

English summaries

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES

M. BOSS, What remains of theodicy in contemporary theology?, RThPh 2018/2, p. 101.

This essay presents a typological inventory as a way to appraise the critiques and transformations the concept of theodicy has undergone in recent theological literature. The criterion selected to this end is the classical trilemma inherited from 17th century metaphysics, namely how to conciliate the omnipotence and perfect goodness of God with the reality of evil, given that picking up any two of the three propositions entails the logical exclusion of the third. The three main types, exemplified by Hans Jonas, John K. Roth and John Milbank, accept the terms of the trilemma, and respectively give up divine omnipotence, the perfect goodness of God, or the reality of evil. Three additional types, illustrated by Richard Swinburne, Paul Ricœur and Odo Marquard, reject the terms of the trilemma, and respectively refuse the constraints of a non-instrumental understanding of evil, a systematic and totalizing intelligibility of God's purposes, or a theistic notion of God's providential action within the course of history.

A. CHUKURIAN, Cartesianism's Grappling with Theodicy. A Metaphysical and Ethical Response to Evil, RThPh 2018/2, p. 123.

Descartes and Leibniz, on the basis of their respective philosophical foundations, articulate two models of theodicy which, despite their irreducible differences, converge in their ways of holding together the metaphysical and the ethical dimensions. Starting with Leibniz, the article envisions, for heuristic purposes, a Cartesian theodicy. The goal of the article is twofold: first, to assess the points of disagreements and agreements between Descartes and Leibniz on the locus of theodicy, and second, to show how being anchored in Cartesian philosophy allows one to think anew about theodicy today and to attribute a certain relevance to it.

M. PARMENTIER, Voltaire and Leibnizian Theodicy, RThPh 2018/2, p. 141.

*The aim of this article is to try to clear up the reason(s) of Voltaire's deliberate misunderstandings of Leibnizian theodicy. Voltaire cannot be suspected of not knowing very well Leibniz's philosophy, nor can he be suspected of being opposed a priori to optimism. Thus this article examines, on the one hand, Voltaire's way of bending Leibniz's concepts in *Candide* (moral necessity becomes fatalistic; the best is confused with the good, whereas Leibniz did not minimize the reality of evil; a blind way of applying general maxims for local problems), and, on the other, Voltaire's comments on these questions in his *Éléments de la philosophie de Newton*, as well as certain episodes with Leibnizian overtones in other tales, especially *Memnon* and *Zadig*. This way of confronting the two thinkers leads to the hypothesis that *Candide* may in fact be a Leibnizian device meant to test Leibniz's theses experimentally.*

É. DE MEVIUS, Evil In Spite Of, RThPh 2018/2, p. 159.

*Is it possible to translate the movement of Hegel's theodicy into the frame of a practical philosophy? If, on the one hand, the spirit's dialectic triumphs over evil, but, on the other hand, the tragedy of history cannot be overcome, then we suggest that the path of recognition (*reconnaissance*) may point toward an ethic of reconciliation that*

takes history seriously, namely history with all its violence and evil, without falling into fatalist or nihilist resignation.

P. CLAVIER, Theodicy's Arguments as First-Person Arguments. A Reply to the Critiques of Theodicy as Being Compassionless, RThPh 2018/2, p. 171.

The critique is often made that analytical theodicies make claims about God and the permitting of evil from a standpoint characterized by logical compatibility – a standpoint which differs from the individual or collective experience of suffering. And so theodicies of mercy, especially Hans Jonas', are preferred. The present article seeks to show that a discussion which relies on arguments need not be cut off from the question of suffering as trial, and that articulating claims using first-person language may help show the compatibility between lived suffering and the existence of a God who is both good and all-powerful, without instrumentalizing evil and without any grim calculating of evil's utility.

M. HASSENFRAZ-COFFINET, Process and Theodicy. Cutting the Gordian Knot, RThPh 2018/2, p. 193.

The default interpretation among Process thinkers regarding theodicy has been to eliminate divine omnipotence from the equation. Exploring the foundations of this metaphysic, the present article seeks a revised definition of the concepts of Good and Evil, in order to retrieve their deeper meaning, beyond certain limitations which come from all-too strict interpretations of metaphysics. As a consequence of this adjustment, Good and Evil are seen in a different way: they no longer are absolutes. The question of theodicy thus becomes once again relevant, despite the suppression of the divine attribute of omnipotence. Theology may need to focus on God as "poet of the world" (Whitehead), rather than as cold judge who, in each circumstance, only chooses an objective and universal Good, thereby rendering evil a trivial factor in our experience.