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Going East

Switzerland's Early Consular Diplomacy toward East and Southeast Asia

Pascal Lottaz

In 1868 Sweden-Norway and Spain joined an illustrious club. By signing a treaty of friendship and commerce with the then newly formed Meiji Government, they became part of a group of colonial powers that had forced unequal treaties on Japan. This group included, among others, the USA, Russia, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Portugal, and even alpine Switzerland.¹ In fact, the Swiss had already in 1864 succeeded in concluding such a treaty with the Edo Shogunate. This is remarkable for several reasons. Firstly, Switzerland achieved something that other European countries had only accomplished through gunboat diplomacy. Secondly, Switzerland, less than two decades earlier, had gone through a civil war (1847), and had never engaged in colonial conquests (which is why historians for a long time did not consider Switzerland to have been a colonial state).² It was a small, relatively poor,³ landlocked nation without a navy or even a single merchant ship. Yet, the Swiss were four years ahead of two of Europe's oldest seafaring nations in establishing treaty relations with Japan.⁴ This is even more astonishing considering that Switzerland had been kept waiting for nearly five years for its treaty. Had the initial efforts of 1859 succeeded, this non-seafaring nation would have been right behind the major colonial powers in engaging Japan against its will.⁵ And this was not Berne's only diplomatic effort in "the Far East". Switzerland also established two consulates in Southeast Asia, one in Manila (1862) and one in Batavia (1863). Together with the consulates in Yokohama and Nagasaki, which were created right after the signing of the treaty in 1864, Switzerland had swiftly acquired four diplomatic outposts in East and Southeast Asia.⁶ These consulates were part of a second wave of representations (created between 1850 and 1865) but were among the first of the modern Swiss state.⁷

The establishment of the Swiss-Japanese trade treaty has been well researched,⁸ but the cases of the first consulates in Manila and Batavia, less so.⁹ This article offers an analysis of the structural factors for Switzerland's diplomatic expansion to East and Southeast Asia, based in part on a study of key primary sources from the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland and the Federal Archives in Berne. It argues that the official diplomacy of the Swiss state toward "the Far East" was

the outcome of at least three factors; its export-oriented economy, the influence of elites, and the opportunity structure of the colonial era. A holistic analysis of Switzerland's Far Eastern diplomacy would naturally also require a discussion of other factors, such as individual experiences, perceptions, or culture.¹⁰ For brevity's sake, however, this article is only concerned with economic, political, and structural aspects of Swiss diplomacy. Especially trade interests were of central importance, which is why this article explores the links between foreign commerce in Asia and decision-making in Berne. The aim is to understand why and how the Swiss state started to be diplomatically active in a corner of the world that was neither easy to access nor crucial to the Swiss economy.¹¹ Since this is a discussion about state action, the reasons for the establishment of consulates represent the reasoning of the state as an actor. Thereby, this analysis is part of the so called "cognitive approach"¹² to diplomacy studies, which seeks to unravel the nodes of decision making and to expose the rationale behind the behaviour of states. It tries, in the words of Alexander George, to open "the black-box"¹³ of state reasoning for the case of Switzerland's diplomatic expansion toward East and Southeast Asia.

Consular Diplomacy

The focus on the creation of consulates is crucial because they are a particular characteristic of Swiss diplomacy, which used consular representations rather than proper legations to protect its interests abroad. Until 1866 Swiss diplomacy was conducted by merely three legations (Paris, Vienna, and Turin) but by a full seventy-seven (honorary) consulates. This was uncommon compared to other small European states, most of which used three or four times as many legations.¹⁴ On the other hand, one might ask if consular relations mattered at all to diplomacy or if they only reflected trade interests. After all, consulates are by definition tasked with supporting national economic interests.¹⁵ However, the important question is why Switzerland at some stage came to appreciate these places strongly enough to extend its consular diplomacy and deliver official support to its expatriate communities. For example, the Swiss Federal Council considered a consulate in Manila as early as 1851, but at that time the Commerce and Customs Department argued successfully against the proposal, by saying that it "does not take the view that consulates should be created in places where only few Swiss reside and where consular capacities grant the appointee, effectively, a monopoly of influence on commercial activities. [...] [T]he creation of consulates in remote and under-civilised seaports as well as in those [places] where foreigners enjoy extraterritoriality, are of no use. On the contrary, it might be

dangerous, since the necessary respect in these places can only be gained through gunboats. Until now, in all such cases, our merchants have found far more effective protection through foreign consuls than what a local [Swiss] consul could have supplied them with.”¹⁶

In 1862 the Federal Council reversed its opinion and created a consulate in Manila. The change of heart had structural reasons, as Swiss diplomacy was inseparably linked with the country’s political economy and the structure of the young state.¹⁷

Switzerland’s Political Economy in the Nineteenth Century

There is a tendency among historians to explain the world-wide expansion of Swiss trade activities in the 19th century by stressing the increase in protectionist measures by other European states. The narrative is usually that, since most great powers (especially Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and the German states) closed their markets off by way of high import tariffs, Swiss merchants had to find new markets overseas.¹⁸ However, Switzerland’s diplomatic extension to East and Southeast Asia did not coincide with the surge in protectionism in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. Protectionism in Europe reached its peak with the British Corn Laws between 1815 and 1846 but went on a steady decline all over Europe in the late 1830s. The timespan between 1866 and 1877 marked the height of liberalism on the continent with national tariffs at historic lows.¹⁹ This is also clearly reflected in Switzerland’s foreign trade numbers. In 1845 nearly two thirds of Swiss exports went outside Europe, the opposite was true by the late 1850s, when only one third of Swiss exports were shipped overseas, and two thirds went to European markets.²⁰ Throughout this time, exports to the Far East remained consistently low, at only four percent – testifying to the minor importance of these markets.²¹ Neither protectionism in Europe nor the size of existing trade with Asia seem to explain Switzerland’s sudden interest in diplomatic relations with East and Southeast Asia. Rather than tariffs, it seems that a general decline in Swiss exports between 1851 and 1870 incentivised Swiss industry to seek new opportunities in Asia.²² The question then is: was the search for new markets important enough to translate into diplomatic action of the state? Mid-19th century Switzerland was, as Paul Bairoch described it, a “competitive” economy because it relied more than any other European country on the export of manufactured goods which, on colonial markets, rivalled those of the great powers.²³ Although large-scale industrialization only took place after 1850, the Swiss had long before started to manufacture high value-added goods like clocks, watches, fine textiles, and specialised machinery.²⁴ Since the volume

of goods produced significantly outstripped the size of Switzerland's consumer market, the success of the manufacturing sector depended to a great extent on the ability to cater to foreign customers. Already in 1840, Switzerland's exports per capita were more than twice the level of Great Britain, the USA, Belgium, or Denmark, and four times higher than Germany or France.²⁵ Until the late 1880s, no other European GNP was as reliant on its export sector as that of Switzerland. Even on a global scale, land-locked Switzerland, with only 1 % of Europe's population, accounted for 4 % to 5 % of the continent's exports in the 1840s and 1850s.²⁶ All of this happened at a time when only 4 % of the workforce was employed in factories.²⁷

The story that these numbers tell is that a relatively large part of Switzerland's national economy depended on a relatively small industrial sector that was strongly export-driven. This created a small group of industrial elites in the manufacturing cantons who had strong interests in foreign markets. Claudia Aufdermauer has recently discussed the influence of these industrial magnates, who were unofficially known as "Federal Barons". They wielded power by virtue of their wealth and political mandates, to the point that they overshadowed all other groups of political decision makers, including the Federal Council.²⁸ Unsurprisingly, they became driving forces engaging the Swiss state in new markets abroad—mainly for the benefit of their own trading houses. The following section will examine the influence of these "Federal Barons" over the decision-making process in Switzerland's foreign relations with Asia.

A Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Japan²⁹

Switzerland's bid for treaty relations with Japan was a cumbersome and costly affair. To understand the rationale of the decision makers involved, three government records between 1860 and 1862 are of particular interest; (1) a protocol of a plenary meeting discussing the desirability of treaty relations with Japan,³⁰ (2) the meeting minutes from a conference of cantonal delegates about the same matter,³¹ and (3) the message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly to propose the ratification of the treaty.³² These three documents are the culmination of a long process that started in 1854 after the news about the United States' forced opening of Japan had reached Switzerland. Watchmakers in La Chaux-de-Fonds were the first to call for a Swiss-Japanese trade agreement.³³ Under the name "Union Horlogère", several of them joined forces to launch a commercial representative mission in 1859. The Union even succeeded in convincing the Federal Council to support the private mission by charging its delegate, Dr. Rudolf Lindau,³⁴ with a mandate to conclude a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship.

However, he was not given the diplomatic title of “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary” but became only the “Delegate of the Federal Department of Commerce and Customs”.³⁵ This turned out to be a major problem as his semi-official position as a merchant and a state representative confused Japanese authorities. To make matters worse, he arrived on 3 September 1859, at a moment when the *Bakufu* (Japan’s pre-Meiji Government) had just made the decision not to grant more treaty relations. Lindau had to leave Japan empty-handed the next year. The outcome was a disappointment to the Union Horlogère and the Federal Council, but the driving forces did not give up. Already on 15 December 1860, Federal Councillor Josef Martin Knüsel (Minister for Commerce and Customs) called for a meeting with “competent” representatives to consider Switzerland’s trade interests in the Orient and the Far East. All of them were members of the Federal Assembly and “distinguished industrialists”, as the protocol of the meeting refers to them. Four of the six were “Federal Barons” under Aufdermauer’s definition,³⁶ whereas the remaining two were only slightly less illustrious; J. R. Raschle, National Councillor and cotton manufacturer from St. Gallen, and Aimé Humbert, a prominent Neuchâtelian State Councillor (and former State Council President) and also no less than the president of the Union Horlogère. He was the most outspoken member at the meeting, arguing that

“Japan is indeed a country that is very rich in valuable products [...]. Meanwhile, many European industrial products are finding a profitable market that already now can be called meaningful, but that will be highly expandable in the future [...]. From this, it can be inferred how important this little-exploited country promises to become for European commerce. [...]. Switzerland must not fail to secure such a tempting opportunity to obtain new and rich sales grounds.”³⁷

Humbert also pointed out that only states with treaty relations were allowed to engage in commerce with Japan. He argued that Switzerland could not rely much longer on other nations like the USA or Great Britain for the legal protection of its merchants, as they had already indicated that their protection would in the future be limited to the interests of their own nationals abroad.³⁸ To what extent this was true can be questioned as Switzerland would continue to receive considerable support over the next two years from the Netherlands and the United States to conclude their treaty. None of the meeting members doubted Humbert’s views. National Councillor Peter Jenny, one of the “Federal Barons”, founder of Blumer, Jenny & Co, seconded Humbert’s opinion more forcefully – even polemically – by holding that “until now the federal authorities have paid too little attention to Swiss trade interests abroad [...] Switzerland’s foreign trade has grown into a power whose existence nobody disputes anymore, and this power is becoming considerable and prestigious everywhere. For Switzerland, this is of great importance in relation to its statehood, and the state only needs to proceed

hand in hand with this industrial power to make sure that the importance and position of Switzerland will be raised and fortified. However, to achieve this, it is absolutely necessary that the Federal Government engages more with these issues and attributes more importance to them. It could do so – even owed it to the trading profession – because the satisfying condition of custom revenues can be attributed by and large to their activities, and because commerce and industry are of great merit to the Swiss population.”³⁹

To stress their point, the Union Horlogère pressured the Federal Council only two weeks later with a letter which included a thinly veiled threat that they would take the matter directly to the Federal Assembly should the executive fail to act quickly – a testimony to the relative weakness of the Federal Council in matters of foreign trade policy.⁴⁰ The strategy was successful. The Federal Council agreed to approach Japan again for treaty relations. Both parliamentary chambers consented in summer 1861, sanctioning a budget of 100,000 Swiss Francs and choosing Humbert as the leader of the mission with the title of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.⁴¹

Humbert was a skillful man. Domestically, he whipped up support for his mission in the industrial cantons, from which the Federal Council had requested financial support.⁴² The budget was large but not enough for sending more than two diplomats. Humbert, therefore, secured additional financing from fellow industrialists for presents and recruited four additional commercial delegates⁴³ who would leave with him on their own budget. Only his second in command, legation Councillor Kaspar Brennwald – another industrialist – was granted diplomatic status.⁴⁴ Humbert also negotiated with the Dutch, who became the protecting power of his embassy and even agreed to let him and his companions travel to Japan on one of their warships.⁴⁵ This was an important detail since Japan at the time had only agreed to treaties with nations who had made use of gunboat diplomacy. This approach was an outcome of Humbert’s experience. Four years earlier he had already tried to secure Lindau’s mission on a French warship, but the French Government rejected the request and Lindau returned empty-handed.⁴⁶ Humbert was without doubt aware of the importance of gunboat appeal.

His legation arrived in Nagasaki on 9 April 1863. Negotiations were again difficult and might have failed a second time had it not been for the support of the US and Dutch Ministers, who intervened on behalf of Humbert. This resulted in a treaty that granted Switzerland the status of most favoured nation, signed on 6 February 1864, in Edo.⁴⁷ The outcome of the Humbert Mission was exactly what the initiators had hoped for – a durable, strategic relationship with a promising Asian nation. The Federal Council described the new relationship with Japan in an explanation to parliament as follows: “[T]his treaty can be said to give more to us than what we must concede. [...] [T]he contracts with Japan that are cur-

rently in effect should be understood much more as introductory steps toward future agreements than as a remaining instrument for the transport of trade [...]. The justified expectations that this treaty conclusion will lead to the opening of new export markets should, however, not be overestimated at the moment. [...] In contrast, it can be expected with certainty that in the future, the ever-evolving civilization in the country will develop trade, which will bear plentiful fruit for our efforts.”⁴⁸

Swiss business was quick to capitalise on the new opportunity. Besides eight Swiss merchants who were already residing in Yokohama at the time,⁴⁹ three of the four commercial delegates who accompanied Humbert immediately started businesses in Japan specializing in the import and export of watches, firearms, printed materials, silk, and garments. The legation councillor, Kaspar Brennwald, went back to Switzerland but returned to Japan, in 1866. There, he founded a trading house, Siber & Brennwald Co., and became Switzerland’s Honorary Consul General. The seat of his company doubled as Switzerland’s main consulate in Japan until 1895. Interestingly enough, the company was so successful that it still exists today under the name DKSH.⁵⁰

Consulates in Manila & Batavia

Already in 1838 (ten years before the creation of the modern Swiss state), there had been deliberations in the Confederate Diet about the creation of a consulate in Batavia.⁵¹ A second attempt was made in 1855 when the Netherlands started to allow foreign consulates on its territories. Preliminary discussions came to an abrupt end, however, when the Dutch made it clear that consuls of non-maritime powers would not be granted substantial diplomatic rights. The Swiss Consul in Amsterdam, Jean T. Liotard, considered that the establishment of a consulate would not be necessary to protect the minor Swiss trade interests in Batavia.⁵² The Federal Council agreed,⁵³ although this position would later change in 1863 when the Netherlands ratified a consular convention as part of a larger commercial treaty.⁵⁴ At the same plenary meeting on 15 December 1860, where Japan had also been discussed, Peter Jenny brought up Southeast Asia, insisting strongly that consulates in Batavia and Manila were a necessity.⁵⁵ However, this matter was met with less urgency than the Japanese affair. It took the Ministry of Commerce and Customs a year to follow up on Jenny’s request and to send letters of inquiry to other interested parties – namely the cantonal governments of Neuchâtel, Waadt, and Geneva, as well as the chambers of commerce of Basel, Zürich, St. Gallen, and Glarus.⁵⁶ After receiving mostly positive responses, and indications from the consul in Madrid that Spain would grant Switzerland con-

sular rights in Manila even without a treaty, Federal Councillor Friedrich Frey-Hérosé, the successor of Josef Knüsel in the Commerce and Customs Department, argued in favour of creating a consulate in Manila: “[T]he desirability of establishing a Swiss consulate in Manila has become palpable, and if the department has not previously made such a request, the reason for that is simply that it was first necessary to obtain information about the local conditions and about a suitable personality to whom the consulate could be entrusted – which has happened now.”⁵⁷

The Federal Council eventually named H. Peter Jenny its consul in Manila. A relative of his namesake, “Federal Baron” Peter Jenny, the younger Jenny served at the time as head of the Manila office of the family business Blumer, Jenny & Co. Besides the nepotism in this case, the choice does not lack irony, as the younger Jenny was the man who had requested the position as consul already in 1851 and was turned down over fears of granting an unfair competitive advantage to one merchant house. Eleven years later, the Federal Council’s hesitation over granting a local merchant a trade monopoly and worries about the inability of Switzerland to exercise gunboat diplomacy had vanished. They were replaced by a strong belief in the potential of Manila as a growth market.

In March 1863, Frey-Hérosé followed up with a next request to his colleagues in the Federal Council to sanction the establishment of a consulate in Batavia as well. He attested that it was the earlier expressed “desire to install a Swiss consular agent in the Royal Dutch Colonies that led to the conclusion of a state treaty with the Dutch Government”.⁵⁸ Although that treaty was not ratified by the Dutch parliament (due to an unrelated dispute), the consular convention that the Swiss were seeking most eagerly, was ratified.⁵⁹ This shows once more the willingness of other colonial powers to assist the Swiss in their quests overseas. Frey-Hérosé further argued for

“[t]he necessity of a consulate in Batavia, taking into account the important commercial interests of the industrialised cantons, whose manufactured goods find an important market in Java [...]. The information [which the Commerce and Customs Department had received from a different chamber of commerce] was congruent with the view of the Financial Directorate and Chamber of Commerce of Zürich, namely that Batavia qualified as one of the more important places for Swiss industry and that the creation of a consulate there would be altogether justified. Following these concordant opinions of the principal institutes entrusted with the promotion of Swiss trade, the department has the honour of proposing to the Federal Council the establishment of a consulate in Batavia.”⁶⁰

Subsequently, the Federal Council agreed and named Conrad Sonderegger, the director of Moorman & Co., Swiss Consul General in Batavia.

Conclusion: Elites, Markets, and Switzerland's Second-Hand Colonialism

On the one hand, the process by which Switzerland's first four consulates in East and Southeast Asia were established is testament to the disproportionate political power of economic elites. Their vested interests in new export markets, in conjunction with their political influence on the federal level, enabled them to shape the diplomatic decisions of the young Swiss state. Private entities such as associations (e. g., the Union Horlogère), cantonal chambers of commerce, and "Federal Barons" were driving forces behind the expansion of Switzerland's consular diplomacy. Naturally, these individuals and institutions also had their limits. Peter Jenny (senior), for example, further proposed additional consulates in Singapore, China, Macassar, and Siam, but failed to convince his colleagues.⁶¹ The Federal Administration would act only when a majority of the elites agreed. When they did, however, their political will translated into state action. These observations confirm a thesis of Cédéric Humair that the "need to respond to the interventionist needs of economic elites accelerates the construction of the centralised state."⁶² As demonstrated in this article, it certainly accelerated the construction of Switzerland's consular diplomacy.

On the other hand, the colonial opportunity structure was crucial. The Swiss could only operate where existing arrangements established by mightier colonial powers allowed for it. To create consulates in Manila and Batavia, it was essential that Spain and the Netherlands agree to give the Swiss the scope of consular powers they sought. Investments in consulates would not have made sense otherwise. Also, the treaty with Japan was only possible with support from other western powers who lent their gunboat appeal to Swiss diplomats. Humbert was only one of many who were aware of this. The Swiss consul in Leipzig, for instance, also argued that "[t]rade treaties with countries like China and Japan are only viable for sea powers, and [the importance of] consulates sinks to zero if the consul does not have behind him some warships and canons to defend lawful rights".⁶³ Since no treaty would help Swiss merchants abroad if the treaty rights were not enforceable, consular jurisdiction was a must-have for trade companies. This usually depended on the willingness of the primary colonial power to extend their enforcement mechanisms.⁶⁴

On a grand-strategic level, this narrative also shows that the inconvenience of not having a merchant fleet did not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of overseas trade. The transport of goods could be organised. The important point was to be allowed to trade in the first place. Market access was the cornerstone of this industrialising, strongly export-oriented economy. Last but not least, this study finds that an external event, the opening of Japan, provided

the main impetus for Switzerland's pursuit to extend its consular network to East and Southeast Asia.

Notes

- 1 Appendix 1 in Michael R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism. The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*, Cambridge 2004.
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- 3 Jean-Charles Biaudet, “Vorwort und Einleitung”, in Jean-Charles Biaudet (ed.), *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland*, Berne 1990, 5; Paul Bairoch, Susan Burke, “European Trade Policy, 1815–1914”, in Peter Mathias, Sidney Pollard (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire*, Cambridge 1989, 3; Joël Floris et al., “Wealthier – Older – Taller. Measuring the Standard of Living in Switzerland since the 19th Century”, *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 69/2 (2019), 207–232.
- 4 Pascal Lottaz, *Neutral States and Wartime Japan. The Diplomacy of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland toward the Empire*, Ph. D. thesis at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo 2018, 147–156, 242–257.
- 5 Matthias Koch (ed.), *Rudolf Lindau. Reise um Japan – Das Land der aufgehenden Sonne im letzten Jahrzehnt der Tokugawa-Zeit (1603–1868)*, Löhne 2010.
- 6 *Proposition du Chef du Département du Commerce et des Péages, F. Frey-Hérosé, au Conseil fédéral*, 21. 6. 1864, Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis), dodis.ch/41506; Lottaz (see note 4), 316–326; Matthias Schnyder, “Das Schweizerische Konsularwesen von 1798 bis 1895”, *Politobis – Zeitschrift zur Aussenpolitik* 36/2 (2004), 46; Claudia Aufdermayer, *Die Bundesbarone und die Neutralität. Der Einfluss der Wirtschaftsvertreter auf die schweizerische Aussenpolitik und Aussenhandelspolitik (1848–1872)*, Ph. D. thesis at the University of Fribourg 2016, 165–181, 216–218.
- 7 Biaudet (see note 3), 4.
- 8 Lottaz (see note 4); Koch (see note 5); Comité du Centenaire, *Nippon-Helvetia, 1864–1964*, Tokyo 1964; Aufdermayer (see note 6), 165–181.
- 9 Zanger (see note 2), 63, 164–165; Schnyder (see note 6) 24, 27.
- 10 See, for example, Jonas Rüegg, “Aimé Humbert. Wertvorstellungen eines Bourgeois und das Japan der Bakumatsu-Zeit”, *Asiatische Studien* 69/1 (2015), 47–71; Marc-Olivier Gonseth et al. (eds.), *Imagine Japan*, Neuchâtel 2015.
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- 12 Markus Kornprobst, “Statecraft, Strategy and Diplomacy”, in Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, Paul Sharp (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, London 2016, 54–65.
- 13 Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: the Challenge for Political Science and History”, *International Security* 22/1 (1997), 44.
- 14 Claude Altermatt, *Les débuts de la diplomatie professionnelle en Suisse. 1848–1914*, Fribourg 1990, 316; Biaudet (see note 3), 4.
- 15 Article 8 of the consular regulations of 1851 in *Schweizerischer Bundesrat*, “Reglement für die Schweizerischen Konsuln”, *Bundesblatt* 1/15 (1851), 295.
- 16 Auszug aus dem Protokoll der 199ten Sitzung des schweizerischen Bundesrates, *Ablehnung des Antrages von Hn Jenny laut Errichtung eines Konsulats in Manilla*, 9. 12. 1851, Swiss Federal Archives (SFA), E2400#1000/717#593*. All quotes in this article were translated by the author.

- 17 Altermatt (see note 14), 11, 5; Schnyder (see note 6), 5–7.
- 18 Paul Akio Nakai, “Die Aufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Japan im Jahre 1864”, in *Nippon-Helvetia* (see note 8), 16; Béatrice Veyrassat, “Aussenwirtschaft”, *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/013776/2006-09-21> (19. 12. 2019); Christof Dejung, Andreas Zangger, “British Wartime Protectionism and Swiss Trading Companies in Asia during the First World War”, *Past & Present* 207/1 (2010), 183; Schnyder (see note 6), 46.
- 19 Ronald Findlay, Kevin H. O’Rourke, *Power and Plenty. Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium*, Princeton 2007, 395–402. See also Bairoch/Burke (see note 3), 45.
- 20 Veyrassat (see note 11), 297, 308.
- 21 Ibid., 307–308.
- 22 François Jequier, “Les relations économiques et commerciales entre la Suisse et le Japon des origines à la Première Guerre mondiale”, in Bairoch/Koerner (see note 11), 474.
- 23 Paul Bairoch, “La Suisse dans le contexte international aux XIX^e et XX^e siècles”, in Bairoch/Koerner (see note 11), 103.
- 24 Cameron Rondo, *A Concise Economic History of the World. From Paleolithic Times to the Present*, Oxford 1993, 250–253.
- 25 Bairoch (see note 23), 103–106; Bairoch/Burke (see note 3), 3.
- 26 Paul Bairoch, “Le volume des exportations de la Suisse de 1851 à 1975”, *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 28/1 (1978), 31.
- 27 Rondo (see note 24), 250.
- 28 Aufdermauer (see note 6), 254–262.
- 29 The following passage has partially appeared in Lottaz (see note 4), 316–326.
- 30 *Protokoll über eine in Bern den 15. December 1860 abgehaltene Versammlung, behufs Berathung der schweizerischen Handelsinteressen im Orient und in Ostasien*, 15. 12. 1860, dodis.ch/41414.
- 31 *Procès-verbal de la Conférence de délégués des cantons industriels réunie le mardi 1^{er} juillet 1862, à Berne, sous la présidence du Chef du Département fédéral du Commerce et des Péages, Monsieur le Conseiller fédéral F. Frey-Hérosé, pour s’occuper des mesures d’exécution de l’expédition suisse au Japon*, 1. 7. 1862, dodis.ch/41455.
- 32 *Message du Conseil Fédéral à l’Assemblée Fédérale*, 27. 6. 1864, dodis.ch/41508.
- 33 Nakai (see note 18), 13–15.
- 34 Koch (see note 5).
- 35 Nakai (see note 18), 17–22.
- 36 Dodis.ch/41414 (see note 30); Aufdermauer (see note 6), 166.
- 37 Dodis.ch/41414 (see note 30).
- 38 Idem.
- 39 Idem.
- 40 Conseil général de l’Union Horlogère’s petition to the Federal Council, 5. 1. 1861, dodis.ch/41417.
- 41 Rüegg (see note 10), 51; Lottaz (see note 4), 325.
- 42 Dodis.ch/41455 (see note 31).
- 43 Nakai (see note 19), 44.
- 44 Dodis.ch/41455 (see note 31).
- 45 Nakai (see note 19), 44.
- 46 Koch (see note 5), 248.
- 47 Nakai (see note 18) 44–63.
- 48 Dodis.ch/41508 (see note 32).
- 49 Stefan Sigerist, “Die frühe Schweizer Gemeinde und die ersten Schweizer Unternehmen in Japan”, in Patrick Ziltener (ed.), *Handbuch Schweiz-Japan. Manuel des relations nippon-suisse. Diplomatie und Politik, Wirtschaft und Geschichte, Wissenschaft und Kultur*, vol. 1, Zürich 2001, 241.

- 50 See Alexis Schwarzenbach's article in this volume.
- 51 Zangger (see note 2), 63.
- 52 Schweizerischer Konsul in Amsterdam, "Consulat à Batavia", 10. 2. 1856, SFA, E2#1000/44#1236a*.
- 53 Schweizerischer Bundesrat, "Auszug aus dem Protokoll der 28. Sitzung des Schweizerischen Bundesrathes", 27. 2. 1856, SFA, E2#1000/44#1236a*.
- 54 *Proposition du Chef du Département du Commerce et des Péages, F. Frey-Hérosé, au Conseil Fédéral*, 19. 5. 1863, dodis.ch/41478.
- 55 Dodis.ch/41414 (see note 30).
- 56 *Proposition du Chef du Département du Commerce et des Péages, F. Frey-Hérosé, au Conseil Fédéral*, 25. 3. 1862, dodis.ch/41447.
- 57 Idem.
- 58 Idem.
- 59 Dodis.ch/41478 (see note 54), note 1.
- 60 Dodis.ch/41478 (see note 54).
- 61 Dodis.ch/41414 (see note 30).
- 62 Cédric Humair, *Développement économique et État central (1815–1914). Un siècle de politique douanière suisse au service des élites*, Bern 2004, 12.
- 63 *Le Consul général de Suisse à Leipzig, G. Hirzel-Lampe, au Chef du Département du Commerce et des Péages, C. Fornerod*, 18. 11. 1858, dodis.ch/41313.
- 64 Zangger (see note 2), 64, 124–125, 435.

Zusammenfassung

Richtung Osten gehen. Die frühe konsularische Diplomatie der Schweiz mit Ost- und Südostasien

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Gründe für die frühen diplomatischen Beziehungen der Schweiz mit Ostasien. Es wird zu beantworten versucht, warum und wie ein kleiner Staat in Europa ohne Zugang zum Meer und ohne koloniale Ambitionen im 19. Jahrhundert ein konsularisches Netzwerk in einer maritimen Region am anderen Ende der Welt aufbaute. Die Fallstudien zur Schweizer Diplomatie in Japan, Manila und Batavia (Jakarta) zeigen auf, dass die Schweizer Entscheidung einer Öffnung nach Osten das Ergebnis besonderer Umstände war: Als entscheidend herausgearbeitet werden die stark exportorientierte Wirtschaft der Schweiz, der Einfluss von Industrieeliten auf die Aussenpolitik und schliesslich die Nutzung bestehender Kolonialstrukturen.

(Übersetzung: Ariane Knüsel)