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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

- C. CHALAMET, Which Conditions for the Encounter between Religion and Rationality? A Theological Perspective. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 7-20.

*This article considers the conditions which may favor a fruitful dialogue between religion and rationality. After some brief comments on these two notions, the author criticizes certain reductions of religion to « what is believed » (cf. R. Swinburne) and thus certain misunderstandings of the object of religion, which cannot be reduced to natural theology. The author ends by advocating for mutual criticism between religion and rationality, without subordinating one to the other.*

- R. POUIVET, Reason, Faith, and Humility. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 21-32.

*Anthony Kenny has argued that, within Christianity, there is a tension between two attitudes, namely those of humility and faith. Faith and humility, however, are both virtues. Humility does not pretend to know more than what can be known. Faith, on the other hand, appears to posit a firm intellectual assurance with regard to the existence of God, of God's Son, dead and risen, of his return in glory to judge the living and the dead, and of his kingdom without end. How then can intellectual humility be compatible with what is presented as religious knowledge ? The present article, from the perspective of virtue epistemology, argues for the compatibility of the virtue of faith and the virtue of humility (humility in both its moral and intellectual dimensions), and even for their proximity.*

- V. DELECROIX, Religion of Reason, Rational Religion, Reasonable Religion, RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 33-58.

*The question of the relations between religion and rationality can be considered through an inquiry concerning the model of agreement which is proposed by the critical instance. The idea that a religion might satisfy the requirements of that instance of course implies that these requirements have been clarified, and also that the type of "reason" which these requirements posit has been specified. Three possible models are presented, which derive in part from a broadening of "rationality", of its criteria and procedures, to fit the breadth of the public space, without reducing "religion" to theoretical beliefs ; the word "religion", here, constitutes a social and political reality which philosophical reason must evaluate as such. Such models may serve as indicators, even perhaps as the horizon, for the practice of the philosophy of religion.*

- O. RIAUDEL, Christian Doctrine as a Grammar of Faith, RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 59-72.

*What is the nature of Christian theological doctrines ? What is the task of theology, as a second-order reflection on faith and its contents ? On the basis of two examples, namely the resurrection of the body (as presented in the Catechism of the Catholic Church and the Supplement to Thomas' Summa theologiae) and the concept of*

"person " in Trinitarian theology, the author argues, following Wittgenstein, in favor of the regulative, rather than referential, nature of theological assertions.

M. BASTIT, Rationality and Causality in the Quest for a First Being. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 73-84.

*One of the rational paths in the direction of the discovery of God's existence consists in the regress from a causal chain all the way until a first cause. This implies a strong causality which runs through acts from one causal agent to the next. But Ockham and Hume, in reducing causality to chronological sequence, have introduced a discontinuity between cause and effect, so that it no longer seems possible to bridge the gap between a cause and its effect. Several theories have been advanced in order to fill this gap, but none has proved satisfactory. After examining these failed attempts, the author considers the causal power theory and shows how this theory may be of help in addressing the challenge of discontinuity.*

P. CLAVIER, On a Supreme Cliché: if God Does not Exist, then Everything is Permitted, RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 85-104.

*This article considers Dostoevsky's axiom « if God does not exist, then everything is permitted. » There is more, here, than a material implication. Rather, this axiom must be discussed as a bi-conditional assertion with causal and foundational import : "It is because, and only because God exists (or if, and only if, God were to exist) that everything is not (or would not be) permitted. " A trivial way to render this formula true consists in defining God as "the one whose existence, and that only, implies that there are moral obligations. " But here problems arise : seeking to ground or to "source " moral obligation appears to go against humanity's moral emancipation. And yet the identification of God with the Good cancels this objection, and the relation of dependence of the creature to the Creator implies a situation which generates an obligation – which, we may note in passing, resolves the 'is/ought' problem. The hypothesis of a Creator God lends itself to justifying a universal and objective "you ought " to a much greater extent than the hypotheses of atheist naturalism or of morality's autonomy, in which obligation is nothing more than a fact.*

A. BASTIT, Appeals to Rationality in Irénée de Lyon. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 105-124.

*This article seeks to uncover the positive comments on rationality which can be found in Irenaeus of Lyons' main work, where he denounces and argues against gnostic doctrines before articulating, against them, a theoretical construal of Christian dogma. The following points are considered : 1. The ridiculing by Irenaeus of gnostic ideas, in order to show their inconsistency and their lack of theoretical force ; 2. Some of the counterargument methods which Irenaeus adopts in the critical, rational part which precedes the recourse to Scripture's authority ; 3. Irenaeus's insistence on the limits of human knowledge and what humans can grasp, and, consequently, on the prudence with regard to the methods of inquiry in the investigation of divine and invisible realities. Far from being mutually exclusive, the positive use of rationality and the exaltation of revealed mystery go hand in hand – the former serving as preliminary condition of the latter.*

- S. AYADA, The Doctrine of Divine Names in Ibn 'Arabi. A Theological and Philosophical Issue. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 125-140.

*The divine names are at the center of Ibn 'Arabi's hermeneutic of revelation. Articulating the tension, which runs through the Quran, between two representations of God – a transcendent God who, nevertheless, becomes accessible through God's names – which exceed the theologians' powers, Ibn 'Arabi suggests a way out based on the idea of theophany. The divine names constitute the substance of the divine essence as it manifests itself to itself. They are given in a twofold perspective : on the one hand, they absorb themselves in the divine essence ; on the other, they possess meaning and they are capable of effecting something. As agents of God's self-revelation, the divine names are at the basis of existing things and are the causes of phenomena. They introduce the requirement of rationality into the heart of religious discourse.*

- R. THEIS, Kant, Religion within the Domain of Reason. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 141-152.

*Starting with Kant's statement about religion as the answer to the question "what may I hope ?", the author considers Kant's concept of religion, first in the context of practical philosophy, especially the Critique of Practical Reason, where it is stated that morality leads – and possibly leads infallibly – to religion. This raises the question of the semantic content of the concept of religion ("the religion of reason"). The author then addresses Kant's treatment of religion in relation to the complex relation between reason and revealed religion as articulated in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793).*

- C. BERNER, Religion and Rationality in Schleiermacher. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 153-168.

*Being both a theologian and a philosopher, Schleiermacher constantly tried to reconcile religion and rationality, without sacrificing the specificity of one or the other. Already the young Schleiermacher, in his speeches On Religion, proceeding in a purely rational manner and engaging readers who were fond of rational understanding, aimed at distinguishing religion, philosophy, and morality. In later years, Schleiermacher sought to facilitate the encounter between the Dialectic and The Christian Faith (Glaubenslehre), as both point, through different paths, toward the necessity of positing a transcendent ground, in the form of a rational hypothesis on the one hand, in the form of human existence given in the feeling of absolute dependence on the other. Religion and rationality thus remain compatible.*

- A. FENEUIL, Reason Unbound: Joseph Bochenski and Karl Barth. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 169-180.

*The idea that theology lies beyond the limits of reason is a widely held idea, which deserves to be carefully considered. On the basis of a comparison and acknowledgement of the convergences which can be seen between Joseph Bochenski's argument, in The Logic of Religion, in defense of God's unspeakability, and Karl Barth's assertions regarding negative theology, the author shows, thereby delineating a theory of faith and of the specificity of theological discourse as fully anchored in rationality, that this widely held idea is in fact, both philosophically and theologically, unsound.*

- L. JAEGER, The Gospel as Public Truth (L. Newbigin). A Third Way beyond the Alternative between Rationalist Theology and Private Religion ? RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 181-200.

*Lesslie Newbigin presents the Gospel as "public truth". This article considers the meaning of this statement and presents the epistemological and theological grounds on which it rests. According to Newbigin, the Christian message concerns facts and thus cannot be relegated to the realm of values and private certainties. Any argument in favor of the Christian faith must be articulated within this paradigm, rather than simply presuppose the criteria of rationality we have inherited from the Enlightenment. Instead of relying on traditional natural theology, which pretends to base itself on a supposed neutral reason, the goal is to demonstrate, starting with the Gospel itself, the fecundity of the Christian fiduciary frame for Christian knowledge and life.*

- M. MAZZOCCO, Rationalism until its Mystical End ? RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 201-212.

*As a meeting point between religion and rationality, mysticism coincides both with the endpoint of logical thought and the beginning of a journey in the midst of an ineffable region. And yet, far from signifying the eclipse of reason, mysticism might be seen as its prolongation, even its consummation. But how can the abyss between science and mysticism be bridged ? How can we conceive the relation between mysticism and rationalism ? This article aims to explore the borders between faith, reason, and mysticism, examining what is at stake philosophically with mysticism. In order to do that, Albert Schweitzer's notion of « rationalist mysticism » and several examples drawn from the history of spirituality are examined.*

- Y. SCHMITT, The Religious Reasons Behind Political Reasons. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 213-226.

*The public space is often viewed as a space which must be neutral and thus free of any usage of religious beliefs as arguments legitimizing decisions. Neutrality is perceived as a key aspect which will favor the acceptance by all of decisions which might be coercive in nature. This paper seeks to show that it is in fact possible to articulate neutral reasons and religious reasons, at least as long as neutral reasons remain ultimate. This implies that religious reasons, when they are adequately correlated to neutral reasons, are perfectly legitimate when justifying a political or public decision.*

- O. DESMONS, Should Religious Convictions be Privatized ? Exploring the Resources of Consequentialism. RThPh 2017/I-II, p. 227-246.

*Must we consider religious beliefs to be private preferences ? Should we exclude religious symbols from the public square ? Must religious arguments be banned from social and political debates ? This paper examines the answers which political liberalism tends to give to these three questions. These answers are negative when it comes to the first two questions, and positive with regard to the third. There are, within political liberalism, two distinct argumentative strategies : a deontological strategy and a consequentialist strategy. On that basis, the author critically considers the idea that a liberal position, while seeking to exclude religious convictions from the social and political debate, might simultaneously render religious convictions more visible. The question then concerns the possibility of softening the limits of public reason.*