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“I spoke in haste”:
Overcoming Original Causality
in *The Grandissimes*

Sämi Ludwig

“h-tradition is much more
authentic than history!” (19)

Foundation myths always explain origins. They are, in that sense, inverted teleological narratives of attributed causality. By insisting on a beginning, they explain the present as some kind of result. Thus foundation myths imply forces of the past which determine the now. In this essay I want to address the question of the *mediation of causality*, a question which involves agency by the mediator as well. My recent readings in American literary realism from a pragmatist-cognitive angle have convinced me that these texts oppose all forms of determinism, be it genetic, metaphysical, or mechanical. Though acknowledging the impact of tradition (most often as a detrimental element), they reject it as a force of truth and instead subject it to scrutiny by analyzing its performance and judging its merits by the effects it has on human experience. Rather than positing a single and, in that sense, primary source of causality, they look for an alternative in highly complex systems of cognitive interaction. These comprise both verbal and physical aspects of behavior, and are projected in pragmatic contexts that unpack what is commonly glossed over as “speech acts.” In this contextualizing sense, my argument will also contribute to, and implicitly criticize, theories of the “linguistic turn” which collapse these separate entities into one.

In order to explain what I mean by the pragmatist-cognitive rejection of determinism in American literary realism, let me present George Washington Cable’s *The Grandissimes* (1880) as an example and discuss how it deals with the origins of the New Orleans Creoles and their view of the natural order. I will show that Cable presents the Grandissime family tree as a “biologizing” concept which does not reflect biological facts and that, more-

over, he opposes the notion of metaphysical reality in his presentation of an experiential cosmology. Cable furthermore criticizes the enslaving discourse of a language of “engines,” which attributes mechanical causality to words. It takes the Northern apothecary Frowenfeld to introduce a discourse of *reversible* causality, in which statements can be taken back, in which apologies are possible and automatic stimulus-response contingencies can be interrupted. Cable criticizes the agricultural model of the Creoles and its Lamarckian determinism, which locates identity in original adaptations of the past, and suggests instead a particular kind of liberal model, which locates causality in human actions. Thus a confused notion of *original* causality and determinist force is replaced by a *cognitive* kind of causality. In exposing the contradictions of the Grandissime tradition, Cable does important cultural work and prepares the transition from a patriarchal framework of direct essentialist causality to one of negotiation and commerce, which leaves room for a mediating model of reality in which reflections on human agency are possible.

At the center of the traditional Creole culture stands Agricole Fusilier, the old patriarch of the Grandissime clan. His name combines the old ideology of plantations (*agricola*, the farmer) with the power of the gun. With his “knotted walking stick” (58), later also described as an “ugly staff” (88), this Fusilier stands for a PHALLIC IDEOLOGY of force, for the brutal policing of slaves and the shooting of his aristocratic rivals. We read that he killed Aurora Nancanou’s husband in a duel (31). Neither wanting to be called an *old* man nor a *young* man (99), he can be associated with attributes of mythic agelessness. He also indulges in God-like speech acts, telling the immigrant Frowenfeld, “when I, Agricola Fusilier, pronounce you a professor, you are a professor. Louisiana will not look to you for credentials; she will look to me!” (53).¹ Responsible for the epigraph at the beginning of this essay, he stands for a logocentric operational system which is destructive. (Yet notice that by exposing Agricole’s performative speech agency, Cable actually deconstructs the discursive determinism of this figure of tradition.)

¹ Also cf. his giving a kind of papal absolution to Frowenfeld, who fears for his reputation after having been knocked on the head by Palymre Philosophe’s slave, the disreputable “Congo dwarf”: “Not guilty. Professor Frowenfeld, *absolvo te!*” (227).

The society of New Orleans presented by Cable is basically a heterogeneous body of people who see themselves in homogeneous ways, controlled by the metaphor of a FAMILY TREE. It stands for a unified biological organism, in which all members are physically connected to a common origin. Honoré Grandissime tells the outsider Frowenfeld that it is "a kind of tree not dreamed of in botany [...] We call it – with reverence – 'our dead father's mistakes.' I have to eat much of that fruit" (219). This tree goes beyond botany in its application to human culture, thus creating an inherited way of understanding, which causes much harm. In reality, rather than all being cut from the same wood, the Creoles are divided into different clans, such as the dueling DeGrapions with their "sad aptness for dying young" (23), the numerous Grandissimes, and the proverbial "Fusiliers." Moreover, even among the Grandissimes, who multiplied "as though their family tree was a fig tree" (22), we find a great variety, ranging from the brutal slave trader Captain Jean-Baptiste and the hot-blooded Sylvestre to the illiterate but more conciliatory Valentine, and Frowenfeld's polyglot assistant Raoul Innerarity. Moreover, this heterogeneity does not even take into account all the ramifications of the ragged family tree across racial boundaries between the Creoles and their slaves. Thus the actual Grandissime family presented by Cable emphasizes the Darwinian variety of species and the centrifugal forces in the development of life, rather than any kind of evolutionary determinism. As opposed to biological tendencies toward mutation, the stability of existent systems is rather an informational entity; "cloning" may work fairly reliably on the level of concepts (as astute postmodern philosophers such as Jean Baudrillard rightly argue [98 ff.]), but in the realm of biology or "life," it remains the exception.

The real fig tree in the novel is located next to the six graves of Frowenfeld's family and will be the site of the steel-trap in which later on the slave Clemence is caught and dehumanized. This garden of fertility is presented as highly problematic and will be exposed to a cognitive critique. Frowenfeld and Honoré Grandissime, an apothecary and a merchant who represent the new generation of the North and the South, first meet as mutual "stranger[s]" (35, 36) under the fig tree, where they discuss Creole society and soon become friends. Honoré advises the immigrant: "You must get acclimated, [...] not in body only, that you have done; but in mind – in taste – in conversation – and in convictions too, yes, ha ha! They all do it – all who come. [...] Myde'-seh, the water must expect to take the shape of the bucket; eh?" (37). What is invoked here is a Lamarckian view of the species being determined by its environment, in what William James calls the "clumping of two cycles of causation into one. What preserves an animal in his peculiarity, if it be a

useful one, they saw to be the nature of the environment to which the particularity was adjusted. The giraffe with his peculiar neck is preserved by the fact that there are in his environment tall trees whose leaves he can digest" (222).² Or, to translate the Creole view of the climate of Louisiana into the terminology of Hippolyte Taine: the *milieu* determines who one will be. It is the "bucket" of which one has to take the shape. Frowenfeld objects, however: "One need not be water!" (37). He is against such a collapsing of physical connectedness with identity, which implies a contiguous coupling of minds as well: "Mr. Grandissime, is not your Creole word 'we' a word that does much damage?" (151). To which Honoré replies: "Yes, our Creole 'we' does damage, and our Creole 'you' does more." As a businessman, he emphasizes human interaction. All Creoles are expected to be of the same mind, an attitude which turns into a phallic source of intolerance toward the inside and aggression toward the outside.

We find in Cable's criticism of the notion of society as a single organism a literary elaboration of William James's pragmatist argument (also published in 1880) against philosophers who went too far in their understanding of adaptation by maintaining that the presence of the high trees "also produced" the giraffe's long neck: "They *made* his neck long by the constant striving they aroused in him to reach up to them. The environment, in short, was supposed by these writers to mould the animal by a kind of direct pressure, very much as a seal presses the wax into harmony with itself" (222). James contrasts such views of "adaptive change" to the work of Charles Darwin, whose "first achievement was to show the utter insignificance in amount of these changes produced by direct adaptation, the immensely greater mass of changes being produced by *internal molecular accidents*" (223). Thus the point in "Great Men and Their Environment" is that the "same parents, living in the same environing conditions, may at one birth produce a genius, at the next an idiot or a monster" (224). James insists: "Almost all causes there are forces of *detent*, which operate by simply unlocking energy already stored up. They are upsetters of unstable equilibria, and the resultant effect depends infinitely more on the nature of the materials upset than on that of the particular stimulus which joggles them down" (224). For him, social evolution is "a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors, – the individual [...] and, second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts" (232).

² Also cf. Caron d'Ache's contemporary cartoon on the Lamarckian giraffe, reprinted in Bateson (167).

James criticizes the "pseudo-philosophy of evolution" and writers such as Taine with their nebulous notion of the "climate." His particular nemesis is the Scottish philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer, who was the most popular representative of a determinist view of evolution in the late nineteenth century: "The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception, a lapse [...] into the most ancient oriental fatalism" (245).³ Thus James concludes: "The plain truth is that the 'philosophy' of evolution [...] is a metaphysical creed, and nothing else" (253). It is a "mood of contemplation, an emotional attitude, rather than a system of thought." He associates Spencer's philosophy with "the mood of pantheistic fatalism, with its intuition of the One and All, which was, and is, and ever shall be, and from whose womb each single thing proceeds. [...] What we at present call scientific discoveries had nothing to do with bringing it forth" (253). Hence James protests

against its disguising itself in 'scientific' plumes. I think that all who have the patience to follow me thus far will agree that the spencerian 'philosophy' of social and intellectual progress is an obsolete anachronism, reverting to a pre-darwinian type of thought, just as the spencerian philosophy of 'Force,' effacing all the previous distinctions between actual and potential energy, momentum, work, force, mass, etc., which physicists have with so much agony achieved, carries us back to a pre-galilean age. (254)

This view, that Darwin is not responsible for the philosophy of evolution, is also confirmed by Soltysik.⁴ As a theoretical aside we may wonder what will happen if James's criticism of evolutionary "force" is not only historically analyzed but also applied to certain concepts of the new historicism such as its crucial notion of "power."

Returning to Cable, it becomes clear that he treats the metaphors of Louisiana identity in terms of the most advanced biology of his time and avoids stepping into the traps of the popular evolutionist thought of his time. The character Frowenfeld stands for a dissociation of direct connections of human individuals and the land in an all-encompassing tradition. Thus Honoré observes about him: "You find it easier to be in harmony with Louisiana than

³ According to James, "[i]t is folly [...] to speak of the 'laws of history' as of something inevitable, which science has only to discover, and whose consequences anyone can then foretell but do nothing to alter or avert. Why, the very laws of physics are conditional, and deal with *ifs*" (244).

⁴ She writes: "For example, the two terms most often associated with Darwin, 'evolution' and 'survival of the fittest,' come not from Darwin but from Herbert Spencer" (42-43).

the Louisianans, eh?" (151). As "a man of thorough scientific education" (47), Frowenfeld opts for a reorientation of cosmology, away from a Louisiana culture which is limited to tradition, from a transcendental source or typology, toward a mode of experience and interactional human construction. Cable prepares this shift by describing the land on which the two men are riding out as "an inverted cosmology of flowers" (150). The stars, which offer operational guidance, can also be found in the Louisiana landscape, i.e., in an empirical territory. Thus a top-down orientation is replaced with a model of bottom-up grounding. Tradition is not more authentic than history, as Agricole Fusilier would have it.

Further star guidance is found in the beautiful Aurora, who personifies aspects of cosmology in herself as a human being: "[W]hatever Joseph's astronomy might have previously taught him to the contrary, he knew by his senses that [upon Aurora's look] the earth turned entirely over three times in three seconds" (90). We find him in "the knowledge that he was walking across the vault of heaven with the evening star on his arm" (91). This alternative cosmology is ultimately grounded in human relationships. Though certainly informed by many clichés of romance writing, Cable's transformation of STAR imagery from metaphysical cosmology to empirical territory and ultimately human contact points in the direction of epistemological notions of reality as social construction we find in Berger and Luckmann's sociology almost a century later.

The idea of an interactional reality is also corroborated in the identity of Frowenfeld's friend Honoré Grandissime, who personifies the best of the Creole heritage and stands for the enabling values of the future. Being a merchant who does business with all parties, even with his colored brother, the Honoré f.m.c.,⁵ and the Yankee governor, and who ultimately marries a De-Grapion of the enemy clan, he represents a culture of commerce and negotiation, which stands in contrast to the rigid and absolute traditionalism of the other Grandissimes.⁶ While his darker brother, as a *rentier*, invests in real estate and the ownership of things in the essentialist sense of a material positivism, the lighter Honoré makes a living on transactions only. He constructs his reality from interactions.⁷ The superiority of this approach is confirmed in

⁵ Ultimately, the f.m.c. also becomes "a member of the mercantile house of H. Grandissime, enlisting in its capital [on] the one condition that the new style should be *Grandissime Brothers*" (268).

⁶ We read that "to the dismay and mortification of his kindred, [he] established himself in a prosperous commercial business" (109).

⁷ The person who mirrors these qualities on the side of the slaves is Clemance, the singing *marchande de calas*, who offers "her professional laugh" to all of her customers, be they Span-

a poetic logic in which Cable makes the former end as a rejected and suicidal lover, whereas the latter finds himself united with the beautiful Aurora. Significantly, in the final chapter, called "'No!'," the happy couple's understanding is mediated pragmatically, i.e., in a contextual interaction. When Honoré declares his love, she answers "No, no!" (338). And pressed to "say the word!" (339), we read that she cried out "'No!' burst into tears, laughed through them, and let him clasp her to his bosom." The reality which they hold in common is not a matter of linguistic agreement but of their relationship. It exists this side of conceptual definition.

The damage done by the Creole tradition and its determinist discourse is also manifested in the deadlock of relationships petrified in the ideology of slavery. This antagonistic framework makes all negotiation impossible. Unanimously accepted as a given fact by masters and slaves alike,⁸ and set beyond all means of meta-communicational reviewing, it cannot overcome the dysfunctional circularity of reciprocal reinforcement.⁹ Cable exemplifies this in a particular type of detrimental discourse, in which argumentation is restricted to attitudes of direct, physicalist causality and which is metaphorically described as an ENGINE. This is a motor discourse of mechanical determinism, not a cognitive one. Thus Agricole works on a Creole manifesto described as "an engine of offensive warfare which would revenge him a hundred-fold upon the miserable school of imported thought which had sent its revolting influences to the very Grandissime hearth-stone; he wrote a '*Phillipique Générale contre la Conduite du Gouvernement de la Louisiane*'" (315-16). This document should have a direct political impact,

ish, American, or Creole. Selling herbs to the apothecary on Christmas Day marks her as a practitioner of white magic (83).

⁸ Cable constructs quite a bit of reciprocity between masters and slaves. Aristocratic attitudes and disdain for "WORK" (171, original capitals) can be found in both camps, as the case of Bras Coupé exemplifies, an African prince "driven by *ennui*" to the coast, where he was enslaved and "became a commodity" (169). When handed a hoe, he kills the overseer: "Bras-Coupé understood [...] that he was a slave – it was the fortune of war, and he was a warrior; but according to a generally recognized principle in African international law, he could not reasonably be expected to work" (174). He is presented as prone to similar "aristocratic pretensions" (Egan 76) as the planters. And when the slaves Palmyre and Bras Coupé are married on the same day as Honoré's sister and Don José Martinez, the Creole traits of favoring instrumental discourse and their aristocratic disdain for work are mirrored in a dysfunctional union of the "darker couple" (179), a union which also symbolizes a false reconciliation of the Grandissime and the De Grapion clans (146).

⁹ On meta-communication, reactive behavior in interaction, and the reciprocal attribution of causal origins, cf. Watzlawick et al. (54 ff.).

like a physical weapon; it stands for the phallic type of discourse of a Fusilier rather than for discursive reflection.

On the side of the slaves, this Creole “engine” is opposed by a similarly instrumental discourse of “voudou charms,” which the narrator calls, in a similar wording, “terrible engines of mischief” (307). It is a discourse likewise conceived of in terms of direct physical retaliation, where words magically cause deeds. Thus, for example, in his discussion with the former slave Palmyre Philosophe, who wants to have “revenge” and “seemed to have lost all knowledge of place or of human presence,” Frowenfeld “saw the folly of the debate” (292). For this “barbaric beauty” of “femininity without humanity” (71), language is not a means of negotiation. We learn that even Agricole is “*afraid of her*” (61). When Frowenfeld asks Palmyre, “That is all I can do?” she answers, “*Oui, merci, Miché,*” adding “in perfect English, ‘but that is all *I* can do.’” And then she laughs, which sends a chill through his blood. *Doing* here implies more than the negotiation of understanding. Rather, it suggests an engine-like language, which has a direct physical impact in the sense of Frazer’s classical definition of sympathetic magic (14 ff.). Discourse is used in analogy to physical action and consequently, causality is similarly understood in physicalist ways.¹⁰

Through Frowenfeld, Cable also presents a different kind of language which is cognitively buffered and thus detached from direct causal implications in a physical sense. This means that the direct connection between words and deeds is interrupted. In the Creole context, the typical test case for this is the moral offense of defiling a man’s honor. How can it be avoided that such an act of sign-making triggers the immediate retaliation of Southern pride and ends in a duel and in killing a person? How can this fatal connection between words and deeds be interrupted? Crucially, there is a quarrel between Agricole and his nephew Sylvestre at the *fête de grandpère* which takes place at “the great mother-mansion of the Grandissimes” (158). Clearly, the family is not of one mind – but because organic unity is expected, disagreements can

¹⁰ Crucially, Frowenfeld’s notion of communication is different. He treats Palmyre’s wound with a “womanly touch” and “commanding gentleness” (134). Bendixen writes that “Frowenfeld clearly possesses qualities that the nineteenth century thought of as belonging to the woman’s field of endeavor” (31). This is a different, non-phallic strategy; other men only “regarded her as legitimate prey. The man before her did not” (*Grandissimes* 136).

only be overcome at the cost of annihilation. We read that the quarrel at the fête "is likely to end in a duel" (223).

At this point Cable presents a case of reversible discourse, in which the impact of language can be taken back. Frowenfeld keeps Agricole from getting himself killed by writing an excuse for him:

"Are you writing something, Professor?" asked the old man, without stirring. His staff tumbled to the floor.

[....]

"I have a sad headache."

He cast his eyes over the table and took mechanically the pen which Frowenfeld extended toward him.

"What can I do for you, Professor? Sign something? There is nothing I would not do for Professor Frowenfeld. What have you written, eh?"

He felt helplessly for his spectacles. (232)

The patriarch has lost his phallic determination and his head is sorely working. Without his culturally colored glasses, he can do things beyond the framing of Creole ideology. Frowenfeld presents Agricole with the following note: "*Mr. Sylvestre Grandissime: I spoke in haste.*" It is signed by the patriarch: "*Your affectionate uncle, Agricola Fusilier*" (232). We learn from this incident that a verbal offense is an act that can be withdrawn. Such a speech act can be dealt with as a merely hypothetical deed. Thus, most crucially, it can be taken back in ways in which physical acts cannot.

Hence in this scene, the apothecary becomes a cognitive medicine man, a shaman who changes reality by changing the discourse.¹¹ The unidirectional connection which has bound words to deeds, and thus imposed Newtonian laws of direct material causality on the Southern discourse of honor, is severed. Instead a reversibility of causality is made possible in which statements can be undone – at least in their immediate physical consequences. This makes more complex (and probably also more intelligent) human interactions possible, which allow for words as a kind of "soft action," a pragmatic intermediary which in its nature should be located between sign-without-impact and closing deed. The point is that such a cognitive system goes beyond a simplistic stimulus-response model in which behavior is defined by a single origin or provoking cause. Instead, the stimulus is processed and the reaction to it will be deliberate, a result of cognitive reflection. Through this introduction of extra *time*, the flow of action is subjected to a "time-out" by an intelligent agent who can think beyond momentary contingencies.

¹¹ The Honoré f.m.c. once even calls him an "*ouangan*" (106), a Voodoo doctor.

The first step in the transition toward such an attitude is to avoid immediate retaliation. After Frowenfeld has persuaded Agricole to take his words back, he is himself tested in a confrontation with the angry Sylvestre, who offends him as a “Yankee clown.” But Frowenfeld only responds with a “stern gaze” (241). When further provoked, the

apothecary stood like a cliff.

It was too much for Creole forbearance. His adversary [...] slapped the apothecary on the cheek. And then –

What a silence!

[. . .] For one instant, objects lost all natural proportion, and to the expectant on-lookers the largest thing in the room was the big, upraised, white fist of Frowenfeld. But in the next – how was this? Could it be that that fist had not descended?

The imperturbable Valentine [. . .] stood between the two men and said:

“Professor Frowenfeld – one moment –”

Frowenfeld’s face was ashen. “Don’t speak, sir!” he exclaimed. “If I attempt to parley, I shall break every bone in his body. Don’t speak! I can guess your explanation – he is drunk. But take him away.”

Valentine, as sensible as cool [...] shuffled his enraged companion out. (241)

Like a good Christian, Frowenfeld does not slap back but controls his rage. The silence and the lack of motion at the peak of the tension stand for an interruption of direct causality, when the force of exterior reality stands still.¹² There is a gap in the interaction, which makes possible that the course of the events can change. By calling Sylvestre drunk, moreover, Frowenfeld marginalizes his opponent’s position and marks it with unreality – another provocation has been classified as a mistake and can be deflected.

Let me again emphasize that such a turn of action is only possible because diversity already exists among the Grandissimes. Thus Valentine proves a temperate negotiator – as his names implies, he stands for love and values relationships. And the aggressive Sylvestre, named after the saint of the last day of the year, stands for a terminal tradition of retaliation. At the end of the novel, we even have a group of friends who establish “that social variety of New Orleans life now distinguished as Uptown Creoles” (303). This diversity, moreover, can only manifest itself as semiotic ambiguity in Agricole, who symbolizes the whole Grandissime clan and is therefore characterized in contradictory ways. Mentally, the patriarch is the victim of his

¹² As one critic observes: “For Frowenfeld to become involved in an affair of honor would be to embrace the same flawed social values that gave rise to the Grandissime-DeGravion feud” (Cleman 76).

own tautological premises. Thus we hear him spout: "Gone over to the enemy means, my son, gone over to the enemy" (302). Crucially, however, he ignores his convictions in his own practice, e.g., in his ability for friendship. Though Agricole is Frowenfeld's chief ideological antagonist in the novel, he still calls the immigrant a friend and supports him (227). There is a realm this side of ideology, a relational and illogical dimension of reality, which cannot be contained by any discourse, because it is pragmatic. On his death-bed, Agricole even blesses the union of Honoré Grandissime and Aurora DeGrapion, and Cable can present a Christian scene of reconciliation. In the end, "the very pride of the Fusiliers broke down" (325).

Actually, Cable already de-mythologizes any notion of original causality when he opens the novel with a charity ball in which four maskers impersonate the Creole ancestors Lufki-Humma, her husband Epaminondas Fusilier, the Dragoon, a little monk, and a *fille à cassette*. The ancestors are put into an ironical context of theatrical impersonation in which the actors demand the respect of the roles they play, and thus actually control the past from their own position in the present. Thus the cross-dressing Indian Queen, who is called "Medicine-Man" by the Dragoon (4), addresses Agricole: "Don't you know your ancestors, my little son?" (2). As opposed to the Grandissime patriarch, who "had an hour ago forgotten that he was in mask and domino" (1) and cannot impersonate anybody but himself, the maskers understand the nature of disguise and historical constructions. They counteract the determinism of tradition through the appropriation of given roles for their own use.

It has been my aim in this essay to show new and exciting ways of appreciating Cable's novel, though I should not gloss over its shortcomings. Of course, Cable at times wallows in clichés of chivalry¹³ and, worse, although a strong supporter of the African American cause during Reconstruction in his political essays,¹⁴ he still keeps the really outcast out, namely the slaves and

¹³ Kreyling writes that "Cable's genteel, romantic habits of mind slowly became an anachronism" (x).

¹⁴ Cf. particularly Cable's important statement "The Freedman's Case in Equity," published in the January 1885 issue of *The Century*. Kreyling also mentions his insistence on attributing rationality and intelligence to the slave woman Clemence when his editors urged him to cut this material from the manuscript: "Clémence's ability to think and argue logically, as well as her knowledge of European history and class structure, were elements of human personality that the

the people of color. The novelistic plot assigns them to die or to stay tragic mulattos. Clemence is lynched in the swamp by a mob of Grandissimes; the Honoré f.m.c. remains a "silent man" (155) without voice, too weak to become a "leader and deliverer of his people" (291), a "broken hearted" and "sad man" (196) who eventually commits suicide because his love for Palmyre is not requited; and Palmyre, in turn disregarded by the white Honoré, ends up exiled as a liminal "Madame Inconnue" in Bordeaux, France (331).

Where Cable is doing very exciting cultural work, however, is in his unpacking of speech acts, in his exposure of conceptualist "biologizing," in his new grounding of concepts in experience, and in his demonstration that any kind of original determinism is impossible, harmful if attempted, and can be overcome in pragmatic negotiations. I believe that calling upon Christian values and upon values of enlightened humanism to provide such an anti-determinist strategy is more than a backward gesture. These frameworks should be reconsidered in view of their contribution to a cognitive paradigm and its pragmatic outlook on reality. Moreover, the motif of negotiation and commerce should also be reconsidered beyond simplistic denunciations of capitalism,¹⁵ as contributing to a theoretical framework of enabling pluralism in an emergent reality of interaction and exchange.¹⁶

Scribner's group, even with their high note of nationalism, could not allow to the black character. Cable held his ground; each one of these scenes and characters survived in the published novel" (xiv-xv).

¹⁵ Also cf. my article on capitalism and pluralism in Howells.

¹⁶ Honoré Grandissime actually has custody of all his kinsmen's property interests (221) and, more important, through his business dealings, he can save them from ruin (227).

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