

# English summaries

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- W. C. SMITH, *Towards a World Theology. Faith and the Comparative History of Religion*, Maryknoll N. Y., Orbis, 1989/2, 206 p.
- D. STALTER-FOUILLOY, *Histoire et violence. Essai sur la liberté humaine dans les premiers écrits chrétiens*, Paris, PUF, 1990, 160 p.
- M. K. TAYLOR, *Remembering Esperenzia. A Cultural-Political Theology for North-American Praxis*, Maryknoll N. Y., Orbis, 1990, 292 p.
- The Living God. A Catechism for the Christian Faith*, translated by Olga Dunlop, Vol. 1 et 2, Crestwood N. Y., St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989, 444 p.
- P. VALADIER, *Inévitable morale*, Paris, Seuil, 1990, 221 p.
- ED. VERMEIL, *La pensée de Troeltsch*, Genève, Labor et Fides, 1990, 104 p.
- D. A. WEIR, *The Origins of the Federal Theology in Sixteenth-Century Reformation Thought*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, 244 p.
- R. WHELAN, *The Anatomy of superstition: a study of the historical theory and practice of Pierre Bayle*, Oxford, The Voltaire Foundation, 1989, 269 p.
- D. A. WHITE, *Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's "Phaedo"*, Cranbury, Susquehanna University Press, 1990, 316 p.

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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

- J. BOUVERESSE, *Homage to Henri Joly*. RThPh 1990/III, pp.297-304.
- J. RUDHARDT, *Dans quelle mesure les mythes grecs ont-ils symbolisé le néant?* RThPh 1990/III, pp. 303-312.
- F. LÉTOUBLON, *The Idea of non-being in the history of archaic Greek*. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 313-322.

*The study of the origins of Greek language—Homer and Hesiod—confirm studies in mythology which show that not even the idea of non-being existed in Greece in archaic times. Homeric poetry is a poetry of being, even when the Sirens are shown in the full act of lying. The poetry of the lie (or of fiction?) appears furthermore only timidly in Hesiod. But there is no trace of non-being, not even in the word χάος "void". No one should be surprised that Greek speculation of non-being begins, in vocabulary and as a philosophical object, with the Pre-socratics, Xenophanes, and certainly Parmenides. It is the appearance of the formal neuter singular of the negation (τὸ μὴ ὄν) in the place of the nomic plural (τὰ ὄντα)—never disdained—which seems to be the main linguistic line of this evolution in thought, parallel to the designation of the infinitive, after Anaximander, by another neuter singular (τὸ ἄπειρον). Finally, to return to the Odyssey, speculation about the ambiguousness of οὐτις, "no one"—a pronoun susceptible to becoming a proper noun—is a possible witness to the burgeoning of reflection on non-being in the archaic epoch.*

L. COULOUBARITSIS, La logique du mythe et la question du non-être. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 323-340.

A. J. VOELKE, Void and non-being in Leucippus and Democritus. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 341-352.

*For the philosophers of the school of Abdera, the opposition between void and plenitude is at the same time an opposition between being and non-being. Y-et, as they say, the void exists and, therefore, non-being exists. This theory is notably expressed in the formula of Democritus: "That which is something (den) is not more than that which of nothing (mēden)". I will try to show that the formula confers to "that which is nothing" a reality equivalent to that of being, which permits us to attribute a causal function to the void. Finally, I will look at various aspects of this function.*

C. CHIESA, Ideas of negations. RThPh 122 (1990), pp. 353-364.

*This paper examines the passage from Aristotle's De Ideis concerning the "one over many" argument, according to which the common predicate is eventually considered by the Platonists as a separate form. Aristotle thinks that this argument implies forms even for negations. But, curiously enough, the second version of this argument points out that negative predicates refer only to a positive form, so that Aristotle's criticism seems to be incoherent.*

E. BERTI, Being and non-being for Aristotle: contrary or contradictory? RThPh 122 (1990), pp. 365-373.

*Being and non-being for Aristotle, thanks to the multiplicity of their meanings, are reciprocally opposed in many ways: 1) by contradiction, when they are considered without any other determination; 2) by privation, when they are taken in relation to a subject; 3) by contrariety, when they are convertible respectively with the One and the Multiple. The only opposition which does not exist between them is the reciprocal implication.*

A. DE MURALT, L'être du non-être en perspective aristotélicienne. RThPh 122 (1990), pp. 375-388.

*In this article it is shown that, in spite of the interpretation which Gregory of Rimini gives of certain texts of the Categories, Non-being for Aristotle does not have any univocal reality (against Parmenides), no "objective" Being (on which point Ockham criticizes Duns Scotus). For Non-being is a negation, and negation, a contradictory operation of opposition. Thus, in the proposition: "there is no Non-being", the intellect conceives of a notion of Being according to the mode of intelligible exercise proper to negation. This is the only "objective" entity which can be applied to the notion of Non-being.*

- J. BRUNSCHWIG, Concerning a stoic manner of not being. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 389-403.

*An attempt to explain the stoic theory that "impulsions" are directed toward "predicates", incorporeal particulars which are not "beings". Antecedents to this theory (in Plato and the dialecticians) permit us to see in it more than an artificial or gratuitous paradox. Its insertion is examined in various theoretical stoic contexts concerning such notions as finality, the Good, assent, moral responsibility and destiny.*

- D. J. O'MEARA, The question of being and non-being of mathematical objects in Plotinus and Iamblichus. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 405-416.

*This article examines the positions of two Neoplatonists, Plotinus and Iamblichus, concerning the ontological status of mathematical objects. Although realists, both philosophers reflect the influence of Aristotle and of stoicism. Plotinus thus shows a nominalist tendency in this realism, tendency attacked by Iamblichus who, while finding numbers at every level of reality, seems to think of mathematical objects as projections by the human mind of higher principles.*

- F. BRUNNER, The rational and religious aspects of the philosophy of Plotinus. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 417-430.

*There is a rational intention which runs through the doctrine of Plotinus, as is shown by analytical research of the First Cause and by the synthetic attempt to explain the world. But the rational moment in Plotinus is not separate from the religious moment. By this observation, the author is led to expose and to discuss the opinion of Pierre Hadot (*Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, 2<sup>e</sup> ed., Paris, 1987, p. 237-239), according to which ancient wisdom is purely and strictly rational.*

- BIBLIOGRAPHIE d'Henri JOLY. RThPh 1990/III, pp. 431-432.