard for the transferring of the treasure<sup>1</sup>. It is, of course, possible that Ecbatana had been used as a transit-camp for Macedonian troops during the years in which Alexander was in India and the Far East and that it is these whom Arrian means by τὴν πολλὴν τῆς στρατιᾶς (τῆς ἐν Μηδίᾳ); but I am not convinced of this, since Babylon had been marked out clearly as the centre of the new 'Reich' and it was to Babylon that Alexander would return, if he ever did return. Hence it would be much more sensible to send any reinforcements directly to Babylon.

With respect to losses from the Macedonian phalanx during the years from 331 B.C. to the return from India, one can do no more than make what one hopes are intelligent guesses. Arrian (III 29, 5; cf. Curt. VII 5, 27) records the sending home from the Oxus in 329 B.C. of τῶν τε Μακεδόνων... τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους; Berve<sup>2</sup> guesses their number at c. 750. Lock<sup>3</sup> conjectures losses of 3-4,000 phalangites for the years of campaigning on the Iranian plateau and in India, but offers no arguments or evidence for these figures. Obviously, the losses in the hard fighting and harsh climate of the Iranian plateau would have been considerable; even more so in India, where the climate was worse and the fighting even more bitter<sup>4</sup>. Again, it is impossible to guess how many Macedonians were among the ἀπόλεμοι and ἀπόμαχοι, who were frequently left behind to form parts of garrisons and new settlements<sup>5</sup>, but their num-

<sup>1</sup> See my note, forthcoming in *Historia*, on "Troop Details in Arrian".

<sup>2</sup> I 180.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, 136.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the significant silence of Arrian on Macedonian losses in the battle of the Hydaspes. Only two phalanx-*taxeis*—those of Cleitus and Coenus (Arr. V 12, 2)—were actually involved in the battle, but their losses in the fighting, especially against the elephants, would have been considerable.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Arr. V 27, 5, where Coenus, at the Beas mutiny, says that οἱ δὲ ἐκ τραυμάτων ἀπόμαχοι γεγενημένοι ἄλλοι ἄλλη τῆς Ἀσίας ὑπολειμμένοι εἰσίν... ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ὑπολείπονται. Rhetorical exaggeration, no doubt, but not without a grain of truth.

bers too could not have been negligible. With respect to losses on the march back through Gedrosia, we may accept that, whatever may have been the real magnitude of the disaster <sup>1</sup>, the Macedonians probably suffered less than the other troops, partly because of their better training and discipline, partly because, as Berve points out <sup>2</sup>, it is highly likely that Alexander looked after his most important troops better than the others, and partly because a considerable part of the Macedonian infantry was sent with Craterus to march by an easier route (perhaps over the Bolan Pass) and to rejoin the army in Carmania <sup>3</sup>. J. Beloch <sup>4</sup> assumes total Macedonian losses in the Indian campaign and the Gedrosian march as 3,000 and the losses up to the start of the Indian expedition as c. 5-7,000, thus arriving at total losses for the whole Asian campaign (inclusive of the cavalry and hypaspists) of 8-10,000 Macedonians. This represents 27-33% of the 30,000 Macedonians who, on his calculations, took part in the Asian campaign. There would thus have been c. 20,000 Macedonians in the forces brought out of the desert by Alexander <sup>5</sup>. These are, in my opinion, unreasonably high figures. My own calculations are based on the belief that no Macedonian reinforcements at all reached the army after late 331 B.C. until, probably, 324-3 B.C. Thus to the original 9,000 phalangites there will have been added no

<sup>1</sup> On the Gedrosian march, see H. STRASBURGER, in *Hermes* 80 (1952), 456-93, and R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 421-31; cf. also W. W. TARN's view in *CAH* VI, p. 415: "He had extricated the army [12-15,000 men, on his view] without great loss, but the mortality among the non-combatants was severe."

<sup>2</sup> I 183.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. VI 17, 3.

<sup>4</sup> P. 349.

<sup>5</sup> The figure of 30,000 includes the erroneous assumption of a reinforcement of 5,000 men in 329-8 B.C.; see above p. 108. BERVE, I 184, protests against J. Beloch's figure of 20,000, though since his protest is based upon the rather dubious evidence of Plutarch's statement (*Alex.* 60) that of an army of 135,000 who entered India only a quarter came back out of the desert, his protest loses some of its force.

more than 9,000 (the 3,000 at Gordium and the 6,000 after Susa, some of whom may have been hypaspists). Losses to the time of Persepolis, including garrison-troops, were c. 7,600<sup>1</sup>. If we assume losses of c. 2-3,000 in East Iran and India (a not unreasonable assumption, since the phalanx as a whole was not involved in any major pitched battle in this area) and, based on Lock's convincing arguments for total losses in Gedrosia of between 5,000 and 10,000, a further loss of c. 2,000 phalangites in the desert, there would have returned to the west with Alexander about 7,000 phalangites. It is probable, as Berve points out<sup>2</sup>, that the Macedonians who had been left as garrison-troops in the Near East were recalled to the main army in 324, in order to be given their discharge with the veterans of the field-army at Opis. These were, as I have shown elsewhere<sup>3</sup>, c. 6,200; we may round this down to c. 6,000. There were thus c. 13,000 phalangites assembled at Opis, of whom 10,000 were discharged, to return home with Craterus, thus leaving a residue of c. 3,000 of the phalangites who had participated in the Asian expedition. The overall percentage of losses is thus about 38% (13,000 survivors out of 21,000), which is not, I would argue, a particularly high proportion in view of the length of the campaign, the continuous and hard nature of the fighting and the rigours of the climatic extremes which had to be endured<sup>4</sup>. An indirect confirmation of these calculations may be gained from the statement of Curtius (X 2, 8) that before the discharge of veterans from Opis, Alexander ordered 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to be retained in Asia, "thinking that

<sup>1</sup> See R. D. MILNS, in *GRBS* 7 (1966), 163.

<sup>2</sup> I 184, cf. BELOCH, 346-7.

<sup>3</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 163-4.

<sup>4</sup> BERVE, I 185, working on a different conjectural basis, reaches a figure of 4-5,000 phalangites remaining after the Opis mutiny; on p. 121 he assumes 3-4,000 (see below notes 1 and 2, p. 127 and *ibid.* for F. Schachermeyr's figure of 4-5,000 Macedonians (phalangites)).

Asia could be held in check with a small force, because he had placed garrisons in many places and had recently founded towns and filled them with settlers who would be anxious to keep their property.”

Having established that no Macedonian reinforcements reached the main army from 331 B.C. till at least the return from India; and having shown that c. 10,500 phalangites set out eastwards from Ecbatana in early 330 B.C. (i.e. 9,000, who originally crossed into Asia, together with 9,000 reinforcements, less c. 7,600 losses) and that c. 9,000 entered the Gedrosian desert in 325 B.C., we must next examine the question of whether the *taxeis* were reinforced and kept up to strength from any other source than Macedonians, or whether their ethnic character was completely retained and hence the strength of each *taxis* allowed to fall considerably below ‘paper’ strength. It is obvious that if the ethnic character and the territorial principle of organisation were both maintained, there would have developed considerable differences in the strength of individual *taxeis*, since some—especially those engaged at the Hydaspes—suffered heavier losses than others. Berve, who believes that from the time of Bactria-Sogdiana (329-7 B.C.) the number of *taxeis* was at least ten <sup>1</sup>, argues that at this period the principle of territorial organisation of the *taxeis* was abolished and that Greek mercenaries and Asian infantry were recruited. Lock argues that the numbers were kept up and even increased by the use of Greek mercenaries; and that an internal reorganisation of the *taxeis* took place, as a result of which each *taxis* was increased in strength to c. 2,000 and split up into two chiliarchies, one of Macedonians, the other of Greek mercenaries <sup>2</sup>. Against Berve’s argument for the inclusion of Iranian infantry in the *taxeis* of the phalanx may be urged two points: (1) the *pezbetaeri* are generally agreed to have been far more

<sup>1</sup> I 116 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 122 ff.

'nationalistic' and conservative in their attitudes towards the conquered Iranians than the cavalry<sup>1</sup>; (2) the 'heavy' infantry of the Persian empire was generally of a poor quality (hence the Persian reliance on Greek mercenaries) and none is known to have served under Alexander until the very end of his reign<sup>2</sup>. It is therefore highly unlikely that any were made part of the *pezbetaeri taxeis*. Tarn<sup>3</sup> argues against the incorporation of Greek mercenaries on the grounds that (i) there is no evidence for this anywhere and (ii) Alexander can, in India at least, have had very few mercenaries and those that he did have are mentioned separately from the phalanx. The second argument is not a strong one, since the references could simply have been to mercenaries *not* incorporated in the phalanx; but the first—the *argumentum e silentio*—carries more weight. Tarn, however, does believe that reinforcements reached the army from Macedonia in 328-7 B.C.; and this I believe to be an erroneous argument<sup>4</sup>. I myself argued in my article on "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion"<sup>5</sup> against the addition of Greek mercenaries on the ground that, as far as could be seen, the phalanx retained its purely natural character until the end of Alexander's reign. Lock<sup>6</sup>, whilst agreeing with my general premise, argues that there is no evidence that the Macedonians of the phalanx felt towards the Greek mercenaries the sort of hostility which they displayed towards the conquered Asiatics; indeed, he argues, citing G. T. Griffith's *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (London 1935), 26, in support of his claim, the Macedonians and Greek mercenaries were usually on good terms during Alexander's campaigns. Furthermore, he argues,

<sup>1</sup> G. T. GRIFFITH, in *JHS* 83 (1963), 74; BERVE I 337.

<sup>2</sup> R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 179 ff.

<sup>3</sup> II 143 n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 108; W. W. Tarn is followed by P. A. BRUNT, in *JHS* 83 (1963), 39.

<sup>5</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 161 n. 15.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, 134 ff.

if Alexander did recruit *pezbetaeri* from the Greek mercenaries, he merely continued the policy of his father, who brought many Greeks into the service of his army when he established the new recruiting areas. "Any argument based upon the national character of the Macedonians can carry little weight, for the character of the Pezhetairoi was already a mixed one, of Greeks and Macedonians." This last argument is, of course, begging the question; for, as has already been argued, there is no evidence to show that Philip recruited Greeks from the newly annexed or conquered areas as part of his phalanx-*taxeis*. Nor is the passage in Griffith's book a good support for his argument, since the point that Griffith is making is that it is an indication of the good organisation and discipline in Alexander's army that there is little or no evidence of friction between the Macedonians and the Greeks, not that they 'were usually on good terms'—a very different matter. Moreover, any theory that would have Greek mercenaries recruited into the phalanx-*taxeis* runs into several problems; on what basis were the mercenaries allotted to these territorially raised units? Did the mercenaries so assigned become themselves *pezbetaeri* (or even *astbetaeri*)? Did they have the same legal status and the same privileges and rates of pay as their Macedonian counterparts? My own view is that the silence of the sources is decisive: Greek mercenaries were not recruited into the phalanx-*taxeis* at any stage in the campaign; the *taxeis* retained their national character throughout, Alexander preferring to allow numbers to drop below 'paper'-strength rather than face the problems that would arise from introducing foreign elements into their ranks. We might note that, on my calculations, the *taxeis*, which I believe never exceeded seven in number, were not much more than 200 each below 'paper'-strength when the army set out from India (i.e. 9,000 divided by seven = c. 1,300 per *taxis*). Even Lock, whose estimates of figures are generally higher than mine, states, on p. 134, that "Only a few, hardly more than 3,000 to 4,000 (*sc.* Greek mercenaries) need have been in-

volved.” On his estimate of seven *taxeis* of 2,000 men each, this represents only 250-300 Greeks per chiliarchy. Would a 25 % reduction in ‘paper’-strength have been sufficient to compensate for all the problems of integration that would have been created by introducing mercenaries, many of whom may well have fought at some time or other on the side of Macedonia’s enemies ?

On the question of the number of phalanx-*taxeis* that crossed into Asia with Alexander, there seems to be little dissent from the view that there were six and that at some time during the expedition the number reached seven. Disagreement sets in on the questions of when the seventh *taxis* was added and whether other *taxeis*, over and above seven, were formed. At the Granicus there are six *taxeis* recorded in Arrian’s narrative of the battle-formation<sup>1</sup>. Six *taxeis* are again recorded in Arrian’s description of Issus<sup>2</sup>, though now Ptolemy, son of Seleucus has replaced Philippus. Arrian and Diodorus agree that there were still only six *taxeis* at Gaugamela<sup>3</sup>, though they differ on the names of the *taxeis*-commanders. Curtius too (IV 13, 7) seems to be in agreement with this number, if indeed it is possible to sort any sense out of Curtius’ account. We can say with reasonable certainty that up to the time of Gaugamela there were no more than six *taxeis*. From this point onwards views on the number of *taxeis*—and their respective commanders—became sharply divided. J. Beloch<sup>4</sup> believed that the number rose to at least ten and possibly eleven, two being added to his original seven at the end of 331 B.C. and yet another in 329/8 B.C., when, as he argued, reinforcements reached the army from Macedonia. Two, at least, of these can be removed,

<sup>1</sup> I 14, 2 ff. ; Arrian’s carelessness had made him record the *taxeis* of Craterus and of Philip, son of Amyntas, twice.

<sup>2</sup> II 8, 3 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. III 11, 9 ; Diod. XVII 57, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 328 ff.

since, as we have seen, there were only six *taxeis* at Gaugamela and no Macedonian reinforcements reached the army in 329/8 B.C. The arguments that have gone on for years over who replaced whom in the command of phalanx-*taxeis* are exhausting, if not exhaustive, and to a large extent unrewarding; and I do not intend to open up the question here. Let it suffice to make reference to the discussions of Tarn and Lock for good examples of the different aspects of the controversy<sup>1</sup>. I will limit myself here to making two points: (1) as stated earlier, it would be an unsound method of working if one were to assume that every time Arrian uses the word *taxis*, he is referring to a unit of the phalanx<sup>2</sup>; (2) as Tarn pointed out<sup>3</sup>, it is very hard to refute the evidence of Arrian (V 11, 3 and 12, 1-2) that at the battle of the Hydaspes, "where again he [*sc.* Alexander] needed every man he had," there were only seven *taxeis* named. This, when combined with the evidence of the numbers of Macedonian infantry available to Alexander at any time during the expedition, seems to me to be reasonably conclusive proof that there were never, at least before the return from India, more than seven phalanx-*taxeis*. I cannot, however, accept Tarn's date for the arrival at the army of the new, seventh *taxis*—327 B.C., at Bactra—since this, in my view, is based upon an erroneous interpretation of Arrian IV 18, 3. Berve argues<sup>4</sup> that the seventh *taxis* was formed or added at the end of 331 B.C., with the arrival of the 6,000 reinforcements from Macedonia (see above, p. 108) and that its leader was the Philotas who is mentioned at the battle of the Persian Gates<sup>5</sup>. In my article on this subject<sup>6</sup> I also argued the case for late 331 B.C. as the date for

<sup>1</sup> TARN II 142 ff.; R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 97 ff.

<sup>2</sup> This is essentially the basis upon which H. BERVE worked in his discussion of the problem; cf. I 116 ff.

<sup>3</sup> TARN II 142.

<sup>4</sup> I 115.

<sup>5</sup> Arr. III 18, 6; Curt. V 4, 20.

<sup>6</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 159 ff.



the arrival or formation of the new *taxis*, with Philotas as its commander, and added (pp. 165-6) what I considered a piece of indirect, but conclusive evidence.

Worthy of mention, as a tailpiece to this discussion of the number of phalanx-*taxeis* that took part in the Asian expedition, is the view of A. von Domaszewski<sup>1</sup>, which both revives an argument of D. G. Hogarth and anticipates one of R. Lock.

Basically, A. von Domaszewski's view is that there were never more than six *taxeis* during the whole expedition; that the strength of each *taxis* was 2,000 men, divided into two chiliarchies (Lock's view of the phalanx later in the expedition); and that sometime before the invasion of Bactria and Sogdiana a modification of the structure of the *taxis* was made, in that one of the chiliarchies now was composed of 'heavy' armed, the other of more lightly armed troops, "nach Art der Peltasten" (p. 30). The question of whether there were ever chiliarchy subdivisions of the phalanx-*taxeis* is a more debatable one, which has recently been re-opened by Lock<sup>2</sup>, though on quite different evidence and grounds; his attempt has not, I believe, been particularly successful, especially the argument that "The fact that there were chiliarchies of hypaspists is no indication that there were not also chiliarchies of *pezetairoi*" (p. 126). True; but neither is it an indication that there were; and, pace Lock (*ibid.*), an argument from silence must carry some weight in the circumstances<sup>3</sup>.

The question of whether in the Far East or at any time the *taxeis* of the phalanx were composed of two different types of soldier, one more heavily armed, the other more like the Greek peltast, is a more important one. A. von Domaszewski, as we

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 29 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 122-9.

<sup>3</sup> Note the comment of D. G. HOGARTH on the passage of Curt. V 2, 3 ff., on which R. Lock has based his view (in *Journal of Philology* 17 (1888), 7 n. 2): "The tactical unit of the phalanx was no more a pentacosarchy before, than it was a chiliarchy afterwards."

have seen, believes that such an innovation was made in the *taxeis* "für den Krieg in den Steppen und Oasenlandschaften Irans" (p. 30). D. G. Hogarth<sup>1</sup> had already gone even further than this. Describing his view on "rank heresy", he suggested that "Again and again in Arrian (especially I 27 and II 4, 3) we find a clear distinction between lighter and heavier hoplites of the phalanx ... and in at least two passages (Arrian I 21; III 26) if not three (V 17?) hoplites seem to use missile weapons" and that "we have as the largest constituent of Alexander's 'ever victorious army' from six to ten battalions, presenting a front of five pikemen, who on occasion could use the sword at close quarters, complemented perhaps by from two to four lighter hoplites armed with javelins, and closed by an οὐραγός, probably armed also with the pike." A. von Domaszewski draws his evidence from three passages in Arrian: IV 6, 3 (Alexander's forced march on Samarkand); III 23, 3 (the march through the Hyrcanian mountains); and IV 28, 8 (the assault on Aornus). The passages cited by Hogarth (I 27, 8 and II 4, 3) refer respectively to the attack on Telmissus and the forced march on Tarsus. The relevant parts are worth quoting in Greek:

- I 27, 8: καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε τοξότας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τάξεις καὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ὅσοι κουφότεροι ἐπήγαγεν.
- II 4, 3: ... Παρμενίωνα μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλείπει σὺν ταῖς τάξεσι τῶν πεζῶν, ὅσοι βαρύτερον ὀπλισμένοι ἦσαν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἀμφὶ πρώτην φυλακὴν ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριαῖνας... (cf. II 4, 6: δρόμῳ ἤγεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ταρσὸν τοὺς τε ἰππέας καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν ὅσοι κουφότατοι...)
- IV 6, 3: ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τῶν τε ἐταίρων ἰππέων τοὺς ἡμίσεας καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς ζύμπαντας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριαῖνας καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς κουφοτάτους ἤει ὡς ἐπὶ Μαράκανδα.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

- III 23, 3: ... ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς καὶ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς κουφοτάτους καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν ἔστιν οὗς ἦει... .
- IV 28, 8: αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς τοξότας τε ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τοὺς κουφοτάτους τε καὶ ἅμα εὐοπλοτάτους καὶ τῶν ἐταίρων ἰππέων ἐς διακοσίους καὶ ἵπποτοξότας ἐς ἑκατὸν προσῆγε τῇ πέτρᾳ.

It will be seen that, with the exception of II 4, 3 (though cf. II 4,6), the passages all have in common the adjective κοῦφος, which, with the exception of I 27, 8, is always used in the superlative form. The argument of D. G. Hogarth and A. von Domaszewski is, essentially, that the word κοῦφος means "light armed"; hence there were two classes of phalangites, "von denen die eine in alter Weise schwer bewaffnet war, die andere leichter gerüstet"<sup>1</sup>. Obviously, the validity of this theory stands or falls on the meaning of the adjective κοῦφος in Arrian: does it mean 'light-armed' or something else? I am hoping shortly to publish an article surveying the uses of κοῦφος in the *Anabasis* and will here limit myself to indicating some of my arguments and conclusions. Firstly, G. T. Griffith would seem to be quite correct when he makes the point that the Macedonian phalangite was *not* a Greek hoplite, in that he did not have the essential breastplate and carried a smaller shield<sup>2</sup>. Hence, it is difficult to see how one could make any distinction between phalangites on the ground of quantity of equipment; for what could be further removed from the equipment without leaving the soldier completely defenceless? Secondly, we should note again that, with the single exception of I 27, 8, whenever Arrian uses the word κοῦφος he always uses it in the superlative form. If the word does mean 'light-armed', the implication is that there were more than one degree of 'lightness' of arms within the

<sup>1</sup> von DOMASZEWSKI, 30.

<sup>2</sup> In *PCPhS* N. S. 4 (1956-7), 3 ff.

phalanx; and this is patently absurd. Why does not Arrian simply speak of the κοῦφοι τῶν πεζῶν? Indeed, why use the word at all, when there is a regular and perfectly satisfactory word for 'light-armed' troops, which is frequently used in Arrian's narrative, viz. φιλοί. At two places in Arrian (II 4, 6 and VI 18, 5) we read about τῶν ψιλῶν ὅσοι κουφότατοι and τῶν ψιλῶν τοὺς κουφοτάτους. Were there, then, gradations of lightness among the light-armed?<sup>1</sup> Again, if κουφότατοι means 'the light armed', how can we explain the statement at Arrian IV 28, 8 (the assault on Aornus) that Alexander selected for the attack the archers, the Agrianians, τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τοὺς κουφοτάτους τε καὶ ἅμα εὐοπλοτάτους, κτλ.? The ἅμα indicates that the κουφότατοι were also the best equipped troops in the phalanx (apart from Coenus' *taxis*); and it would be surprising if 'best equipped' meant those with least equipment. All these problems, however, disappear, if we understand κοῦφος, when it appears in Arrian, to mean "active, nimble, fittest", i.e. best at marching long distances in the shortest time, because the toughest and best trained<sup>2</sup>. We may note that the κουφότατοι are always used by Alexander, under his own leadership, on special expeditions, away from the main army, expeditions requiring these very qualities of marching ability and toughness; and that these expeditions almost invariably include those favourite troops of the King, the hypaspists and the Agrianians (and often the archers)<sup>3</sup>. Now,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also III 18, 5: τῶν τοξοτῶν τοὺς κουφοτάτους; were there "heavier" and "lighter" armed archers?

<sup>2</sup> For this common meaning of κοῦφος, see LIDDELL/SCOTT/JONES, s.v. I was interested to read, after writing this passage, the following footnote 4 in TARN II 153: "The latter word [*sc.* κουφοτάτους] does not mean lighter-armed (had the hypaspists been lighter-armed he [*sc.* Alexander] would presumably have taken them); it means the most active, ...".

<sup>3</sup> See Arr. III 23, 3; IV 6, 3; IV 28, 8, for examples of such special expeditions which consisted of combinations of hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and κουφότατοι of the phalanx.

while there is little doubt that the archers and Agrianians were genuinely 'light-armed' troops, who could be put under the category of *φιλοί*, there is also little doubt, thanks to the researches of W. W. Tarn and G. T. Griffith<sup>1</sup>, that there was no difference between the equipment of the hypaspists and the phalangites and that the long-held view that the hypaspists were more lightly equipped than the phalangites must be rejected<sup>2</sup>. It would thus seem strange to argue that, for expeditions demanding long, forced marches, Alexander took with him phalangites who were more lightly equipped than their comrades and hypaspists who were more heavily equipped than these 'lighted-armed' phalangites. It is also worth noting that, on the occasions where *οἱ κουφότατοι τῆς φάλαγγος* can be determined with any accuracy, the *taxis* of Coenus is regularly present<sup>3</sup>; and that we learn from V 22, 5 and 6 that the force with Alexander, which was described at V 21, 2 as *κουφότατοι τῆς στρατιᾶς* consisted of the *hippotoxotae*, the *agema* of the Companions, the hipparchies of Cleitus and Perdiccas, the hypaspists, the Agrianians and *τὰς τῶν ἀσθεταίρων τάξεις*. The *taxis* of Coenus was, as we have already seen, in all probability the first *taxis* to be called *ἀσθέταιροι*; and that it was so called as an honour describing the best or 'crack' *taxis* of the phalanx; and that other *taxeis* eventually received the same title. Surely this equation of the *asthetaeri* with the *κουφότατοι* of the phalanx must be an indication of the correct interpretation of the word;

<sup>1</sup> TARN II 153; G. T. GRIFFITH, *art. cit.* (above n. 2 p. 120).

<sup>2</sup> For examples of this view, see footnote 4 p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arr. III 23, 2, where, in the march across the Hyrcanian mountains, Alexander takes *τὸ πλεῖστον καὶ ἄμα τὸ κουφότατον τῆς δυνάμεως*. By a process of elimination, working from the troop-units sent with Craterus and Erigyus, it turns out that Alexander has only one phalanx-*taxis* with him and this, as we learn from III 24, 1, is that of Coenus. See also IV 28, 8 and IV 25, 5-6, in which passage the word *κουφότατοι* is not used, but in which the force with Alexander consists of the Companion Cavalry, the horse-archers, the *taxeis* of Coenus and Polyperchon, the Agrianians, the archers and—what has to be deduced from IV 26, 6—the hypaspists.

they were the *asthetaeri* because they were the toughest and most reliable of the phalangites, capable of feats of marching and fighting that the others were not ; they were 'the most mobile and active' of the phalanx. It is highly likely, moreover, that these qualities were rewarded with more than a mere honorary title. We can well imagine their receiving better attention in terms of arms and equipment ; which is why Arrian—or Ptolemy—can refer to them as the εὐοπλότατοι of the phalanx. The κουφότατοι τῆς φάλαγγος, then, were these 'crack' *taxeis* of the phalanx, who, because of their superior fitness, training and bravery, were eventually called *asthetaeri* ; but they were not more lightly armed and equipped than their fellows. It only remains to consider the other two arguments for lighter and heavier armed phalangites : the use by Arrian of the phrase βαρύτερον ὀπλισμένοι and the apparent use on occasions, pointed out by Hogarth, of missile weapons by phalangites rather than that of the sarissa. With respect to the former, it would be dangerous to draw any conclusion from Arrian's use of this phrase at II 4, 3 ; for the contrast that is intended is evidently between the flying column that Alexander took with him to capture the Cilician Gates and the rest of the army, which remained with Parmenion. I would be inclined to regard the phrase βαρύτερον ὀπλισμένοι in this context as yet another example of Arrian's imprecise expression and vague understanding of the Macedonian army ; for the Macedonians who remained with Parmenion were not—and Arrian's text does not imply this—differently equipped from others in their ranks ; nor were they, as we have seen, differently equipped from the hypaspists ; but they were differently equipped—more heavily—from the archers and Agrianians ; and that is all that Arrian is saying. Of the three passages cited by Hogarth as indicating the use of missile weapons by phalangites, the logical explanation of I 21, 2 is that the two soldiers from Perdikkas' *taxeis* are using the missile weapons of the defenders of Halicarnassus whom they had killed in close combat, not that each of the two

had his own—considerable—supply of javelins; and the fact that Philotas, in III 26, 3, κατακοντισθῆναι πρὸς τῶν Μακεδόνων is not strong evidence upon which to build an argument; for, as we can see from Arrian III 8, 9, it is probably that the hypaspist-detachment that attended the King carried λόγχοι instead of sarissas and it would be reasonable to assume that it was these who executed Philotas. The passage V 17, 3, which Hogarth admits is dubious evidence, is easily explained: the expression ἡ φάλαγξ αὐτῆ τῶν Μακεδόνων refers to all the infantry forces under Alexander's command; and these, as we see from V 13, 4, included οἱ Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ οἱ ἀκοντισταί; these obviously were the troops who were ἔς τε τοὺς ἐπιβάτας αὐτῶν [*sc.* τῶν ἐλεφάντων] ἀκοντίζοντες κτλ.

Finally, I would like to examine briefly the developments in the use of the phalanx-*taxeis* and their organisation in the years from Gaugamela to the death of Alexander. It has been generally recognised by historians that, after Gaugamela and the overthrow of the Achaemenid monarchy, the character of any further warfare in the eastern part of the empire must necessarily be different from what had hitherto taken place. Up to now the war had taken the form of the besieging and capturing of key cities and the defeating of the levies of the empire in large-scale pitched battles. Henceforth, at least in the north eastern part of the empire, of which we can be certain that Alexander had good information, there would be no pitched battles against large and unified armies, but rather the sort of guerrilla warfare which involves the pursuit and defeat of small, but highly mobile groups of 'national resistance' fighters; a warfare in which it would be necessary to have available several 'flying columns' of swift moving troops to deal with uprisings or assaults from several quarters at the same time. It was the type of warfare which first the Romans and then the Napoleonic armies had to face in the Spanish peninsula and which recently the United States has fought, with singular lack of success, in Vietnam. It also turned out, though in 331 B.C. it is doubtful

whether Alexander had any presentiment of this, that, with the one exception of the Hydaspes battles, the same type of warfare would be encountered in India. What was needed was a new type of army. As F. Schachermeyr puts it <sup>1</sup>: “An Stelle des vereinten Einsatzes hatten geteilte Unternehmungen zu treten, mit jeweils ad hoc zusammengestellten Heeresgruppen, geführt von entschlossenen Generälen”. Hence his belief that between 331 B.C. and 327 B.C. wide-sweeping reforms were made in the army organisation, the main results of which were: (1) the abolition of the position of overall commander of the phalanx, a position which Parmenion had held until he was left behind in early summer, 330 B.C. at Ecbatana <sup>2</sup>; (2) the *taxeis* of the *pezbetaeri* were made independent of each other with respect to their organisation and were increased considerably in number. The result of these reforms, says F. Schachermeyr, was that Alexander had at his disposal the means to put into effect his idea “eines getrennten Marschierens, eines nach Bedarf vereinten Schlagens und einer Verwendung feinnervig aufeinander abgestimmter gesonderter Heeresverbände.” It was, he believes, the creation of the first ‘modern’ army in the history of the world, surpassing even today’s armies in “innerer Beweglichkeit und Anpassungsfähigkeit”; and Alexander’s genius as a commander showed itself above all in his handling, in India, of these flexible, mobile “getrennter Heeresgruppen”.

It is possible to quibble with details of Schachermeyr’s assessment of the situation; e.g. it is debatable whether Parmenion actually ever did hold a formal overall command of the phalanx; it is debatable—in my view, highly unlikely—that there was any increase in the number of phalanx-*taxeis* after 331 B.C.; and there is no direct evidence in Arrian, or any other source, of the argued reforms. But the character of Arrian’s narrative of the years of campaigning in Bactria, Sogdiana and India

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 292 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. III 19, 7.



make it abundantly clear of the basic correctness of his view and of his assessment of Alexander's achievement. The phalanx-*taxeis* were used always either singly, in combination with other units, such as light-armed and hypaspists, or in pairs or larger groupings, depending on the needs of the situation. It is possible that there never was any *formal* reorganisation<sup>1</sup>, but that each army group was formed at the time to meet the particular need; but the result is still the same: flexibility, mobility and a far greater degree of independence for each *taxis* and with this a greater degree of responsibility for each *taxis*-leader. R. Lock<sup>2</sup>, speaking of the period from 328 B.C. onwards, sums up the situation nicely: "The typical detachment during 328 B.C. consisted of a force of Companion cavalry, some light cavalry or infantry, or both, and a substantial force of good quality Macedonian *pezetairoi* infantry." At the same time, argues Lock<sup>3</sup>, though the new method of warfare imposed greater responsibility and independence upon the individual *taxeis*-leaders, it tended to lessen the importance of the phalangites in the army, since there was now less scope for close order fighting in which the phalangites could play their traditional role. "Light infantry and cavalry were the more important arms, for they were mobile and, therefore, more suited to the new style of warfare." This, however, is only true to a certain degree: light-armed, "specialist" troops, such as slingers and archers, certainly did increase in importance; but the backbone of any significant force was invariably its units of hypaspists and *pezbetaeri/astbetaeri*. Nor is it true to say, as does R. Lock in the same passage, that there was a corresponding decline in the status of *pezbetaeri taxis*-leaders; rather, it should be said that the senior commanders in the army from 329 B.C. onwards were men like Craterus, Perdikkas and Coenus, who

<sup>1</sup> So R. Lock, *op. cit.*, 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, 138-9.

had all been *taxis*-leaders and were promoted because of their abilities ; but this does not necessarily imply any diminution in the quality and prestige of their successors ; indeed, in the new type of warfare and organisation, it could well be argued that a *taxis*-leader would be called in to display far greater powers of initiative and intelligence than in the old style warfare of pitched battle and solid, close knit phalanx.

Of the reforms which took place in the phalanx in the last two years of Alexander's life, little need be said and little can be said, so slender is the evidence. I have argued above that, after the dismissals from Opis, there were little more than 3,000 Macedonian *pezbetaeri* left with Alexander, a figure which harmonises reasonably well with those of Berve<sup>1</sup> and Schachermeyr<sup>2</sup>, and that reinforcements of c. 10,000 Macedonians were expected from Antipater. We hear in the sources of the arrival at Susa in 324 B.C. of the 30,000 young Iranians whom Alexander had arranged to have trained, in 327 B.C., in Macedonian weapons and military techniques and who bore the significant name of *Epigoni* (Successors)<sup>3</sup>. We further hear of the arrival at Babylon in 323 B.C. of 20,000 Persians and a significant number of Cossaeans and Tapurians under the command of the satrap of Persis, Peucestas. These troops were mainly archers and slingers<sup>4</sup>, and, according to Arrian<sup>5</sup>, Alexander enrolled these ἐς τὰς Μακεδονικὰς τάξεις, in such a way that each file

<sup>1</sup> I 121 : " . . . ungefähr 3-4,000 Pezhetairen nach Verabschiedung ihrer Kameraden übrig blieben."

<sup>2</sup> P. 406 : "etwa 4,000-5,000 Makedonen" ; though F. Schachermeyr believes that the 13,000 infantry in Curtius' text refers to the Greco-Macedonian army that still remained with Alexander after Opis ; I have argued the case differently in my discussion.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. VII 6, 1 ; Diod. XVII 108, 1 ff. ; Plut. *Alex.* 71. On the significance of the name *Epigoni*, cf. SCHACHERMEYR, 405 : "Sollten sie den Kern des künftigen Heeres wie seiner Phalanx bilden. "Epigonoi" (Nachkommen) nannte sie darum der König" ; and BERVE I 120, for a similar comment.

<sup>4</sup> Arr. VII 23, 1 ; Diod. XVII 110, 2.

<sup>5</sup> VII 23, 3-4.

contained sixteen men, of whom four were Macedonians and twelve Persians; the Macedonians retained τὴν πατριὸν ὄπλισιν, while the 'Persians' were armed with the bow and with μεσάγκυλα. Questions immediately arise from this account, both with respect to the numbers involved and Alexander's intentions for the Macedonian element in his future army. If there were only c. 3,000 Macedonians available, as I have argued, and if each file was sixteen deep, then only c. 12,000 of Peucestas' troops would have been involved in this new 'mixed' phalanx, whose strength would thus have been c. 15,000 (without including any hypaspist formations). If this formation were intended as a permanent force, what are we to make of Curtius' statement<sup>1</sup>, discussed earlier, about the 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry? The only suggestion that I can offer is that Alexander intended to have at least three, and possibly four, field armies, each having a different character. Thus there would be one army of c. 10,000 Macedonians—the replacements from Macedonia—formed on traditional *pezbetaeri*-phalanx lines; a second army of the *Epigoni*, perhaps broken up into two army corps, armed and trained in Macedonian fashion; and a third army, this new 'mixed' phalanx. It is also possible that he intended to extend the process of 'Verschmelzung' to the newcomers from Macedonia and mix them with the *Epigoni* in the ratio of 1 : 3 and then split the whole 40,000 into two or possibly three field-armies, together with the mixed phalanx. But this can be only speculation; there is no evidence for the King's intentions with respect to the *Epigoni* or the Macedonian reinforcements, other than the significance of the name and Curtius' vague statements about holding down Asia. Two things only can be said with reasonable certainty. Firstly, despite the enthusiasm of such scholars as Berve<sup>2</sup> and such

<sup>1</sup> X 2, 8. See above, pp. 112-3.

<sup>2</sup> I 121: "In genialer Weise wurde hier das System der verbundenen Waffen zum ersten Male Wirklichkeit ...".

soldiers as J. F. C. Fuller<sup>1</sup>, the 'mixed' phalanx was a monstrosity, whose soldiers must have breathed a great sigh of relief that Alexander died before he had the opportunity of sending them into battle. As a military corps it would have been both useless and unworkable and one may agree wholeheartedly with F. Schachermeyr's statement that "Fast will es uns scheinen, dass Alexander in der neuen Reichsarmee vorerst gar nicht so sehr ein Instrument der Kriegführung sah wie ein solches der inneren Ausgleichspolitik"<sup>2</sup>. Secondly, whatever may have been Alexander's intentions for his 'Reichsarmee' and whatever may have happened after his death, "Eins nur ist sicher, die Neuregelungen in Babylon bedeuteten das Ende der makedonischen Truppe der Pezhetairen"<sup>3</sup>, a fair comment from a scholar who perhaps more than any other has contributed to our understanding of Alexander's Macedonian phalanx.

<sup>1</sup> *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London 1958), 142-3: "The army of occupation he would require must be more flexible than his old army, hence the mixture of light and heavy troops. Another characteristic was that it combined missile power and shock." J. F. C. FULLER, it may be noted, says incorrectly that "this mixed phalanx was never formed."

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 406-7.

<sup>3</sup> BERVE I 121.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- BELOCH = K. J. BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte* III<sup>2</sup> 2 (Berlin/Leipzig 1923).
- BERVE = H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* I-II (München 1926).
- VON DOMASZEWSKI = A. VON DOMASZEWSKI, *Die Phalangen Alexanders und Caesars Legionen*, Sitzungsber. Heidelberger Ak., Phil.-hist. Kl. 1925-6, 1.
- H. DROYSEN = H. DROYSEN, *Untersuchungen über Alexanders des Grossen Heerwesen und Kriegführung* (Freiburg 1885).
- J. G. DROYSEN = J. G. DROYSEN, "Alexander des Grossen Armee", in *Hermes* 12 (1877), 226-52.
- KROMAYER/VEITH = J. KROMAYER und G. VEITH, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer*, Handbuch d. Altertumswissenschaft IV 3, 2 (München 1928).
- SCHACHERMEYR = F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Grosse. Ingenium und Macht* (Wien 1949).
- TARN = W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great* I-II (Cambridge 1948-1950).

## DISCUSSION

*M. Errington* : I should like to open by dealing with a preliminary point which has traditionally been extremely troublesome. I am not convinced that the Alexander of Anaximenes (F 4 Jacoby) is any other than Alexander I Philhellene, an assumption which solves many difficulties. I do not think it legitimate (if the passage is usable at all, which I believe) to separate the two parts of the sentence. This means therefore that the same Alexander was responsible for the creation of the cavalry *hetairoi* and of the *pezhetairoi*. In favour of Alexander I is the formal point that Harpocration attributes the fragment to book I of Anaximenes. Moreover the creation of the cavalry *hetairoi* as early as Alexander I would make good sense : he led Macedonian cavalry under Persian generalship at the battle of Plataea ; and I should cautiously suggest that the experience of the success of the Greek *hoplites* against the massed cavalry of the Persians at Plataea might well have provided Alexander with the incentive to form an equivalent body of infantry for Macedonia.

It would than be possible to use Theopompus F 348 Jacoby without conflict with Anaximenes with specific reference to the *pezhetairoi* of Philip, on the assumption that Philip's *pezhetairoi* were a reorganised select group whose new formation was necessitated by the virtual collapse of Macedonian military power in the period before Philip : it would therefore be a case of a well-established name having being used for a newly formed unit.

*M. Badian* : If we want to use the Anaximenes fragment, we must (as has often been observed) take it as it stands : it means that Alexander first had to teach his barons to ride, and this is absurd. The fragment therefore does not seem to give us any real information about the creation of the *hetairoi*. Since, as Mr. Errington says, we ought to take it all together, it follows that one must doubt much reliance can be placed on the information about the *pezhetairoi*.

Mr. Milns seems to be right in stressing the superiority of the Theopompus passage, which at least makes very good sense as it stands. If this does not help us much in defining the *pezhetairoi*, that is merely the usual difficulty in the kind of sources on which we depend.

*M. Bosworth*: I would agree, and make a further point. It is obviously absurd to imagine any Macedonian king training his nobles to ride—so absurd that it has been often suggested that ἵππεύειν συνεθίσας is a misunderstanding by Harpocration. The quotation is at second hand and there is a double possibility of corruption. But the same is true of the Theopompus fragment also. It is an explanation of Demosthenes' reference to the πεζέταιροι (II 17), transmitted by the scholia of Demosthenes. There may again be distortion. Theopompus may merely have said that the king had an élite bodyguard who belonged to the πεζέταιροι. This the commentators may have seized as an explanation of the technical term.

*M. Badian*: The Theopompus passage, however, is essentially different from the Anaximenes in that it makes perfect sense as it stands, as his definition of the term *pezhetairoi* and explanation of the origin of the unit. There is no sign of compression or error in excerpting.

*M. Wirth*: Wichtig für die Historikerfragmente zur Pezhetairenfrage (Anaximenes F 4 Jacoby; Theopomp F 348 Jacoby) scheint mir weniger das Militärische als das Soziale der Aspekte. An Möglichkeit, je Klarheit über den Anaximenes-Text zu gewinnen, zweifle ich. Indes, das erste ἑταίρους weist auf Rangerhebung durch Reiterdienst hin, die m.E. allein auf den Feudalcharakter der Monarchie Bezug haben kann. In Analogie dazu müsste das πεζεταίρους... als sensationelle Neuerung für den Fussdienst gelten, erklärlich vielleicht aus einem Bedarf an geeigneten Lehensträgern bei räumlicher Ausweitung des Reiches. Das πλείστους (das folgende καὶ τοὺς verstehe ich im Sinne etwa von ὄντας) liesse dabei Auswahl nach Qualität er-

kennen. Der Theopompstelle nach müsste derartige dann als Erweiterung dieses Kreises verstanden werden: Bezöge sich das ἑδορυφόρου auf die Hypaspistengarde, die auf diese Weise als neu geschaffene Durchgangsstufe zum Pezhetairenstand zu denken wäre, so liessen sich die späteren drei Hypaspistenchiliarchien sowohl als Erweiterung verstehen, die entweder Philipp oder erst Alexander durchführte. Dem Pezhetairenstand gehörten auch die Hypaspisten an (so möchte ich Arr. I 14, 2 verstehen). Allgemein scheint mir die damit forcierte Attraktivität des militärischen Dienstes die wichtigste Voraussetzung für Philipps jahrzehntelange Königspolitik, ähnlich auch für die Anfänge Alexanders. Der Schluss der Anaximenesstelle in diesem Zusammenhang ist bezeichnend, gleichzeitig, auf welchen König man sie bezieht.

*M. Schachermeyr*: Die Schwierigkeit des Pezhetairen-Problems liegt darin, dass wir über den sozialen Status dieser Leute keinen Bescheid wissen.

Dann ein weiteres Problem: Es ist richtig, dass wir mit Reformen mehr *de facto* als im Sinne einer intendierten organisatorischen Umstellung zu tun haben, seitdem der Gebirgskrieg immer häufiger spontane Kleinunternehmungen erforderte. Bis Baktrien tritt immer die Armee als Ganzes auf. Seit dem sogdischen Aufstand tritt immer öfter eine Verteilung auf kleinere Armeegruppen in den Vordergrund mit spontan zusammengestellten Expeditionsverbänden im Sinne «verbundener Waffen». Die Reform galt somit eigentlich der Kriegführung.

*M. Bosworth*: I should like to make two points, both dealing with use of the sources. Firstly, it seems to me dangerous to argue from the silence of the sources that there were no reinforcements sent to Asia after 331. The sources in these matters are too unreliable and lacunose for us to make reliable arguments from silence. Before 331 Arrian and Curtius both transmit details omitted by the other, and significantly the only reinforcement known to have been reported



by Callisthenes—the 5000 infantry from Macedonia who arrived just before the entry into Cilicia (Plb. XII 19, 2)—appears in none of our major sources. The record is obviously far from exhaustive. It is also dangerous to make sweeping inferences from the casualty figures in the sources. They are equally lacunose, and cover only one aspect of the losses. One need only recall that there were unrecorded and constant losses caused by illness and fatigue—such as the casualties on the march to the Oxus, greater says Curtius than all the battle losses (Curt. VII 5, 15). The figures in Arrian give a partial and totally incomplete picture.

Secondly I would agree with the speaker that hypaspists and phalanx troops were uniformly armed. In particular he appears correct that in the passages cited *κουφος* denotes physical agility not lightness of armament. But Arrian is quite capable of using the word in two senses. At III 21, 8 he describes a flying column of Agrianians and hypaspists sent in pursuit of Bessus. These were lightly armed—*ὡς κουφότατα ἐσταλμένους*—and they are contrasted with the rest of the infantry who followed *ἐν τάξει*. This does not mean that the hypaspists were regularly more lightly armed than the phalangites, merely that they discarded some of their weaponry for a particularly arduous task. We should remember the tradition of the combat between Corrhagus and Dioxippus, which explicitly attests that the phalangites carried a missile javelin as well as the sixteen foot *sarisa*; and the blade of such a weapon has in fact been found alongside the fittings for a *sarisa* in the warrior tomb at Vergina (cf. M. Andronicos, in *BCH* 94 (1970)). It is quite possible that for particularly arduous assignments the hypaspists (and phalangites) carried javelins alone. In that case we are dealing not with two different bodies of troops, permanently armed in different ways, but with a single flexible corps, uniformly armed but capable of using different weapons in different situations.

*M. Errington*: I should like to add that the passages in which *κουφότατοι* are mentioned do not need necessarily to imply the use of whole major units (*taxeis*). In particular Arr. IV 28, 8 seems to

imply a contrast between the *κουφότατοι* and the *taxis* of Coenus. Thus the *κουφότατοι* may have been small units or even individual phalangites detached for these specific non-phalanx duties. This would therefore constitute an additional illustration of the great flexibility of this part of Alexander's army practice.

*M. Milns*: I agree that we should be careful in making sweeping assumptions on the basis of Arrian's silence, or the silence of the sources in general. Hence my assertion that any attempt to work out figures for reinforcements and losses can be at best purely conjectural and tested only by their "innere Wahrscheinlichkeit". Do they, in other words, all add together to make a consistent and plausible account?

*M. Badian*: The question of reinforcements simply cannot be properly discussed, in view of the poor quality of our sources, so often stressed by Mr. Bosworth. Not only is an argument from silence impermissible: the difficulties raised by positive statements can be easily illustrated. In Arrian VII 23, 1, various contingents reach Alexander in Babylon in 324, including cavalry under Menidas. Mr. Milns argues that these are possibly the Macedonian reinforcements that Alexander had sent Menidas and two others to collect during the winter of 328/7, with instructions to wait in Asia Minor until the King had returned from India. This seems quite arguable. But Arrian merely has Philoxenus *στρατιάν ἄγων ἀπὸ Καρίας* and Menander *ἐκ Λυδίας ἄλλους*. Were they Macedonians? Compare (for the wording) IV 7, 2, where Asander and Nearchus bring the king Greek mercenary forces at Bactra (*στρατιάν Ἑλλήνων μισθοφόρων ἄγοντες*) and Arrian continues that Bessus and Asclepiodorus (whoever they were) came *καὶ οὗτοι στρατιάν ἄγοντες*. Does he mean to contrast their *στρατιά* with the mercenaries—i.e., were these *Macedonian* reinforcements? Does he mean us to understand that this *στρατιά* was, like the other, one of Greek mercenaries? Or did he neither know nor care?

*M. Bosworth*: This incident is particularly interesting, for the parallel passage of Curtius adds to Arrian's account: *Antipater Graecorum VIII milia . . . miserat* (VII 10, 12). It may be that they were Greek mercenaries, but they might also have been Macedonians. What is important is that it is omitted by Arrian and it is a contingent sent from the Greek mainland after 331.