

# English summaries

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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

F.-D. SEBBAH, The accusation of folly: radical reduction. Concerning the gesture of Pierre Thévenaz in Phenomenology, RThPh, p. 235-244.

*This article attempts first to render the philosophical gesture of Pierre Thévenaz as he expresses it in La condition de la raison philosophique, with attention to his relation to phenomenology. Questions of “method”, of “autism” characterizing reason according to Thévenaz and of faith as epoché (bracketing) are also examined, insisting thus on the value of experience (faith and reason being two systems of experience). Secondly, it applies this gesture to the later context of the debate concerning the so-called theological turn in French phenomenology in order, on the one hand, to measure its originality and audaciousness, and, on the other hand, to allow a new reading and understanding of this debate.*

J.-P. THÉVENAZ, Believing and thinking with my father Pierre and my professor Paul Ricoeur, RThPh, p. 245-253.

*The author recounts his heritage as received and transmitted by two contemporaries and friends both born in 1913 and corrects some inaccuracies in the testimonies of their exchanges. In this account of mutual reading and listening, the theologian attaches importance to the critical schooling necessary for his own profession. Following his mentors, he has recourse to a triple philosophical resource for questioning and appealing without the abuse of language: the critical reduction of phenomenologists, the silent listening of believers and the passionate humanism of personalists. This does not imply that the passage from fragility to stability is any more evident for a believing philosopher; all humans are fragile.*

T. YAMADA, Reception of Pierre Thévenaz' “Philosophie sans absolu” in the last years of Paul Ricoeur, RThPh, p. 255-266.

*In his posthumous work “Living up to death” followed by Fragments, published in 2007 (English in 2009), Ricoeur claims to be a “philosopher without an absolute,” a digression borrowed from “Philosophie sans absolu” by Pierre Thévenaz. It affirms the agnostic attitude in the face of death which contradicts the usual perception of the “Christian philosophy”. The Fragments reflect an effort to reconcile the desire to live with the necessity of dying. The present contribution treats the reception and influence of Thévenaz in Ricoeur's thought, particularly in the last years of his life.*

D. MÜLLER, The radicalism of the philosophical position of Pierre Thévenaz: a theological concern, RThPh, p. 267-276.

*Pierre Thévenaz' approach spurs philosophical reflection to constant radicalism, which helps to show the finite condition of thinking without an absolute. Such a root-deep reduction can give value to the strict autonomy of reason and create conditions for a challenging debate between philosophy and theology.*

- I. ULLERN, The precious challenge and the challengeable cost of a “Protestant” philosophy or the refusal to assign thought to intimacy by its traumatic openness, RThPh, p. 277-300.

*The “Protestant” philosophy of Pierre Thévenaz is questioned in essay style rather than specialized, so as to hear its incongruity, actuality and folly all at the same time. It is more a refusal than an apology of these traits; refusal to reduce thought to coherence alone, or worse, to reason or conscience. Refusal also to confuse first philosophy with the tyranny of “crisis” or of radicalism. However, the essay develops by drawing up the present philosophical scene in which Thévenaz’ proposition stands and beneath it, protestant thought; to situate them in a contradictive and ambivalent prodigiousness leads back to the fact that even there, to think “relates to life”.*

- P. GISEL, Where are we at present? What refusal of the absolute for what intrigue at the heart of the phenomenal, RThPh, p. 301-321.

*This article treats and confirms the breach made by Pierre Thévenaz and others with general visions as onto-theological as they are spiritualizing which validate an existence constitutively exposed to the world where reason (all reason but only reason) must account for what happens to it and destabilizes its hopes of an absolute. But the present text also distances itself from a radical position which, used in this set of circumstances, has called for an instance of pure alterity and refused, for that very reason, to propose any specifically determined and thus effective constructive treatment of the world. Contrary to that position, the author builds on certain traits which, in Thévenaz’ personal circumstances made him what he was (a good self-image and consistency in the world) and allow immediate given human responses to the experience of destabilization along the line of answering for oneself and the world through differentiated positive and non-neutral stances.*