

# Greek political oratory and the canon of ten Attic orators

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# I

MICHAEL EDWARDS

## GREEK POLITICAL ORATORY AND THE CANON OF TEN ATTIC ORATORS

My purpose in this paper is to set the scene for the discussion of later Greek deliberative oratory by surveying the largely fragmentary evidence we have of the practice of political speaking during the classical period of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC, with a focus on the ten members of the later Canon.<sup>1</sup> The great irony of Athenian political oratory from the period that was to be so influential on later oratorical practice, rhetorical theory, literary criticism and education is, of course, that so little of it survives, even though in rhetorical theory deliberative oratory was often assigned the first place in importance, preceding mention of judicial and epideictic. So Aristotle at the start of the *Rhetoric* (1, 1, 10):

“It is for this reason that although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking is the same and though deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than private transactions ...” (trans. Kennedy)<sup>2</sup>

And again, a little later on (*Rhet.* 1, 3, 2-3):

“Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either a spectator or a judge, and [in the latter case] a judge of either past or future

<sup>1</sup> For a recent survey on the likely date and compiler of the Canon see ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 6-9.

<sup>2</sup> διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλλίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας οὔσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα ...

happenings. A member of a democratic assembly is an example of one judging about future happenings, a jurymen an example of one judging the past. A spectator is concerned with the ability [of the speaker]. Thus, there would necessarily be three genera of rhetorics; *symbolleutikon* [“deliberative”], *dikanikon* [“judicial”], *epideiktikon* [“demonstrative”].” (trans. Kennedy)<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, Laurent Pernot, in his excellent survey of *Rhetoric in Antiquity*,<sup>4</sup> details “The Practice of Oratory”, and treats the contexts of judicial and political oratory in that order, thereby reflecting the actual state of affairs in what remains of both Athenian oratory and rhetorical theory. Now, it may well be that the standard version of why in practice the judicial predominates is correct. For example, as George Kennedy stated, “(t)he statesmen of the 5<sup>th</sup> century did not publish their orations and perhaps made little or no use of writing in composing them ... deliberative oratory was not regarded as a literary form”.<sup>5</sup> But as Kennedy himself indicates, there is evidence that there were both deliberative speeches which *were* written down during the 5<sup>th</sup> century, and theoretical works about how to write them. In the latter category Kennedy mentions the *Demegoric prooemia* of Critias (Hermogenes, *Peri Ideon* 2, 11, p. 402 Rabe). Into the former category falls Antiphon, the first in the Canon of Ten Attic Orators.

According to Thucydides (8, 68, 1), Antiphon never willingly spoke in the assembly because of his reputation for cleverness. However,

τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ  
πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνὴρ, ὅστις συμβουλευσάιτό τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν.  
“(W)hen other people were engaged in lawsuits or had points to  
make before the assembly, he was the man to give the best and

<sup>3</sup> ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτὴν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστιν δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἶον] ὁ δικαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.

<sup>4</sup> PERNOT (2005) 24-26.

<sup>5</sup> KENNEDY (1963) 203.

most helpful advice to those who asked him for it.” (trans. Warner)

In my opinion, commentators have paid insufficient attention to the phrase ἐν δήμῳ, which is strengthened by the καὶ ... καὶ ... correspondence. It is dismissed by Simon Hornblower in his *Commentary on Thucydides* as “perhaps something of a tag”;<sup>6</sup> and the focus has been on Antiphon’s activities as a forensic logographer and whether or not he was the first to publish speeches.<sup>7</sup> But Thucydides’ statement, which is later reflected by Hermogenes (*Peri Ideon* 2, 11, p. 400 Rabe),<sup>8</sup> should not be lightly dismissed when we have evidence that Antiphon did indeed compose at least two deliberative speeches, *On the Tribute of the Lindians* and *On the Tribute of the Samothracians*.<sup>9</sup> Hornblower questions whether these speeches were delivered in the assembly or rather before the Council – I do not follow his logic that ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα does not indicate the courts, because “it is agreed that Antiphon appeared in court”, and so might mean the Council, when he goes on to say that Thucydides’ “formulation (ἐκούσιος, “willingly”) in any case allows some degree of participation in both assembly and whatever the ‘other arenas’ may be” – which therefore, to my mind, “allows some degree of participation” in the courts as well (presumably Antiphon will not “willingly” have stood trial for his role in the revolution of the Four Hundred). Further, while Hornblower may be right to note that the two tribute speeches are assigned to the assembly in the Loeb translation without ancient authority, and hence “(t)he Council is at least as likely”, the flow of Thucydides’ sentence (καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριῶν οὐδ’ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἐκούσιος οὐδένα ... τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ ...) suggests to me that

<sup>6</sup> HORNBLOWER (2008) 956.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, EDWARDS (2000).

<sup>8</sup> οὐπὲρ οἱ φονικοὶ φέρονται λόγοι καὶ οἱ δημηγορικοὶ ... (“to whom the speeches about homicide, as well as deliberative speeches ... are attributed”) (trans. WOOTEN).

<sup>9</sup> Frgs 25-33 and 49-56 THALHEIM; see MAIDMENT (1941) 290-293.

he is referring chiastically to the same arenas, even if ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ... οὐδένα may also bring in the Council. Either way, Antiphon is composing deliberative speeches for others to deliver.

I have one observation to make at this point on the four fragments that survive of the speech for the Samothracians in later writers. This is, that three of the four could easily derive from a narrative section or sections of the speech.<sup>10</sup> All three, indeed, begin with the particle γάρ, which is a regular indicator of the start of the narrative in the orators, although interestingly none of the narratives in the three surviving judicial speeches of Antiphon have it:<sup>11</sup>

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τὴν ἀρχὴν οἰκίσαντες τὴν νῆσον ἦσαν Σάμιοι, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐγενόμεθα. κατωκίσθησαν δὲ ἀνάγκη, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία τῆς νήσου· ἐξέπεσον γὰρ ὑπὸ τυράννων ἐκ Σάμου καὶ τύχη ἐχρήσαντο ταύτη ... καὶ λείαν λαβόντες ἀπὸ τῆς Θράκης ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν νῆσον. (frg. 49 Thalheim = Suidas, s.v. Σαμοθράκη)

“For those who originally occupied the island were Samians; and from them we are descended. They settled there from force of circumstances, not from any desire for the island; for they were driven from Samos by tyrants and met with the following adventures ... and after a successful raid on Thrace they reached the island.” (trans. Maidment)

ἡ <μὲν> γὰρ νῆσος, ἣν ἔχομεν, δῆλη μὲν καὶ πόρρωθεν <ὅτι> ἐστὶν ὑψηλὴ καὶ τραχεῖα· καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα καὶ ἐργάσιμα μικρὰ αὐτῆς ἐστί, τὰ δ’ ἀργὰ πολλά, μικρᾶς αὐτῆς οὐσης. (frg. 50 Thalheim = Demetrius, *On Style* 53)

“For the island we inhabit is mountainous and rocky, as can be seen even from afar. It is but small; yet the productive and cultivable portion is small, and the unproductive large.” (trans. Maidment)

<sup>10</sup> The other, frg. 51 THALHEIM (= PRISCIAN 18, 280), could also, but is more likely to come from the proofs section: καίτοι οὐκ ἂν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ταλαιπωρίας προῦσκέψαντο, τῆς δὲ σφετέρως αὐτῶν σωτηρίας οὐκ ἐνεθυμήθησαν (“Yet if they were concerned for the sufferings of their fellows, they can hardly have failed to take thought for their own lives”) (trans. MAIDMENT).

<sup>11</sup> The narrative of speech 1, *Against the Stepmother* (14-20) has a tripartite structure, in which the third and main part in § 18 does begin with γάρ. See EDWARDS (2004) 60-61.

ἠρέθησαν γὰρ ἐκλογῆς παρ' ἡμῖν οἷς πλεῖστα ἐδόκει χρήματα εἶναι. (frg. 52 Thalheim, = Harpocration, *s.v.* ἐκλογεῖς)

“Those of us were appointed Collectors who were reputed the wealthiest.” (trans. Maidment)

This is interesting because, as is well known, Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (3, 16, 11) begins his very brief discussion of deliberative narrative with the statement that “(n)arrative is least common in deliberative oratory, because no one narrates future events”. However, Aristotle goes on to suggest two things, that if there is a narrative of past events it will serve to remind the audience about them and take better counsel for the future; and if something is unbelievable, the speaker should “promise to tell the cause of it immediately and to refer [judgment] to somebody”. Both pieces of advice apply here, the first to frg. 50 (not an event, but a geographical feature which should lead to a reduction in tribute), the second to frg. 49, where the perhaps unlikely origins of the Samothracians in Samos are explained (note the second γὰρ in the passage, which serves Aristotle’s function of promising to tell the cause).

It would be good to know how the speeches and fragments of a man executed for being a traitor to the democracy were preserved, when he suffered *damnatio memoriae*, with his house rased to the ground, and himself and his descendants disfranchised.<sup>12</sup> Their preservation may be due to the activities of one of the oligarchic clubs (ἐταιρεῖαι) of the period, and the same probably applies to the speeches of the second member of the Canon, Andocides, who was also a member of a club<sup>13</sup> and was banished after his unsuccessful peace mission to Sparta in 392/1.<sup>14</sup> With Usher,<sup>15</sup> Andocides was the least esteemed of the ten orators, his reputation being summed up in the infamous

<sup>12</sup> See the decree preserved in PS.-PLUT. *Antiphon* 834a-b.

<sup>13</sup> See the fragment of his speech *To the Members of His Party* (πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους), frg. 3 BLASS.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. DEM. 19, 277-279; PHILOCH. *FGrH* 328 F 149a; PS.-PLUT. *Andocides* 835a; ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 114-115.

<sup>15</sup> USHER (1999) 42.

statement of Herodes Atticus, “at least I am better than Andocides” (Philostr. *VS* 2, 1, 565).<sup>16</sup> But Andocides has the distinction of being the author of our earliest surviving deliberative speech, *On the Peace with the Spartans*.<sup>17</sup> This speech, despite its failure,<sup>18</sup> is a good example of the deliberative genre, though its opening indicates that discussion of the arrangement (τάξις) of a speech is not a clear-cut, scientific matter.<sup>19</sup> For most commentators, myself included,<sup>20</sup> the speech has no formal proem, in line with Aristotelian theory (*Rhet.* 3, 14, 12, “there is very little need for them”). Aristotle does, however, add the remark that “the subject needs no prooemion except because of the speaker or the opponents”. We might, therefore, think alternatively that the speech opens with some general remarks (“That it is better to make a just peace than to make war you all seem to me, Athenians, to understand”), followed by an anticipation of his opponents’ arguments (“but that the public speakers accept the name of peace but are opposed to the actions by which peace might be concluded ...”). Nevertheless, this opening is hardly designed to win over the listeners, with its “this you do not at all perceive”.<sup>21</sup>

Andocides indicates at the outset his concern that the people, advised by their leaders, will regard peace with Sparta as potentially leading to oligarchy. He attempts to counter this immediately with a set of historical examples (3, 3-12). The use of paradigms would later be recommended by Aristotle as

<sup>16</sup> He is discussed last by HERMOG. *De ideis* 2, 11, p. 403 RABE.

<sup>17</sup> I accept, with most scholars, that *On the Peace* is a genuine speech of Andocides. For the view that it was a later rhetorical forgery, see HARRIS (2000). For TODD (2000) 335, n. 1, “it may be a pamphlet rather than a real speech”.

<sup>18</sup> It is easy to forget that many of Demosthenes’ political and quasi-political legal speeches were also unsuccessful, despite the brilliance of their rhetoric.

<sup>19</sup> For BLASS (<sup>2</sup>1887) 330, indeed, the whole speech is problematic: “Erstlich das gänzliche Fehlen einer Ordnung und eines Planes”. See further ALBINI (1964) 24-26.

<sup>20</sup> EDWARDS (1995) 194. See USHER (1999) 50.

<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the opening (3, 1-12) is for Anna Missiou an indicator of Andocides’ ‘subversive’ attitude towards the Athenian democracy. See MISSIOU (1992) 85.

being “most appropriate to deliberative oratory” (*Rhet.* 3, 17, 5), and the theme of expediency (συμφέρον) runs through the examples employed by Andocides here. Expediency and justice are the key themes also of Thucydides’ deliberative speeches, and these recur in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1, 3, 5):

“The ‘end’ of each of these is different, and there are three ends for three [species]: for the deliberative speaker [the end] is the advantageous [*sympheron*] and the harmful (for someone urging something advises it as the better course and one dissuading dissuades on the ground that it is worse), and he includes other factors as incidental: whether it is just or unjust, or honorable or disgraceful.” (trans. Kennedy)<sup>22</sup>

Andocides continues by refuting the claim that continuing the war was a necessity imposed by justice (3, 13-16) and arguing that peace will bring advantages (3, 17-23).<sup>23</sup> Alliance with Corinth and Argos, on the other hand, would be disadvantageous (3, 24-32); expediency is to the fore in 3, 28:

“What I fear the most is this, Athenians, our accustomed error that we always abandon our stronger friends and choose the weaker, and make war for the sake of others when it is possible for our own sakes to live in peace.” (trans. Edwards)<sup>24</sup>

This bad habit is illustrated by a second set of historical parallels (3, 28-32), and the speech concludes with a justification of the referral to the assembly of the decision in the matter (3, 33-41, including a third set of historical examples at 37-39). Andocides pointedly fails to indicate the advantages Sparta would gain from the proposed agreement, especially peace with

<sup>22</sup> τέλος δὲ ἐκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι πρία, τῶ μὲν συμβουλευόντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρονος ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδίκον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν.

<sup>23</sup> Included here (3, 17-19) is a highly provocative defence of the Spartans, ending with “(y)et what kind of peace would they have obtained from us, if they had been defeated in one single battle?”

<sup>24</sup> ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνο δέδοικα μάλιστα, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ εἰθισμένον κακόν, ὅτι τοὺς κρείττους φίλους ἀφιέντες ἀεὶ τοὺς ἥττους αἰρούμεθα, καὶ πόλεμον ποιούμεθα δι’ ἐτέρους, ἐξὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰρήνην ἄγειν.

Persia, which would allow Sparta to dominate Greece and at the same time cede control of the Greek cities in Asia Minor to the Persians. His opponents must have played on the expediency of resisting this outcome, and it is perhaps no surprise that Andocides and his fellow-ambassadors were exiled.

Before leaving Andocides, we should note two other speeches of his, one of which survives: the second speech in the corpus, entitled *On his Return*. This speech, whose date is unclear,<sup>25</sup> was delivered by Andocides before the assembly on the private matter of his own recall from exile. It is not, therefore, strictly a deliberative speech,<sup>26</sup> but it is a *δημηγορία* and so can only fall under the first of Aristotle's three categories. The dramatic narrative (2, 10-16), in which Andocides lists his services to the democracy's army during his exile and the way he was treated by the Four Hundred on his first attempt to return, is an example (however unsuccessful) of creating pathos, of which "[deliberative oratory] does not have many opportunities", according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3, 17, 10). Andocides' own past services, and those of his ancestor Leogoras (2, 26), are supplemented by his current services in supplying grain (2, 20-21) and additional 'secret' services which he has revealed only to the Council (2, 19) – the underlying message, it is clear, is of the expediency for the democracy of allowing Andocides to return from exile. Justice also plays a role. Andocides admits his past 'mistake', his involvement in the Herms scandal of 415, but in § 22 he twice says that the favour (*χάρις*) he is requesting, in return for his secret services, is just.<sup>27</sup> We also have a fragment of a speech *To the Members of his Party* (preserved at Plut. *Them.* 32):

“The Athenians removed his remains by stealth and scattered them to the winds.” (trans. Maidment)<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Perhaps 409 or 408, but possibly later. See EDWARDS (1995) 89.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, JEBB (1893) 109, n. 1.

<sup>27</sup> The repeated adjective *δικαίαν* ... *δικαία*. Andocides additionally uses the adverb *δικαίως* five times in the course of the speech (2, 5, 12, 18, 19, 24), though not with reference to the favour he is asking.

<sup>28</sup> φωράσαντας τὰ λείψανα διαρρῖψαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

This is perhaps too short a fragment to allow the inference that it derives from a narrative section of the speech, but Andocides is clearly trying, as Plutarch comments, “to incite the oligarchs against the democracy”, that is, to arouse pathos. The six other fragments of Andocides in Blass’ 1871 edition may also belong to this speech, and interestingly in the two that are more than a single word there are clearly again attempts to arouse pathos.<sup>29</sup> The second counts, indeed, as a ‘diatribe’ (personal abuse) against the opponent, which for Aristotle is, once more, rare in deliberative oratory (*Rhet.* 3, 17, 10).<sup>30</sup> It is unclear what the *To the Members of his Party* actually was – Roisman / Worthington, for example, suggest “a literary composition written in the form of a speech”,<sup>31</sup> but again by its nature it would appear to fall under the Aristotelian deliberative category. Both the *De Reditu* and the *Pros tous Hetairous*, then, indicate the difficulties which can arise from Aristotle’s rather simplistic schematisation.

The practice of speechwriting for politicians is a very familiar one today, with membership bodies such as the “Professional Speechwriters Association”.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, one can hardly imagine a

<sup>29</sup> μὴ γὰρ ἴδοιμέν ποτε πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὄρων τοὺς ἀνθρακευτὰς καὶ τὰς ἀμάξας εἰς τὸ ἄστυ ἤκοντας, καὶ πρόβατα καὶ βοῦς καὶ γυναῖα, καὶ πρεσβυτέρους ἀνδρας καὶ ἐργάτας ἐξοπλιζομένους· μηδὲ ἄγρια λάχανα καὶ σκάνδικας ἔτι φάγοιμεν (“May we never again see the charcoal-burners and their waggons arriving in Athens from the mountains, nor sheep and cattle and helpless women, no, nor old men and labourers arming for battle. May we never again eat wild herbs and chervil”); περὶ Ὑπερβόλου λέγειν αἰσχύνομαι, οὗ ὁ μὲν πατήρ ἐστιγμένος ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ ἀργυροκοπέῳ δουλεύει τῷ δημοσίῳ, αὐτὸς δὲ ξένος ὢν καὶ βάρβαρος λυχνοποιεῖ (“Hyperbolus I blush to mention. His father, a branded slave, still works at the public mint; while he himself, a foreign interloper, makes lamps for a living”). (trans. MAIDMENT)

<sup>30</sup> KENNEDY compares “the general absence of personal invective against his Athenian opponents in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches with his extended invectives in judicial speeches such as *On the Crown*” (1991) 275, n. 239. Andocides’ pithy abuse of Hyperbolus compares well with Demosthenes’ more extended abuse of Aeschines’ parents at 18, 129-131.

<sup>31</sup> ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 115.

<sup>32</sup> See, for instance, LANCASTER (2010). Lancaster wrote speeches for the former UK Labour cabinet minister, Alan Johnson.

British politician delivering a speech which had not been prepared for him or her in advance. It is usual to think the opposite of ancient Athenian politicians, and Laurent Pernot sums up the standard view:

“Les discours judiciaires, dont le contenu était préparé à l’avance, se sont prêtés de préférence à la mise par écrit, qui d’ailleurs était nécessaire quand intervenait un logographe. Les discours adressés à l’Assemblée, au contraire, qui faisaient une large place à l’improvisation en fonction des propositions présentées en séance et de la tournure prise par les débats, ont été confiés à l’écriture plus rarement et plus tard.”<sup>33</sup>

Generally speaking, Pernot is correct, but we have already seen evidence in the Antiphontean fragments and Thucydides of the use of a speechwriter in a political setting. The third member of the Canon, Lysias, provides further evidence. As a metic, Lysias cannot have addressed the assembly other than during the brief period when he was granted citizenship. But Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lysias* 1, cf. 3) says that Lysias “wrote many speeches for the lawcourts, and for debates in the Council and the Assembly, each well-adapted to its medium”,<sup>34</sup> while the Pseudo-Plutarchan *Life* (836b, cf. Photius 262, p. 488b) mentions ‘deliberative speeches’ without subdivision. The only extant deliberative speech by Lysias is the fragment of the *Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens* preserved by Dionysius (*Lysias* 31-33) and numbered 34 in modern editions. Dionysius himself is not sure that the speech, opposing a proposal by Phormisius to restrict the franchise to Athenians who owned land, was actually delivered,<sup>35</sup> and modern scholars have been sceptical, as Stephen Todd in the introduction to his

<sup>33</sup> PERNOT (2000) 46-47. See also TREVETT (2011) 19: “Most speeches to the Assembly will have been made extemporaneously; almost by definition politicians had to be capable public speakers, who could participate in a debate without being tied to a prepared text”.

<sup>34</sup> Trans. USHER (πλείστοις δὲ γράψας λόγους εἰς δικαστήριά τε καὶ βουλὰς καὶ πρὸς ἐκκλησίας εὐθέτους).

<sup>35</sup> Though “at all events it is composed in a suitable style for an actual debate” (*Lys.* 31).

Texas translation.<sup>36</sup> Todd is inclined to regard the speech as a political pamphlet, but we should note that Dionysius is not in doubt that the speech was written “for one of the prominent politicians”.<sup>37</sup> It contains various features of which Aristotle would have approved in a deliberative speech, most notably countering the fears of the listeners (34, 6):

“Our situation is such that they ask what security there will be for the city if we do not do what the Spartans command. In my view, however, these men should say how the democracy will benefit if we do what they [the Spartans] recommend.” (trans. Todd)<sup>38</sup>

Aristotle discusses fear at *Rhetoric* 2, 5, defining it as “a sort of pain or agitation derived from the imagination of a future destructive or painful evil”, and since deliberative oratory concerns the future, this is an appropriate topic for the deliberative context. As Usher notes,<sup>39</sup> dispelling the fears of the audience “was a standard task for a deliberative orator”, and Lysias supports his defiant attitude with reference to the Spartans’ past record of conservatism in their foreign policy. The example of the Mantineans and Argives leads into a recollection of the Athenians’ own attitude during their time of empire (34, 7-9).

Todd follows the standard opinion with regard to the written circulation of deliberative oratory as noted above with Pernot. I do not think that Dionysius’ doubts over whether speech 34 was delivered or not necessarily warrant the conclusion that he “appears to have had considerable difficulty finding a deliberative

<sup>36</sup> TODD (2000) 335, 338. ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 133 sit on the fence: “It is possible, then, that he composed it for a speaker in the Assembly or circulated it as a pamphlet”.

<sup>37</sup> See further FLORISTÁN IMÍZCOZ (2000) 171: “Los argumentos que pueden inducirnos a sospechar de la pronunciación del discurso son muy débiles. La duda que Dionisio manifiesta afecta tan sólo a su propia certeza, y nada hay en el discurso que nos mueva a considerarlo un mero ejercicio de retórica”.

<sup>38</sup> εἶτα τοιούτων ἡμῖν ὑπαρχόντων ἐρωτῶσι τίς ἔσται σωτηρία τῇ πόλει, εἰ μὴ ποιήσομεν <ἄ> Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτους εἰπεῖν ἀξιῶ, τίς τῷ πλήθει περιγενήσεται, εἰ ποιήσομεν ἃ ἐκεῖνοι προστάττουσιν;

<sup>39</sup> USHER (1999) 69, with n. 57.

speech” in a corpus of 425 speeches, of which he thought 233 were genuine (Ps.-Plut. 836a) and among which, as we noted, he says there were speeches for the Council as well as the assembly. But there is no doubt that the great majority of Lysias’ speeches were forensic, and indeed it is hard for us, at least, to find possible examples of any other deliberative orations. Blass lists only frg. CXI Carey (= CV FI), the Ὑπὲρ Νικίου mentioned by Dionysius (*Lysias* 14) as being a speech delivered by the captive Nicias before the Syracusans whose authenticity was rejected by Theophrastus. Blass’ square brackets indicate the general modern opinion too that the speech is spurious.<sup>40</sup> One other possible candidate I might suggest, listed by Blass among the public legal suits as ‘Vereinzelt’,<sup>41</sup> is the speech Περὶ τῆς εἰσφορᾶς (frg. XLVI Carey, = XLIV FI).

The complex, periodic style of the demegoric discourses of Isocrates, the fourth member of the Canon, reflects the purpose of their composition for use in his school, rather than the assembly.<sup>42</sup> This technically renders them worthless as examples of practical deliberative oratory, but it is useful for the purposes of this survey to note the key themes that they rely on in persuading their readers to adopt a course of action, that is, the regular deliberative topics of justice (δίκαιον), expediency (συμφέρον) and possibility (δυνατόν), and also opportunity (καιρός), which plays such a prominent role in the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* of Demosthenes. These topics may be briefly illustrated from Isocrates’ most famous discourse, the *Panegyricus*. More than half of the *Panegyricus* is epideictic in nature (4, 21-132),<sup>43</sup> with the theme of justice underpinning an encomium of the Athenians’ past achievements, which in turn justify

<sup>40</sup> See CAREY (2007) 444: “recte Sauppe hanc orationem exercitationem esse intellexit”; less helpful is FLORISTÁN IMÍZCOZ (2000) 317, n. 100): “No es seguro que el discurso sea espurio, pero tampoco que sea auténtico”.

<sup>41</sup> BLASS (21887) 363.

<sup>42</sup> As was clear to DION. HAL. *Isoc.* 2.

<sup>43</sup> See USHER (1990) 19, 154 and (1999) 299. (In his 1990 commentary Usher takes the epideictic section to end at § 128, followed by a transitional passage §§ 129-132.)

their claims to leadership of Isocrates' proposed Panhellenic expedition against Persia. Forms of *δίκαιος* occur sixteen times in the discourse, including seven examples of the adverbial form *δικαίως*; of these, just over half (nine instances, including four of the adverb) fall in this section. To *δίκαιος* may be added *ἀδικ-* cognates, of which there are seven examples, including one of *συναδικεῖν* (4, 53), and six of these fall in this section of the speech. But it is perhaps significant that only just under half of the *δίκαιος* cognates (seven instances, including three of the adverb) are found in the deliberative section of the discourse (4, 133-169),<sup>44</sup> where Isocrates proposes the expedition after establishing both its justice and that of the Athenians to lead it – the theme of justice in fact permeates throughout. But the main topics of the deliberative section of the discourse are expediency (4, 133-137) and possibility (4, 138-156). For example (4, 133, 138):<sup>45</sup>

“I believe that anyone coming from abroad and witnessing the present spectacle would pronounce both our sides guilty of utter insanity, as we risk so much over unimportant matters when we could have so much without danger, and we ruin our own land after neglecting to reap the riches of Asia ... Yet there are some who express wonder at the extent of the King's power and say that he is a difficult opponent; and they catalogue the many changes he has caused to Greek fortunes. But in my opinion those who say this are arguing not against the expedition but in favour of hastening it: for if he is going to be difficult to wage war against when we are united and he is in a state of confusion, surely we should greatly dread that time when the barbarians have settled their differences and are of one mind, while we continue in our present hostile attitude to one another.” (trans. Usher)<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> As USHER notes (1990) 20, this section deals with the future, after the past has been addressed in the epideictic section.

<sup>45</sup> See USHER (1990) 185-186 and (1999) 301.

<sup>46</sup> Ἡγοῦμαι δ' εἴ τινες ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθόντες θεαταὶ γένοιτο τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοὺς καταγνῶναι μανίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν, οἵτινες οὕτω περὶ μικρῶν κινδυνεύομεν, ἐξὸν ἀδεῶς πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν χώραν διαφθείρομεν, ἀμελήσαντες τὴν Ἀσίαν καρποῦσθαι ... Καίτοι τινὲς θαυμάζουσιν τὸ μέγεθος τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ φασὶν αὐτὸν εἶναι

The end of the second passage above touches on the theme of opportunity, which is picked up in § 160:

“Therefore it seems to me that the factors that should encourage us to start a war against them are very numerous, but the main one is the present opportunity, which we must not let slip.”  
(trans. Usher)<sup>47</sup>

The *Panegyricus* was completed in c. 380, and while its theme of justice is (as we noted earlier) familiar from the deliberative speeches of Thucydides, the emphasis on expediency and possibility foreshadows the order of the advice of Aristotle, that the ‘end’ of deliberative oratory is *sympheron* (*Rhet.* 1, 3, 5) and that the subjects for deliberation are those which are within our power (*Rhet.* 1, 4, 3).<sup>48</sup>

Pseudo-Plutarch (*Isoc.* 839c) attributes both forensic and political speeches also to Isocrates’ adopted son, Aphareus. We only know from elsewhere about his involvement in the defence of his adoptive father concerning his trierarchy (which prompted the *Antidosis*), and scholars have been sceptical.<sup>49</sup> Even more questionable is Pseudo-Plutarch’s statement (839f, repeated at Photius 263, p. 490a), as translated by Roisman / Worthington, that Isaeus, the fifth member of the Canon, “was also the first to introduce figures and to specialize in political oratory, in which he was followed above all by Demosthenes” (πρῶτος δὲ καὶ σχηματίζειν ἤρξατο καὶ τρέπειν ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν τὴν διάνοιαν· ὃ μάλιστα μεμίμηται Δημοσθένης).<sup>50</sup> This sentence

δυσπολέμητον, διεξιόντες ὡς πολλὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς τοῖς Ἑλλησιν πεποίηκεν. Ἐγὼ δ’ ἠγοῦμαι μὲν τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας οὐκ ἀποτρέπειν, ἀλλ’ ἐπισπεύδειν τὴν στρατείαν· εἰ γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁμονοησάντων αὐτὸς ἐν ταραχαῖς ὢν χαλεπὸς ἔσται προσπολεμεῖν, ἢ που σφόδρα χρὴ δεδιέναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον ὅταν τὰ μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων καταστῆ καὶ διὰ μιᾶς γένηται γνώμη, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ νῦν πολεμικῶς ἔχωμεν.

<sup>47</sup> ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ πολλὰ λίαν εἶναι τὰ παρακελευόμενα πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς, μάλιστα δ’ ὁ παρῶν καιρὸς, οὗ σαφέστερον οὐδέν. ὃν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

<sup>48</sup> See further QUINT. 3, 8, 22-25; USHER (1990) 187.

<sup>49</sup> See ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 169.

<sup>50</sup> But Isaeus on all the evidence we have (and the ancients had) clearly did not “specialize in political oratory”. The Loeb translation by FOWLER (1936)

makes much more (or indeed only makes) sense if, with Blass, we construe τὴν διάνοιαν with σχηματίζειν.<sup>51</sup> The biographer refers to figures of thought (not figures of speech), which Isaeus (he claims) was the first to use in political oratory, a practice in which he was followed above all by Demosthenes. Whatever the truth of the claim, it implies that Isaeus wrote political speeches, probably for others to deliver, since he was in all likelihood a metic from Chalcis.<sup>52</sup> I have argued elsewhere that in addition to the surviving eleven speeches connected with inheritance, plus the fragment on the subject of citizenship quoted by Dionysius that is regularly printed as speech 12, there are numerous fragments and titles of speeches that were more or less certainly concerned with inheritance and citizenship; and also that together with the speeches these fragments and titles account for nearly all the speeches of Isaeus that were known later in antiquity.<sup>53</sup> There is then far less room in the corpus of Isaeus than in that of Lysias for this metic to have been writing political speeches. Only one of the fragments, in my estimation, might have been deliberative: frg. XXVII, entitled *On the Speeches Made in Macedonia* (Περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ῥηθέντων), but no details are preserved in the three entries in Harpocration that mention the speech.<sup>54</sup>

This fragment of Isaeus reminds us that with Isocrates and Isaeus we reach the threshold of the five later orators, who were active during and after the Macedonian conflict and of whom four were leading Athenian politicians. The most notable, of course, is Demosthenes, in whose corpus the first seventeen speeches are of a deliberative nature.<sup>55</sup> I say “of a deliberative

makes little sense: “He was also the first to give artistic form to his speech and to turn his attention to the urbane style of the orator; in which Demosthenes has closely imitated him”.

<sup>51</sup> See BLASS (21892) 498-499, n. 1.

<sup>52</sup> See, e.g., ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 170-171.

<sup>53</sup> See EDWARDS (2006) 72-75.

<sup>54</sup> HARP. s.v. Ἀλλέτας, Ἐπικράτης, πέπλος. The fragment is listed among the forensic public speeches by BLASS (21892) 495.

<sup>55</sup> For a succinct survey see TREVETT (2011) 18-22.

nature” advisedly, because Dem. 12, *Letter of Philip*, clearly is not meant to be a speech (nor of course is it by Demosthenes, though it may be by Philip), while Dem. 17, *On the Agreement with Alexander*, may be a later exercise, though MacDowell argues that it was written by a politician other than Demosthenes around 331.<sup>56</sup> It is also the case that at least one of the deliberative speeches (7, *On Halonnesus*) was not written by Demosthenes, in this instance probably Hegesippus.<sup>57</sup> Other speeches whose authenticity has been doubted are 10 (*Fourth Philippic*), 11 (*Response to Philip’s Letter*) and 13 (*On Organisation*), but all are defended by MacDowell both in terms of their Demosthenic authorship and as being genuine political speeches.<sup>58</sup>

I shall not examine Demosthenes’ speeches in this survey, especially since the next paper in the *Entretiens* by Christos Kremmydas will focus on Demosthenes. My focus here is on the publication of the speeches and also the set of *Proems*, a task which many scholars take to have been carried out by Demosthenes’ nephew Demochares at the start of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century.<sup>59</sup> This would be designed to justify Demosthenes’ policies, and would fit the pattern of the preservation of the speeches of Antiphon and Andocides noted above. It may be that Demosthenes was unusual in writing out drafts of his speeches in advance,<sup>60</sup> perhaps through nervousness;<sup>61</sup> and he may have published the speeches himself, presumably to justify his actions and policies.<sup>62</sup> But I tend to agree with Trevett and MacDowell that it is more likely they were published after his death.<sup>63</sup> However, the publishing of political speeches by Demosthenes, whether by himself or by his heir, does tend to obscure the fact

<sup>56</sup> MACDOWELL (2009) 377-381.

<sup>57</sup> See MACDOWELL (2009) 343-346.

<sup>58</sup> MACDOWELL (2009) 354-359, 360-366, 223-229.

<sup>59</sup> As TREVETT (2011) 19.

<sup>60</sup> Hence his opponents could mock that they “smelled of the lamp” (PLUT. *Dem.* 8).

<sup>61</sup> See AESCHIN. 2, 34; PLUT. *Dem.* 11; MACDOWELL (2009) 6.

<sup>62</sup> See, e.g., TUPLIN (1998).

<sup>63</sup> See TREVETT (1996); MACDOWELL (2009) 7-8.

that we have no examples of deliberative speeches from any of the other four later members of the Canon. The three preserved speeches of Aeschines are all technically forensic, however much they are thinly disguised political attacks on Demosthenes and his supporters. A fourth speech known to the ancient critics, *The Delian Oration*, was pronounced spurious by Pseudo-Plutarch (840e, cf. 850a; Photius 264, p. 490a, 266, p. 496a, 61, p. 20a), since Aeschines was replaced on the embassy to the Amphictyonic Council by Hyperides (see below). Only one speech of Lycurgus survives, the forensic *Against Leocrates*, and all of the fourteen fragments of Lycurgus in Conomis' Teubner text appear to be forensic.<sup>64</sup> As for Hyperides, recent discoveries mean that eight speeches survive in part, six on papyrus (including five forensic and one epideictic speech) and two forensic speeches from the Archimedes Palimpsest.<sup>65</sup> Blass listed the titles of thirteen speeches as possibly ambassadorial or demegoric, but the genuineness and classification of a number of these are doubtful.<sup>66</sup> Six of them would have been delivered abroad, including the *Delian Oration* mentioned earlier, but the greatest scepticism has been reserved for the seven that seem to qualify as speeches delivered to the assembly. Thus, for Whitehead, the *Plataean Speech* (Plut. *Mor.* 350b = *P.Oxy.* 3360) "cannot be safely classified as demegoric, ambassadorial, or even, if border disputes had given rise to litigation, forensic"; while Pseudo-Plutarch's passage from which are drawn the titles *On the Generals*, *On the Triremes* and *In Defence of Chares on the Mercenary Force at Taenarum* (Ps.-Plut. *Hyperides* 848e) "does indicate that H spoke on these three topics in the *ekklêsia*, but not necessarily that those speeches themselves had ever been published". Finally, Dinarchus was a Corinthian

<sup>64</sup> CONOMIS (1970). See further BURTT (1954) 135-157; CONOMIS (1961); HARRIS (2001) 204-218. The *Suda* (Λ 825) records the titles of fifteen speeches (cf. PHOT. 268, p. 496b)

<sup>65</sup> For references to texts and translations see ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 246.

<sup>66</sup> See BLASS (<sup>2</sup>1898) 19; WHITEHEAD (2000) 5-7.

metic and so, like Lysias and Isaeus, could not address the assembly in person.<sup>67</sup> Pseudo-Plutarch, however, states that Dinarchus made a fortune under Cassander writing speeches for clients, whose adversaries “were the most eminent orators, but not in the sense that he came up against them in person in the Assembly, for he was unable to attend it; but he wrote speeches for their opponents” (*Dinarchus* 850c). This seems to imply deliberative speeches, though Dinarchus’ surviving three speeches are forensic.<sup>68</sup> The fragments, too, appear mostly to be forensic, but I draw attention to one noted by Dionysius which might have claims to being deliberative, *The Tyrrhenian Speech* (*Din.* 10), and to several of what Dionysius lists as spurious speeches (*Din.* 11): *The Attic Speech*, *The Aetolian Speech*, *For Diphilus* (“a deliberative speech requesting privileges”), *On the Refusal to Surrender Harpalus to Alexander* and yet another *Delian Speech*.

Such, in brief, is the meagre and problematic evidence for political oratory at Athens in the late 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries. The importance of the Canon of Attic orators for the later development of oratory and rhetoric in Graeco-Roman antiquity can hardly be overstated, yet frustratingly little remains of what Aristotle considered to be the highest form of the art. The situation with regard to the preservation and publishing of political speeches seems to have changed very little during the course of a century or more, Demosthenes’ practice of carefully preparing written drafts being wholly exceptional (though equally the vast majority of the speeches preserved in the Demosthenic corpus are forensic), and there can be no doubt that the standard view of the necessity for extemporaneous speaking is largely correct. This does not mean, however, that no other political speeches were composed in advance and written down, whether

<sup>67</sup> For references to texts and translations see ROISMAN / WORTHINGTON (2015) 262.

<sup>68</sup> See also DION. HAL. *Din.* 2: “Having revealed a natural talent for political oratory, he began to write speeches when Demosthenes and his party were still at the height of their power, and gradually acquired a reputation” (trans. USHER).

by individual politicians or indeed by professional logographers, and all ten members of the Canon may, to varying degrees, have participated in this activity.

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## DISCUSSION

*M. Kraus:* Vielen Dank für diese ausgezeichnete Bestandsaufnahme dessen, was wir an deliberativer Rhetorik aus der Periode der attischen Redner haben. Es ist weniger, als man erwartet. Es verwundert freilich ein wenig, gerade Aristoteles als Gewährsmann für das Gewicht der deliberativen Rede in der frühen Zeit angeführt zu finden, und nicht etwa die praktisch gleichzeitige *Rhetorik an Alexander*, die dafür noch sehr viel mehr Substanz geboten hätte. Die *Rhetorik an Alexander* kennt ja nach der korrekten Rekonstruktion des Textes nur zwei Grundtypen von Reden, ‚demegorische‘ (d.h. an das Volk gerichtete) und dikanische (gerichtliche), mit zusammen sieben Untergattungen: Empfehlende, abratende, lobende und tadelnde Rede gehören zum demegorischen, anklagende, verteidigende und prüfende Rede zum dikanischen Typus. Nicht nur steht die Behandlung des demegorischen Typus am Anfang und erhält weitaus mehr Raum, sondern sie fungiert explizit auch als Modell für die gerichtlichen Redegattungen, die „analog dazu“ (ὁμοιοτρόπως τούτοις, 4, 1426b22) beschrieben werden sollen. Dasselbe Grundmuster findet sich wieder in den späten Kapiteln (*cap.* 29-36), wo wiederum stets die demegorischen Gattungen (insbesondere die empfehlende Rede) das universelle Paradigma auch für die dikanischen Gattungen bilden. Bei Aristoteles ist dieser Schwerpunkt auf der deliberativen Rede zwar ebenfalls vorhanden, indem auch er erklärt, dass ‚demegorische‘ und dikanische Reden im Grunde denselben Regeln gehorchen, die ersteren aber als ethisch hochwertiger und politisch relevanter einstuft und ältere Theoretiker dafür kritisiert, die demegorische Rede als die komplexere Gattung vernachlässigt zu haben (*Rhet.* 1, 1, 1354b22-35). Allerdings ist diese Vorrangstellung bei ihm deutlich schwächer ausgeprägt als in der *Rhetorik an*

*Alexander*, insofern die Darstellung der gerichtlichen Rede in etwa denselben Umfang zugebilligt erhält wie die der deliberativen und epideiktischen zusammen und sich konzeptuell völlig vom demegorischen Modell löst. Aber auch bei ihm steht die deliberative Rede noch immer an erster Stelle. Erst die hellenistische und vor allem die römische Rhetorik scheinen die Gewichte hier zugunsten eines paradigmatischen Vorrangs der Gerichtsrede ins Gegenteil verkehrt zu haben.

*M. Edwards*: You are quite right, of course, to draw attention to the absence of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* from my discussion, Manfred. Indeed, I would have been surprised if you had not. This was deliberate on my part, in order to keep the paper focused on a specific rhetorical theory, that of Aristotle, though I recognise that Anaximenes (if he wrote the *Rhetoric to Alexander*) is often very similar in his approach. In addition, my expectation is that Aristotelian rhetorical theory will dominate this *Entretiens*, as it has tended to dominate histories of Greek rhetoric.

*L. Pernot*: Les traces de publication de discours délibératifs existent, mais sont limitées et parfois douteuses : on peut faire un parallèle entre cette situation et celle de l'*epitaphios logos*. L'*epitaphios logos* est un discours qui, lui aussi, était fréquent et régulier dans la vie publique athénienne, et pour lequel les traces de publication sont rares. C'est que, probablement, la plupart des orateurs ne publiaient pas leurs discours. L'Athènes classique était entre oralité et écriture. Certains auteurs de discours rhétoriques avaient conscience de composer des ouvrages qui constituaient un corpus (Isocrate), d'autres non (Démotène). L'éloquence délibérative est le plus souvent du côté de la seconde attitude. De même, en philosophie, il y avait une opposition entre Aristote, qui composait un corpus pour construire méthodiquement un système, et Platon, qui faisait recommencer le monde à chaque nouveau dialogue.

*M. Edwards*: Thank you, Laurent, for your comments, which reflect your deeply informed knowledge of the subject.

You suggest what is a very interesting comparison between deliberative and epideictic rhetoric, and I am sure you are right. It was specifically the forensic genre of oratory whose speeches were in the main published, perhaps because these were what the slowly but surely growing reading public wanted. There is also the question of the logographers, who naturally focused on forensic oratory and published their speeches in order to enhance their future business prospects. You make a comparison between Isocrates and Demosthenes, and Isocrates had additional reasons to compose and publish his discourses, both in terms of his political agenda of a Panhellenic expedition against the Persians, and as materials for his highly successful school. The publication of Demosthenes' speeches has been recently explored by Douglas MacDowell in his *Demosthenes the Orator* (Oxford, 2009), 7-9.

*A. Chaniotis:* This presentation makes clear that Aristotle's categorisation (*Rhet.* 1, 3, 2-3) does not really work, and a sharp distinction between deliberative and forensic oratory is not possible. The aim of a 'forensic' speech is to convince an audience of jurors, exactly as a deliberative oration (and most epideictic orations and speeches of ambassadors). So, instead of using the reference of a speech to the past (forensic) or the future (deliberative) as a criterion, we should look at whether the speaker is part of the deliberating body that will take a decision or not. For instance, in a forensic speech the orator is not a member of the deciding body; in orations in the assembly some orators (citizens) are members of the body to which their speech is addressed, others (e.g. ambassadors) are not. The problems of categorisation are clear, e.g., in the speeches of Antiphon and Andocides that were commented on by Mike Edwards. Thucydides reflects contemporary mentality, when he uses the general term *agôn*.

My second comment concerns Antiphon's fragments 49 and 50; both fragments share the use of images and language for the arousal of pity. The orator explains the arrival of the Samians to Samothrace as the result of *anankê*, not desire (*epithymia*) of

gain. He highlights the poverty of the island (*tracheia, ergasima mikra, arga polla, mikras ousês*) and the status of the immigrants as exiles. Here, references to the past are used in order to justify the orator's request.

*M. Edwards:* Thank you for those comments. This is a very interesting way of looking at the categorisation of forensic and deliberative oratory. Almost (but not quite: cf. Antiphon 5, delivered by a Mytilenean; Isocrates 19, delivered before a court in Aegina) all of speeches of the corpus of Attic orators were delivered in Athens by Athenians, so I suspect your approach would have been a little too broad for Aristotle's liking.

*D. Colomo:* With regard to the fact that so little of Athenian political oratory survives, as you say in the first paragraph of your contribution, on the basis of my experience with fragmentary papyri recovered in archaeological excavations, I would like to point out that in any case we have to take into consideration the factor of chance in the survival of material in the process of transmission of texts and information through the centuries.

*M. Edwards:* The survival of manuscripts and papyri, and the vagaries of chance in that survival, are complex topics, as you know from your papyrological expertise. Isocrates and Demosthenes have their separate, extensive manuscript traditions, while Hyperides' medieval manuscript tradition has only recently been established by the discovery of two fragments in the Archimedes Palimpsest. It seems that the speeches of the other members of the canon were preserved from some point after the survey in the pseudo-Plutarchan *Lives* of the orators in selections (cf. Palatinus Graecus 88 for Lysias) and florilegia, such as the one that has come down to us as the codex Crippsianus (Burney 95 in the British Library) and which contains Antiphon, Andocides, Isaeus, Lycurgus and Dinarchus (also Gorgias, Alcidas and Lesbonax).

*A. Chaniotis:* Finally, a question concerning the question why orations that were delivered after the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC were not included in the canon. Could it be related with developments in performative aspects of oratory?

*M. Edwards:* Performance is an increasingly important area of study in the orators, but it is not clear to me that this necessarily played a part in the formation of the canon. It is far from clear, indeed, when that formation took place, but it seems that the orators of what became the canon, like members of other canons in classical literature, very quickly acquired a status that was later cemented by the activities of the librarians in Alexandria. There were clearly other contenders, and the canon of ten that we have, and which may be due to Caecilius of Caleacte, was not agreed immediately – Dionysius, who recalls the names of other orators, only writes six essays, with the later addition of Dinarchus, but all seven, it should be noted, are in the Caecilian canon. But there does not seem to have been any appetite to include orators of the post-classical period.

*J.-L. Ferrary:* Ma question viendra en complément de celles de D. Colomo et de M. Kraus. J'aimerais savoir ce que l'on sait exactement de la collecte et de la transmission des discours délibératifs de l'Athènes classique à l'époque hellénistique. Peut-on exclure que l'importance de la rhétorique judiciaire et de ses développements avec la théorie des états de cause ait contribué à favoriser la préservation des discours judiciaires plutôt que des discours délibératifs ?

*M. Edwards:* Yes, this is entirely possible, and the transmission processes are entirely unclear. I would note, however, that there is very little evidence that orators were publishing deliberative speeches before the time of Demosthenes, and so while more deliberative speeches might have been preserved under other conditions of transmission, these are unlikely to have come in the main from, for example, the 5<sup>th</sup> century – Pericles

and his contemporaries do not appear to have left any written record.

*M. Kraus:* Zusätzlich zu bewussten Selektionen und Kanonbildungen der hellenistischen Zeit ist für die Frage der Erhaltung der Reden auch noch mit den Unwägbarkeiten und Zufälligkeiten der handschriftlichen Überlieferung in Spätantike und Mittelalter zu rechnen.

*M. Edwards:* That is an important observation, Manfred, thank you.

*M. Kraus:* Verantwortlich für die zähe Langlebigkeit der Aristotelischen Kategorien und Distinktionen trotz ihrer vereinfachenden und im Laufe der Zeit auch zunehmend unpraktischen Rigidität ist neben der Autorität des Namens Aristoteles zweifellos auch der starre Konservatismus der Schulrhetorik, die seit dem Hellenismus das verzweigte rhetorische System über Generationen hin bewahrt und tradiert, wofür etwa das Kompendium Quintilians ein schönes Beispiel gibt.