

Zeitschrift: Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie
Band: 41 (1991)
Heft: 3: Approches de Fichte

Bibliographie: English summaries

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. [Siehe Rechtliche Hinweise.](#)

Conditions d'utilisation

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. [Voir Informations légales.](#)

Terms of use

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. [See Legal notice.](#)

Download PDF: 17.11.2024

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>

ENGLISH SUMMARIES

- A. PHILONENKO, Fichte's letter to F. A. Weissshuhn (Aug.-Sept. 1790; Gesamtausgabe III, 1 p. 167-8). Translation and commentary. RThPh 1991/III, p. 229-248.

This article concerns the letter in which Fichte describes the dawn of his transcendental thought when reading Critique of Practical Reason, he declares he is living in a new world. In this fragment, we discover the overwhelming conversion of a soul. Once directed toward Spinoza and driven to despair, believing that there was no conceivable freedom for humankind, Fichte discovers in Kant absolute freedom. Thus the birth of a philosophy of human liberty.

- Reinhard LAUTH, The importance of Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*. RThPh 1991/III, p. 249-273.

Between 1806 and 1809 Fichte discovered the full implication of the judgement of history while engaged in active resistance against the French occupation of the territories which he grouped together under the term "German Nation". In naming the German language, character and people, he denounced the "nameless usurper" Napoleon, who had destroyed the ideals of the revolution and opened up the way for the reign of capital.

- A. PERRINJAQUET, The deductive method in the second demonstration of the science of knowledge. RThPh 1991/III, p. 275-292.

Fichte wanted to construct a rigorously deductive system upon one irrefutable principle. After we have ascertained the progression of this deduction from self-affirmation to self-potential (1), we will see that it forms a chain of hypothetical syllogisms (2). This will lead us to consider if the second demonstration of the science of knowledge (WL) presupposes deductive reasoning or if, on the contrary, it can found it (3-4). Finally we will point out that the deductive method of Fichte presupposes rules not furnished by logic, but discovered through an intellectual intuition similar to that which reveals the irrefutable principle (5-6).

- Ives RADRIZZANI, Reflections concerning the status of history in the system of Fichte. RThPh 1991/III, p. 293-304.

Fichte's transcendental approach to history centres around three points: 1) inference of being from history as a transcendental condition of conscience; 2) inference of the objectivity of history as a science applied a posteriori to facts which are essentially non-deductible; 3) the inference of a universal plan of history which determines both the meaning of the study of the past and the principles which

necessarily guide human action in the making of history, on the way to a "free system".

- A. RENAUT, Fichte and the politics of understanding. RThPh 1991/III, p. 305-313.

While in his "revolutionary" period, notably 1793, Fichte defended political rationalism against the criticisms of Burke, Rehberg and Jacobi, in 1806-1807 we see a doubt arising concerning the politics of reason. Does this imply a real internal displacement of Fichte's thought in the direction of romanticism, or is it rather a more subtle move to be wary of certain excesses of reason while remaining attached to rationalism?

- I. SCHÜSSLER, Self-affirmation and will. The determination of pure reason in *The Science of Rights* by Fichte. RThPh 1991/III, p. 315-332.

The Science of Rights, from the first paragraph onward, shows the position of Fichte to be fundamentally original. Reason, as Fichte conceives of it, is neither absolute (in Hegel's terms) nor pure (in Kant's terms), but has an essentially synthetic character. In that it constitutes the Ego in self-affirmation, reason is known to itself as will. This practical knowledge is more important than theory.